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It is a generally accepted view in the literature on civil-military relations and military 
sociology that the military is a ‘Janus-faced’ organisation. One of its faces has to watch the 
strategic requirements and the other face looks at its parent society. The Janus-face analogy 
indicates that the strategic and societal views are intrinsically antithetical. The notion of the 
antithetical relationship between liberal ideology and military security was established as 
early as the 1950s in Samuel Huntington’s seminal book The Soldier and the State. This 
thesis is conceived as a critical debate with Huntington, challenging, in particular, the notion 
that societal and functional imperatives are inevitably distinct and antithetical. 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse in what ways liberalism – as a meta-ideology or a 
guiding ethos – determines the military capacities of West European societies. The empirical 
analysis has been carried out on the cases of the German Bundeswehr (from the 1950s 
onwards) and the British armed forces (from the beginning of the 20
th
 Century onwards). 
Despite the enormous divergence these two cases represent, a similar pattern of behaviour is 
recognisable in them. This examination reveals that specific policies, institutions and 
practices are preferred because of their relation to liberal principles. Sometimes liberal norms 
are used merely to advocate an otherwise necessary policy, such as universal conscription at 
the time of emergency. Regarding other issues, such as the right to conscientious objection, 
liberal principles are the most relevant causal factor. Among the issues affected by liberal 
ideology are also the varieties of military mission, military ethics and professional identity of 
soldiers. 
The case studies examined in this thesis demonstrate that a meaningful adaptation of 
the military to the principles possessed by its parent society can be, more often than not, 
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During the autumn of 2013 I spent over two months at the University of the German 
Armed Forces in Hamburg. The university is a world-wide unique institution where the 
process of socialisation of young officers into the military is confronted with their thorough 
academic education in non-military subjects. According to the official mission statement of 
the university, a completion of a degree at the university is supposed to increase the 
attractiveness of the profession, to sharpen the profile of the graduates and to improve their 
future prospects. Yet, this should not conceal the fact that the university is a place of tension 
between two antithetical tendencies: between the orderly and uniformed life of a military 
professional and the intellectually free world of liberal civilian academia. 
In October, I was given the opportunity to observe the matriculation ceremony in 
which young ensigns were ushered into the new role of students. Lieutenant-General Bruno 
Kasdorf, the most senior Army officer, was invited to give an address to the audience of 
about 500 students in military uniform. In his speech General Karsdorf in a rather enlightened 
way emphasised the importance of non-military expertise in current military operations and 
the need for intellectually and humanly mature officers. However, he also urged the audience 
that although as university students they are allowed to wear civilian clothes, they should 
never strip off their ‘inner uniform’ and forget about their being soldiers. That was the last 
straw for my hosts, academics from the historical institute of the university. To them, already 
the fact that the students were ushered into the university by a military man was a serious 
issue, but the appeal to keep the ‘inner uniform’ was perceived as a direct assault on their 
academic efforts. It is exactly the intellectual emancipation from the mental uniform that they 
considered a prerequisite for an effective academic education. 
The case of General Karsdorf’s matriculation address, however passionately felt about 
by my friends, is certainly not a serious issue. Yet it may illustrate the tension that exists 
between the military and liberal society, here represented by its probably most extreme agent: 
academia. In this rather benign case, it was the liberal academics who perceived the military 
culture at odds with their ideals of intellectual life. However, in this conflict the military is 
not always on the offensive and liberal society in defence. Nowadays, more often than not it 
is the other way around. Military culture and institutions get under pressure to conform to the 
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features of liberal society. Yet, the end of the military ethical and institutional autonomy is 
often argued to have serious consequences for the business of military effectiveness.  
On this point Bernard Boëne posits: 
The soldier is the one who, when ordered to do so, will if need be take to impersonally 
killing or maiming designated human beings, destroying property and suppressing freedoms, 
all in the name of a legitimate or even sacred duty which he cannot possibly evade. This, 
literally, does not stand to reason, and implies a peculiar socialization, hence distinctive 




In this quotation Boëne assumes that being a soldier necessarily implies the transgression of 
norms that are central not only to liberal society. While the peaceful internal life of an 
organised society requires that killing and the use of excessive violence be prohibited not 
only by the law but also by the most fundamental ethical norms, the state still needs to 
legitimise the use of violence under certain circumstances. Therefore, it is imperative for the 
security of the state to create a separate organisation within state and society that is permitted 
to use deadly force. As Jan Angstrom argues, creating and maintaining a distinction between 
civil and military is crucial for the existence of the state: ‘If we did not have “civil” and 
“military”, the elites would not be able to uphold the distinction between war and peace.’
2
 
The military culture and ethic thus may be quite plausibly argued to be necessarily distinct 
from that of society. 
It is a generally accepted view in the literature on civil-military relations and military 
sociology that the military is a ‘Janus-faced’ organisation.
3
 One of its faces has to watch the 
strategic requirements and the viewpoint of this face is commonly used to lend support to the 
claim for the need of a distinct military culture and ethics. Yet, the other face has to look at 
its parent society and be responsive to its normative requirements. After all, modern military 
organisations can do little without support from society. Thus accepting the Janus-face 
analogy for the time being, the armed forces have to adopt some of the societal requirements 
                                                 
1
 Bernard Boëne, "How 'Unique' Should the Military Be? A Review of Representative Literature and Outline of 
a Synthetic Formulation," European Journal of Sociology, 31, no. 1 (1990): 8. 
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 Jan Angstrom, "The Changing Norms of Civil and Military and Civil-Military Relations Theory," Small Wars 
& Insurgencies, 24, no. 2 (2013): 226-27. 
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 Christopher Dandeker, "New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks on the Changing Role and 
Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies," The British Journal of Sociology, 45, no. 4 
(1994): 639; Jean Callaghan et al., "Armed Forces and Society in Europe - the Challenge of Change," in 
Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis, ed. Jürgen Kuhlmann and Jean 
Callaghan (Hamburg: Lit, 2000), 6. 
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in order to survive within society, but simultaneously this normative convergence towards 
society may undermine the very function of the military organisation. 
The Janus-face analogy indicates that the strategic and societal views are intrinsically 
antithetical. After all, it would contradict the physiognomy of the double-headed god if the 
societal and strategic views were to overlap. The notion of an antithetical relationship 
between liberal ideology and military security was established as early as the 1950s in 
Samuel Huntington’s seminal book The Soldier and the State. This thesis is conceived as a 
critical debate with Huntington. However, it is not going to adopt the contrary relationship 
between functional and societal requirements as its supposition. The aim of this thesis is to 
examine the relationship between the normative values of Western European societies and 
their defence policies and military organisations (here called societal-military relations) in an 
open-ended way. Assuming from the beginning that the impact of the societal imperatives – 
hostile to the military though these might be, as manifested in the academic reaction to the 
matriculation address – always tends to emasculate the functional effectiveness of the 
military would automatically discard the thesis of Jean Jaurès, a pre-1914 French socialist-
internationalist: 
France ought to develop her military organization on the lines of her national characteristics, 
in harmony with the ideal law of an all-embracing democracy devoted to the cause of 
peace.... It would be fatal to the national genius and to the independence of France if she 
were — as regards military organization — merely a feeble imitation of Germany: the first 
essential step towards attaining her national ideals without war is to set her national genius 




Jaurès here suggested that even a fundamentally peaceful society can organise itself for the 
purpose of defence in accordance with its societal principles. Moreover, by doing that the 
society would be better prepared for war than if it allowed for a normatively insulated war-
oriented military organisation. Accordingly, the liberal political and ethical thinking, as will 
be demonstrated later on, produced a range of propositions concerning the legitimate use and 
organisation of military force. It is the applicability and practical relevancy of such 
ideological propositions which this thesis is designed to examine. 
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 Jean Jaurès, Democracy & Military Service. An Abbreviated Translation of the Armée Nouvelle of Jean Jaurès, 
ed. C.G. Coulton (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., 1916), 20. 
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Central Research Question 
The central research question of this thesis reads: In what ways does the liberal 
ideology of Western European societies determine their military capacities? As mentioned 
above, this thesis attempts to go beyond the assumption that societal and strategic imperatives 
are inevitably distinct and antithetical. Yet it is not assumed, either, that fusionism – an 
effective blurring of all distinctions between the military and civil spheres
5
 – would be a 
necessary result of a perfect impact of liberalism on defence policy. One may conceive of a 
military organisation shaped completely by liberal norms concerning the organisation of 
armed forces, yet to a certain extent distinct from the rest of society. For example, the liberal 
concept of nation-in-arms rests on compulsion, suspension of individual rights and freedom, 
and the ultimate sacrifice; yet, simultaneously, the military forms, ethos and leadership 
practices have to be refashioned along liberal principles. 
Moreover, although the antipathy between societal and strategic imperatives is not 
considered a supposition here, it does not mean that this hypothesis is rejected outright. On 
the contrary, it is obvious that the armed forces in Western Europe can rarely stand for an 
ideal version of liberal military organisation. Even the West German armed forces, the 
Bundeswehr, which were established by liberal society and strongly influenced by liberal 
norms, manifested a significant tendency to develop an illiberal martial ethos. Therefore, it 
must be assumed that other factors, including the strategic one, might contradict and provide 
resistance to the liberal propositions. After all, it has become commonplace in the literature 
on civil-military relations and military sociology to assume that it was the disappearance of 
the Soviet threat after the end of the Cold War that allowed social values to expand into the 
armed forces.
6
 The question as to under what conditions liberal precepts determine the 
military organisation is thus an essential part of the thesis’s research puzzle. 
Closely related to this question is the issue of political processes through which 
general and broad ideological principles are translated into rules and institutions. Defence-
policy formulation is a field where various factors might be expected to present contradictory 
demands. The external security environment may require overriding ideologically based 
                                                 
5
 Boëne, "How 'Unique' Should the Military Be," 3-4; Peter D Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," Annual 
Review of Political Science, 2, no. 1 (1999): 219-20. 
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 See e.g. Charles C. Moskos et al., "Armed Forces after the Cold War," in The Postmodern Military: Armed 
Forces after the Cold War, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 2. 
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principles and, conversely, domestic ideological imperatives may demand a reshaping of the 
external security environment or at least the state’s position in it. This is the central issue in 
the constructivist contribution to the structure/agency debate that will be presented in the 
following chapter and then form the theoretical backbone of this thesis.  
Yet it is not only the conflict between external/strategic and internal/ideological 
imperatives that is under scrutiny here. The military is usually a culturally and ethically 
distinct community of people. It can be expected, therefore, that the norms of wider society 
would face an organised resistance if extended onto a conservative military community. The 
conservative/traditionalist forces thus may represent another factor which is contradictory to 
liberal ideological imperatives. Hence it is important to the research project to trace the 
processes through which broad ideological principles are translated into rules and institutions, 
such as major military reforms and their implementations, and the agents that have the power 
to promote liberal policies, e.g. the minister of defence or the constitutional court. 
Last but certainly not least, it is of primary interest to this research to find out which 
aspects of the military organisation, such as form of recruitment, hierarchy, obedience or 
code of conduct, may become affected by liberal principles and which would remain beyond 
the reach of ideological imperatives imposed by society. In this regard, to ascertain the 
relationships between general ideological principles and specific institutions related to 
military capacities is instrumental in answering the central research question. 
Military Capacities 
The central research question asks about the relationship between two concepts: 
liberal ideology and military capacities. It is the aim of this and the following section to 
explicate these terms. In comparison with the term ‘military organisation’ frequently used in 
military sociology,
7
 The concept of military capacities is used here to cover both the policy of 
the use of military power and its organisation. It is important to consider these two aspects as 
closely interrelated, or even as a whole. The military organisation cannot be formed 
independently from its role in the foreign and security policy of the state and, conversely, in 
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 See Maury D. Feld, "A Typology of Military Organization," Public Policy, 8(1958); Charles C. Moskos, 
"Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States," in The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the 




the foreign and security policy only such instruments can be utilised that actually exist. A 
system in which these two parts were dissociated cannot persist for very long.  
For analytical purposes, the concept of military capacities is divided into three 
constitutive elements: the mission, the make-up, and the institutional culture of the armed 
forces. As for the mission, the existence of the armed forces should be legitimised by their 
role in the state’s foreign and security policy and the concept of mission reflects this role. On 
the one hand, the mission can be formulated quite broadly, for example if the armed forces 
are considered as a convenient instrument at the disposal of government for pursuing real-
political interests. The gunboat diplomacy frequently witnessed in the 19
th
 Century may be 
one example of such a rather unscrupulous use of military force in the arena of international 
politics. However, a similarly limitless use of the military may also be experienced in 
domestic politics if the government uses troops to enforce its policies. On the other hand, the 
mission of the military can be defined very specifically, such as for national defence against 
external aggression. That was the case of the German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, during 
the Cold War. The German constitution stipulated very explicitly that the purpose of the 
Bundeswehr was the territorial defence of West Germany, while aggressive military 
operations were criminalised and until the late 1960s troops were forbidden to be deployed to 
suppress an internal insurgency either.  
The mission has to reflect the international security environment. Therefore, it is this 
part of the military capacities in which articulations of the external strategic factors play a 
crucial role. Yet, it might be expected that liberal political and ethical principles exercise 
quite a strong impact on the mission. The principles of just war, jus ad bellum in particular, 
should be the minimal restriction on the use of force by every liberal society. Moreover, some 




The concept of the make-up of the armed forces stands for the outer forms of military 
organisation, such as the personnel structure along with military assets and capabilities. 
Specifically, the question of conscription and voluntary recruitment has a prominent position 
in the examination of this category. The process of recruitment establishes a direct connection 
between the military and the rest of society. Therefore, the mode of recruitment is crucial for 
the character and quality of the societal-military relations. Conscription, on the one hand, can 
                                                 
8
 Harald Müller, "The Antinomy of Democratic Peace," International Politics, 41, no. 4 (2004): 494-520. 
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be easily perceived as too intrusive into the private lives of citizens and violating their 
individual freedoms; on the other hand, it might be necessary to generate sufficient 
manpower for defence of the state and society and, moreover, it keeps the armed forces under 
close scrutiny of their parent society. In contrast, voluntary recruitment may allow for 
thorough development of professional skills among those who freely choose the military 
career path, but a process of professionalization may at worst alienate, or at least distance, the 
military from the rest of society.  
The make-up of the armed forces should correspond with the mission and thus reflect 
the strategic needs. Yet, out of the parts constituting the military capacities, it is the make-up 
that is placed under greatest control of domestic political decision making. Of course, the 
exclusive military expertise may significantly influence the political deliberation. For 
example, the insistence of the Prussian General Staff in the early 1860s on three-year 
compulsory service engendered a constitutional crisis. It is, nonetheless, the full 
responsibility of the political elites to create or reform the organisational structure of the 
armed forces in such a way that society would perceive acceptable, appropriate and 
legitimate. 
The concept of institutional culture relates to a normative and value system that is 
embodied in the military organisation and reproduced through military training, regulations, 
everyday practice and traditions.
9
 As depicted at the beginning of this introduction, every 
military organisation tends to develop an institutional culture that is to a certain extent 
distinct from the value system of the rest of society. However, this tendency may vary in 
intensity. The armed forces may, on the one hand, create a segregated community, or caste, of 
warriors whose ethos would be completely dissociated from the moral code of their parent 
society. On the other hand, the métier or profession of soldiering may effectively 
approximate a job in other public services, such as the police, fire or ambulance brigades, or 
even in the private sector.
10
  
This thesis will distinguish, and focus on, two aspects of military institutional culture. 
The first one deals with the ethos that is supposed to motivate soldiers to do their duties, 
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 Theo Farrell, "The Dynamics of British Military Transformation," International Affairs, 84, no. 4 (2008): 783; 
see also Theo Farrell, The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2005). 
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1 (1977): 2-9. 
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including the ultimate sacrifice. This ethos may, on the one hand, emphasise the loyalty to 
one’s superiors, to the armed forces as a whole or to ‘king and country’. On the other hand, 
the military ethos may appeal to the individual moral commitment to a specific mission, such 
as to defeat an unjust enemy or to help other people out of misery. Professional identity is the 
second aspect of institutional culture. The professional identity may be, for instance, 
determined by the fact that warfighting and physical combat completely dominate the 
training, preparation for and actual practice in the deployment, or, in contrast, the use of 
violence may be considered just a minor item in a larger job description. 
It seems apparent that the institutional culture depends on the mission of the military. 
If, for example, the armed forces are supposed to be a real-political instrument at the disposal 
of the government, their ethos can hardly support the development of the individual moral 
commitment to the cause of deployment. Similarly, the warfighting professional identity is a 
logical outcome if the military is engaged in a conventional war. Moreover, the intensity 
and/or quality of the institutional culture are bound to be affected by the make-up of the 
armed forces. A force consisting of short-term conscripts would probably be prevented from 
developing into a segregated caste and the emphasis on physical combat might be weakened 
by the utilisation of advanced technology.  
Yet, besides the dependence on the other elements of the concept of military capacity, 
the institutional culture can also be shaped directly by various agents of society. The 
government, for example, may provide an institutional setting – e.g. legislation allowing for 
refusal to obey orders on the ground of conscience or lifting of all barriers on military service 
of women – that would steer the institutional culture in a specific direction. The courts may 
enforce that the individual rights and freedoms are not curtailed by the peculiarities of the 
institutional culture. In addition, civil society may influence the soldier’s mind through 
personal interactions on an everyday basis. After all, the fear that the mass armies of the 19
th
 
Century could be corrupted by civilian influence was a major reason why the soldiers were 
kept isolated within barracks at all times. However, any attempt to bring about a significant 
reform of the culture is bound to be an uphill struggle, since the culture is engrained in the 
minds of those who would be asked to carry out the changes. Moreover, in some cases the 
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socialisation and assimilation processes within the military have the potential to displace the 





Figure 1 The concept of military capacities 
 
In the above description of the military capacities the relationship between the 
constitutive elements is portrayed to follow an instrumental logic: the mission represents 
objectives and, therefore, determines both the make-up and the institutional culture. 
Moreover, the culture is also claimed to depend on the personnel structure and/or military 
capabilities, i.e. the make-up of the armed forces. Since liberalism is not an ideology 
favouring the conservation of traditional military features, the logic described here should be 
applicable to the military capacities in liberal societies too. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that 
in cases where the military dominates domestic politics it is the institutional culture that, in 
the long-term, can determine both the mission and the make-up of the armed forces. That 
should not be the case of Western European liberal states with which this thesis is concerned. 
However, it is by no means unlikely that particular features of the military make-up become 
so rooted that, in order to keep these institutions, politicians would tend to preserve an 
outdated mission. It is a commonplace observation about Germany in the 1990s and 2000s 
that the dependence of German public services on alternative civilian service (Zivildienst) 
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was a significant constraint in the process of military transformation.
12
 The Bundeswehr, well 
after the end of the Cold War, remained recruited, structured and trained in ways that made 
its engagement in ‘out of area’ operations problematic. 
Liberal Ideology 
This thesis understands liberalism as a specific kind of ideology or a guiding ethos. 
This understanding is based on the work of Anthony Arblaster and Richard Bellamy. Both 
Arblaster’s The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism
13
 and Bellamy’s Liberalism in 
Modern Society
14
 present a strong critique of the contemporary liberal socio-economic 
system. Unlike most of the present-day critics of liberalism, however, they are not concerned 
merely with the neoliberal ideology; they try to point out problems that are inherent to the 
entire tradition of Western liberalism. 
Arblaster and Bellamy reflect that liberalism in contemporary western societies is no 
longer represented by any political movement or party. It need not. Its major aims have 
already been attained, particularly certain forms of political freedom and tolerance and lawful 
rather than arbitrary government were achieved, and hence liberalism now exists only as a 
‘widely diffused ethos’ that is, as Arblaster maintains, ‘influential in determining attitudes 
and outlook at the most fundamental level, the level of assumptions’.
15
 In Bellamy’s words, 
present-day liberalism is a meta-ideology – a ‘set of presuppositions and sentiments of a 
supposedly neutral and universal kind which dominates political thinking across the 
ideological spectrum’. Hence Bellamy can state: ‘it seems we are all liberals now’.
16
 
Arblaster reflects in his book the revival of classical laissez-faire liberalism as a 
response to the economic crisis in the mid-1970s. He interprets this ideological 
transformation as merely a replacement of one liberal alternative with another: 
The revised social-democratic version of liberalism, which is suited to capitalism in its 
periods of growth and stability, yields place to a more oldfashioned, nineteenth-century 
version of the creed at moments of crisis. At those moments, a robust defence of the old 
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liberal values of property, initiative and ‘free enterprise’ is what capitalism requires; and the 




Irrespective of whether Keynesian or monetarist, social-democrat or liberal-
conservative, all main political movements in the West have adopted basic liberal 
assumptions. One of the most fundamental assumptions is concerned with the individual. 
‘Built into the everyday uses of the term “the individual” are certain assumptions about the 
naturalness and rightness of human diversity, and the desirability of allowing deviance and 
eccentricity to flourish.’
18
 Arblaster stresses that, despite the fact that such individualism is an 
almost exclusively Western and comparatively recent historical concept,
19
 these assumptions 
are regarded as so commonplace in the West that ‘they lurk concealed and undiscussed 
beneath the surface of our ordinary, apparently non-ideological language’.
20
  
Both Arblaster and Bellamy show that present-day liberalism cannot be expected to 
provide specific, direct guidelines for actions. After all, such direct rules would always tend 
to be contested. Liberalism has moved beyond that. According to the conceptualisation of 
norm strength postulated by Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein,
21
 liberal principles could be 
described as ‘common wisdom’ which constrains behaviour without being realised. As 
Arblaster notes, liberalism in its contemporary form ‘is a way of seeing the social world, and 
a set of assumptions about it, which are absorbed by the individual in so natural and gradual a 
manner that he or she is not conscious of their being assumptions at all’.
22
 
This concept of liberal meta-ideology determines the methodological approach used 
in this thesis. Since the ideological assumption may ‘lurk concealed and undiscussed beneath 
the surface’,
23
 historical hindsight is required to understand liberal beliefs shared and 
maintained by contemporary Western societies. Historical examination of liberal political and 
ethical thinking thus will be used to identify and articulate the principles that are expected to 
affect the military capacities in the past and present alike. Bellamy advocates such a 
methodological approach on the ground that current liberal societies perpetuate the 
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 Moreover, Arblaster proposes that certain normative common threads run through 
the history of liberalism. In accordance with this view, it is assumed here that the common 
threads identified in the examination of 19
th
 Century liberal political thinking, for example, 
continue to shape world-views and other political ideas in contemporary societies. 
Thesis Structure and Case Selection 
The thesis objectives and argument are developed progressively. The first substantive 
chapter contains a literature review, a critical analysis of Samuel Huntington’s theory of civil-
military relations and a section on methodological issues related to the examination of norms 
and ideologies. Huntington dealt with the relationship between liberal ideology and the 
military as early as the 1950s and produced a theory which, though heavily criticized, 
influences the field of civil-military relations down to present times. The critical analysis of 
his theory thus attempts to identify flaws in his theory and, by applying constructivist theory 
of international politics, establishes an alternative theoretical foundation for the thesis 
argument. Huntington’s conceptual framework remains a reference point throughout the 
entire thesis. 
The second chapter deals with the liberal principles concerning the military and the 





is analysed in order to uncover the most relevant common threads in the philosophical 
tradition. It is assumed that these common threads represent the most fundamental principles 
in Western European liberalism until present times. The chapter is divided into three main 
sections, each dealing with a different level of analysis. In the first section the ideas 
concerning humankind on a supranational level are examined. The second section is 
concerned with political thinking about the position of the military institutions within the 
state. The last section deals with the ethical issues concerning the conflict between the rights 
and freedoms of the individual and military service. These three categories then continue in 
the following chapters to frame the liberal principles duly identified. 
The empirical part of the thesis consists of three case studies. Chapter Three focuses 
on the case of West German rearmament during the Cold War. The foundation of the West 
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German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, presents a unique case of a military created by a 
liberal society. The fact that the Bundeswehr was created in the mid-1950s in a situation 
when the basic political institutions had already been established allowed for the maximum 
amount of societal influence in the design of the armed forces. Admittedly, the West 
Germany of the 1950s can hardly be described as a liberal society in the sense of deeply 
embedded meta-ideology as defined above. However, the cultural and ideological rupture that 
followed the defeat in the Second World War, the process of re-education conducted by the 
Western allies and the division of Germany into two states significantly facilitated the 
adoption of liberalism in the Federal Republic. Moreover, the social and political elites that 
were decisive in the process of rearmament pursued the aim more or less consciously of 
liberalising West German society.
25
 The rearmament of West Germany is hence assumed to 
present a case in which the liberal imperatives probably faced the weakest possible resistance 
on the domestic level.  
The fourth chapter is concerned with the transformation of German military capacities 
after the end of the Cold War. The liberal principles should be understood as providing a kind 
of guidance for political decision-making, which, nevertheless, has to reflect the conditions of 
the day. Specific liberal norms, rules and institutions should always be viewed in relation to 
the prevailing security environment. Therefore, even if West German military capacities had 
completely followed the liberal principles during the Cold War, the radical change of the 
international security environment wrought in the early 1990s had to render the original 
military capacities obsolete and inappropriate. This chapter hence observes the process of 
transformation of the Bundeswehr from a Cold War defensive force to an expeditionary one. 
What is examined is the extent to which this transformation has been guided by liberal 
principles. 
The British military policies and institutions are the topic of the last case study. 
Through the conceptual framework of military capacities the development of the UK armed 
forces throughout the 20
th
 Century until the present is analysed. Such a long historical period 
is necessary in order to examine such temporally distant issues as the debates on the merit of 
national service that started before the First World War, the programme of citizenship 
education during the Second World War, and the early 21
st
 Century counterinsurgency 
operation in Afghanistan. 
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Finally, the conclusion provides an opportunity for comparison of the findings from 
each case study so as to develop a generalisable understanding of the impact of liberal 
ideology on defence policies and on military institutions. This reasoning also informed the 
selection of individual cases. Apart from the fact that West German rearmament presents a 
unique case of the creation of armed forces almost on a fresh blank canvas, Germany and the 
United Kingdom also represent two opposite extremes with regard to their strategic culture. 
The two charts below may illustrate the fact that the public views on strategic issues in these 
two countries could not be more diverse, as far as European liberal societies are concerned.  
 
Figure 2 Scatter plot displaying agreement with the statements:  
x) ‘war may be necessary to enforce justice’; y) ‘the armed forces should be deployed to secure 
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Figure 3 Scatter plot displaying agreement with the statements:  
x) ‘my country should exrcise strong influence in international politics’; y) ‘my country should 




Germany is commonly described as a ‘civilian power’, a particular foreign-policy 
identity ‘which promoted multilateralism, institution-building and supranational integration 
and tried to constrain the use of force in international relations through national and 
international norms.’
28
 Such an identity is an obvious legacy of the Second World War – a 
legacy which is present in the German political discourse in the set of ‘never again’ 
principles: ‘never again war’, ‘never again Auschwitz’, and ‘never again alone’. The 
historical experience thus guides Germany to take its share of responsibility for global 
problems, but simultaneously to accentuate the restraint on the use of force. 
In contrast, the United Kingdom has traditionally few qualms about using her armed 
forces as an instrument of foreign policy. The Blair government thus proclaimed the armed 
forces to be ‘a vital part of our armoury in helping to enforce the rule of law in an unstable 
world’.
29
 This militant liberalism certainly owes a great deal to the legacy of empire, for it 
was the imperial commitment that kept the British Army deployed throughout most of the 
20
th
 Century. It is telling, in this regard, that there was only one year in the 20
th
 Century – 
1968 – when no British soldier was killed in action. Moreover, its homeland’s insular 
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position provided Great Britain with rather unique strategic conditions. The United Kingdom 
thus differs considerably from Germany, in terms of strategic culture and defence policies. 
Yet, it is important to emphasise that the aim of this thesis is not to explain the difference in 
the German and British strategic cultures; rather, observing similar processes and features 
gives us the opportunity to explore the effects of liberal ideology on the military capacities in 






Liberal Organisation of the Military – Literature 
Review, Theory, and Methodology 
The relationship between societal ideology and defence policy has not gone 
unattended by scholars. This chapter is designed to review the literature that has explored the 
issues of domestic imperatives and ideology, on the one hand, and military capacities on the 
other. The literature under consideration here ranges from the liberal peace theory, through 
military sociology to strategic studies. Nonetheless, the main part of this chapter focuses on a 
single book – Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. Huntington’s theory of civil-
military relations postulates a strong argument about the role of liberalism in military policy 
and in the organisation of armed forces. Huntington’s seminal book is here subjected to an 
extensive critique based on a constructivist-ontological perspective and upon this 
constructivist critique a theoretical foundation for the thesis argument is subsequently 
established. The last section of this chapter is designed to discuss the methodological 
challenges that the examination of norms and ideologies poses. 
Literature Review  
Liberal peace and liberal wars 
 For anyone seeking a link between the ideological structure of liberal societies and 
their use of military force, the liberal peace theory remains an obvious reference point. The 
theory elaborates very strong claims about the military behaviour of liberal-democratic states 
and, furthermore, it is one of the most solidly established theories in international relations. 
Its solidity is based on a large number of statistical studies which provide robust empirical 
evidence that modern democratic states have never or very rarely fought one another. 
18 
 
According to its major proponents,
1
 the liberal peace theory is based on several strains 
of assumptions. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett argue that lasting peaceful relations between 
liberal-democratic states rest upon, first, structural and institutional constraints within 
democratic political systems (structural assumptions) and, second, externalisation of domestic 
liberal-democratic norms and political culture (normative assumptions).
2
 Michael W. Doyle, 
who has built his liberal peace theory directly on Kant’s essay Towards Perpetual Peace 
written in 1795, adds a third strain of explanation – transnational interdependence.
3
 
From the viewpoint of this thesis what is particularly relevant here is the normative 
strain of the theory. Interestingly enough, statistical tests conducted by Maoz and Russett 
suggest that in comparison with the structural assumptions, the explanatory power of the 
normative assumptions is more robust and thus the normative factors present a better overall 
account of liberal peace.
4
 The normative assumptions deal with the externalisation of liberal 
principles as well as domestic democratic procedures. Regarding the former, norms of 
equality, human dignity and self-determination and a ‘live-and-let-live’ notion, which are 
attributes of liberal societies, are said to be projected onto other recognised liberal-democratic 
societies. As for the latter, a regulated political competition, compromise and the peaceful 




These restraints do not, however, apply to non-democratic states. Rulers of non-
democratic states are claimed to control their subjects by authoritarian and forceful means 
and not to respect their own people’s right to self-determination. They are not, therefore, 
expected to behave better towards people outside their states.
6
 Doyle emphasises that these 
normative principles differentiate policy towards liberal and non-liberal states, ‘requiring 
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The liberal peace theorists thus stress that liberal democracy creates not only friends 
but also enemies by inferring either peaceful or aggressive motives from the domestic 
normative structures of their counterparts and imputing those motives to the respective brands 
of government.
8
 Liberal states are believed to establish a zone of peace, or ‘pacific union’, 
among themselves, whereas, as Doyle or Thomas Risse-Kappen postulate, outside the 
‘pacific union’ of liberal states anarchy with a latent state of war, as realists describe it, 
exists.
9
 However, this explanation, as Harald Müller points out, neglects the fact that liberal 
states tend to fight wars that no one else would. It is unique to liberal societies that their wars 
are waged to preserve international law and to prevent human disasters and large-scale 
violations of human rights.
10
 Therefore, it is not only the extraordinary absence of wars 
between liberal-democratic states, but also the actual use of force that needs to be explained 
by domestic factors. 
In this respect, Bruce Buchan explains that one of the core principles of liberalism 
demands that the use of violence should be mitigated both at the level of individual citizens 
and at the state level. A tension within liberalism thus exists between keeping peace within 
society by empowering the state and containing state violence by constraining the state. One 
result of this tension is said to be a highly selective conception of ‘pacification’ within 
liberalism, which has legitimised the use of military force for such objectives as the imperial 
expansion seen in the past and the disciplining of so called ‘rogue’ states in the present.
11
  
Moreover, Müller remarks that there have been huge differences in the use of military 
force by liberal states. Liberal philosophical tradition allows, he argues, for two competing 
ways of behaviour (antinomies) towards non-liberal states. On the one hand, ‘militant 
democracies’ regard non-liberal states as potential enemies and hence frequently fight wars to 
change their regime (‘democratic wars’); on the other hand, ‘pacifist democracies’ believe in 
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a modus vivendi with autocracies and attempt to engage them in a peaceful process of 
democratisation.
12
 Elsewhere Müller, in collaboration with Jonas Wolff,
13
 describes the 
German engagement in the war in Afghanistan as a straightforward example of the liberal 
peace antinomies. On the one hand, the war in Afghanistan may be seen as a clear example of 
a ‘democratic war’; on the other hand, Germany’s military engagement in the war is assessed 
as half-hearted and inconsistent. Müller and Wolff argue that the peculiar way of Germany’s 
engagement may be explained by the fact that Germany’s political culture remains that of a 
‘civilian power’ and thus close to the ideal type of ‘pacific democracy’. The half-heartedness 
is thus claimed to be a consequence of a serious attempt to reconcile the demands of the 
domestic political culture in which German politicians have been socialized on the one hand, 
and the external requirements of solidarity with allies on the other.
14
 
To sum up, the literature on liberal peace shows a strong and long-lasting interest in 
the relationship between the normative principles of liberal societies and the use of military 
force. However, to earlier proponents of the theory, such as Doyle, the effect of normative 
factors is more or less confined to the relations between liberal-democratic states. The 
relations outside the ‘pacific union’ are left to the realist logic of an anarchical international 
structure. Only recently liberal peace theorists also became concerned with the character of 
wars that liberal democracies tend to wage. Works by Buchan and Müller demonstrate that 
liberal ideology plays an important role in determining with what mission liberal democracies 
task their armed forces. Yet, the question of military mission is exactly where the relevance 
of liberal peace theory for this thesis ends. In the next part of this literature review we will 
turn to the issue of military organisation. 
Formation of military organisation 
The debate about the role of international anarchy, on the one hand, and cultural and 
ideational factors, on the other, is even more intense in the literature concerned with change 
in military organization. Since the military may be defined as an expression of state power on 
the international stage, it is more than any other state organisation susceptible for 
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international comparison – either the easy way by learning from the experience of others or 
the hard way on the battlefield. Neorealist theory therefore offers a strong argument 
concerning the emulation of military doctrines, capabilities and organisations. As Kenneth 
Waltz posits:  
The possibility that conflict will be conducted by force leads to competition in the arts and 
the instruments of force. Competition produces a tendency toward the sameness of the 
competitors... Contending states imitate the military innovations contrived by the country of 
greatest capability and ingenuity. And so the weapons of major contenders, and even their 




The neorealist argument has been recently elaborated by João Resende-Santos. Focusing on 
the attempts by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to imitate German army organisation in the late 
19th and early 20th Centuries, Resende-Santos tries to demonstrate that the external security 
environment, and not the peculiarities of the national culture, history or tradition of the 




The neorealist structural argument has its constructivist/culturalist counterpart.
17
 In 
contrast with the neorealist theory, the constructivist approach emphasises that particular 
institutional and organisational forms are adopted because they are perceived to be legitimate 
or symbols of modernity rather than being a purely rational response to external challenges. 
Not so much rational strategic assessment but rather ‘global military culture’, Alexander 
Wendt and Michael Barnett argue,
18
 shapes military institutions around the world and leads to 
‘isomorphism’, or military emulation. Wendt and Barnett point out that Western norms of 
modernity in general and in regard to the ‘modern’ army in particular are perceived as an 
important symbol of the modern state and therefore pursued in an imitative fashion by elites 
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in the non-Western Third World too. The military emulation in Argentina, Brazil and Chile in 
the late 19th Century, as examined by Resende-Santos, hence could be such a case of 
response to ‘global military culture’, rather than to the external security environment. Theo 
Farrell has interpreted the case of Irish defence policy in the first half of the 20th Century in a 
similar vein. Farrell’s analysis demonstrates that Irish Army culture adopted transnational 
norms of military professionalism and conventional warfare despite the fact that irregular 
warfare and a less formally constituted military force, as practiced by the Irish Republican 
Army during the fight for independence from the United Kingdom, would have been more 
adequate considering the resources and strategic position of the Irish Free State (later the Irish 
Republic) in the first half of the 20th Century.
19
 
A similar debate between neorealist and culturalist approaches also exists with regard 
to the domestic level of analysis. Since this literature necessarily deals with civil-military 
relations, it relates more closely to the issue with which this thesis is concerned. By focusing 
on domestic politics this literature is trying to determine who, whether it be the political 
masters or the military, is responsible for the formulation of military strategies and to what 
extent the strategies relate to an actual security environment. The neorealists argue that 
civilians are more perceptive of the requirements stemming from the international system 
and, therefore, better equipped to formulate adequate military plans than the military, which, 
in contrast, tends to pursue parochial interests.
20
 According to Jack Snyder, it was the 
insufficient civilian control that allowed the pre-1914 militaries to develop the offensive 
doctrines that resulted in the disaster of 1914.
21
 Conversely, the cases of pre-1939 Britain, 
Germany and France lead Barry Posen to the conclusion that civilians, despite the limits of 
their own military knowledge, manage to ‘get around the bureaucratic shenanigans of their 
military organizations’ and enforce an adequate doctrinal change.
 22
 
Regarding the culturalist perspective, analysing the interwar civil-military relations in 
Britain and France, Elizabeth Kier explains the formation of military doctrines as a military 
response to the limitations imposed by politicians. Thus, for instance, the defensive doctrine 
                                                 
19
 Farrell, "Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army," 63-102; 
see also Farrell, The Norms of War. 
20
 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision 
Making and the Disasters of 1914 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jack Snyder, "Civil-
Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," International Security, 9, no. 1 (1984): 
108-46. 
21
 Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," 109-10. 
22
 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 223. 
23 
 
in the French Army was a military reaction to the introduction of short-term conscription in 
1928.  Important is that neither civilian nor military choices are ‘just a reflection of structural 
conditions or functional needs; culture has causal autonomy’.
23
 In this respect, Kier warns 
that making a distinction between interest and culture makes little sense because culture is 
supposed to shape what people imagine is their interest.
24
 Kier’s work thus represents an 
attempt to explicate the formation of military organisation by predominantly 
ideational/cultural factors. However, her interpretation draws a very clear distinction between 
the cultural norms held by civilians and the organisational culture of the military. The 
assimilation processes within the military, she maintains, are powerful enough to effectively 
displace and largely freeze out the influences of wider society.
25
 It needs a significant 
external shock, such as defeat in war, to make the military culture receptive of societal 
imperatives. Works by Thomas U. Berger and Peter Katzenstein demonstrate that under 
conditions of total defeat, post-1945 West Germany and Japan managed to change their 




If Kier’s conclusions were applied to the research question of this thesis, the role of 
societal norms would be confined to such outward aspects as conscription or funding, but 
would have very little impact on the organizational culture of the military and only indirect 
effect on strategic doctrines. The work of Berger and Katzenstein demonstrates that there is a 
possibility for socially driven reform; however, such a reform of military organisation, 
including the organizational culture of the armed forces, may require rather unique 
conditions, such as the ruptures and existential dislocations experienced by Germany and 
Japan following the Second World War. The case study of West German rearmament in this 
thesis hence promises a rich picture of armed forces designed to a large extent by societal 
ideological factors. However, on the whole the culturalist literature appears rather sceptical 
about the prospect that societal features would play a decisive role under less severe 
conditions. In this point the culturalist works differ from the large body of literature on 
military sociology, with which the following subsection is concerned. 
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The perspective of military sociology 
The sociological research of military organisation is founded on the premise that the 
military is a subsystem of society and as such its form is bound to be dependent on the socio-
political context. This does not mean that sociologists automatically assume that the military 
organisation is receptive to societal norms or will imitatively reflect them; in fact, the 
question to what extent the armed forces are socially integrated into their parent society is 
among the central questions of the research in military sociology.
27
 Yet, however unique or 
integrated a military is, its form should be understood as related to the overall structure of 
society. 
The typology of military organisation created by Maury Feld, and further developed 
by Bernard Boëne, is one among many that attempts to accomplish this aim to define forms 
of military organisation as parts of social structure. Feld defines five ideal types of military 
organisation that range from the imperial army that is in charge of governing ‘uncivilised’ 
subjects in faraway colonies, at the one extreme, to the military organisation in a totalitarian 
society, at the other.
28
 Feld’s typology deserves special attention here because one of the 
types captures the characteristics of a military organisation in a liberal society.  
To use the framework of military capacities, the mission of the liberal/representative 
type of military organisation is determined by the fact that not the pursuit of real-political 
national interest and ambitions but economic well-being and social welfare for ordinary 
citizens are the central preoccupations and conditions of the legitimacy of the state. 
Moreover, multilateral organisations became regarded as better adapted to provide military 
security or economic cooperation.
29
 The armed forces should therefore contribute to the 
collective military security without being an unnecessary burden to the economic prosperity 
of the parent society.  
The organisational culture of the liberal type of military is based on the fact that all 
citizens in a liberal society are regarded as ‘publicly useful on the basis of their private 
interests’ and successful pursuit of such interests hence should be considered ‘a valid index of 
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 The consequence for the military is that its share of responsibility for 
national defence is significantly restricted. The officer therefore cannot ‘claim to be a 
member of a caste morally qualified for leadership. Instead, [the officer] regards himself as a 
martially oriented member of the general body of managerial technicians’.
31
 The skills that 
the officer seeks to master are comparable with those possessed by civilian professionals and 
the armed forces consequently wish to be recognized as a legitimate enterprise. This type of 
military organisation is thus supposed to ‘strive to be more civilian than civil society itself’.
 32
 
This has a direct consequence for the make-up of the armed forces too. Conscription loses its 
role as a necessary instrument of civil control of the military, whereas all-volunteer forces 
(AVF) are increasingly considered to be better suited to the technological and specialist 
character of the military profession.
33
 
At the same time as Feld articulated her observations about the liberal military 
organisation Morris Janowitz put forward the concept of constabulary force.
34
 According to 
Janowitz, around the mid-20
th
 Century military officers became exposed to a series of 
dilemmas that altered the character of the military profession. In order to cope with the 
altered conditions, according to Janowitz, military officers should adopt the constabulary 
concept, which means that the military should ‘be continuously prepared to act, committed to 
the minimum use of force, and seek viable international relations, rather than victory’.
35
 
Moreover, an essential part of the development towards constabulary force is the need for the 
professional officer to learn skills and adopt practices common to civilian administrators and 
technicians. 
Both Feld and Janowitz developed their concepts in the late 1950s and it is obvious 
that the context of the Cold War and the strategy of deterrence are inextricable aspects of the 
socio-political structure in which the liberal/representative type of military organisation and 
the constabulary concept are founded. The post-Cold War situation thus no longer 
corresponds with Feld’s liberal/representative type and certain modifications are required also 
for Janowitz’s constabulary concept. According to Charles Moskos, the end of the Cold War 
‘has ushered in a period of transition in which the conventional Modern forms of military 
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organization are giving way to new Postmodern forms’.
36
 Significant organisational changes, 
including the change of military purpose from warfighting to non-traditional missions and the 
ascendancy of new types of military professional, are argued to characterise the 
transformation from the Cold War (‘late modern’) towards the post-Cold War (‘postmodern’) 
type of military organisation in liberal society. The ‘new times’ for Western armed forces,
37
 
which are, among other things, characterised by the ever greater application of societal values 
into the military, have attracted wide attention not only in the field of military sociology, but 
also among strategists and political scientists. 
The transformation after the end of the Cold War was shaped by multiple factors. 
Despite the fact that Western societies entered the 1990s without significant ideological 
change, some sociologists identify a certain alteration of social values by which armed forces 
are affected. It is argued, for example, that a considerably higher emphasis has become 
placed upon individualism and social equality, and that this compels the military to 
accommodate these social features into its structure and organisational culture. In addition, 
the ‘blame and compensation’ culture is seen to make people more disposed to seek their 
rights through redress in court.
38
 The 1990s also strengthened the features of the post-military 
society, as defined by Martin Shaw. In a post-military society militarism no longer takes the 
same forms or has the same significance that it possessed during the previous era. ‘Armament 
culture’, focused on weaponry and technology in general, and ‘spectator-sport militarism’, 
mediated by television, are proposed to replace the glamour and respect traditionally attached 
to the military. In this context, notes Shaw, ‘even military institutions come to be defined in a 
“post-military” way, as peacekeepers, world police forces, or war-managers’.
39
 
Nonetheless, it is not so much the change of social values that makes the post-Cold 
War era distinct. Rather, it is the change of the strategic environment that is assumed to 
intensify the impact of social values. ‘Without the threat of invasion, Western states no longer 
needed to buttress armed forces so distinctive from the social values of the larger society’, 
argue Moskos et al.
40
 Total war ceased to be a relevant paradigm and with it also its main 
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features disappeared – full-scale escalation and an all-embracing participation of society.
41
 In 
the new ‘spectator-sport wars’, as Colin McInnes calls them, people in the West may watch, 
sympathise or maybe even empathise with deployed soldiers and victims of war, but do not 
personally experience the conflict or suffer.
42
 Consequently, the public demands that the 
armed forces follow strict rules of engagement and pursue specific strategies. The military is 
thus supposed to respect the principles of proportionality and discrimination and to act in 
such a way that collateral damage is minimised. Soldiers are expected to respect individual 
civil liberties and civilian norms, even in the course of war.
43
 
The notion of the operational autonomy of the military has thus effectively 
disappeared. Its persistence was fatally compromised by the character of the new missions 
and the ways in which they blurred the boundary between political and military aspects of the 
use of force. The military professional is thus ‘less the apolitical technician and more the 
politically attuned manager of the means of violence’.
44
 Moreover, the boundaries between 
international and domestic environments have become blurred as well. Globalisation strongly 
affects international security politics and, therefore, the organizations of the armed forces 
tend towards integration and multinationalism.
45
 
Although the sociological approach identifies those aspects of military organisation 
which may be relevant from the perspective of relations between the military and society, the 
focus on difference between the Cold War and post-Cold War militaries should remind us 
that the sociological approach draws its concepts to a large extent inductively from the 
general socio-political situation at a given moment. Concepts such as Feld’s ‘representative’ 
type of military organisation, Janowitz’s constabulary concept, and Moskos’s ‘postmodern 
military’ may be very helpful in our enquiry into the relationship between liberalism and 
military organisation, but, since they do not regard societal ideology as an independent factor, 
they cannot deliver a relevant answer to the issue with which this thesis is concerned. 
                                                 
41
 Colin McInnes, Spectator-Sport War: the West and Contemporary Conflict (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002), 143. 
42
 Ibid., 148. 
43
 Ibid., 144. 
44
 Christopher Dandeker, "The Military in Democratic Societies: New Times and New Patterns of Civil-Military 
Relations," in Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis, ed. Jürgen 
Kuhlmann and Jean Callaghan (Hamburg: Lit, 2000), 42-43; see also Moskos, "Toward a Postmodern 
Military: The United States," 19. 
45
 Wilfried von Bredow, "Re-Nationalization of Military Strategy? New Challenges for the Armed Forces in a 
Changing Global Environment," in Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis, 
ed. Jürgen Kuhlmann and Jean Callaghan (Hamburg: Lit, 2000), 53; Dandeker, "The Military in 
Democratic Societies," 42. 
28 
 
The functional significance of liberal ethical norms 
The post-Cold War strategic environment brought about an innovative approach in 
strategic studies, too. Works by Lawrence Freedman
46
 and B. K. Greener-Barcham
47
 pioneer 
a new approach in strategic studies that emphasises the importance of accomodation of 
domestic ethical norms within the military sphere for the effectiveness of military 
performance. Examination of this relationship is among the objectives this thesis set for itself. 
Freedman’s line of argument is built upon the question as to what is required from the 
Western armed forces to win such wars as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. What distinguishes 
contemporary irregular warfare from the previously dominant regular wars is the fact that the 
combat is now ‘integrated in civil society’. The political context of contemporary irregular 
wars therefore demands that the ‘purpose and practice of Western forces be governed by 
liberal values’.
48
 Since the contemporary wars may be won ‘in the cognitive rather than the 
physical domain’, it is claimed to be essential to develop strategic narratives ‘to provide a 
framework of understanding that can bind a fighting force together’
49
 Freedman’s work thus 
demonstrates the significance of liberal ethical norms for the functional effectiveness of 
Western militaries. 
In a similar vein an article by Greener-Barcham tries to deductively establish, ‘What 
kinds of military means are most appropriate if a deployment is to be justified as being 
compatible with liberal ideals’.
50
 The key principles of liberalism include a commitment to 
the rule of law, respect for individual freedoms and rights, and ideals of tolerance and 
progress.
51
 The aim of Greener-Barcham’s philosophical exercise, then, is to construct an 
ideal type in which the liberal principles were projected into the conduct of military 
operations as well as into the very constitution of the military itself. 
Without the adaptation of liberal principles in the conduct of military operations, 
liberal states could be accused of using the rhetoric of liberal values without adopting 
appropriate methods to achieve those goals. Among those appropriate methods should be the 
targeting of individuals who are believed to be responsible for creating a situation in which 
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military force is the only possible answer. The deployed forces ought to exercise restraint and 
increasingly try to minimize casualties and use minimal force. Moreover, it is important that 
the kinds of equipment deployed in operations reflect humanitarian principles and hence the 
use of accurate and non-lethal weapons is recommended.
52
  
Concerning the constitution of the armed forces, the varied operational requirements 
that may emerge are claimed to necessitate the development of a ‘multipurpose’ force and its 
internationalisation might be required in order to keep with liberal faith in international 
institutions. The move from war-orientation to multipurpose functions should be 
accompanied also with a change in military culture. That would entail de-emphasising 
hierarchy, creating and maintaining a less masculine and ‘warrior-like’ environment and 
acceptance of notions of difference.
53
 
For both Freedman and Greener-Barcham the post-Cold War conditions are 
particularly favourable for the application of liberal values into the military. The 
accommodation of liberal principles is ‘especially vital in an era dominated by “stability 
campaigns” and other forms of operations other than war’, maintains Greener-Barcham.
54
 
However, these theoretical propositions are not limited to the socio-political situation of the 
1990s and 2000s. On the contrary, it is supposed to be a generally valid statement that 
military means ‘should be commensurate with liberal ideals if states aim to actually achieve 
robust and genuine liberal ends’.
55
 According to Freedman, the requirement that the purpose 
and practice of Western forces should be governed by liberal values applies to regular wars, 
too, but to a smaller extent for ‘it is the integration with civil society [in irregular warfare] 
that makes the application of liberal values so challenging’.
56
 Furthermore, the primary need 
for survival, notes Greener-Barcham, could well see the liberal principles ‘downplayed or 
even abandoned in a genuine case of individual self-defence’. The processes of 
individualization, legalization and humanization in deployments, and the internationalization 
and civilianization of military forces ‘are likely to be challenged if they do not serve the 
supreme aim of national survival’.
57
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However, this last point should not be accepted without challenge. Both Greener-
Barcham and Freedman focus primarily on the post-Cold War missions of the military and 
the claims they make concerning other strategic situations are derived from their 
understanding of the current situation. In contrast, this thesis takes the aim to examine the 
relationship between liberalism and military capacities in ‘an era dominated by stability 
campaigns’ as well as at the time when national survival was at stake. It cannot be expected 
that the same liberal principles would be accommodated in the same way under all 
conditions; yet, it is exactly the adaptation of liberal principles to different conditions that 
constitutes one of the major issues explored in this thesis. 
*** 
To see how the literature under review may address the research question of this 
thesis, the following table summarises the propositions concerning the individual categories 
of the military capacities. It is evident in this overview that the sociological approach can 
produce a very thorough description of the military capacities in liberal societies, but is rather 
incapable of explaining the specific role of liberalism in the system of societal-military 
relations. In contrast, the literature reviewed on liberal peace and strategy puts the 
relationship between liberalism and the use of force and its organisation at the core of their 
interest. However, the conclusions of the liberal peace literature are confined to the question 
concerning the mission of the armed forces, whilst the works by Greener-Barcham and 
Freedman focus predominantly on peacekeeping, humanitarian and stabilisation operations 
and irregular warfare respectively. The aim of this thesis is thus to supplement the 
shortcomings of these two fields of literature. 
The chief focus of this literature review has been aimed at the constitutive elements of 
military capacities and whether the literature postulates a connection, either descriptively or 
prescriptively, between these elements and normative or ideational factors. Another issue 
important to this research is the mechanism through which societal imperatives may be 
projected into military organisation and defence policy. The debate between the neorealist 
and culturalist research project shed some light on this issue. Yet, a more intensive review of 
this issue will follow in the next section. The critical analysis of Samuel Huntington’s theory 
of civil-military relations will present one of the most prominent concepts of the relationship 
between liberalism and the military. A constructivist-ontological critique of Huntington’s 
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Huntingtonian Civil-Military Relations 
The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative 
stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from the 
social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions 
which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military 
function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military 
institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives. The interaction of these two forces is 
the nub of the problem of civil-military relations. The degree to which they conflict depends 
upon the intensity of the security needs and the nature and strength of the value pattern of 
society. Adjustment and balance between the two forces are not inevitable: some societies 




Samuel Huntington writes these words in the introduction to his seminal book on civil-
military relations The Soldier and the State. In an abridged form this quotation encapsulates 
the problem which his book is supposed to solve – the inherent conflict between various 
modern ideologies, such as liberalism, Marxism and fascism, and the notion of a self-
contained military professionalism, which, Huntington argues, is necessary for providing 
society with military security. Logically, this tension between the societal and the functional 
imperative has, in Huntington’s view, only two possible solutions – either the decline of the 
security threat or an ideological transformation. At the peak of the Cold War in the 1950s, 
when Huntington wrote his book, his recommendation for the USA was clear: ‘So long as the 
Cold War continued, that security would depend upon the ability of the United States to 
evolve an intellectual climate more favorable to the existence of military professionalism...’
59
 
The relationship between liberal ideology and a provision for military security is inherently 
conflictual because, Huntington posits, liberalism rests on ‘ideals of liberty, democracy, 
equality, and peace’, whereas the military is said to be fundamentally concerned with 
‘authority, hierarchy, obedience, force, and war’.
60
  
Huntington’s primary aim was a policy-prescriptive one: to ensure the military 
security of the United States. Whereas until the 1940s the privileged geographical location of 
the United States and the foreign policies of the European great powers had permitted the 
USA to be concerned primarily with the question of ‘what pattern of civil-military relations is 
most compatible with American liberal-democratic values’, the emergence of the USA into 
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the position of a superpower, along with the onset of the Cold War, caused this previous 
concern to be supplanted ‘by the more important issue: what pattern of civil-military relations 
will best maintain the security of the American nation?’
61
 
The level of military security is claimed to be determined by the political authority of 
the military. The extent to which the military representatives may influence military policy’s 
formulation is reflected in the level of military security. In the context of democratic civil-
military relations this appeal for greater political authority to be accorded to the military 
cannot mean that the military be entrusted with an independent policy-making power. The 
political authority of the armed forces is rather considered an informal or semiformal 
influence on politicians and the public. This authority is largely based on the ability of the 
military institutions and individual officers to interact with civilian institutions and 
individuals.
62
 Due to the importance of the military’s ability to interact with civilians the 
issue of potential ideological conflict between society and the officer corps is rendered 
significant.  
At the same level of importance as the military security is civilian control of the 
military. The armed forces should, on the one hand, be powerful enough ‘to do anything the 
civilians ask them to’ and, on the other hand, ‘subordinate enough to do only what civilians 
authorise them to do’,
63
 as Peter D. Feaver puts it. S. E. Finer passes a telling comment on 
this problem:  
Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever 
do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military vis-á-vis other and 





The civilian control must guarantee that the power of the military institution will never 
become a threat to the fundamental character of the host society. Since Huntington stresses 
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the role of social values and ideologies, his objective is to develop ‘a system of civil-military 
relations which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values’.
65
 
Huntington distinguishes two directly opposed types of civilian control – subjective 
and objective. Subjective civilian control is defined as maximizing civilian power in relation 
with the military. In the context of the rise of the modern military profession (as opposed, for 
example, to the pre-modern aristocratic military) subjective civilian control is claimed to be 
in a condition of permanent tension with independent functional military imperatives. 
Whereas functional military imperatives, Huntington argues, lead to one particular form of 
military professionalism with an inherent military ethic, subjective civilian control ‘achieves 
its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state’.
66
 Since most of the 
modern ideologies, liberalism in particular, are fundamentally anti-militaristic, that means 
hostile to military professionalism, the mirroring of the state and society is argued to 
significantly hinder the military security of the state. 
Regarding implications for military institutions, effective subjective civilian control 
leads to transmutation of the military. This means that the military institutions are 
refashioned along normative lines of a given ideology and thus they lose their peculiarly 
military characteristics. In his later book Huntington also uses the term identification with 




Objective civilian control, on the other hand, means maximizing military 
professionalism. As opposed to the civilianizing effect of subjective civilian control, this type 
of civilian control ‘achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the 
state’.
68
 It is supposed to preserve military power in issues that are necessary for the existence 
of the military profession, while the officer corps is rendered politically sterile and neutral 
regarding all other political issues. Whereas subjective civilian control presupposes a conflict 
between civilian control and the needs of military security, if civilian control is exercised in 
the objective sense, military security is by no way obstructed. 
An effective objective civilian control requires a policy of toleration. Since liberalism 
is inherently antimilitaristic, the policy of toleration means that the prevailing social values 
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would shift away from liberalism in the direction of conservatism. The policy of toleration is 
clearly preferred by Huntington. It is not absolutely necessary that conservatism should 
supplant liberalism, although Huntington does not conceal how attractive he finds this option. 
Even if civilian institutions are liberal in character, no necessary conflict exists ‘between 
them and professional military institutions, so long as each was kept within its proper 
sphere’.
69
 The problem is that liberalism, unlike conservatism, is inherently monistic and 
universalistic and as such cannot permit independent military professionalism to flourish.  
Professionalism of the officer corps is, in Huntington’s view, crucial for effective 
performance of the military function and the military ethic of the professional officer corps 
also guarantees subordination of the military to the government.
70
 ‘In practice, officership is 
strongest and most effective when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is 
weakest and most defective when it falls short of that ideal.’
71
 The concept of profession as a 
special type of vocation has three distinguishing characteristics – expertise, responsibility and 
corporateness. The officer corps’ expertise is concerned with peculiar skills regarding the 
‘direction, operation and control of a human organisation whose primary function is the 
application of violence’.
72
 Their responsibility is the military security of the state and society. 
An officer’s ‘behavior in relation to society is guided by an awareness that his skill can only 
be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent, the state’.
73
 
Regarding corporateness, Huntington maintains that the functional imperatives of military 




Huntington’s reasoning behind the concept of military professionalism is based on 
Clausewitz’s concept of the dual nature of war. War as an abstract phenomenon is supposed 
to follow its own laws, has its own grammar, but at the same time a real manifestation of war 
is always determined by its subordination to political ends that originate externally. For the 
military professionalism this logic means that the military expertise must be independent of 
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‘the nature of the cause for which it fights’; however, the purpose for which the armed forces 
are employed ‘are outside its competence to judge’.
75
 
Because of the dual nature of war, particularly owing to the immutable inherent logic 
of war in the abstract, the military ethic is said to be ‘concrete, permanent and universal’.
76
 
Huntington characterises this permanent and universal military ethic as ‘conservative 
realism’. The military conservative realism will stress the primacy of the nation-state, the 
permanency of insecurity and the inevitability of war, the intrinsically evil nature of man, the 
limits of reason, the importance of force and power and the preponderance of the group 
against the individual. ‘While inherent contrast and conflict exist between the military ethic 
and liberalism, fascism, and Marxism, inherent similarity and compatibility exist between the 
military ethic and conservatism,’
77
 claims Huntington. 
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Deconstruction of Huntington’s theory 
Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations rests on the assumption that some 
ideologies are irreconcilable with the military function. However, this claim needs to be 
closely examined. Why cannot liberalism, among other ideologies, guarantee a sufficient 
level of military security? Why is the subjective civilian control unable to render the armed 
forces capable and effective? In fact, the model of civil-military relations (Figure 5 above), 
which represents relations between the main factors that Huntington presented in his book 
and in a revision of his argument twenty years later, does not imply any inevitable inferiority 
of the concept of subjective civilian control. Yet, a reader of The Soldier and the State is 
never left in doubt regarding the superiority – and hence the desirability – of objective 
civilian control. 
Huntington’s original definition of subjective civilian control obviously warrants a 
strong opposition to this concept and casts doubts on the military security provided under 
such a model of civil-military relations. Subjective civilian control is originally described as 
maximizing the power of civilian groups in relations to the military. This may mean that the 
armed forces would be under control of one political party or social class and thus being 
potentially abused as an instrument in a struggle for power within the state. For that reason 
James Burk may justify branding Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations ‘with the 
liberal label’.
78
 However, the main concern of the theory is relations between dominating 
ideologies and military security. As the case of liberalism demonstrates, ideology should be 
considered a long-lasting identity of a particular society rather than a position in party 
politics. The former definition, moreover, is what Huntington seems to have in mind when 
postulating his theory. 
The problem pointed out by Huntington is that subjective civilian control is 
incompatible with the military’s strict professionalism. An officer corps in an anti-militaristic 
society can achieve necessary political authority only at some detriment to the thoroughness 
of its professionalism. Yet, in what respect is the military’s professionalism undermined by 
subjective civilian control? Except for cases of militia forces, it is hardly conceivable that 
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officer’s expertise, acquired by systematic military education and experience, could be lost 
because of subjective civilian control. It is much more likely that among the affected aspects 
would be the professional responsibility. Huntington’s concept of military professionalism 
supposes that the officer corps is responsible for the assurance of military security of society 
and to the state, which is a political agent of society. Subjective civilian control might add an 
ideological aspect to this relation. The military security of society would in such a case gain a 
wider meaning and, moreover, the authority of the government to employ the armed forces 
could be confined to some particular sets of conditions permitted by the ideology. Last but 
not least, if subjective civilian control was employed thoroughly, corporateness and the 
realist-conservative military ethic would certainly diminish significantly or even be 
completely abandoned. 
The concept of military professionalism, and the military ethic in particular, is 
claimed to be ‘concrete, permanent and universal’. However, this characteristic in particular 
invited plenty of criticism or implicit counter-arguments, chiefly in the military-sociology 
literature. Bernard Boëne, for example, questions the permanency and universality of the 
conservative military ethic when suggesting that military conservatism may be derived from 
other sources, such as the social origin of officers as was the case of the army of the Prussian 
monarchy and the German empire, which Huntington presents as an example. Boëne suggests 
that, should the military function render military institutions conservative, it is only formal 
conservatism – the preservation of socio-political status quo, irrespective of its content – not 
substantive conservative ideology as assumed by Huntington.
79
 
Morris Janowitz’s book The Professional Soldier puts forward the argument that the 
professionalism which Huntington conceived had already become outdated by the time 
Huntington wrote his book. Huntington’s concept became obsolete owing to the changes in 
military affairs brought about by technological progress and most importantly by the 
emergence of nuclear weapons. These changes affected almost all aspects of military 
professionalism. Regarding the conservative military ethic, Morris Janowitz articulates ‘the 
dilemma of [the] military profession’ as follows: ‘How is it possible to sustain conservative 
political commitments to the existing social order, while the instruments of warfare become 
more drastic devices of social change, with almost unpredictable and revolutionary 
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 Nuclear weapons rendered war abstract: ‘it is displaced by symbolic 
expression (changes in military posture, subtle variations in states of alert, activation or 
transfer of specialized military assets, etc.)’.
81
 Moreover, the blurred distinction between war 
and peace and the advancing mechanisation of armed forces allow the military culture to shift 
from an institutional model, in which professional soldiering was perceived as a calling or 




Writings on military sociology raise some valid objections and provide rich and 
persuasive counterarguments against Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations. 
However, the viewpoint of military sociology still leaves some crucial aspects of 
Huntington’s theory unaffected. Huntington’s work raised an important question about 
relations between modern ideologies, liberalism in particular, and a capacity to guarantee 
military security. 
In order to approach this issue we need to ask: what is the difference between the 
military capacity of a transmuted military (subjective civilian control) and the military 
capacity of a tolerated professional officer corps (objective civilian control)? In other words, 
why is the professional officer corps claimed to guarantee better military security? The most 
significant difference is that the professional military is pronounced a true ‘tool of the 
state’.
83
 As the instrument of the state the professional military can be deployed when-, 
where- and however the government wishes. Echoing Clausewitz, Huntington insists that a 
professional officer ‘must assume that policy is “the representative of all the interests of the 
whole community” and obey it as such’.
84
 A military which would incorporate a civilian 
ethos within its ideals might fail to exercise the same blind obedience to the government. 
‘The professional army which fights well because it is its job to fight well is far more reliable 
than the political army which fights well only while sustained by a higher purpose... The 
supreme military virtue is obedience.’
85
 
Yet, why should providing for military security require an armed force of the 
exclusively professional qualities? Huntington wrote his book as a response to the political 
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development in the early Cold War, particularly to the ‘policy of containment’, a foreign 
policy which involved, among other things, military alliances and overseas deployments.
86
 
Limited conventional warfare, such as the 1950-53 Korean War, appeared to become a 
frequent military assignment. A realist interpretation of an anarchic international system in 
which occasional conventional warfare plays an important role may lend support to 
Huntington’s argument in favour of professional military.  
Yet, Huntington’s concept is heavily drawn from the form of military organisation 
that emerged in 19
th
 Century Europe, and the Prussian army in particular is regarded almost 
as an ideal type.
87
 However, this particular form of military professionalism was not only a 
functional response to external threats of the time; arguably, it was also a consequence of 
particular social and political conditions at home. ‘The national type’ of the military, as 
Maury D. Feld coined the term,
88
 flourished during the maturing and consolidating phase of 
modern nation-state development. The military was a forerunner of bureaucratization and as 
such conceived as a perfectly neutral and highly effective instrument in the hands of political 
regimes. The political neutrality, however, was preferred by the officer corps simply as a 
prerequisite for the autonomy to which professional officers aspired. The political neutrality 
of the latter cadres did not necessarily imply the officers’ genuine subordination to political 
authorities; rather officers tended to think of themselves as being above, and not only outside, 
politics. In any case, because of favourable conditions this military attitude towards politics 
was rarely a threat to the authority of civilian government. Bernard Boëne describes these 
conditions as follows: ‘the overall missions of the military are transparent to all, the major 
strategic opponent is clearly designated, the boundary between political and military domains 




Although the sociological critique of Huntington’s theory has only limited relevancy 
here, this explanation of military professionalism puts Huntington’s concept in perspective. 
Even though Huntington’s concept might be an apt response to relevant security challenges 
as perceived in the USA in the 1950s, it seems unlikely that his theory provides 
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‘transhistorical, cross-cultural, absolute standard’ as Huntington indicated.
90
 For that reason 
this thesis will explore such cases that may provide alternative accounts of the relationship 
between functional and societal imperatives. 
Constructivist critique 
Huntington says that a closer engagement of the United States in international affairs 
after the Second World War moved the US military into an encounter with needs dictated by 
the international system. The United States, as well as other countries, was forced to suppress 
its social and cultural preferences regarding military institutions in favour of the externally 
imposed functional imperatives. ‘Faced with certain threats, some societies may be incapable 
of providing for their own security except at the price of becoming something different from 
what they are.’
91
 Such explanation may resemble the neorealist argument that international 
anarchy would lead states to develop common sets of military practices, thus reducing 
cultural differences.
92
 Although the permanent and objective nature of Huntington’s concept 
of military professionalism would reject the process of imitation, his theory seems to be in 
accordance with the structuralist explanation. Huntington’s argument rests on the notion that 
agents – states, societies and their military institutions – must adapt to the given constraints of 
an anarchical international structure. 
This assumption is derived from materialist ontology and is, on that account, open to 
constructivist critique. Huntington’s argument holds only if an anarchical international 
structure is, like the military ethic, ‘concrete, permanent and universal’ and the survival of 
states dependent on their adoption of particular institutional forms. Alexander Wendt opposes 
this assumption by claiming that ‘self-help and power politics do not follow either logically 
or causally from anarchy’.
93
 Structure, however anarchical, is argued to be always a set of 
institutions, norms and expectations that agents acquire and maintain. Structure therefore 
cannot be separated from agents. It is, in other words, constructed rather than given. Human 
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Wendt’s argument on the agent-structure problem relies on Roy Bhaskar’s work.
95
 
Bhaskar argues that social structures differ in at least two fundamental aspects from natural 
structures: ‘social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the 
activities they govern’ and ‘social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist 
independently of the agents’ conceptions of what they are doing in their activity’.
96
 From that 
it follows that agents and structures are mutually constitutive yet ontologically distinct 
entities. ‘Social structures are the result of the intended and unintended consequences of 
human action, just as those actions presuppose or are mediated by an irreducible structural 
context.’
97
 Therefore, if state identity is a constitutive element of international structure, and 
if ideology is regarded as part of that identity, the conflict between societal (domestic) and 
functional (structural) military imperatives that Huntington presupposes cannot be so sharp 
and inevitable. This assumption is crucial for our argument and hence requires a thorough 
discussion in the following subsection.  
Constructivist argument 
It was suggested that the conflict between the societal (domestic) and the functional 
(structural) imperative could be mitigated by the fact that the state identity is a constitutive 
element of international structure. However, this assumption may hold only if domestic 
ideology constitutes the identity of the state. This supposition may sound self-evident; 
however, Wendt’s constructivist theory tends to marginalise the impact of domestic factors 
on international structure. Thus, in order to proceed with the thesis’s argument, alternative 
explanations of the relations between international structure, foreign-policy behaviour of the 
state and domestic factors, such as ideology, should be examined. 
In Wendt’s theory the effect of domestic factors on the identities of states gives way 
to the concept of intersubjectivity. It is only through processes of interaction with others that 
actors can acquire their own identities and simultaneously constitute collective meanings, 
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understanding and expectations, in other words, the structures that organize actors’ actions. In 
that sense actor identities – ‘relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations 
about self’ – are constituted by the structure.
98
 State identities and interests, Wendt assumes, 
‘are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to 
the system by human nature or domestic politics’.
99
  
It is not true, however, that Wendt completely neglects domestic factors. He makes a 
distinction between corporate identity, which refers to ‘the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities 
that constitute actor individuality’, and social identities, that is, multiple roles acquired and 
maintained by interaction with others.
100
 Wendt adapts George Herbert Mead’s 
conceptualisation of ‘me’ and ‘I’. The ‘me’ stands for the social determination of the self 
whereas the ‘I’ refers to the personal determination of choice. While the socially defined 
roles (‘me’) presuppose some given rules of behaviour, these rules are not precise scripts, but 
can be adjusted to some extent to suit the individual preferences of each actor (‘I’). ‘Even in 
the most constrained situations, role performance involves a choice by the actor. The “I” is 




Wendt acknowledges the possibility that conscious action by one actor, who is driven 
by domestic factors, may trigger a transformation of international structure, such as Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s policy of ‘New Thinking’ initiated the end of the Cold-War confrontation.
102
 
However, this case seems to be considered an exception that proves the rule. Within the rules 
of Wendt’s theory the effect of domestic factors is confined to, first, a way of structurally 
given roles being performed and, second, ‘motivational energy for engaging in action at 
all’.
103
 Nonetheless, even these limitations may enable military institutions to be shaped by 
societal imperatives. As long as a particular ideology does not inhibit all kinds of defence, 
military organisation that reflects social imperatives might be preferable. In this vein argues 
Stephen Peter Rosen. He claims that ‘the less a military organization reflects the structure of 
the society... the more military will be perceived as an alien element, a group that is not 
representative of society in its demography or in its dominant values’. More importantly, this 
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Although Wendt’s theory may justify an examination of the relationship between 
liberalism and military security, the space for domestic ideology in foreign policy/external 
security policy issues is rather small. Wendt’s obvious preference for keeping his theory 
simple prevents him from suggesting a robust connection between domestic ideology and 
international structure. On this point Maja Zehfuss is persuasive in criticising Wendt that his 
marginalisation of domestic factors ‘is not an innocent methodological choice but a necessary 
move if identity is not to immediately threaten his constructivist project’.
105
 
Zehfuss’s critique of Wendt’s theory is substantiated by an examination of German 
foreign-policy culture. Culturalists share with constructivists the ontological assumptions 
regarding the importance of norms, but their levels of analysis are different and hence the 
implications of their research vary too. Whereas constructivists are concerned with the effect 
of international norms and on that account find a tendency to similarities among states 
(isomorphism), culturalists look at the impact of domestic norms and thus they find norms 
producing difference in state forms and actions.
106
  
Evidence in favour of the culturalist perspective in the research of armed forces is 
given in James Payne’s book Why Nations Arm.
107
 In his book Payne examines the relative 
importance of rational as opposed to cultural factors in acquiring military forces. Utilising 
quantitative comparative methods he finds that non-rational factors in the form of ‘blind’ 
ideological predispositions, cultural orientations and local traditions seem to be three times 
more important than ‘strategic’ factors as a reason for military armament. Payne’s conclusion 
concerning the strength of armed forces – ‘nations respond much more to non-rational 
prejudices than to appeal to rational self-interest’
108
 – is the almost taken-for-granted 
assumption of many culturalist works. On that account, Wendt points out the tendency of 
unit-level culturalist research to ‘reductionism’.
109
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A middle way between Wendt’s constructivism marginalising domestic factors and 
reductionist culturalism, which neglects international relations, is shown by Bill McSweeney. 
‘We misunderstand the international order’, notes McSweeney, ‘if we consider it as an object 
sui generis, set apart by its own logic from domestic society and from the social order in 
general’.
110
 McSweeney advances Wendt’s theoretical model so that both societal (‘inner’) 
identity and structural (‘outer’) identity are taken into consideration. ‘Collective actors such 
as the state must negotiate their two dimensions of identity with different constituencies: with 
other states, on the one hand, and with the people who comprise the domestic constituency, 
on the other.’
111
 The very same political representatives of a state who are exposed to the 
socialising effects of the interaction process on the international level need to legitimize their 
foreign policy before their domestic constituency. This theoretical model thus implies a 
tendency towards narrowing the gap between societal identity, or social imperatives, and 
identity constituted by international structure. 
An example of inner state identity considerably affecting international structure may 
be the formation of NATO. Thomas Risse-Kappen puts forward a telling argument that the 
origins, the interaction patterns and the persistence of NATO can be explained by the 
collective identity of Western liberal states and their externalisation of domestic liberal-
democratic norms and decision-making rules that were enacted into the organisational 
structure of NATO. Specifically, NATO embodies the norm of multilateral consultation, for 




Taking the two dimensions – inner and outer – of state identity into account when 
examining Huntington’s theory on civil-military relations, it may be argued that, provided a 
particular anti-militaristic ideology consistently offers means to its political ends, the same 
societal imperatives which affect military institutions participate in constituting international 
structure which is, on the other hand, reflected in the functional military imperatives. It is 
therefore theoretically conceivable that military institutions shaped by society’s liberal 
ideology provide adequately for military security if the contextual international structure is 
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constituted exclusively by like-minded liberal states. To put it simply, liberal armed forces 
might work well in a liberal world. 
However, international structure can never be this simple. It is constituted in an 
interaction of all participating states, and to a certain extent of non-state actors too. Moreover, 
each state’s identity has two dimensions, inner/societal/domestic and outer/structural, as 
McSweeney posits. Complexity of international structure is thus a result of interactions of 
domestic and structural identities of every single agent. Nonetheless, as McSweeney also 
notes, power plays a considerable role in these complex relations. ‘A strong power has 
greater capacity to influence this learning process than a weak one, making the latter more a 
consumer than a producer of meaning.’
113
 Arguably, the contemporary international system is 
dominated by liberal actors. As Robert Lathan argues, the Second World War created a 
‘historical moment’
114
 for the United States to construct a new liberal world order by 
promoting state sovereignty, self-determination, democracy and human rights.
115
 Therefore, 
since liberal societies may be regarded as rather powerful agents, it is a legitimate assumption 
of this thesis that liberal ideology does play a considerable role in the processes of defence-
policy articulation and formation of military organisations in liberal states. 
Two dimensions of ideological influence – domestic means and foreign-political 
ends 
It was mentioned above that this argument may hold only if the ideology with which 
we are concerned is consistent in providing the means to the attainment of its foreign-political 
ends. As a hypothetical example we can imagine a state which on account of its ideology 
signals to others its hostility and aggressiveness but at the same time effectively prevents any 
effective mobilisation of military resources. Such a case would lend full support to 
Huntington’s assumption about the conflict between societal and functional imperatives. 
International structure in this case would be dangerous and conflicting not only in the 
interpretation of the hypothetical state but also because the structure was rendered dangerous 
by the state’s signalisation. The actuality of the threat would then confirm the claim of 
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Huntington that ‘some societies may be incapable of providing for their own security except 
at the price of becoming something different from what they are’.
116
 
Does it apply to liberalism? Alexis de Tocqueville observed that democracy produces 
the extraordinary paradox that, whereas democratic nations are the most fond of peace, 
democratic armies are ‘of all armies those most ardently desirous of war’.
117
 Huntington’s 
description of liberal norms, however, does not seem to support the case. On the one hand, 
liberalism is presented as hostile to the idea that war be an instrument of national policy; on 
the other hand, ‘war on behalf of universal true principles of justice and freedom’ might be 
held morally justifiable.
118
 Therefore, concerning the international level, liberalism tries, on 
the one hand, to promote non-conflicting international politics, on the other hand, it permits, 
or requires, just wars if necessary. At the domestic level, it is said to oppose large standing 
military forces (‘policy of extirpation’) because these are perceived as a threat to liberty, 
democracy, economic prosperity and, last but not least, to international peace. This policy of 
extirpation has, however, an alternative in the policy of transmutation. If military forces are 
needed, it is claimed to be the responsibility of every citizen to take part and the military 
organisation should be democratic – ‘inculcating liberal ideology into the forces, and relying 
more on individual initiative than upon discipline and coordination’.
119
 Therefore, according 
to Huntington’s account, liberal norms at international level appear as consistent with norms 
concerning the institutional arrangement of armed forces. 
An article by B. K. Greener-Barcham might be read in a very similar vein.
120
 She 
reflects that in recent years the use of armed forces has been justified by liberal values. Her 
argument thus follows that ‘if the overall aim is to promote or defend liberal values, then 
these ideals are best served by the use of actions compatible with and conducive to the 
achievement of those values’.
121
 The liberal values, it is argued, can be most easily achieved 
by shaping military means in accordance with these values. Greener-Barcham’s article not 
only claims that liberal foreign-political ends might be feasibly supported by liberally 
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organised armed forces, it also argues that armed forces that are organised in such a fashion 
may actually help military effectiveness.
122
 
These two brief sketches of the relationship between foreign-political ends and 
military means stipulated by liberalism are by no means sufficient for the purpose of this 
research. Articulation and examination of liberal norms and precepts concerning military 
security policy is the subject of the next chapter. The aim of this subsection has merely been 
to demonstrate how crucial it is not to confine this research to the issue of military 
organisation. Hence the analysis in this thesis is framed by the concept of military capacities 
that encapsulates the domestic/organisational level as well as the issue of foreign-political 
legitimacy of the use of armed forces.  
*** 
To sum up, this section challenges the theoretical argument made by Huntington that 
inherent conflict and contrast exists between societal and functional military imperatives. 
Proponents of Janowitzian military sociology have already provided rich and persuasive 
counterarguments against Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations. However, their 
critique leaves some crucial aspects of this theory unaffected. Huntington’s work raises an 
important question about relations between modern ideologies, liberalism in particular, and a 
capacity of a state and its military entities embodying that ideology to guarantee military 
security.  
Huntington argues that liberal imperatives regarding military institutions are 
intrinsically antithetical to the provision of sufficient military security. This statement, 
however, rests on a materialist interpretation of the international structure and as such is 
vulnerable to a constructivist critique. If identities of states are constitutive elements of the 
international structure, the conflict between societal (domestic) and functional (structural) 
military imperatives that Huntington presupposes cannot be so sharply dichotomous and 
inevitable. A theoretical possibility of reconciliation between societal and functional military 
imperatives is the principal supposition of this thesis. 
However, the plausibility of this assumption rests on two conditions. First, the 
ideology of any particular society to some extent determines the external identity of the state. 
Second, the ideology we are concerned with must be consistent in allowing adequate means 
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to its foreign-political ends. As for the former, the constructivist strain of international 
relations theory presents two views. According to Wendt, the effect of ideology is confined, 
more or less, to how structurally given roles are performed. In the view of McSweeney, the 
actor identity has two dimensions – one being formed through processes of interaction and 
socialisation at the international level and the other based in domestic politics and society. A 
continuous negotiation between these two dimensions is what produces the overall identity.  
In terms of the relationship between ideology and military security, these two distinct 
theoretical arguments lead to diverse expectations regarding the scope of ideological 
influence on military institutions and military security. On the one hand, Wendt’s theory 
permits space for ideological influence only as far as the affected military institutions can 
perform within structurally defined roles. McSweeney’s assumption, on the other hand, 
theoretically allows much greater potential to ideological influence. That is because this 
assumption supposes that the same ideological system which shapes the military institutions 
would also take part in constituting international structure. The variance between the two 
theoretical assumptions of Wendt and McSweeney is reflected in the central research 
question of this thesis. 
Regarding the second condition about consistency of ideologies, an ideology which 
would lead to contradictions between foreign-policy behaviour and domestic military 
organisation could hardly provide for feasible military security. However, even according to 
Huntington’s account, this is not the case of liberalism, since liberal norms at the 
international level appear as consistent with norms concerning the institutional arrangement 
of the armed forces. Yet, instead of relying on Huntington’s scant description of liberal 
norms, the articulation and examination of liberal precepts concerning military capacities 
presents an indispensable part of this thesis. 
Examining Liberalism 
The theoretical account of the relationship between liberal ideology and foreign and 
military-security policies presented in the previous section tends to regard liberalism as a 
homogenous and clearly articulated social force, qualitatively comparable with functional 
imperatives. Moreover, this account completely omits other domestic forces and factors that 
might affect the articulation of those policies. A need for theoretical simplicity and clarity 
50 
 
should justify the conceptualisation of liberal ideology as a set of norms that have very clear 
and unambiguous requirements on what foreign and military-security policy should be like. 
In this section liberal ideology will be dealt with in a more nuanced way. As liberal ideology 
is supposed to provide some political imperatives, it should be clarified what kind of norms 
these imperatives are and in what way they may determine policy-making. Most importantly, 
this section encounters methodological challenges inherent in studying liberalism as an 
ideology of modern Western societies and thus explain the methodology of this thesis. 
The picture of clear and unambiguous liberal norms is strongly opposed by B. K. 
Greener, at least as far as norms on the use of military force are concerned. Greener identifies 
within the liberal tradition a number of sites of tensions that may provide contradictory 
claims on the use of force. Liberals hold different views about the role of states in the 
international system; as to whether state guarantees for the well-being and liberty of their 
citizens sufficiently justify a primacy of the state in the international system or whether 
individual freedoms require a more cosmopolitan system. Another conflict is recognised 
between the notion of universality of liberal norms and the liberal emphasis on tolerance, 
autonomy of people and rule by consent. ‘These notions of cosmopolitanism versus 
communitarianism, as well as those of tolerance and consent versus those of universalism, 




Greener’s understanding of liberal norms would render liberal ideology irrelevant as a 
factor explaining foreign and military-security policy. In her view, liberalism may abhor any 
use of force beyond self-defence as well as legitimise a colonial-like civilising mission. 
Although the diversity of liberal ideas, as presented by Greener, can hardly be denied, this 
thesis is to argue for liberalism’s being relevant in policy-making. Whereas Greener 
considers liberalism only as a wide-ranging philosophical debate, in this thesis liberalism is 
regarded in its relationship to society. As stipulated in the introduction, this thesis views 
liberalism as a meta-ideology of West-European societies. It is a set of assumptions and 
sentiments that are shared across the ideological spectrum of everyday politics. The meta-
ideology may function as a guiding ethos or ethics. Liberalism should not be expected to give 
specific, direct guidelines for actions, since such direct rules are bound to become contested. 
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As a guiding ethos it only effectively limits relevant and legitimate political options and thus 
continues to affect social discourse and political practices. 
This specific character of contemporary liberal ideology poses a methodological 
challenge. According to Theo Farrell’s definition, ‘norms are shared beliefs that are “out 
there” in the real world, in the meaning they give to material things’.
124
 In terms of 
constructivist methodology, it follows from this definition that constructivists are interested 
only in the beliefs that are shared and in order for a belief to be shared it must be at least 
expressed, if not codified and recorded.
125
 On the other hand, Jeffrey W. Legro notes, in some 
cases public efforts to reaffirm a norm may be a sign that a norm is weakening.
126
 So, despite 
the necessity of being shared, deeply internalised norms may be shared in a significantly less 
detectable way yet also be extremely powerful. This seems to be the case of contemporary 
liberalism. Liberal assumptions, Arblaster argues, ‘are so deeply ingrained that they are 
hardly ever made explicit, or argued for or over’.
127
 For example, the terms so fundamental 
for liberalism such as ‘free’, ‘freedom’ and ‘independent’ are already laden with very precise 
meaning. Arblaster points out that people do not understand the terms such as a ‘free press’, 
‘independent’ television or ‘independent’ school as independent or free from various 
commercial and other pressures, but always as free from the constraints of the state. In such 
cases we can see how the liberal conceptions are ‘built into our everyday language so 
thoroughly that the words used are not seen by most people as being political or ideological 
or tendentious in any way’.
128
 Arblaster’s account thus shows that, although liberal 
assumptions are shared in the everyday discourse, for the lack of contrast it is rather difficult 
to identify them. 
Liberal assumptions are often concealed so effectively that ‘it is only with the 
advantage of historical hindsight that they are brought to the surface at all’.
129
 So Arblaster 
presents a feasible way of examining the contemporary form of liberal ideology. Using the 
conceptualisation of Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, norms with the strength of ‘common 
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wisdom’ might be more easily observed in earlier stages of their internalisation when the 
norm’s position was weaker in relation to alternative norms.
130
 
Moreover, Bellamy’s work implies that focusing on earlier stages of liberalism’s 
development may not be merely a methodological preference. At least as far as the social and 
economic system is concerned, Western people continue to live and think within the 





 Contemporary theories of liberalism, Bellamy argues, all turn out to be 
ethical theories that advocate an idealised form of a particular historical community.
132
 
It is not the ambition of this research to prove or reject Bellamy’s criticism of 
liberalism’s ‘current theoretical and political bankruptcy’.
133
 However, his argument, like that 
of Arblaster, shows a way of understanding liberalism in contemporary society and, equally 
or even more importantly, it lends support to the methodological propositions of this thesis. It 
is assumed here that historical examination of liberal political thinking may reveal liberal 
principles shared and maintained by the contemporary Western societies, an assumption 
which Arblaster’s and Bellamy’s work clearly confirm and substantiate. 
Yet Greener’s description of liberalism’s diversity and potential contradictions 
between various liberal norms warns us before we buy into uncritical acceptance of any 
liberal idea that has ever been expressed. Keeping the historical diversity of liberalism in 
mind, this thesis is looking at liberalism as a whole; hence it is primarily concerned with 
principles common to an overarching liberal tradition.  
It is important for this approach, however, to recognise unifying liberal principles 
from various historically contingent liberal ideas. An example can be drawn from the 1856 
Declaration of Paris. The Declaration of Paris provided for the end of privateering and thus 
set rules protecting free trade in war-time. Arguably, the Declaration would have never been 
achieved but for the successful campaign of the liberal free-trade movement.
134
 Yet, what 
does this case tell us about liberal norms of war? Taking this case at face value, it might be 
argued that liberalism tends to limit hostilities to armed forces. War, in this sense, should be 
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an exclusively military business which has little to do with the rest of society. Yet the falsity 
of this proposition may be demonstrated by the fact that one of the fiercest opponents of the 
Declaration of Paris was John Stuart Mill, who among other things criticised such detachment 
of free trade from the fate of the state: 
Nations at war with nations, but their merchants and shipowners at peace; our own merchants 
driving a roaring trade with the enemies whose resources we were endeavouring to cripple, 
and contributing, perhaps, a great part of their revenue. Some persons think that this would 
be a great improvement, that it would be a gain to humanity if war were confined to what 
they call a duel between Governments – a strange gain to humanity if the merchants, 
manufacturers, and agriculturists of the world lost nothing by a state of war, and had no 
pecuniary interest in preventing it except the increase of their taxes... How war is to be 





The Declaration of Paris, nonetheless, was in accord with principles of the laissez-
faire liberalism of the mid-19
th
 Century. It reflected early liberals’ distrust of governments, 
which were held fully responsible for almost all wars, and their conviction that free trade 
alone could secure international peace. Liberalism of the time called for ‘as little intercourse 
as possible between Governments, as much connection as possible between the nations of the 
world’.
136




 centuries, when laissez faire ceased 
to be a sacrosanct liberal norm, vested interests of large capitalists, instead of governments, 
came to be recognised from liberal positions as the main cause of wars and imperial 
expansion. Governments were now required to get involved in economic affairs and 
redistribute resources to state welfare policies, such as health, education, or national 
insurance. Yet, does this all mean that laissez faire liberalism and New Liberalism have 
nothing in common but the name? Arguably, this is not the case. Regarding the point in 
question, various strains of liberalism might have differed in the understanding of the role of 
the state, but there has always been a common liberal ground, abstract principles upon which 
particular, historically contingent, norms may be built. Thus, when looking from the 
perspective of the liberal tradition as a whole, the Declaration of Paris may be interpreted as a 
result of at least one shared liberal principle – the assumption that the state is not a moral end. 
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The state has its clearly delimited scope of power in relation to both the individual and 
humankind as a whole. 
Varieties of norms 
The case of the Declaration of Paris also shows that a distinction needs to be made 
between different kinds of norms, or, rather say, imperatives. The terms ‘principle’, ‘norm’ 
and ‘rule’ are sometimes used in order to differentiate the character of the beliefs. Since no 
convention exists regarding the proper definition of these terms, in this research a 
conceptualisation by Stephen D. Krasner will be followed.
137
 According to his 
conceptualisation, principles, norms and rules are distinct entities. The term ‘principle’ refers 
to very abstract assumptions that are supposed to morally legitimise the purposes which 
actors are expected to pursue. Norms are generalised standards of behaviour defined in terms 
of rights and obligations. Rules refer to relatively specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
action.
138
 To illustrate the difference, Gregory Raymond gives an example of the laws of war:  
the laws of war have been influenced by the principle of humanity, which prohibits any 
military force not required for defeating an enemy. An international norm based on this 
principle is the admonition against weapons that cause superfluous injury and needless 





Utilising this conceptualisation, the examination of the liberal tradition in the 
following chapter is concerned almost exclusively with principles. The concept of liberal 
ideology, then, will stand for a set of principles which constitute a common ground of the 
liberal tradition and are relevant to the issue of defence and military policy. The aim of the 
case studies is to observe the process of transforming the principles into specific norms, rules 
and also policies and institutions.  
Admittedly, the difference between the types of imperatives is not always absolutely 
clear. As Robert Keohane notes, ‘it is difficult if not impossible to tell the difference between 
an “implicit rule” of broad significance and a well-understood, relatively specific operating 
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 Nonetheless, it is not so important for this thesis to draw a clear dividing line 
between principles, norms and rules. It suffices to emphasise that the examination of the 
liberal tradition in the following chapter should reveal rather general assumptions or 
imperatives which are, or became, independent of a particular historical or social context. An 
application of such principles in the form of norms and rules will be examined in the case 
studies afterwards. 
And finally, for the moment, it is also worth noting that principles may be understood 
as ‘beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude’.
141
 As such they are supposed to furnish moral 
legitimisation to an actor’s behaviour. Yet, a more nuanced understanding of how ideological 
principles work may be useful. Mark Warren describes three basic ideological mechanisms: 
justification, reification and dissimulation. As for the first mechanism, ideologies justify 
some practices or arrangements if they identify them as right, proper and good. Regarding 
reification, ideologies may naturalise or reify historically contingent arrangements and 
practices. It may be recognised that existing arrangements are not absolutely right, but 
reification makes rightness irrelevant – it effectively ossifies them. Last but not least, through 
the dissimulating mechanism ideologies may justify situations by misidentifying them, often 
by equating particular conditions with an ideal.
142
 Warren’s description should make us 
aware, and serve as a cautionary reminder, that ideologies and ideological principles may 
operate in various ways. When examining the liberal tradition, the principles that are looked 
for should be understood in their full breadth. The principles do not only positively stipulate 
what is good and what is wrong; they also can curtail a spectrum of relevant options or lead 
to particular ways of (mis)interpretation of a situation. 
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Liberal Principles on the Military 
Liberal ideology is understood here as an ethical and normative system which was 





 The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is, through analysis of political and 
ethical thinking of the Enlightenment, the 19
th 
Century, and partly also of the 20
th
 Century, to 
identify the basic liberal principles that, although having originated before the beginning of 
the 20
th
 Century, may determine defence policy and military organisation nowadays. 
Although it may be plausible to say with Greener that liberalism is quite a wide-ranging 
philosophical tradition and contains potential contradictions between various liberal norms;
2
 
the analysis in this chapter is designed to uncover the most relevant common threads in 
liberal political and ethical thinking. 
This chapter is structured so as to follow three levels of analysis. The first main 
section is concerned with the liberal ideas about humanity as a whole. In particular, the 
overarching topic of this section is the concept of cosmopolitan morality and universal 
justice. The second section deals with political thinking about the relationship between armed 
forces and liberal-democratic society. Specifically, it is the issue of militarism and 
militarisation of society that underlines in this section the discussion on liberal attitudes to the 
standing armies, militias and universal conscription. The ethical issues concerning the 
conflict between the rights and freedoms of the individual and military service is the topic of 
the last section. Conscientious objection and obligation to service and to obey orders are the 
main issues of the last part of this chapter. 
Armed Forces and Humanity 
One of the constitutive features of liberalism lies in its moral commitment to the 
individual as well as to humankind as a whole. Implications of the commitment to the 
individual are presented in the third section of this chapter, nonetheless, the moral concept of 
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mankind and humanity, which is discussed in this section, is inseparable from the liberal 
belief in individuality. ‘Moral rights and duties’, stated Leonard T. Hobhouse, ‘are founded 
on relations between man and man, and therefore applicable to all humanity.’
3
 Every single 
person is a member of a universal community of mankind, regardless of one’s citizenship, 
and as such everyone enjoys some moral rights and is subject to certain duties. Existence of 
the universal community means, in the words of Immanuel Kant, that ‘violation of right at 
any one place on the earth is felt in all places.’
4
 
Moreover, for the ability of each individual to be, or become, a rational being the 
universal community is naturally peaceful and harmonious or, at least, is bound by nature to 
ultimately develop harmony and perpetual peace. Despite the fact that empirical observation 
frequently shows the contrary, this notion is not merely a normative appeal; rather, liberalism 
insists that peace and harmony is a logical and necessary implication of people’s rationality 
and thus it is just a matter of time until the universal community of people would remove the 
last obstacles to perpetual peace and be fully able to realise humankind’s natural 
predisposition. Reinhold Niebuhr, an American theologian, understood this liberal optimism 
as a result of the Enlightenment rejection of the Christian doctrine of original sin. As a 
consequence of this rejection, whenever liberals ‘are confronted with the divisive and 
corrosive effects of man’s self-love, they look for some immediate cause of this perennial 
tendency’.
5







 and the false concept of the state.
9
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Progress and improvement 
Yet the moral unity of mankind, human rationality and peacefulness is unconceivable 
unless a particular threshold of progressive social development has been passed. Kant 
considered the history of mankind as a continuous progressive development from ‘the lawless 
state of savagery’ through an imperfect law-governed state towards a perfect constitutional 
arrangement on the domestic as well as the international level. ‘One can regard the history of 
the human species at large as the realization of a concealed plan of nature, meant to bring into 
being an internally and, to this end, externally perfect state constitution, as the only condition 
in which nature can fully develop all of its predisposition in humankind.’
10
 Until the very end 
of human progress is achieved, perpetual peace, harmony of interests and genuine moral 
unity of humankind cannot be taken for granted. 
In 1989 Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the end of history in the sense that the end of 
the Cold War marked ‘the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’.
11
 The 
constitutional form that recognises and protects universal rights to individual freedom and 
allows a government to exercise its power only with the consent of the governed is asserted to 
be the necessary aim of each society’s development. Such a statement, however, also reveals 
a perceived inequality between advanced liberal-democratic societies and the other, less 
developed peoples; a hierarchical view which is inherent in liberal political thinking. Liberal 
thinkers tend to make a distinction between advanced – civilised, liberal and democratic – 
states, on the one hand, and backward – savage, nonliberal and ‘outlawed’ – states, on the 
other. 
In that sense, John Stuart Mill drew a clear line between civilised and uncivilised 
(savage and barbarous) peoples. Civilised peoples, in Mill’s view, are distinct, among other 
things, by their ability to cooperate for common purposes and by such an arrangement of 
society that protects individual rights and property of its members. In savage communities, on 
the other hand, each person is said to rely on himself and ‘trusts to his own strength or 
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cunning’. Moreover, among savages is seldom seen ‘any joint operations carried on by the 
union of many’.
12
 This concept of civilisation and other claims of Mill’s liberal imperialism 
have since then become, in terms of politically correct discourse, unacceptable. However, as 
Brett Bowden notes, the classical standard of civilisation was replaced by two successors – 
‘standard of human rights’ and a ‘standard of modernity’.
13
 Analogous to Mill’s concept thus 
may be, for instance, John Rawls’s distinction between ‘well-ordered’ and ‘not well-ordered’ 
peoples. Although Rawls’s category of ‘well-ordered’ peoples reaches beyond liberal-
democratic countries (also includes ‘decent constitutional hierarchies’), respect to human 
rights and wide participation in political decision making is the main characteristic that 
distinguishes the ‘well ordered’ peoples from ‘not well-ordered’.
14
  
Despite the fact that the community of mankind is universal and imposes moral rights 
and duties on every human being, there is a significant difference between rights and duties 
possessed by advanced/civilised states and societies, however ‘standards of civilisation’ are 
formulated, and by peoples who have not attained those standards. In comparison with the 
former, the latter’s rights of state sovereignty and non-interference is considerably limited. 
‘To suppose that the same international customs, and the same rules of international morality, 
can obtain between one civilized nation and another, and between civilized nations and 
barbarians, is a grave error’, maintained Mill.
15
 Insufficient progress of a society may warrant 
interference into domestic affairs of the very society and in some extreme cases may even 
justify military intervention with the purpose to improve the standards of civilisation, or 
currently rather the standards of human rights. In fact, some scholars, such as Beate Jahn, 
argue that the liberal belief in the nature of non-liberal societies, which has accompanied 
liberal thinking since the British involvement in India, through the Cold War and beyond its 
end, is inseparable from and constantly supports the tendency of liberalism towards 
interventionism.
16
 Therefore, except for the language used, present-day liberalism may be in 
accord with Mill’s statement that 
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nations which are still barbarous have not got beyond the period during which it is likely to 
be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners. 
Independence and nationality, so essential to the due growth and development of a people 
further advanced in improvement, are generally impediments to theirs. The sacred duties 
which civilized nations owe to the independence and nationality of each other, are not 
binding towards those to whom nationality and independence are either a certain evil, or at 
best a questionable good.... barbarians have no rights as a nation, except a right to such 




Yet it is important to stress that liberalism is generally hostile towards the use of 
violence in order to achieve positive goods, such as social progress in this case. A good 
intention to improve a social order of other peoples, insisted Kant, ‘cannot wash away the 
stain of injustice in the means to attain them’.
18
 The use of violence should always be a 
response to a previous aggression, as it is to be discussed below. However, although the level 
of social progress is measured primarily with regard to internal conditions of a society, it is 
considered inseparable from external behaviour. If an order within a society is regarded 
unjust or inappropriate, doubts also arouse about sociability of the society on the international 
level. ‘Because nonliberal governments are perceived to be in a state of aggression with their 
own people’, Michael Doyle explains, ‘their foreign relations become, for liberal 
governments, deeply suspect’.
19
 In accordance with Doyle’s explanation Rawls claims that 
‘outlaw states’, a category within the group of ‘not well-ordered peoples’, ‘are aggressive and 
dangerous; all peoples are safer and more secure if such states change, or are forced to 
change, their ways’.
20
 Mill highlighted implications of the suspicion when noting that a 
‘civilized government cannot help having barbarous neighbours: when it has, it cannot 
always content itself with a defensive position, one of mere resistance to aggression’.
21
 Thus, 
from the liberal perspective, internal and external behaviour of backward societies is assumed 
as almost inseparable and, therefore, the overall backwardness of such societies may in the 
most extreme cases serve as a justification of a liberal military intervention. 
This interventionist tendency of liberal societies is, moreover, facilitated by the 
presumed military superiority over backward peoples. The assumption that military power is 
dependent on social progress was very explicitly pronounced by both James and J.S. Mill. 
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James Mill considered the military competence as one of the first tests of emerging 
civilisation: ‘one of the first applications of knowledge is to improve the military art’.
22
 J.S. 
Mill emphasised the aspect of cooperation when stating: 
Consider even war, the most serious business of a barbarous people; see what a figure rude 
nations, or semi-civilized and enslaved nations, have made against civilized ones, from 
Marathon downwards. Why? Because discipline is more powerful than numbers, and 




To J.S. Mill, cooperation was the most accurate test of the progress. Cooperation was 
essential for social and economic life and so acquired capability to work with others in large 
groups was seen to be fully transferable to warfare too. Neither Kant had any doubts about 
military improvement based upon progress. With regard to progress of a social order and 
constitution of a state, he assumed a dependency between a military power of a state and a 
level of freedom and respect to human rights within the state – ‘the threat of war is also today 
the only thing that moderates despotism’.
24
 Furthermore, Kant conceived the human progress 
as a way from original natural conditions towards the rule of human reason and creativity. In 
this light, military competences were not seen as a natural gift; on the contrary, because the 
nature had provided people with ‘neither the bull’s horns, nor the lion’s claws, nor the dog’s 
teeth, but only hands’, military skills and capabilities ‘were intended to be entirely products 
of their own efforts’.
25
 Thus, despite the fact that liberal societies present themselves as 
essentially peaceful, liberalism renders them relatively confident about their military power in 
comparison with backward societies. 
Yet, the use of military force is only one part of the overall effort if a military 
intervention into a backward non-liberal state actually occurs. The perceived inequality, 
moral as well as military, between advanced liberal and backward non-liberal societies 
imposes duty on the former to help the latter in their improvement. ‘The long-term goal of 
(relatively) well-ordered societies should be to bring burdened societies, like outlaw states, 
into the Society of well-ordered Peoples’, Rawls claims. ‘Well-ordered peoples have a duty to 
assist burdened societies.’
26
 Military force itself is not regarded as a just and proper means to 
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this end; however, it is sometimes rendered necessary by the perceived danger posed by the 
backward states. Therefore, if military force is deployed into a backward state, it should 
always be followed by other instruments that are more capable then the military forces to 
bring social improvement. 
The state vis-a-vis humanity 
Most of the consequences of the inequality in social progress and improvement are 
related to the state, particularly, related to the state rights as a member of international 
society. Full rights should be granted only to those states whose social and constitutional 
order is sufficiently advanced in protection of human rights and political participation. Yet, 
this is not to say that the concept of the state in its advanced form would be unproblematic or 
uncontested. Liberal thinkers significantly varied in their emphasis on the state. Thus Norman 
Angell regarded the state as merely ‘particular administrative conditions under which they 
[people] may live’.
27
 On the other hand, for Kant, a completely just civic society was the 
ultimate end, to which also the achievement of perpetual peace was subordinated. ‘The 
problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is dependent upon the problem of a law-




Important here is that essential in the liberal thinking is that the state is no absolute 
whole. So as to demonstrate the distinctiveness of this liberal notion, we may contrast it with 
some notably different philosophical systems, particularly with Hegel’s philosophy of state 
and right and the tradition of positive international law represented by Emerich de Vattel. 
Contrary to the liberal view, Hegel understood the state as universality, as the ‘individual’ 
that possesses the last word in defining what is just and, therefore, cannot be subjected to any 
higher international law. ‘[S]ince the sovereignty of a state is the principle of its relations to 
others, states are to that extent in a state of nature in relation to each other. Their rights are 
actualised only in their particular wills and not in a universal will with constitutional powers 
over them.’
29
 In this point Hegel agreed with the school of positive international law. Its 
prominent proponent Emerich de Vattel also rejected a chimerical concept of a supreme 
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world community of states and insisted upon full and absolute sovereignty of the state and 
legal equality of all sovereign states.
30
 
In the liberal view, the state has its clearly delimited scope and therefore it might be 
easily claimed that the liberal state is not sovereign but by name. Above its ‘sovereign’ 
legislative power there are two other legal, or at least moral, systems. As Kant explained, 
those are, first, international law ‘governing the relations of states among one another (ius 
gentium)’ and, second, a juridical system ‘based on cosmopolitan right, to the extent that 
individuals and states, who are related externally by the mutual exertion of influence on each 
other, are to be regarded as citizens of a universal state of humankind (ius 
cosmopoliticum).’
31
 It is worth reiterating that, whereas benefits of the international law may 
be enjoyed only by those states which voluntarily subjugate themselves to the international 
law, cosmopolitan rights are possessed by every member of mankind. In that sense it is 
understandable that John Stuart Mill in his ‘A Few Words on Non-intervention’ 
circumscribed the duty to respect independence and rights of each other exclusively to 
nations ‘of the same, or something like the same, degree of civilization’. International law, as 
he noted, implies reciprocity. ‘But barbarians will not reciprocate.’ Therefore, the only ‘moral 
law for the relation between a civilized and a barbarous government, are the universal rules 
of morality between man and man.’
32
 These universal rules, nonetheless, are valid and should 
be observed by everyone unconditionally. 
Just war 
The acceptance of international law and cosmopolitan morality necessarily means that 
war as a duel or trial is outlawed. War must be, therefore, either a crime or an act of justice, 
for there is no middle way.
33
 Liberalism abhors the concept of war as a kind of extra-judicial 
mechanism to decide disputes, as a mechanism entirely independent of law and justice. As it 
has already been shown, Hegel and Vattel, among others, considered the concept of 
international justice impracticable because of the lack of sovereign power above states. In 
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addition to that, the concept of just war, in the view of Vattel, was dangerous for the entire 
international society and Hegel considered it false or even unjust. Thus Vattel warned that  
... since each Nation claims to have justice on its side, it will arrogate to itself all the rights of 
war and claim that its enemy has none, that his hostilities are but deeds of robbery, acts in 
violation of the Law of Nations, and deserving of punishment by all nations. The decision of 
the rights at issue will not be advanced thereby, and the contest will become more cruel, 
more disastrous in its effects, and more difficult of termination.... The justice or injustice of 
the cause does not come into the question in this matter. There would be no stability of 
possession, and no security in trading with the belligerents, if it were permissible to 
distinguish between a just and an unjust war, so as to attribute legality to the effects of the 





For the same reasons also Carl Schmitt appreciated the positive law of war. He maintained 
that the ‘classical martial law’ has well earned this name on account of the fact that it 
‘recognizes clear distinctions, above all between war and peace, combatants and non-
combatants, enemy and criminal.’ He especially pointed out that war was supposed to be 
conducted between ‘standard-bearers of a jus belli who respect each other at war as enemies 
and do not treat one another as criminals, so that a peace treaty becomes possible and even 
remains the normal, mutually accepted end of war.’
35
 
Hegel, in comparison with Vattel and Schmitt, was less worried about the material 
consequences of application of justice at the international level. On the other hand, he insisted 
that rights and justice had always subjective meaning and since there was no subject above 
the state, the articulation of what was right and just completely rested on the discretion of the 
state: 
Each party grounds its behaviour on rights and accuses the other of an infringement of a 
right.... each party claims to have right on its side; and both parties are right. It is just the 
rights themselves which come into contradiction with one another.... Thus war, or the like, 
has now to decide, not which of the rights alleged by the two parties is the genuine right – 
since both parties have a genuine right – but which of the two rights is to give way. War, or 
whatever it may be, has to decide this, precisely because both contradictory rights were 
equally genuine; thus a third thing, i.e. war, must make them unequal so that they can be 
unified, and this happens when one gives way to the other.
36
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Despite the fact that Hegel did not contemplate the material consequences of the just war 
concept, Hegel’s philosophy can be read as a prevention against moral harm being an effect 
of war. Thus Shlomo Avineri stresses that, according to Hegel, the ‘outcome of any given 
war is by itself neutral to the problem of justice or justification’. Hegel’s thinking thus not at 
all adopted the maxim of ‘might is right’.
37
 
The liberal concept of just war does not oppose the positivist concept of war as 
articulated by Vattel as strongly as it may seem. Vattel tried to prevent such situations in 
which justice, ill-defined or in its very broad sense, would be pursued by the means of war. 
On this point Kant agreed with Vattel. As Gallie points out, Kant, despite his contempt to 
Vattel’s teaching, was in agreement with him that nothing but confusion and harm resulted 
from regarding any wars as just or punitive.
38
 Not a vague idea of justice but peace should be 
the aim of liberal just war. Only defence against aggression may legitimise a use of force in 
international relations. Yet, among liberal thinkers a great variety of views has occurred as to 
what sort of use of force can be justified as a legitimate defence against an aggressor. 
Thus in a conceptualisation offered by Martin Ceadel, the attitudes of most liberal 
thinkers towards war may be described as ‘pacific-ism’ and, by no means rarely, also as 
‘crusading’.
39
 Liberals traditionally denounced real-political practices of balance of power 
with occasional utilisation of war to restore the balance. The ‘pacific-ist’ character of 
liberalism means that liberal thinkers usually viewed war as a distasteful, though conceivable, 
possibility.
40
 Military means are hence acknowledged as the last resort in case of being under 
imminent threat. In accordance with that principle Kant expected that citizens should ‘protect 
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themselves and their country from attacks from the outside’.
41
 As Gallie notes, Kant 
understood self-defence as a natural reaction, essential in life; however, this act in itself does 
nothing to positively advance the cause of perpetual peace.
42
 Jeremy Bentham, who shared 
with Kant the belief that lasting peace needs to be established in a non-violent process, was 
another who advocated the legitimacy of a defensive use of force: ‘Defence is a fair ground 
for war... The Quaker’s [pacifist] objection cannot stand. What a fine thing it would have 
been for Buonaparte to have had to do with Quaker nations.’
43
  
Some liberal pacific-ists may limit the use of force to self-defence. This is probably 
what Bentham, Cobden and others had in mind when they called for no foreign politics and 
non-intervention. But a more common attitude is to regard defence of another nation as, also, 
a legitimate use of military force. Hence Kant stipulated that ‘the states which neighbour one 
another are obliged to emerge’ from an anarchical state of war and to establish a league of 
states in order to ‘protect one another against attacks from outside’.
44
 Similarly, J.S. Mill 
believed that military intervention conducted with the purpose ‘to enforce non-intervention is 
always rightful, always moral’ and he expected the coalescence of ‘an alliance of free 




In addition, since the use of military violence in defence of other nations was accepted 
by the vast majority of liberal thinkers as legitimate, indeed quite often regarded as a moral 
obligation, the notion of an international police force should be recognised as a liberal 
concept. The idea of an international police force was advocated in the interwar period, 1919-
39, for instance, by Lord David Davies, who endowed the Woodrow Wilson Chair in 
International Relations at Aberystwyth in 1919. In Davies’s view, ‘the problem is not how to 
abolish [armed force], but how to use it. Force can only be rightly employed when it has been 
scientifically organised as the sanction of international law in the form of an international 
police force.’
46
 Although the establishment of an international armed force has remained a 
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controversial issue up to the present, Lord Davies’s view provides us with a means by which 
to understand/conceptualise the liberal attitude towards the military. Davies insisted that the 
military is either ‘a servant of justice or the tool of policy. It cannot serve two masters.’
47
 
There can be no doubt that liberalism would clearly prefer armed forces as a servant of justice 
rather than a tool of policy, rather a kind of benign international constabulary than a proper 
military. 
The rejection of the armed forces as a tool of policy in favour of the concept of a 
police force also raises the question of to what extent the armed forces should be obedient to 
the government of the state. A domestic police in a law-governed country is usually 
subordinated to the governmental authority as far as its organisation is concerned, but in 
terms of exercise of the police function, it must abide only by the authority of law. 
Analogously then, the police-like armed forces are supposed to obey governmental 
commands only as long as these accord with the domestic constitution, international law and 
probably also some elementary sense of cosmopolitan justice. Any possible clash between the 
authority of government and the authority of justice can be hardly imagined if the armed 
forces are engaged in an act of self-defence or in a clear case of assistance to another nation’s 
defence. However, liberalism is not entirely hostile to each kind of proactive military 
engagement – the most controversial one may be called a crusade. In fact, it may be argued 
that crusading is inherent in liberal political thinking.
48
 Situations in which the will of the 
government of the day clashes with the principles of cosmopolitan justice are, therefore, quite 
easily conceivable. 
According to the conceptualisation of Ceadel, ‘crusading’ shares with ‘pacific-ism’, 
and also ‘defencism’, its abhorrence of war. Hence crusading is most of the time 
indistinguishable from the latter attitudes. Yet crusading means that an aggressive war can be 
under certain circumstances justifiable – the conditions being a necessity to promote by the 
means of war either order or justice and thus preserve peace in the longer term. As the British 
Prime Minister Herbert H. Asquith put it in 1917, the Allies were ‘waging, not only a war for 
peace, but a war against war’.
49
 Crusading thus justifies war for the sake of peace.
50
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The aims of a liberal crusade possibly may be to establish a new peaceful 
international system or to achieve the liberation of another nation from oppression by a 
despotic ruler. From the liberal perspective, however, neither of these aims is uncontroversial. 
Liberal thinkers usually made a great effort to avoid offering any systematic or doctrinal 
support of crusading. On the other hand, crusading is by definition an irregular activity, 
something which is rather difficult to prescribe in an abstract way. Thus as for the former 
kind of crusade, the First World War may serve as an example. The war did not at all break 
out as a crusade. It was transformed into an attempt to establish a new peaceful international 
system in the later part of the War when the USA came in. So US President Woodrow Wilson 
declared on 2 April 1917 that the USA would be fighting ‘for a universal dominion of right 
by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the 
world itself at last free.’
51
 But to reiterate, this straightforward declaration of a crusade was 
made almost three years after the outbreak of the war and thus it was meant to give meaning 
to the bloodshed that had already been made. 
Crusading is thus rather more an occasional but periodic liberal practice than a liberal 
theory. Liberal thinkers displayed a great caution over the question of the use of violence for 
a good cause. So Kant, on the one hand, maintained that the idea of coercion to create and 
sustain perpetual peace is both logically and practically an absurdity and insisted on complete 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of every state.
52
 On the other hand, Kant also 
supported an enforced change of government as a legitimate aim of war against an ‘unjust 
enemy’. A vanquished unjust enemy, according to Kant, might be forced to accept ‘a new 




Whether a crusade or not, any war so as to be just in the liberal view should be 
somewhat defensive.
54
 Aggression is always a crime and liberal people are supposed to act as 
policemen, not criminals. This is an inviolable principle of the liberal jus ad bellum. That 
liberalism may actually justify quite a variety of possible military actions rests upon the fact 
that an aggression may be defined rather loosely. Thus J.S. Mill stipulated the principle of 
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non-intervention. No nation, in his view, should be allowed to interfere in domestic affairs of 
another nation. But this rule had some exceptions. One of them was ‘the case of a people 
struggling against a foreign yoke, or against a native tyranny upheld by foreign arms’.
55
 In 
that case an aggression had already been committed by the other foreign power which 
prevented the people from liberating themselves by their own powers. This is not to say, 
however, that only the presence of foreign arms represented an act of aggression. Mill also 
understood a popular uprising against a native despot who is without external support as a 
form of popular self-defence against the aggressive behaviour of the authoritarian ruler.
56
 His 
reluctance to intervene in such a case rested chiefly on the belief that the internal situation in 
a war-torn country could never be crystal clear to an external actor and hence the conflict 
might serve as a kind of fair trial whether the popular uprising is truly popular. Despite this 
qualification of Mill, the present-day concept of humanitarian intervention may be seen as 
akin to Mill’s ideas. Dictators or despots who through superior security organisations and 
modern armed forces commit atrocities against their own people can be accused of 
committing the act of aggression against those very people and, therefore, international 
society should feel morally obliged, if need be, to intervene.  
Humanitarian intervention was originally, in legalist terms, meant to stop ‘acts that 
shock conscience of mankind’ and thus warranted disregard to sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the intervened state. Upon this international law’s appeal to ‘conscience of 
humankind’ is built liberal justification of humanitarian intervention too. Commitment to 
humanity and from that following respect to human rights of every single human being 
establishes a moral obligation to defend these rights if being violated. ‘If human beings are 
deprived of their capacity to pursue their autonomous projects, then others owe a duty of 
beneficence owed to rational persons’, posits Tesón. ‘The serious violation of human rights 
generates obligations on others.’
57
 So modern liberal theorists of humanitarian intervention 
tend to agree that gross and massive violation of fundamental human rights warrants a duty, 
not merely a right, to intervene and forcefully defend these rights against any wrongdoer.  
                                                 
55
 Mill, "A few words on non-intervention (1859)," 263. 
56
 ‘... when a nation, in her own defence, has gone to war with a despot, and has had the rare good fortune not 
only to succeed in her resistance...’ Ibid.: 262. Emphasis added 
57
 Tesón, "The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention," 7-8. In a similar vein Carla Bagnoli articulates a 
Kantian argument for humanitarian intervention: ‘Defending human rights is a duty of respect because 
human rights are claims persons have as persons... Recognizing humanity in others amounts to respecting 
their freedom and obstructing and action meant to curb their freedom.’ Carla Bagnoli, "Humanitarian 
Intervention as a Perfect Duty: a Kantian Argument," Nomos, no. 47 (2004): 126-27. (Original emphasis) 
70 
 
Yet, there remains the question whose duty it is. Carla Bagnoli, adamant though she is 
about humanitarian intervention’s being a perfect duty, concludes that a humanitarian cause 
imposes no burdensome responsibility on any particular state. Instead, she argues that ‘since 
the perfect duty falls on the moral community as such, and not on specific states, an 
international agency would best represent such community’.
58
 Walzer is in accord with 
Bagnoli when saying that the impossibility to assign responsibility to one particular country 
yields best to multilateral solutions; however, if there is no effective 
international/supranational agent, Walzer puts forward another principle for assigning 
responsibility to execute humanitarian intervention: ‘Who can, should’. In the cases of mass 
murder and ethnic cleansing, any state which is capable enough to help should help.
59
 Much 
similarity with these liberal principles is shown in the report of the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect. The report states that 
the ‘international responsibility to protect’ falls, in the first place, on the United Nations 
Security Council. However, if the Security Council ‘fails to discharge its responsibility to 
protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may not rule 
out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation’.
60
 
At this point it should be clarified whom liberal thinkers considered an opponent in 
liberal just wars. First, to reiterate, the opponent was regarded as a criminal rather than a just 
enemy and, second, as the case of aggression committed by a despot against his own people 
shows, the criminals were supposed to be identified as concrete persons or clearly defined 
groups of persons, not a nation as a whole. The latter point has, inter alia, important 
implications for the liberal approach to the jus in bello, which will be discussed below. 
Regarding the former point, Kant defined an ‘unjust enemy’ as ‘the enemy whose 
publicly declared will (be it through words or deeds) betrays a maxim which, if it were made 
into a general rule, would make peace among the peoples impossible and would instead 
perpetuate the state of nature’.
61
 Thus provided that perpetual peace is an end embraced by all 
mankind, the moral inferiority of a so defined ‘unjust enemy’ is beyond doubt. That contrasts, 
however, with other philosophical systems, such as that of Hegel. To Hegel, each state sought 
recognition of its individuality and identity by its peers. That identity might be developed 
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through constant opposition and enmity, rather than by friendship.
62
 ‘[T]he state is an 
individual, and individuality essentially implies negation’, wrote Hegel. ‘Hence even if a 
number of states make themselves into a family, this group as an individual must engender an 
opposite and create an enemy.’
63
 Moreover, the act of war is, according to Hegel, by 
definition an act of recognition. ‘It happens of course that a state against which war is 
actually being waged is not recognized; but in reality it is recognized by the very fact that war 
is waged against it’.
64
 
Jus in bello 
The reason why the positivist international law school insisted on moral equality of 
states was to mitigate war’s consequences on people. As it was already said, Vattel dreaded 
the idea of war against an outlawed enemy because ‘the contest will become more cruel, 
more disastrous in its effects’.
65
 From the positivist viewpoint, since waging war did not 
constitute a violation of international law, neither belligerent party was outlawed and, 
therefore, each party remained committed to the rules regulating combat – jus in bello. ‘A 
lawful end confers a right only to those means which are necessary to attain that end’, Vattel 
articulated the general principle of the jus in bello. ‘Whatever is done in excess of such 
measures is contrary to the natural law, and must be condemned as evil before the tribunal of 
conscience.’
66
 A direct implication of this principle is that violence should not be used 
against non-combatants, such as women and children, and also soldiers who gave themselves 
up and therefore pose no threat any more.  
As far as these general rules are concerned, no significant difference existed between 
the positivist and liberal approach to the jus in bello. Despite the criminalisation of an 
opponent, liberals managed to maintain a prominent commitment to the rules regulating the 
conduct of war. This fact may illustrate the first modern, and liberal, codification of the law 
of war, the so called ‘Lieber’s Code’, which was issued by the US Government during the 
American Civil War: ‘Treating, in the field, the rebellious enemy according to the law and 
usages of war has never prevented a legitimate government from trying the leaders of the 
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rebellion or chief rebels for high treason, and from treating them accordingly’.
67
 The 
difference, however, emerges when looking at reasons for establishing and observing the 
rules. 
In the positivist legal system that was proposed by Vattel war was waged between 
entire nations/states. ‘These two nations are therefore enemies, and all the subjects of one 
Nation are enemies of all the subjects of the other’. This rule applied also to women and 
children. ‘Since women and children are subjects of the State and members of the Nation, 
they should be counted as enemies. But that does not mean that they may be treated as men 
who bear arms or are capable of doing so.’ Women and children were supposed to be spared 
because as non-combatants they did not pose any threat or resistance to a military advance. 
The military violence was meant to be only a means and therefore the only legitimate target 




Making this distinction was an essential part of a liberal conduct of warfare too. But 
in the liberal case the reason for this discrimination did not rest merely on the fact that 
civilians did not pose a military threat. As we have already said, the genuine enemy is only a 
limited group of people who bore responsibility for causing the war. All other classes of 
citizens of the enemy state are not regarded as guilty by the crime of aggression. As Micheal 
Walzer stated in his seminal book on just wars, ‘civilians on both sides are innocent, equally 
innocent, and never legitimate military targets’.
69
 Walzer’s idea has been a recurring theme 
throughout the liberal philosophical tradition. Thus John Locke insisted that no punishment 
can be inflicted on any but those responsible for the war
70
 and, moreover, he argued that, 
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when it came to compensations for the damages caused by war, the innocent citizens of the 
vanquished aggressive state have a strong counter-claim over the winning side that fought for 
a just cause.
71
 In a clear and explicit way this idea was expressed by Kant too. He stated: 
 ‘It is allowed in war to demand exactions and contributions from the defeated enemy, but 
one may not plunder the people, that is, take forcibly from individuals what is their own (for 
that would be robbery, since it was not the defeated people, but rather the state that rules the 




Both Locke and Kant seem to suggest that citizens of the state which committed a 
crime of aggression were victims of the crime to the same extent as the people in the 
offended state. The citizens of the aggressive state were misused as an instrument of the 
crime. This claim might be applicable especially for soldiers. Thus, as Walzer explains, ‘the 
moral status of individual soldiers on both sides is very much the same: they are led to fight 
by their loyalty to their own states and by their lawful obedience.... they are not criminals; 
they face one another as moral equals.’
73
 
The liberal position in the jus in bello debate has been comprehensively summarised 
by John Rawls and thus it is worth quoting him at length: 
‘In the conduct of war, a democratic society must carefully distinguish three groups: the 
state’s leaders and officials, its soldiers, and its civilian population. The reason for these 
distinctions rests on the principle of responsibility: since the state fought against is not 
democratic, the civilian members of the society cannot be those who organized and brought 
on the war. This was done by its leaders and officials assisted by other elites who control and 
staff the state apparatus. They are responsible, they willed the war, and doing that, they are 
criminals. But civilians, often kept in ignorance and swayed by state propaganda, are not.... 
As for soldiers, they, just as civilians, and leaving aside the upper ranks of an officer class, 
are not responsible for the war, but are conscripted or in other way forced into it, their 
patriotism often cruelly and cynically exploited. The grounds on which they may be attacked 
directly are not that they are responsible for the war but that a democratic people cannot 




Rawls correctly stresses the traditional liberal assumptions about the proper conduct of war. 
The enemy society should not be considered as an undifferentiated whole; in the first place, it 
needs to be distinguished who is responsible for the war and who is innocent. Only leaders of 
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the state, top officials and top commanders of the army can bear guilt for the crime of 
aggression, considering their actual power in the decision-making. The other classes – 
civilians and soldiers – are supposed to be innocent. Hence civilians are in every case 
illegitimate targets and soldiers can be attacked only on the ground of strategic necessity. 
In terms of practical applicability, the liberal rules of the proper conduct of war do not 
appear significantly different from the rules introduced by Vattel and other positivist lawyers. 
Yet, one considerable difference may be found in the use of the term ‘necessity’. The 
positivist international law school prohibited the use of violence against non-combatants on 
the ground that such violence is not necessary to achieve the military aims. The liberal 
thinking tended to stress, that military necessity may justify the use of violence against 
soldiers. Therefore, the logic of the positivist school could more easily justify less 
discriminating and more ruthless use of force, provided it being considered necessary. In this 
vein, the 19
th
 Century chief of the Prusso-German Great General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke 
the Elder, argued that the ‘greatest kindness in war is to bring it to a speedy conclusion. It 





The difference between the positivist and liberal approach to the proper conduct of 
war becomes more apparent in instances of guerrilla warfare. Since the conventional, written 
law of war necessarily rests entirely upon clear distinctions between war and peace and 
combatant and non-combatant, guerrilla warfare is a rather tough case. In his essay on The 
Theory of a Partisan Carl Schmitt noted that, as far as the classical positive law of war is 
concerned, there is no place for the partisan. He ‘represents an especially abhorrent criminal, 
who stands outside the law and is, thus, hors la loi. So long as war retained a whiff of 
chivalry, of duelling with pistols, it could hardly be otherwise.’
76
 In addition, the existence of 
partisans was said to prevent a tamed and regulated war and unleashed a genuine enmity that, 
according to the Clausewitzian logic of the abstract war, inevitably escalates to complete 
elimination. ‘The modern partisan expects neither justice nor mercy from his enemy. He has 
turned away from the conventional enmity of the contained war and given himself up to 
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another – the real – enmity that rises through terror and counter-terror, up to annihilation.’
77
 
Hence, to Schmitt, the idea of a partisan is incompatible with the concept of limited hostility 
regulated by the law of war. Despite the fact that the Hague Conventions tried to incorporate 
the idea of an irregular combatant into the legal system, Schmitt’s claim that genuine 
guerrillas and law of war are essentially incompatible can hardly be denied.
78
 
Liberalism and the liberal interpretation of war, however, lent support to the concept 
of guerrilla warfare. Most of the reasons for the positive attitude of liberalism to this kind of 
war are discussed in the next section’s part on the militia, which was for most liberal thinkers 
a favourite system of defence. Here it suffices to say that the positive attitude of liberals 
towards guerrilla warfare is based on the fact that this kind of warfare might be regarded as 
an expression of the society’s voluntary and spontaneous resistance against an external 
aggressor or a domestic oppressor. Explicit about his preference for guerrilla warfare was 
William Godwin. ‘The enemy who penetrates into our country wherever he meets a man, will 
meet a foe’, was a basic principle of Godwin’s concept of ‘simple defensive wars’. While 
battles were supposed to be avoided, the popular resistance was to be directed against the 
invader’s lines of communications. That way, the enemy should be ultimately worn down and 




Thus, as Horne describes, in the international gatherings at Brussels in 1874 and at 
The Hague in 1899 and 1907 a dispute arose between relatively liberal countries, such as 
Britain, Holland, Switzerland and Belgium, on the one hand, and conservative powers, 
Germany and Russia, on the other. This dispute did not reflect only purely ideological 
attitudes but also strategic considerations. From the ideological view, the liberal delegations 
regarded a popular resistance as a democratic reaction towards aggression, whereas the 
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conservative delegates despised it for being anarchic and treacherous. In terms of strategy, 
the liberals, who believed in the use of force as a very last resort, viewed every means 
legitimate when national dismemberment was at stake. The conservatives, on the other hand, 
regarded wars with limited means and limited ends as an essential part of the international 
system and therefore wanted to keep wars brief, inexpensive and ‘humane’.
80
 ‘Since we are 
speaking of humanity’, stated German delegate, Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff, ‘it is time to 
remember that soldiers are also men, and have a right to be treated with humanity. Soldiers 
who, exhausted by fatigue after a long march or a battle, come to rest in a village have a right 
to be sure that the peaceful inhabitants shall not change suddenly into furious enemies.’
81
  
This kind of conservative approach which was trying to prevent war from turning 
cruel and barbarous is completely in line with the purpose of the positive international law 
school. In addition, the German military’s response to actual irregular warfare during the 
1870-71 Franco-Prussian War and the First World War was basically grounded in the logic of 
the positive international law. Since, according to the positivist school, every citizen of the 
enemy state is an enemy and only a lack of military necessity allows that some classes should 
be spared, the existence of a public resistance might permit to use the argument of military 
necessity in favour of a harsh punitive treatment of and reprisals against enemy civilians. 
Thus Colmar von der Goltz, the German military governor of Belgium, declared in 
September 1914: 
Every hostile act of the inhabitants against the German military, every attempt to interrupt 
their communications with Germany... will be severely punished. All resistance or revolt... 
will be quelled unmercifully.... It is one of the cruel necessities of war whereby the 




Schmitt hence passed a telling comment that the more strictly an army is disciplined and 
complies with the positive laws of war ‘– the more decisively it distinguishes between 
military and civilian, considering only the uniformed opponent as the enemy – the more 
sensitive and nervous it becomes when an un-uniformed civilian populace joins the battle on 
the other side.’ It followed directly from the logic of the positive law of war, he claimed, that 
the army then reacted ‘with harsh reprisals, summary executions, hostage-taking, and 
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destruction of towns, taking these to be adequate selfdefensive measures against malicious 
ruses and treachery.’ The more the uniformed opponent was respected as an enemy, the more 
harshly the guerrillas were treated as criminals, explained Schmitt.
83
 
The liberal favour shown towards public resistance and irregular warfare stemmed, 
among other things, from the fact that this kind of warfare would always be a popular, hence 
a liberal, weapon against aggressors. Few liberal thinkers would ever conceive the possibility 
of fighting against a popular resistance or a guerrilla on a greater scale. Nonetheless, the logic 
of the liberal just conduct in war also provides clear rules of proper counter-insurgency 
warfare.  
The liberal rules of just conventional warfare require making a distinction between 
war-makers, soldiers and civilians. The first group is criminals and thus the genuine enemy. 
The second and third groups are entirely innocent, but despite that fact, the soldiers are due to 
the military necessity a legitimate target of the use of force. In the case of irregular warfare, 
in contrast with the positivist approach, civilians remain innocent and always an illegitimate 
target of violence. Yet, the group of soldiers/combatants may change its status from innocent 
and abused, as they are under the conditions of conventional war, into criminals in case of 
guerrilla warfare. 
From the positivist viewpoint, the irregular combatants are criminals because they 
violate the law of war and thus render the war more cruel and barbarous than would be 
necessary. It must be stressed, however, that the whole concept of guerrilla rests on the 
regular army’s observance of the laws of war – particularly those about civilian immunity – 
and, therefore, criminalisation of this way of warfare can hardly be an exclusively positivist 
approach. To liberals, moreover, the individual guerrilla fighters might be held responsible 
for an act of aggression – in the conventional war the responsibility is shared exclusively by 
top civilian and military leaders. The guerrilla fighters may, in some cases, become war-
makers, and hence criminals, on account of the essential voluntariness of guerrilla warfare. 
Innocence of soldiers in a conventional war rested upon the fact that they ‘are conscripted or 
in other way forced into it [or] their patriotism often cruelly and cynically exploited’,
84
 as 
John Rawls put it. Michael Walzer expresses the very same idea: soldiers ’are led to fight by 
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their loyalty to their own states and by their lawful obedience’.
85
 This all may, of course, 
apply to quite a number of cases of guerrilla warfare too. However, sometimes it may be 
persuasively claimed that the decision of individual fighters to join a guerrilla group is based 
on their free will to such an extent that the excuse based on their legitimate loyalty and 
obligations ceases to be applicable. So Carl Schmitt described a partisan as someone who 
consciously ‘risks not only his life, like every regular combatant. He knows, and accepts, that 
the enemy places him outside law, statute, and honor.’
86
 
Despite the fact that liberals may accept that a guerrilla fighter can be legally held 
responsible for violation of laws of war and, in case of an unjust insurgency, also morally 
condemned, none of these accusations should adversely affect the generality of the civilian 
population. On this point the liberal approach displayed a tremendous difference compared to 
the positivist school. Since the positivist school considered an entire nation as an enemy, all 
classes must share the consequences of such an illegal and treacherous conduct of warfare. 
On this ground reprisals against civilians could be viewed as legal and even legitimate. On 
the other hand, liberal thinkers consistently claimed that a civilian population cannot be 
blamed for unjust wars decided by their leaders, unless being a perfect democracy. By 
analogy, a civilian population should take no responsibility nor be punished – for example by 
reprisals – for illegal actions committed by individual guerrilla fighters. 
It has already been argued that truly liberal armed forces should establish a form of 
police force. Previously the concept of police force was meant with regard to the relations to 
international justice. Yet it may be argued again, although in a different meaning, that in 
cases of counter-insurgency the liberal armed forces should act as a police force too. The fact 
that the guerrillas do not distinguish themselves from the civilian population should not mean 
that the civilian population may be indiscriminately treated as an enemy. The proper conduct 
ought to be that, through utilizing police methods, the real enemies/criminals are identified 
and eliminated. If such sort of discriminating counter-insurgency approach is not practicable 
owing to a large popular support to the guerrilla forces, then, Walzer argues, such a war 
should not be waged at all. ‘The struggle against them is an unjust struggle as well as one that 
can only be carried on unjustly. Fought by foreigners, it is war of aggression; if by local 
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To sum up, the liberal conception of mankind and humanity imposes a particular 
interpretation of the world and, in accordance with this interpretation, places certain 
requirements on the armed forces and their use. Liberalism views mankind as a united 
community with universal standards of rights and morality. Yet, this liberal universalism is 
an inevitable cause of various dichotomous, black-and-white views, attitudes and approaches. 
Thus, first, level of progress divides states and societies into the advanced and the backward 
ones. The advanced states, on the one hand, can enjoy all the rights of states; on the other 
hand, they have a duty to assist those backward peoples in their improvement. That also 
means that the fact of society’s backwardness may sometimes serve as one of the 
justifications for liberal military intervention into that society and a military presence in a 
backward society should always lead to improvement of the society. 
Second, in any case, the employment of force has to be justifiable as an act of justice, 
which should be defined as a defence against an aggressor. The armed forces are supposed, 
contrary to Clausewitzian precepts, to act as a servant of justice rather than a tool of policy. 
Armed forces, therefore, can be used only if the decision of a government to deploy them is 
in line with a domestic constitution, international law and an elementary sense of humanity 
and justice. Their deployment must be not only legal but also legitimate. 
Third, as a servant of justice liberal armed forces face opponents who must be 
regarded as criminals. Nonetheless, this does not mean that every enemy soldier should be 
condemned as a criminal. On the contrary, the enemy soldiers, if being conscripted or 
otherwise forced to fight, should be viewed as victims of the genuine criminals. Those 
criminals are particular identifiable persons, usually civilian and military leaders and top 
officials. From this point also logically follows the fourth one – being a citizen of an enemy 
state, or similar entity, does not establish any kind of guilt or responsibility for the war. As 
Walzer posits ‘civilians on both sides are innocent, equally innocent’.
88
 In fact, they should 
even be regarded as victims of the criminals too. However, a genuinely popular support 
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arising for the enemy cause, such as popular resistance against occupation forces, may call 
into question the justness of the war that is waged against the supposed ‘unjust enemy’. 
Armed Forces and Society 
The normative ideas of the liberals of the 19
th
 Century were thoroughly reflected in 
Herbert Spencer’s concept of the ‘industrial type of society’.
89
 Spencer postulated two ideal 
types of society – ‘militant’ and ‘industrial’ – towards which social development was 
heading. Spencer supposed that the development towards the ideal types was driven by the 
logic of the survival of the fittest, a term coined by Spencer that Charles Darwin adopted for 
his theory of evolution.
90
 Spencer assumed that a society may live in two distinct sorts of 
international structure, the first one defined by warlike relationships between societies, the 
other one determined by peace between them. A society may either adapt to the international 
structure in which it lives and thus to approximate the particular ideal type, or perish.  
However, the utility of Spencer’s theory for us is not so much in the assumed 
evolutionary mechanism as in the fact that his conceptualisation may clearly illustrate the 
core features of an ideal liberal society and contrast them with non-liberal militaristic 
attributes. The fundamental principle of the industrial type of society is the voluntary 
cooperation of its members. The citizens are supposed to be free individuals and defence of 
their individuality is the essential duty of society. Society may regulate an individual’s 
behaviour only negatively: it tells an individual what is not allowed, but an authority cannot 
impose any obligation upon the citizens. Moreover, an industrial society cannot be governed 
through authoritarianism; the only appropriate form of government is a representative one.
91
 
The ‘militant type of society’ stands in complete contrast to the ‘industrial type’. 
Whereas the ‘industrial type’ is meant to be the most prosperous in a peaceful environment, 
the ‘militant type’ is supposed to represent a society ideally structured for war. Success in 
war requires a corporate, well organised action of an entire society, including that society’s 
non-combatants. Thus ‘the process of militant organisation is a process of regimentation, 
which, primarily taking place in the army, secondarily affects the whole community’.
92
 The 
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only social role of non-combatants is to support combatants. The development of the ‘militant 
type’ thus involves a close building and integration of the society into a whole. The citizen’s 
individuality is subordinated to the state. ‘While preservation of the society is the primary 
end, preservation of each member is a secondary end – an end cared for chiefly as subserving 
the primary end.’
93
 Moreover, the type of society is linked with the nature of its citizens. The 
militant type requires members endowed with bodily vigour and courage. Therefore, these 
martial physical and mental qualities are also the ones most honoured by society. Goodness 
is, in this type, defined by bravery and strength.
94
 
Whereas Spencer considered the militant type of society as the most efficient response 
to a warlike international system, Alfred Vagts’s concept of militarism presents a counterpart 
to the liberal society that flourishes more in peacetime than in war. Vagts’s militarism 
consists of a ‘vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thought associated with 
armies and wars and yet transcending true military purpose’.
95
 While Spencer’s militant 
society was assumed to be the fittest for waging war, Vagts’s concept of militarism is not 
related to an end, such as survival or prosperity. Militarism, in fact, may hamper the purpose 
of a cost-effective conduct of war. In appearance, however, militarism is not so dissimilar 
from the militant type of society. Militarism ‘may permeate all society and become dominant 
over all industry and arts’. It ‘displays the qualities of caste and cult, authority and belief.’
96
  
The industrial type may be easily seen as an ideal type of liberal society. It is worth 
noting that Spencer assumed the necessary condition for developing the industrial type being 
a complete absence of the threat of war, because this type was ‘entirely unfitted for carrying 
on defence against external enemies’.
97
 Not all liberal thinkers, however, could indulge 
themselves in such utopian prospects. Although all liberals viewed the basic interest of 
people in harmony with each other and believed that human beings were essentially peaceful, 
warfare, in their view, remained a conceivable possibility. 
 ‘It is therefore requisite’, said Smith when introducing his lecture on various species 
of armed forces, ‘that an armed force should be maintained.’
98
 Thus given the fact that 
liberalism needs to deal with war, however exceptional such cases may be, what is, in liberal 
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view, the appropriate institutional arrangement for armed forces in society? Spencer’s theory 
expects that a threat of war would lead to an introduction of some features belonging rather to 





 However, as Alexis de Tocqueville put it, war is an ‘occurrence to which all 
nations are subject, democratic nations as well as others. Whatever taste [democratic nations] 
may have for peace, they must hold themselves in readiness to repel aggression, or in other 
words they must have an army.’
100
 Moreover, as it is argued in the previous section, 
liberalism, despite its chief focus on peaceful harmonious life, is relatively confident in 
military potential of liberal societies. Liberal thinkers see little security problems when they 
try to promote such military arrangements that would be as compatible, or even harmonious, 
as possible with liberal society. 
Standing army 
One key traditional institutional arrangement for the purpose of defence is a standing 
army. As was shown in previous sections, both Enlightenment philosophers and the 19
th
 
Century liberal thinkers often attacked standing armies. The liberal case against standing 
armies is manifold. Standing armies were perceived as a threat to peace. As Kant assumed, 
standing armies ‘continually threaten other states with war by their willingness to appear 
equipped for it at all times’.
101
 They were also seen as a platform for preserving the power of 
the aristocratic class in society and inter alia as an illiberal, conservative and authoritarian 
institution standing in strong opposition to the liberal cause. John Stuart Mill described the 
inconveniences of a standing army as follows:  
it would consist principally of the more idle and irregular part of the population, it would 
acquire a professional military spirit, and it would have time to learn habits of passive and 
active obedience to its commanders which would make it, if of any considerable magnitude, 




Moreover, such an institution was perceived as an excessive drain on economic resources of 
society and a cause of high taxation. So Kant insisted that ‘the greatest ills that afflict 
civilised people are brought upon us... by the never subsiding and even ever increasing 
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arming for a future war’.
103
 However, this is not to say that liberalism would unanimously 
oppose standing armies. In fact, the British Liberal Party before the First World War insisted 
on a standing professional army as one of its core principles. However, this attitude was 
caused primarily by the fact that the island position of Britain and its supreme navy rendered 
a large army unnecessary.
104
 
Among liberal philosophers a strong supporter of the standing army was Adam Smith. 
In his view, the character of warfare in the 18
th
 Century required professional skills that could 
not be effectively mastered by the general public. Warfare, therefore, ‘should become the sole 
or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens, and the division of labour is as 
necessary for the improvement of this, as of every other art’.
105
 The principle of the division 
of labour, which Smith promoted, was, in his view, as valid for the military as for any other 
trade.  
Moreover, his support to a professional standing army was not merely a commitment 
in principle to the theoretical concept. Observing an adverse effect of the division of labour 
on individuals, Smith realised that an ordinary worker or artisan is largely incapable of 
defending his country. ‘The uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of 
his mind, and makes him regard with abhorrence the irregular, uncertain, and adventurous life 
of a soldier.’ The concentration on a single profession, Smith observed, ‘corrupts even the 
activity of his body, and renders him incapable of exerting his strength with vigour and 
perseverance in any other employment than that to which he has been bred.’
106
 
In addition to this socio-economic argument, Smith also saw a merit of a standing 
army for maintaining a high level of freedom within the country: 
That degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness can be tolerated only in countries 
where the sovereign is secured by a well-regulated standing army. It is in such countries only 
that the public safety does not require that the sovereign should be trusted with any 
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A rule of law that is essential for a liberal society requires an impartial, apolitical force in 
order to be secured. Liberty, according to Smith, could hardly exist if the public safety was 
entirely dependent on voluntary actions of members of the community. Such security 
enforcement would be not only ineffective, but also dangerous for the liberty of those 
individuals who fail to conform. However, this argument applies only in respect of internal 
security. In the 18
th
 Century, when Smith lived and worked, the military was engaged in 
internal security as much as in the external one because no other police force then existed. 
With the establishment of a professional police force, the relevance of this latter argument of 
Smith declines. 
Despite the fact that most liberal thinkers abhorred powerful standing armies, Smith’s 
argumentation reveals one liberal principle for the establishment of armed forces. If a 
professional military organisation is needed, the status of the soldierly profession should be 
derived from the principle of division of labour. Being a soldier or officer does not constitute 
a distinct social class or a vocation different, in terms of social status or prestige, from any 
other profession. As Spencer explained, ‘where the industrial type is much developed, the 
soldier, volunteering on specific terms, acquires in so far the position of a free worker’.
108
 
Tocqueville made a similar observation in his analysis of democracy in America. However, 
in his view, it was the professional status of the soldier in democratic society that strained the 
relationship between the military and society. The professional soldier fell to the little 
esteemed rank of the public servants and, consequently, ‘the best part of the nation shuns the 
military profession because that profession is not honored, and the profession is not honored 
because the best part of the nation has ceased to follow it’. It was therefore inevitable, 
according to Tocqueville, that the army in a democratic nation eventually forms an insulated 




The concept of a powerful standing army, rather than within the liberal tradition, was 
assigned a strong position in the philosophical system of Hegel: ‘The matter at issue in 
disputes between states may be only one particular aspect of their relation to each other, and 
it is for such disputes that the particular class devoted to the state’s defence is principally 
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 A standing army was held necessary because Hegel assumed wars with limited 
means and limited aims constituted an essential part of the relations between sovereign states. 
However, he was also aware of the possibility that the very existence of a state can be 
endangered. In such a case, ‘all its citizens are in duty bound to answer the summons to its 
defence’.
111
 The reason for the existence of the standing army is, therefore, the nature of the 
international system. 
However, it is rather the manner of Hegel’s reasoning about society and the position 
of the military within it which demonstrates why, for most of the liberals, it was so difficult 
to accept the existence of the standing army. For Hegel, individuals in civil society tend to 
pursue their own private interests, their ‘particularity’. But the state is not a mere instrument 
of civil society, as liberals assume. If it were, its definitive purpose would be the security of 
individual life and property. This security, however, requires sacrifice. Yet that assumption is 
one which, according to Hegel, shows an inconsistency in the liberal way of thinking. ‘This 
security cannot possibly be obtained by the sacrifice of what is to be secured’.
112
 What is to 
be secured is rather the state itself, of which civil society, or a ‘particular class’ of citizens, 
forms only a part. Above the ‘particular class’ is a ‘universal class’ of civil servants. This 
class of civil servants provides a crucial link between the particularism of civil society and 
the universality of the state.
113
 The ‘universal class’ holds higher moral ground than the 
‘particular class’ because the former, in contrast with the latter, does not pursue its own 
interests but is motivated instead by the interests of society as a whole.  
Even closer ties with the universality of the state provide the military class with the 
position at the top of a moral hierarchy. ‘The military class is that universal class which is 
charged with the defence of the state, and its duty is to make real the ideality implicit within 
itself, i.e. to sacrifice itself.’
114
 Comparing the military class with the class of civil servants, 
the latter finds satisfaction of their private interests ‘in its work for the universal’.
115
 The 
former, on the other hand, is characterised by true courage. ‘The true courage of civilised 
nations is readiness for sacrifice in the service of the state, so that the individual counts as 
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Needless to say that Hegel’s concept of civil-military relations is incompatible with 
the liberal mindset. Nonetheless, Hegel’s argumentation shows that the liberal concept of the 
division of labour might be rather problematic if applied to the military. As William Godwin 
warned, a soldier who sells the ‘safety of his existence’ for a mere ‘pecuniary recompense’ 
considers his countrymen ‘indebted to him for their security; and by an unavoidable transition 




For most liberal philosophers a favourite military arrangement was a militia, though 
in terms of practical politics, the liberal preferences were notably different. The concept of 
militia supposes that, if need be, every able-bodied man would defend his country and put his 
life at risk. As Rousseau explained, the life of every individual citizen is at all times protected 
by the state. So when waging inevitable wars, they are ‘defending the means of preserving 
their lives’ by putting their lives at risk. ‘All have to fight for the fatherland if need be, it is 
true, but then no-one ever has to fight for himself.’
118
 Both Rousseau and Kant understood 
that warfare can never be merely a profession of some individuals; all society must be 
engaged. So Kant warned that ‘being hired out to kill or be killed seems to constitute a use of 
human beings incompatible with the rights of humanity in our own person.’ Therefore he 
suggested that all capable citizens should ‘voluntarily and periodically undertake training in 




A comprehensive case in favour of the militia was presented by J.S. Mill in his 
correspondence. According to Mill, to train the entire able-bodied male population to military 
service is highly efficient because it provides a force ‘without either the expense, the loss of 
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productive power, or any other of the evil consequences of increased armaments.’
120
 So Mill 
did not agree with Smith that the military profession was an efficient utilisation of the 
division of labour; on the contrary, he thought of it as being a drain on the productive forces 
of society.  
Moreover, the militia was for Mill ‘the strongest security against its being called out 
unnecessarily: for a service from which no one would be exempt would inevitably be 
unpopular, unless the cause were one for which the nation at large felt a real enthusiasm.’
121
 
Reliance on enthusiasm instead of blind obedience is what makes the militia a truly defensive 
force. Here Mill reiterated the argument of Kant that people would, if possible, avoid war lest 
they ‘bring the hardships of war upon themselves’.
122
 However, it is worth pointing out that 
Mill did not consider people’s enthusiasm as merely a theoretical insurance against an 
aggressive foreign policy. At the time of the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian conflict he called for 
mobilisation of volunteer forces funded by public subscription: 
...our people ought to arm at once, taking the responsibility off the Government, which is 
right to be prudent and silent. The Volunteers ought to be armed with the newest and best 
rifle by public subscription. It is not a time for talking about peace and the horrors of war 




In this case, people’s enthusiasm was supposed to ensure defence of the country even without 
a proper authorisation of the government. 
To say that most liberal thinkers regarded a militia as an armed force most suitable for 
liberal society does not mean that every argument for establishing a militia fits the liberal 
mindset. A lively discussion about the merits and otherwise of the militia was held among the 
proponents of the Scottish Enlightenment, such as Adam Ferguson, Alexander Carlyle, 
Frances Hutcheson and also Adam Smith. Despite the fact that Smith favoured a standing 
army as an efficient means of defence, he recognised the chief arguments for a militia too. 
Supporters of the militia saw its utility in making ‘fortitude and military discipline’ as 
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 So for Smith the militia was a useful educational instrument, rather 
than a means of defence: 
...coward, a man incapable either of defending or of revenging himself, evidently wants one 
of the most essential parts of the character of a man... Even though the martial spirit of the 
people were of no use towards the defence of the society, yet to prevent that sort of mental 
mutilation, deformity, and wretchedness, which cowardice necessarily involves in it, from 
spreading themselves through the great body of the people, would still deserve the most 
serious attention of government, in the same manner as it would deserve its most serious 
attention to prevent a leprosy or any other loathsome and offensive disease, though neither 
mortal nor dangerous, from spreading itself among them, though perhaps no other public 




However, are martial values imposed upon people through military education 
compatible with liberal society? To a certain extent they might be. Quite a few liberals would 
probably agree with Theodore Roosevelt that the ‘man fit for self-government must be fit to 
fight for self-government’.
126
 Nonetheless, the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers certainly 
stepped beyond the liberal limits. So Hutcheson expected that during peace all citizens should 
keep in mind the military discipline and for Carlyle the militia was ‘useful at all times to 
preserve the warlike spirit among the people’.
127
 Moreover, Ferguson argued that ‘the abilitys 
of the Statesman & those of the Warrior are intimately connected. When they are separated 
the statesman becomes a Clerk & a Baubler’.
128
 Thus in the view of the Scottish 
philosophers, the militia is an instrument for spreading military values into society. Such a 
development, however, Spencer described as the way of establishing the ‘militant type of 
society’.  
Liberals, in contrast, inclined towards the militia so as to prevent the militarisation of 
society. The militia was not meant to bring about any positive goods to society; rather it was 
regarded as merely the least malign system of defence. Although writing about standing 
armies, Tocqueville identified the institution of short-term conscription as the crucial factor 
that prevents the military from alienating from its parent society. The enlisted man tends to 
‘infuse the spirit of the community at large into the army, and retain it there... It is by the 
instrumentality of the private soldiers especially that it may be possible to infuse into a 
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democratic army the love of freedom and the respect of rights’.
 129
 The effect which Scottish 
philosophers assumed as public good was, however, viewed by some liberal thinkers as a 
danger. So William Godwin, a supporter of militia though he was, feared the effect of 
peacetime military training. ‘It cannot be a matter of indifference, for the human mind to be 
systematically familiarized to thoughts of murder and desolation.’
130
 
Moreover, apart from the fear of militarisation and regimentation, there is present an 
assumption that civilian skills and capabilities of an advanced society should contribute to the 
military power better than traditional or, say, natural warrior virtues. Thus Mill explained that 
the division of employments and other aspects of modern life is ‘the great school of co-
operation’. ‘A people thus progressively trained to combination by the business of their lives, 
become capable of carrying the same habits into new things’, such as warfare, because one of 
the most decisive factors in war was considered ‘discipline, that is, perfect co-operation’.
131
 
Thus, contrary to Spencer’s belief in the incompatibility of the industrious society with war, 
liberal thinkers do not necessarily view the militia or other similar defensive arrangements as 
a sacrifice of security in favour of free civilian society. 
Universal conscription 
So far we followed the philosophical arguments as if a fully professional standing 
army and a militia were the only two forms of military institutions. Naturally, theoretical 
contemplation is much easier if only two concepts clearly opposite to each other are at play as 
in dialectic. Yet, the question may arouse as to whether a standing army recruited through 
universal conscription is closer to the concept of a standing army or to the concept of a 
militia. The historical account that now follows should highlight how little utility comes from 
sticking liberalism onto any particular model of a military. Rather, we should be concerned in 
this chapter with underlying principles which led particular thinkers to their adherence to a 
particular model. 
When Kant considered establishing the militia armies as an important step in the 
development towards perpetual peace, his ideas did not stem purely from his armchair 
contemplations. Kant’s essay ‘On Perpetual Peace’ emerged shortly after the peace treaties of 
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Basle, in April 1795, between Revolutionary France, on the one hand, and Prussia, Spain and 
Hessen-Kassel, on the other. The peace confirmed that France was militarily strong enough to 
repel every intervention. Yet, the military strength of France rested on a kind of militia army 
– the levée en masse or so-called nation-armée. To Kant, the success of the levée en masse 




The levée en masse, decreed in 1793, mobilised the entire people of France for their 
own defence. All, in theory at least, were required to contribute for the war effort:  
The young men shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; 
the women shall make tents and clothes, and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall 
turn old linen into lint; the old men shall repair to the public places, to stimulate the courage 




The people were obliged to serve under arms and support the war effort ‘until the enemies 
have been driven from the territory of the Republic’.
134
 The levée en masse successfully 
accomplished this task, as the Basel peace treaties proved. However, the levée also revealed 
the military potential of a nation in arms. The system of a regular universal conscription, 
which replaced the original levée en masse, later provided Napoleon with an armed force 
sufficiently strong to conquer and control almost all Europe. 
Both the inspiration by the original levée en masse and the Napoleonic expansion 
made Prussia utilise her own kind of militia army – Landwehr and Landsturm. The institution 
of Landwehr and Landsturm was decreed by the Prussian government in March 1813. The 
Landwehr was an organised militia with universal compulsory service for men between 
seventeen and forty.
135
 The Landsturm acted as an irregular force. Each citizen who ‘does not 
belong to the Landwehr shall consider himself to be part of the Landsturm, every time that 
the opportunity present itself’.
136
 Both the Landwehr and Landsturm were expressing the 
Enlightenment view about social equality and carried the aspirations of the middle classes for 
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greater political participation. Thus it is no wonder that the monarchical and aristocratic 
Prussian government betrayed great reluctance before it embraced the military reforms it 
found were needed to win the war against Napoleon.
137
  
With the end of the war the military necessity for mobilization of entire nations eased 
up. Instead, to the fore came an effort to prevent recurrence of revolution, an effort which 
included suppression of some of the revolutionary ideas and institutions. For this reason the 
Bourbons in France, along other European powers, abolished universal conscription as a 
potentially dangerous revolutionary institution. The only power in Europe that preserved a 
militia as an element of its military system was Prussia.
138
 In its case, however, the 
preservation and further development of universal conscription and the Landwehr were not at 
all a result of a liberal leaning by the Prussian government. On the contrary, universal 
conscription and the Landwehr, which was transformed into a reserve army, became 
instruments for the gradual militarisation of society. Despite the fact that liberal parties in 
Prussia and Germany urged that the military power should rest on enthusiasm and patriotism 
(values which were manifested in the Prussian Erhebung, or the uprising), the government 
and military circles considered completely different military virtues. ‘Still cherished 
resentment against the revolution’, Vagts points out, ‘the generals demanded a hierarchical 
order, a discipline extending over the whole of society, on which to build up the army.’
139
 
Proponents of German liberalism were by no means devoted to pacifism. The 
movement was nationalistic in character and the primary aim of mid-19
th
 Century German 
liberals was German unification, by force if necessary, and establishing Germany as an 
assertive great power with all the rights entitled to her position. By the same token, the 
German national-liberals represented the interests of middle classes against the attempts of 
military circles, largely composed of landed aristocracy, to militarise society. Whereas the 
former believed in the power of free will, patriotism and enthusiasm, the latter trusted only to 
a stern discipline for war. This conflict escalated in 1861-62 to a constitutional crisis. The 
Landtag, where liberals held the majority of votes, resolved not to approve the military 
budget unless the compulsory military service was shortened from three to two years. While 
the Prussian minister of war Albrecht Roon would have ultimately accepted that a two-year 
service was sufficient for mere military drill, King Wilhelm I ‘considered a three year term 
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the only panacea against the “revolutionary infection of the army”.’ Moreover, and provoking 
the constitutional crisis in a display of breath-taking brinkmanship, he declared himself 
prepared to abdicate rather than accept the liberal demands.
140
 
The case of Prussian militarists was plainly stated by Field-Marshal Helmut von 
Moltke the Elder, the chief of the Prusso-German Great General Staff (1857-1888), in his 
parliamentary and other speeches and essays. For them the compulsory service was a ‘school 
which trains the people to order and exactness, to loyalty and obedience’ – values which, in 
his view, are transferable to a civilian life. So discipline, which is ‘the whole soul of an 
army’, is what young men must be taught. However, discipline cannot be drilled into men; ‘it 
must become a matter of habit and of second nature’. For that reason, very short term of 
service absolutely had to be prevented.
141
  
For its lack of order and discipline Moltke also abhorred the militia. Besides the fact 
that enthusiasm was believed to be militarily inferior to discipline, he did not consider the 
people reliable enough to be armed. Without the military hierarchy and discipline there was 
no assurance that arms would be used only to achieve the very aim for which they had been 
issued. 
Gentlemen, if you arm the nation, you arm the bad as well as the good elements. Of the 
former every nation has its share, though the latter vastly predominate. But has not our own 
experience of armed citizens demonstrated how quickly the trustworthy portion itself 
becomes dissatisfied, and disappears noiselessly, leaving a clear field to those who are 





The contemporary experience with the American Civil War confirmed his belief in the merit 
of a disciplined standing army. The American case, in his view, clearly demonstrated that 
wars ‘carried on by a militia have this peculiarity, that they last much longer, and even on this 
ground and for this very reason involve far greater sacrifice, both of money and of human 
life, than all other wars.’
143
 
The military success of Prussian armies during the German wars of unification made 
other European powers imitate the Prussian model of an army with universal conscription. A 
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desperate attempt of the French government after 4 September 1870 to oppose the German 
armies with the re-established National Guard, an organised militia with universal 
conscription, and francs-tireurs, who acted as an unorganised guerrilla in the rear of German 
forces, was an exception that proved the rule. This mass mobilisation could not derail the 
German course towards victory; worse still, it facilitated the armed revolt of the Paris 
Commune. Predictably, plans, such as that one essayed by Jean Jaurès,
144
 French socialist 
leader, to establish a militia army or at least introduce militia-like features in the French 
armed forces, inexorably gave way to a system that emulated the German model of a standing 
army with universal conscription. Illustrative for the time is Ernest Renan’s call for imitation 
of the Prussian pattern: ‘The victory of Germany is a victory of science and reason... Prussia 
is the best model.... We need a military law closely copying, as far as general lines are 
concerned, the Prussian system.’
145
 
France copied the Prussian system, whereas Jaurès’s bill on militia, brought into the 
French Parliament on 14 November 1910,
146
 was rejected. Yet, Jaurès’ critique of the then 
French (Prussia-like) military system cast light on a liberal, in his case rather social liberal or 
socialist, attitude towards a conscription-based standing army. Jaurès’s chief objection 
against the then system was that ‘in spite of all appearances to the contrary, it does not really 
represent the Armed Nation.’ The system, in his view, was based upon the supposed 
inferiority of the reserves as compared with the active army in barracks. Only the active army 
was seen to represent the military strength of a nation, whereas the reserves, the real armed 
nation according to Jaurès, were neglected as a mere supplement to the active army. Although 
soldiers were drafted equally from all walks of life, owing to a long-term service in barracks 
the spirit of a segregated military caste could be fostered and preserved. ‘And the more 
political and social necessity compels this army to throw open its gates to the nation, the 
more these people [high rank officers] cling to the idea that its strength lies in those aspects 
of the old regime which made it a thing special and apart.’
147
 
Universal conscription, like a militia, is often perceived by liberals as a severe 
constraint on aggressive use of the armed forces. Jaurès agreed with this view, provided that 
matured married men would bear all the burdens of military life from the very onset of war. 
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However, a long-term service in barracks, he argued, circumvented this constraint. An active 
army composed of young unmarried men who, besides drilled-in obedience, can be easily 
inflamed by jingoistic and chauvinistic ideas, would be used at the outbreak of war. In 
addition, once the war has begun, a government can count on the patriotism of the nation to 
rally behind the fighting army.
148
 
Rather than imitating the Prussian example Jaurès wanted France to develop her 
military organization in accordance with her national characteristics, in harmony with the 
ideal of a liberal democracy devoted to the cause of peace. A democratic society like France 
should not allow the military to become separated from society, both physically in barracks 
and morally through preservation of a military caste. The military strength of a nation is only 
partially exploited unless the military is in close union with the people and ‘is inspired by the 
energy of its ideals’.
149
 ‘There is no army more powerful and more capable of endowing its 
leaders with moral authority and prestige, if they are in harmony with it, than an army which 
is the armed nation itself, inspired with the determination to defend its independence and 




To sum up, liberalism requires a military arrangement that, first, should not lead to the 
militarisation of society as a whole or to the creation of a distinct and separate military class. 
The military class would not only be incompatible with a liberal social order; it was also 
perceived to be inefficient in securing the defence of a nation. If security of the nation is 
seriously threatened, the military force should reflect the democratic structure of society. 
Only the nation as a whole, inspired by its ideals and driven by enthusiasm and patriotism, 
may effectively resist any invader. Not a regimentation of society or drilled-in obedience to 
military superiors, but a strong sense of purpose of a war effort is affirmed to be crucial to 
victory.  
Second, if professional soldiers are required, the soldiering should be treated in the 
same way as any other profession. The principles of division of labour apply to soldiers as 
well as to all other professions. Service under arms cannot legitimise the existence of a 
segregated military community. Finally, the peace-time military system should disturb the 
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economic life of society as little as possible. This last point may sound trivial; however, it is 
not as self-evident as it may seem that the military establishment and military power of the 
state should be regarded only as a means in relation to an economic life of society. 
Armed Forces and the Individual 
Individualism lies at the foundations of liberal thinking. Although the roots of 
individualism reach much deeper into the European culture than the Enlightenment and 
liberalism,
151
 liberalism brought a new quality into the long-lasting tradition of Western 
individualism. Liberal thinking was founded on a novel notion of natural individual rights 
and liberties. Man was born, stated John Locke, ‘with a title to perfect freedom and an 
uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of Nature’.
152
 Life, liberty 
and possession of private property are subjects of those natural human rights which, in the 
eyes of every liberal person, cannot be legitimately removed. J.S. Mill listed three other 
fundamental individual liberties: first, liberty of conscience, which means ‘absolute freedom 
of opinion and sentiment on all subjects’ including the right to express them; second, liberty 
to frame ‘the plan of our life to suit our own character: without impediment from our fellow-
creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them’, to do ‘as we like, subject to such 
consequences as may follow’; and third, ‘freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving 
harm to others’.
153
 The liberal understanding of individual freedom can be summarised as 
follows: as far as the individual behaviour does not harm or otherwise limits the liberty and 
rights of others, individual‘s ‘independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own 
body and mind, the individual is sovereign.’
154
  
People’s association with each other in the state is regarded legitimate as long as it 
does not conflict with individual freedom. In fact, in the view of some philosophers, such as 
Locke, the state was established precisely in order to protect the natural rights and liberties. 
The individual, when joining a political society, according to Locke, gave up merely one’s 
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right ‘to judge and punish the breaches of that law in others’ and transfer this right to the state 
which can exercise it more effectively.
155
  
If Locke’s theory of social contract conceives of a minimalist state founded on 
utilitarian rather than moral reasons, Kant might be regarded as representing the other 
extreme within the liberal tradition. To him, the state was a prerequisite for the development 
of morals and, moreover, a perfect civil constitution was the ultimate aim of social progress. 
However, even Kant insisted that positive laws ‘must not contradict the natural laws of 
freedom and equality’ and, furthermore, that the role of the state was to create conditions for 
exercising these rights.
156
 Thus a society can be called liberal only if the individual liberties 
are respected. The freedom of the individual is understood not only as a natural right, it is 
also assumed as a precondition for other crucial values. As Benjamin Constant maintained, 
‘upon it depend both public and private morality; upon it depend expectations of industry; 
without it men can enjoy neither peace, nor dignity nor happiness.’
157
 
However, if the chief purpose of the state is to protect rights and liberties of the 
individual, life, personal freedom and property being subjects of the most crucial rights, what 
means of defence remains available to the state? This problem of liberalism’s capability to 
raise a defensive force was highlighted by Hegel: the preservation of the state ‘can only be 
important to [its citizens] as a means to the preservation of their property and its enjoyment. 
Therefore, to expose themselves to the danger of death would be to do something ridiculous, 
since the means, death, would forthwith annul the end, property and enjoyment.’
158
 Thus, as 
long as the state defence requires sacrifice of individual’s rights and property, the liberal way 
of thinking is, in Hegel’s view, inconsistent: ‘This security cannot possibly be obtained by the 
sacrifice of what is to be secured’.
159
 
Hegel’s critique of liberal inconsistency is telling as far as Hobbes’s theory of state is 
concerned. To Hobbes the state was established by its citizens/subjects for the sole purpose of 
protecting their individual lives and hence the individuals remain subjected to the state only 
                                                 
155
 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, § 87. 
156
 Kant, "Metaphysics of Morals," 112, 14. 
157
 Benjamin Constant, "Principles of Politics Applicable to All Representative Governments," in Political 
Writings, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 289-90. 
158
 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Early Theological Writings, trans. T. M. Knox (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1948), 165. 
159
 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §324. See also Shlomo Avineri, "The Problem of War in Hegel's Thought," 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 22, no. 4 (1961): 466; Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on 
Disobedience, War, and Citizenship (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 89. 
97 
 
as long as it fulfils its function. ‘The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to 
last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.’
160
 
Logical consequences of these foundations of state legitimacy therefore are, as Walzer puts it, 
that a ‘man who dies for the state defeats his only purpose in forming the state’ and a ‘man 
who risks his life for the state accepts the insecurity which it was the only end of his political 
obedience to avoid’.
161
 In case of war the citizen is obliged ‘to protect his Protection as long 
as he is able’;
162
 however, the limits of one’s ability are determined by one’s fear of death. To 
avoid the risk of death ‘is not Injustice, but Cowardice’,
163
 and an act of cowardice should be 
regarded as a legitimate choice of an individual to leave, as perceived, an ineffective 
protection of the state and return to the state of nature.
164
 
Early liberalism, an ideology championing the interests of the bourgeoisie, has no 
objection against the contemporary practice of buying oneself out of conscription. Hobbes 
explicitly envisaged this option when stating that a citizen may avoid a call to arms by 
substituting another soldier in his stead: ‘for in this case he deserteth not the service of the 
Common-wealth’.
165
 Arguably, Locke, though only implicitly, accepted the practice of 
conscripting the poor too. While he gave priority to property rights and the emphasis on 
taxation, he completely ignored the issue of citizens’ obligation to defend their state. Locke’s 
work thus might be read as justification of the class distinction between, on the one hand, 
property owners who were represented in the Parliament and paid taxes and, on the other, ‘a 
kind of moral proletariat whose members have nothing to give to the state’ but their lives.
166
 
Yet, this view of almost no obligation of citizens to defend their country contradicts 
the arguments of Kant, J.S. Mill, Jaurès and others, which were presented in the previous 
section on armed forces and society, who insisted that every able-bodied man should join a 
militia in order to defend his country and, if necessary, put his life at risk. To Kant, the militia 
was a prerequisite for the realisation of perpetual peace for two reasons. In comparison with a 
professional standing army, which ‘threaten other states with war by their willingness to 
appear equipped for it at all times’, the militia was considered a military organisation of 
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essentially defensive character and, since all men would take part, it would also effectively 
‘bring the hardships of war’ upon all of them.
167
 Moreover, according to Mill, such a militia 
system provided a force ‘without either the expense, the loss of productive power, or any 
other of the evil consequences of increased armaments.’
168
 Probably the most serious 
argument regarding the military obligation was that to hire other persons to kill and die 
constitutes a use of human beings as a means by others, hence being ‘incompatible with the 
rights of humanity in our own person’.
169
 In fact, the right to be treated and a duty to treat 
others as ethical subjects and not merely as objects or tools lies at the very foundations of the 
liberal conception of moral freedom of the individual.
170
 
To sum up, Hobbes’s and Locke’s political theory, on the one hand, permitted only 
very limited space for any serious citizen obligation to risk one’s life in the defence of the 
state. On the other hand, Kant’s categorical imperative, which has ever since constituted one 
of the most fundamental principles of liberalism, envisages nothing but an equal duty to face 
an aggressor. Does it mean that liberalism has grown up from roots that are in irreconcilable 
conflict with each other, hence the inconsistency which Hegel’s critique pointed out? The 
account of liberal thinking that is to be presented in this section rests on the assertion that 
these two approaches, and not only those, should be understood as supplements rather than 
competing substitutes and only their combination can provide a complete picture of the 
liberal attitude towards the relationship between the individual and the military. 
Nonetheless, the diversity of liberal roots permits a relatively wide spectrum of 
approaches towards individual obligations. Thus, on the one hand, Alan Gewirth stresses 
priority of the just state when arguing that natural rights of individuals are not absolute. They 
are subordinate to the equality of those rights and to the state that protects this equality. 
Therefore, sacrifices of the individual rights in form of participation in defence of the state 
may be justified, provided the just state cannot survive without them. If the sacrifices are 
necessary for this purpose, they should be imposed as impartially as possible.
171
  
                                                 
167
 Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 75. 
168
 Mill, "The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill 1849-1873 Part III." 1017:  'To Edwin Chadwick, 29 Dec 1866' 
169
 Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 69. 
170
 Doyle, Ways of war and peace, 207. 
171
 Alan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago; London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), 250-51. 
99 
 
On the other hand, Walzer, following Hobbes, praises the great advantage of liberal 
society ‘that no one can be asked to die for public reasons or on behalf of the state’.
172
 
However, such a statement, according to Walzer, neither invalidates other ethical obligations 
nor undermines the defensibility of the state. As he explains: 
[Citizens] may even find themselves in situations where they are or think they are obligated 
to risk their lives to defend the state which defends in its turn the property and enjoyment of 
their friends or families. But if they then actually risk their lives or die, they do so because 
they have incurred private obligations which have nothing to do with politics. The state may 
shape the environment within which these obligations are freely incurred, and it may provide 
the occasions and the means for their fulfilment. But this is only to say that, when states 





Walzer’s work emphasises moral obligations towards other people at the sub-state level.
174
 
However, to make the picture complete we should also add moral obligations built upon the 
liberal notion of the unity of mankind. After all, both areas are, in the view of some, 
inherently interconnected. So Leonard Hobhouse stated that moral obligations ‘are founded 
on relations between man and man, and therefore applicable to all humanity.’
175
 Nonetheless, 
the passage by Walzer helps to illustrate one important question: since the state, and only the 
state, shall organise the military forces, what sort of obligation, if any, can the state impose 
upon its citizens and upon soldiers? 
Liberal political thinking probably requires a specific conception of ‘obligation’. As 
Carole Pateman puts forward, the term ‘obligation’ in liberal thinking should be understood 
merely as a moral commitment that is voluntarily entered into by individuals – ‘this is the 
only conception that is compatible with (and, in turn, has helped shape) the liberal view of 
individuals and their social life’.
176
 In contrast with coercion or beliefs in divinely ordained or 
natural hierarchies of subordination, liberal individualism transformed the relationship 
between subject and government into ‘self-assumed obligation’, which bound citizens by 
virtue of their own free action and commitment. It logically follows from this that 
government ‘can no longer rest on mere political obedience... A free and equal individual can 
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always question political authority and political obligation in general terms; political 




This never-for-granted obligation seems to be represented in the issue of 
conscientious objection from military service. Modern liberal authors practically 
unanimously argue for the right to refuse military service due to conscientious objection.
178
 
Nonetheless, this topic was not entirely unknown to older liberal thinkers. Jeremy Bentham in 
his Plan for Universal and Perpetual Peace implied that soldiers could and should refuse 
service if they believe a war is unjust.
179
 On this point also Leonard Hobhouse in 1911 
suggested that in the case of compulsory military service the conscientious objector should be 
allowed to perform his duty in an alternative form. Moreover, during the First World War 
when the compulsory service was actually introduced in the United Kingdom, Hobhouse 
argued that since Britain was supposed to be fighting the war to defend certain fundamental 




From the perspective of liberal individualism, acceptance of conscientious objection 
seems to be beyond question. Yet, there are some objections that need to be dealt with. First, 
in the words of Michael Walzer: ‘Why bother having a political process if its determinations 
are subject to the conscientious objection of anyone who loses out?’
181
 After all, the theory of 
social contract presupposes a voluntary trade-off between some individual rights and 
liberties, on the one hand, and equal access to public goods, on the other. The second 
objection may be represented by Hobhouse, who, surprisingly, during a short period in 1915 
believed that engagement in a just war should suspend the right to refuse service: ‘If I plead 
duty to mankind as a reason for disobedience, it may retort that to rebel successfully is to 
dissolve government into anarchy and to destroy those very social bonds on which I rely.’
182
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As for the former, there are two interrelated lines of argument. First, as Walzer points 
out, the liberal political system rests on the distinction between citizen’s being a subject of a 
law or policy and being a servant. Whereas the subjection, once the law has been 
democratically adopted, is compulsory and the refusal to obey cannot be tolerated, state 
service should be a voluntary activity. In Walzer’s view, it is an essential right of a citizen in 
a liberal country not to become an instrument of the state.
183
 Also J.S. Mill acknowledged the 
difference between these two sorts of obligation, although the consequences of the difference 
were not to him as black and white as to Walzer. Mill realised that there were some ‘positive 
acts for the benefit of others’, which a citizen might be compelled to perform. ‘A person may 
cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly 
accountable to them for the injury.’ However, he also recognised that the enforcement of such 
positive obligations requires the greatest caution. ‘To make any one answerable for doing evil 




The second line of argument is based on the distinction between the individual 
interest and conscience. Although the liberal state is often conceived as an instrument to 
further the interests of its citizens, it seems plausible to assume that the state can require 
sacrifice of individual wellbeing and freedom, though only to some extent, if it is absolutely 
necessary for the benefit of the whole. However, conscience is meant to represent ‘an inner 
alternative to the ego, a motive beyond self-interest’ that is founded on shared moral 
knowledge.
185
 Liberalism does not assume a moral unity of the individual and the state, as 
Rousseau or Hegel did. The individual may feel moral obligations to various sub-state groups 
(e.g. religious communities) or trans-state groups of people (e.g. churches or socialist parties) 
and ought to feel moral responsibility for humankind as a whole.
186
 In the case of conflict 
between the commands of the state and another moral obligation, liberal society is supposed 
to permit the individual not to become a means in execution of the commands. This should be 
the legitimate reason for conscientious objection. 
However, when it comes to the objection that individual disobedience may effectively 
endanger the very existence of the state, which makes all the other social and moral bonds 
possible, the proponents of conscientious refusal are ready to fully yield to it. To Walzer, the 
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right to refuse military service should be maintained only ‘as long as the disobedience does 
not threaten the very existence of large society or endanger the lives of its citizens’.
187
 This 
shows the importance of making distinction between a defence against aggression and a war 
of choice. A genuine war of national defence which presents a clear and imminent danger to 
survival of all national values may justify forcing conscientious objectors to fight. Regarding 
wars of choice, in liberal society the individual freedom and autonomy of conscience should 
take precedence over the will of the majority. In that sense, the conscientious refusal is not 
meant to prevent the state from execution of its democratically adopted policy. However, a 
recruitment shortfall caused by a large scale refusal would in fact call the decisions 
concerning the particular war into question.
188
  
In the last point we encounter the liberal theme that recurs throughout this chapter: 
even decisions sanctioned by a democratically established government need to be carried out 
by , to certain extent, voluntary action of people. On this principle is also based Mill’s 
argument for the universal military service, which in fact contradicts to Walzer. According to 
Mill, the universal military service from which no one would be exempt is ‘the strongest 
security against its being called out unnecessarily’.
189
 
National defence and compulsory military service 
A genuine threat to the existence of the state appears to represent so extreme a case 
that even some liberal thinkers can conceive of an actual duty to fight that reaches beyond the 
‘self-assumed obligation’. So in his On Liberty J.S. Mill conceded that ‘to bear his fair share 
in the common defence’ is precisely that sort of positive act which a citizen might be 
rightfully compelled to perform.
190
 Moreover, later in his life Mill explicitly advocated the 
Swiss model of compulsory militia system. Nonetheless, even in the case of national defence 
the idea of voluntary action of individuals is sometimes projected at least in the rhetoric of 
liberal thinkers. Constant, for example, maintained that a truly free state does not need to rely 
on compulsion in national defence: ‘Citizens are not slow to defend their country when they 
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In general, however, relevant requirements of national defence are believed to justify 
a compulsory military service. On this point, John Rawls explains that ‘since conscription is a 
drastic interference with the basic liberties of equal citizenship, it cannot be justified by any 
needs less compelling than those of national security’.
192
 In the same way Walzer claims that 
conscription is ‘morally appropriate only when it is used on behalf of, and is necessary to the 
safety of, society as a whole, for then the nature of the obligation and the identity of the 
obligated persons are both reasonably clear’.
193
 However, if we previously assumed that only 
imminent existential threat to the state might justify a sacrifice of some of the most precious 
individual rights and liberties, quotations of both Rawls and Walzer show that individual 
rights and liberties can be considerably infringed upon even if the threat is relatively distant. 
Of course, effective defence of the state requires a preparation in advance and, 
because the danger of aggression arises out of control of the state, a sufficient defensive force 
has to be ready to fight at short notice. Liberal proponents of the militia were well aware of 
that and therefore included peace-time military training and preparations into their schemes. 
J.S. Mill suggested that a military preparation of young men should include ‘school drill, six 
months training at first, and a few days every succeeding year’.
194
 As prevention against 
‘wars of political convenience’ the Allgemeine deutsche Real-Encyclopädie in 1818 urged 
that ‘a militia is to be maintained even in times of peace, from which no one may be 
exempted’.
195
 For the same purpose Kant advised that citizens should ‘voluntarily and 
periodically undertake training in the use of weapons in order to protect themselves and their 
country from attacks from the outside.’
196
  
We should notice here that Kant considered the participation in the militia as a 
voluntary obligation; yet the obligation was integral to the right of citizenship. Kant 
conceived the republic constitution following three basic principles. The constitution should 
be established ‘first, according to principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as 
                                                 
191
 Constant, "Principles of Politics Applicable to All Representative Governments," 261. 
192
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 380. 
193
 Walzer, Obligations, 118; see also Stephen Pfaffenzeller, "Conscription and Democracy: The Mythology of 
Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society, 36, no. 3 (2010): 482-83. 
194
 Mill, "The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill 1849-1873 Part IV." 1627: 'To Edwin Chadwick, 2 Jan 1871' 
195
 ‘Soldaten’ in Allgemeine deutsche Real-Encyclopädie für die gebildeten Stände (Leipzig, 1818-19), quoted in 
Moran, "Arms and the Concert: The Nation in Arms and the Dilemmas of German Liberalism," 67. 
196
 Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 69. 
104 
 
human beings), second according to principles of the dependence of all on a single, common 
legislation (as subjects), and third, according to the law of the equality of the latter (as 
citizens of the state)’.
197
 Therefore, it should not be possible to exercise individual freedom 
without obedience to the laws of the state and without fulfilment of citizen obligations, 
among which taking appropriate measures in order to protect one’s country definitely is. The 
obligation to regular military training is voluntary in the sense that an individual may exercise 
his freedom and not participate; however, such action of his would also mean renouncement 
of his citizenship. 
For this way of reasoning Kant is regarded as one of the founding fathers of civic 
republicanism. This tradition sees military service as an inseparable, and even desirable, 
component of citizenship. According to the civic-republican tradition the rights of citizenship 
are founded on duties towards the community and the state; the citizen should not enjoy the 
liberties granted by the state, unless he demonstrated his willingness of personal sacrifice for 
the benefit of the whole. For this reason universal military service is regarded as an institution 
invaluable for the cultivation of citizenship, an institution that should awaken in young 
people a sense of civic duties.
198
  
In comparison with civic republicanism, liberalism is often criticised for its 
imbalanced conception of the relation between rights and liberties, on the one hand, and 
duties, on the other, in favour of the former.
199
 Liberal citizens may rightfully seek as little 
personal connection with the state or society as they deem comfortable, while the state can 
impose obligations on them only if it is genuinely necessary. Yet, a practical policy of civic 
republicanism and liberalism would not radically differ on conscription as long as an 
existential threat to the state is, at least, conceivable.
200
 Nonetheless, they definitely differ in 
attitudes. Whereas the former see an inherent good in the institution of universal military 
service regardless of security context, to the latter it might be a necessary but not desirable 
solution. 
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The liberal attitude towards compulsory service is manifested in attempts of liberal 
authors to qualify conditions of the service or justify its very existence. So Mill advocated his 
plan for universal military training by explaining that the measures he proposed ‘would not 
take away the young men from civil occupations to any material extent’.
201
 Friedrich Hayek, 
although he considered compulsory service as a ‘severe coercion’, regarded it justifiable and 
compatible with individual rights and liberties, at least, when compared with ‘a constant 
threat of arrest resorted to by an arbitrary power to ensure what it regards as good behaviour’. 
Hayek argued that ‘if a period of military service is a foreseeable part of my career, then I can 
follow a general plan of life of my own making and am as independent of the will of another 
person as men have learned to be in society.’
202
 Thus, according to Hayek, the necessary 
qualification of the compulsory service justification is that the service has to be a short and 
predictable part of one’s life. 
War of choice and humanitarian intervention 
As it was shown above, severe restrictions of individual rights and freedoms in form 
of compulsory military service can be justified in the case of national defence or in 
preparation for that. It is important to add that national defence does not need to be confined 
to military operation aimed to protect the state itself; defence of close allies against common 
threat might be justifiable as well. After all, Kant urged states to establish a league in order 
‘to protect one another against attacks from the outside’.
203
 Considering the fundamental 
interests of the individual, preservation of such a league should be considered almost as 
important as preservation of the state. So the wars of national as well as alliance defence 
should be viewed as necessary for maintaining just social institutions and hence may warrant 
conscription of citizens. However, the situation is different in the case of war of choice.
204
 
In terms of liberal discourse, the term ‘war of choice’ is slightly misleading. The 
freedom of the liberal state to make war, as it was presented in the section on just war, is 
considerably limited. The employment of violence by the liberal state needs to be justifiable 
as an act of justice and, strictly speaking, to serve justice should be a moral duty. Thus 
Fernando Tesón asserts that if human rights are severely violated, ‘then others owe a duty of 
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beneficence derived from the respect owed to rational persons’.
205
 Hence Rawls affirms that 
conscription is permissible for the defence of liberties of ‘not only the citizens of the society 
in question, but also those of persons in other societies as well’.
206
 Yet, a clear line exists 
between wars of necessity, i.e. wars of individual and collective self-defence, and wars of 
choice that rest on moral rather than existential imperatives. 
Assuming the state being a moral person based on general will, the distinction 
between moral and existential imperatives would be rendered almost irrelevant, as far as 
individual obligations are concerned. However, such a concept of the state is at odds with the 
precedence of individual freedom of conscience that liberal society should grant. Hence the 
state may be conceived in liberal political thinking as, in the words of Allen Buchanan, ‘a 
discretionary association for the mutual advantage of its members’.
207
 On the other hand, the 
state may be viewed as a collective institution which enables its citizens to contribute to the 
creation of just arrangements to all people. Buchanan calls it the ‘state-as-the-instrument-of-
justice’ view.
208
 With regard to this latter concept of the state, some theorists of humanitarian 




In either sense, however, it is not so much upon the state, should the state be 
understood as merely a bureaucratic structure of a sort, but rather upon the individual citizens 
to respond through their representatives to moral obligation. The citizens may, and ought to, 
democratically express their adherence to the moral duty to use the state resources, including 
armed forces, for a cause of humanity, peace and justice; nonetheless, the moral conviction 
and will of the majority should not infringe upon the most essential individual rights and 
freedoms of the minority. Thus Tesón notes that ‘the duty that liberal governments have to 
promote global human rights is not absolute: it must cohere with other important moral-
political considerations, such as the need to respect non-opportunistic exercises of individual 
autonomy. A way to do this is to resort to voluntary armed forces.’
210
 On that point Walzer 
passes a similar comment that ‘the state must rely on volunteers and can only hope (a genuine 
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and vital democracy might expect) that committed citizens... will choose to come forward’.
211
 
Rawls’s suggestion of using conscription for such purposes is compatible, at least to a certain 
extent, with this view owing to Rawls’s strong argument in favour of ‘discriminating 
conscientious refusal to engage in war in certain circumstances’.
212
 
Thus engaging military power in wars of choice warrants use of voluntary or 
professional soldiers. Yet this might be claimed to violate Kant’s categorical imperative, 
because ‘being hired out to kill or be killed seems to constitute a use of human beings as mere 
machines and tools in the hand of another (the state), a use which is incompatible with the 
rights of humanity in our own person’.
213
 In liberal eyes, voluntary and professional soldiers 
should not be recruited as mercenaries who for pecuniary interest render themselves a blind 
instrument of the government. Soldiers in a liberal state are assumed to join up, at least to a 
degree, owing to their willingness to serve and risk their life for a just cause.  
A stimulating elaboration of the liberal argument on this point is presented by Daniel 
Baer.
214
 His main assertions are that the defence of human lives and basic human rights are 
valuable enough to justify the ‘ultimate sacrifice’; however, it also means that no individual 
ought to be forced to risk his life. Hence it is crucial to respect individual freedom to decide 
under what conditions, if at all, one’s life will be put at risk.
215
 ‘Soldiers agree to be used as a 
means to an end, and their choosing to do so is the only thing that makes this permissible 
while maintaining a position that human beings are to be regarded as ends.’
216
 
However, present-day armed forces in the liberal West, Baer maintains, are still 
primarily intended for national defence and, therefore, those who join up give consent to be 
used for this purpose. This is not to say that the purpose of humanitarian intervention be 
morally inferior to self-defence. ‘The choice of an individual to risk his life in order to defend 
the life and basic human rights of another may be so obviously good as to be beyond 
objection, and yet it must still be his.’
217
 Unless the soldiers participating in a humanitarian 
intervention explicitly agree with the humanitarian aim, they should be regarded as non-
combatants of sorts, mere bystanders in a war that is not theirs. ‘As mere bystanders we can 
require that they not be indifferent to the horror, and that they do what they can to alleviate it, 
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but we cannot require that they risk their lives to stop it.’
218
 Baer’s argument thus further 
explicates the principle expressed by Walzer that no one can be asked to die on behalf of the 
state.
219
 No one, not even professional soldier, should be used by the state as a means with no 
regard to the individual as an end in itself; yet everyone can freely devote one’s own life to a 
particular just cause.  
Duty to refuse 
So far we have discussed the scope of the right of the individual to exercise freedom 
and personal autonomy in relation to the state and society. Important here is to stress that the 
liberal understanding of individual freedom is related primarily to this realm. Undoubtedly, 
different concepts of individual freedom are also conceivable. So J. Glenn Grey reports of a 
soldier who perceived freedom gained through military discipline: ‘When I raised my right 
hand and took the [army oath], I freed myself of the consequences for what I do. I’ll do what 
they tell me and nobody can blame me.’
220
 Liberalism, however, does not permit this sort of 
freedom. On the contrary, membership in a universal community of mankind should impose 
some obligations that may disqualify the absolute obedience to military superiors or state 
officials. In the words of Bhikhu Parekh: ‘In being a citizen I do not cease to be a human 
being; to the very contrary my citizenship expresses and articulates my humanity. My 
citizenship cannot therefore absolve me from my moral obligations to other human beings 
wherever they may happen to live.’
221
 
In that sense, a refusal to obey serves as an instrument which the individual may use 
in order to keep abiding by the principles of humanity, as presented above. On this point 
Rawls stated that ‘if a soldier is ordered to engage in certain illicit acts of war, he may refuse 
if he reasonably and conscientiously believes that the principles applying to the conduct of 
war are plainly violated. He can maintain that, all things considered, his natural duty not to be 
made the agent of grave injustice and evil to another outweighs his duty to obey... one may 
have a duty and not only a right to refuse.’
222
 The individual, who may assert as much 
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freedom from the state authority as possible, is not free to blindly obey flagrantly unjust 
commands. It is the duty of the individual to refuse obedience in such cases.  
Michael Walzer advocates the right of conscientious objection on the ground of moral 
commitment towards a community of people. The obligation towards such a community 
takes precedence over the state owing to the fact that membership in a sub-state or trans-state 
group rests on the individual’s explicit consent, whereas consent with citizenship is in most 
cases only theoretical.
223
 Thus, as the membership in a group is voluntary, the act of 
conscientious objection against military service is also based on freedom of individual 
conscience, which can be judged by no other person. Yet, this is not the case of the moral 
commitment to humanity. Membership in the universal community of mankind is in no sense 
voluntary; in fact, it is an essential feature, or a constituent, of being human. Despite the fact 
that principles of humanity are not necessarily as a whole codified, every human being should 
know what humanity proscribes and demands from everyone.
224
 For that reason, the 
individual has a duty to refuse a military command which obviously transgresses the 
principles of humanity and failure to do so may be tried and condemned by other people. 
Thus, despite the soldiers’ oath of allegiance, ‘we blame them for the crimes that follow from 




To sum up, respect to individual rights and freedom is a defining characteristic of 
liberal society. However, defence of the state against existential threat may require a 
considerable sacrifice of individual rights and freedom, including the most crucial rights. 
Such a sacrifice, then, can be justified, provided the state institutions are just and the sacrifice 
is absolutely necessary for their survival. Moreover, the sacrifice should be imposed equally 
and impartially. Yet, even such a sacrifice has its limits. The state cannot legitimately 
demand from anyone to die on its behalf. 
Nonetheless, even the deprivation of freedom and risk of death cannot be asked by the 
state when the circumstances are less threatening and a war approximates a war of choice. In 
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such cases everyone should have the right to object to becoming an instrument of a state 
policy which contradicts his own moral judgement. A voluntary service, or at least a realistic 
alternative for conscientious objectors, is an institution necessary to carry out military 
operations other than individual and collective self-defence.  
Compulsory military service can be justified only by relevant existential threat to the 
state. It should be conducted in a way that curtails individual rights and freedom as little as 
possible. As for the voluntary and professional soldiers, they are not supposed to join up for 
merely pecuniary reasons. They should be aware of what is their mission and should be 
convinced that their mission is legitimate. Professional soldiers should not be regarded as a 
blind instrument of the state. 
The liberal concept of individual freedom, from which all the previous principles 
were derived, must be understood in terms of individual independence from the state, society 
and other individual people. Yet, it does not exempt from duties towards humanity as a 
whole. The individual has the duty to refuse to execute commands which flagrantly violate 
principles of humanity. 
Conclusion 
Through examination of political and ethical thinking of liberal philosophers the 
underlying principles related to defence policy and military organisation were identified. 
Upon the assumption of a universal community of humankind are based the principles that 
the use of force should follow the imperatives of universal justice and cosmopolitan morality. 
Other principles have the aim to ensure that the military organisation takes a form that 
reflects in its composition the free, democratic, and individualistic character of liberal society 
and is not capable of endangering values possessed and held dear by its parent society. The 
last but certainly not the least important set of liberal principles provides for a protection of 
the rights and freedom of the individual against the pressure of the state and/or a majority 
within society. 
The following case studies are designed to show the extent to which these normative 
principles are embraced in political decision-making and in what particular norms and 
institutional designs the influence of liberal principles may result. It is the role of the next 
chapter, the case of German rearmament, to present an institutional design of armed forces 
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that very closely followed the liberal principles. However, it has to be born in mind that the 
institutional forms created during the process of German rearmament were results of an 
application of liberal norms under the specific conditions of West Germany in the Cold War. 
The subsequent cases should enrich the analysis by presenting the effect of liberal principles 
under different strategic conditions (Chapter Four on the current transformation of the 





West German Rearmament and building of liberal 
armed forces 
Innere Führung means the realisation of national and social values and norms in the armed 
forces. The behaviour of soldiers in training and within and outside the barracks has to 




In these words the Parliamentary Commissioner of the Armed Forces described the 
institutional philosophy upon which the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the Bundeswehr, were built – the philosophy of Innere Führung. The philosophy presents a 
conscious effort to prevent the Bundeswehr from developing a peculiar militaristic culture 
and to ensure essential unity between society and the armed forces. This effort is a defining 
pattern of the period of West-German rearmament and since then has never ceased to be an 
important issue.  
Moreover, the way the Bundeswehr was established adds to the uniqueness of this 
case. The first soldiers were recruited at the end of 1955 – ten years after the previous 
German military – the Wehrmacht – had laid down their arms and six years after the West-
German constitution had been adopted. Civilian institutions were given time to become 
embedded in the state and society before the first soldiers donned their uniforms. As a result 
the civilians, the people’s political representatives, possessed the power to design the armed 
forces in their own image. For those reasons the military policy of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) invites attempts to examine and understand the influence of ideological 
imperatives on military capacities. 
This chapter is to show how the liberal principles took form in a particular 
institutional design suitable for West Germany – a front-line state in the Cold War – and what 
limitations this liberal institutional design had to face. The first section of this chapter 
articulates the military’s functional delimitation that stemmed from the position of the FRG 
                                                 
1
 ‚Innere Führung bedeutet die Verwirklichung staatlicher und gesellschaftlicher Werte und Normen in den 
Streitkräften. Daran hat sich das Verhalten der Soldaten in der Ausbildung wie im Zusammenleben 
innerhalb und außerhalb der Kasernen zu orientieren.‘ Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten: 
Jahresbericht 2000 (42. Bericht),  (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 2001), 13. 
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in the international structure determined by the Cold War. The following section contains an 
analysis of the philosophy of Innere Führung, which was to address the functional needs with 
liberal means. The institutionalisation of Innere Führung by the legislature is the subject of 
the third section. The last two sections deal with the soldiers’ resistance to the liberal 
institutional philosophy, on the one hand, and with the response to this resistance by Minister 
of Defence Helmut Schmidt in the early 1970s, on the other hand. 
Reasons to Rearm – Adenauer’s Case for Armed Forces 
At the beginning of this thesis it is suggested that the extent of the ideological impact 
on the development of armed forces might be dependent on the international structure. We 
may expect that liberal armed forces would functionally fit a world dominated by liberal 
actors. Yet this does not appear to be the case of the Cold War, in which the international 
structure was determined by a conflict between two equally powerful and radically polarized 
ideological camps – the liberal West and the Marxist-Leninist East.  
It was also suggested that powerful actors might shape, to some extent at least, the 
international structure in their own image. However, West Germany is even less the case. 
Owing to the control of occupational powers, the FRG was an object rather than a subject on 
the international stage. In spite of that, the decisions as to how to remilitarise and whether to 
remilitarise at all were made mainly in Bonn and, as this chapter demonstrates, the context of 
the Cold War happened to be particularly favourable for an application of liberal principles in 
the West-German military policy. 
Arguably, the basic parameters of West-German military policy were set by Konrad 
Adenauer (Federal Chancellor 1949-1963). His primary objective was to raise West Germany 
to the status of an equal sovereign partner to the Western allies and rearmament was an 
effective instrument to attain this aim. Yet Adenauer’s ‘policy of strength’, as his foreign-
policy approach came to be known, was neither a popular nor necessary option for West 
Germany. In the aftermath of the Second World War West-German society was rather 
unresponsive to another call to arms and resistant to a war scare (see the charts below). 
Moreover, since Germany was divided into two parts, reunification was a primary aim for a 
notable part of West German politicians, an aim by no means exclusive to the opposition 
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 However, the policy of reunification obviously contradicted 
Adenauer’s ‘policy of strength’. West Germany’s joining the Western allies would only 
entrench the division of Germany and leave no chance for eventual reunification.  
 
 
Figure 6 Surveys on the issue of rearmament conducted by the Allensbach Institute 1950-1954
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Adenauer appeared to be quite comfortable with ruling German reunification out, for 
the time being at least.
4
 In order to gain support for his vision, Adenauer had to convince 
post-war West German society, demilitarised not only physically but also spiritually, that, 
because of the severity of the Soviet threat to Germany and to Western Europe, rearmament 
was indispensable. In his view, ‘the German defence contribution was necessary, the West 
wanted it, and the Germans owed it to civilization to produce it’.
5
 
According to Adenauer, security against the existential danger from the East, 
regardless whether this was real or constructed, had to have priority over all other 
preferences. The Korean War of 1950-53 and the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian 
Uprising in 1956 added weight to Adenauer’s words.
6
 These events, nonetheless, having 
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manifested the possibility of an internecine war in Germany, did not reduce the relevance of 
the principle behind the SPD’s policy: without unity there was no security for Germany.
7
  
The SPD, in fact, did not oppose rearmament in absolute terms. Since East Germany 
created in 1952 its Kasernierte Volkspolizei, a military force in all but name, the Social 
Democrats came to perceive the necessity to balance East German military power. They 
suggested, therefore, that West Germany should build a small standing army composed of 
volunteers and supported by a militia.
8
 This preference took a detailed form in a paper 
produced by former Wehrmacht Colonel Bogislav von Bonin,
9
 a high-ranking official in the 
Amt Blank (later the Ministry of Defence). 
According to Bonin’s analysis, an implementation of Western strategy would lay 
Germany in ruins, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons would be catastrophic in the 
densely populated Germany and rearmament and integration into NATO would hamper all 
hopes of German reunification. Therefore, Bonin proposed to create an army consisting of 
120-150,000 troops armed with unmistakably defensive weapons, above all highly mobile 
anti-tank guns.
10
 This system, Bonin believed, would perfectly suit West Germany in her 
situation: 
Neither the Soviet Union nor France can perceive this form of West German rearmament as a 
threat.... It presents the shortest way to ensure a certain level of security, in particular by 
establishing parity with Volkspolizei. Thus it will as soon as possible create an essential 




Besides some probably relevant objections considering operational feasibility,
12
 
Bonin’s proposal was, from the viewpoint of Adenauer’s government, out of the question 
owing to the fact that it completely missed Adenauer’s rationale for rearmament. The 
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assumptions leading to West German rearmament were postulated as follows: first, only a 
large military force could justify West Germany’s claim for sovereignty and equal rights 
within the Alliance; second, in the Cold War there was no place for neutrals; third, without a 
significant West German military contribution western Europe would be defenceless; and last 
but not least, a strong Germany would be much more secure from war than a weak one.
13
 
Therefore, in Adenauer’s view, only a mass army was suitable for West German needs. 
From Adenauer’s negotiations with Western allies it emerged as a given fact that the 
West-German military contribution should amount to approximately half a million troops. A 
memorandum of the government explicated this as follows: 
Required are conventional combat troops of such strength that they would provide protection 
against a numerically superior aggressor. Armed forces of 500,000 men within NATO meet 
this desirable balance of power... Fighting force of this strength enables an effective defence, 





From this reasoning it also followed that conscription was an inevitable means of recruitment. 
Nobody doubted that German society in the 1950s would be otherwise unable to generate 
enough volunteers and, moreover, a professional army would not create sufficient reserves. 
West German political leadership thus constructed the new West-German state as an 
enemy, or rather a possible victim, of the Soviet bloc. Therefore, in the early 1950s West 
Germany had to deal with a military threat to the very existence of its society. It was faced 
with the task to create armed forces which would be capable of withstanding, in cooperation 
with NATO allies, and hence deter too, a full-scale Soviet aggression. A mass army of half a 
million troops and compulsory service came to be fundamental requirements of West German 
rearmament. Yet besides these caveats ample space remained for devising forms of military 
organisation that would reflect social imperatives. Considering that West German society was 
after the Second World War in strongly antimilitaristic mood, the founders of the new armed 
forces had to devote a great deal of effort to design the new armed forces as a legitimate and 
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integral part of the kind of society which West-German people were trying to achieve – of 
liberal society. 
Wolf von Baudissin’s Philosophy of Liberal Military Reform 
The effort to create armed forces closely approximating the requirements of liberal 
society found its form in the concept of Innere Führung (‘Internal Leadership’). The 
principles of the reform project were developed and promoted by several influential officers 
of the former Wehrmacht. Among the most important proponents of the reform were 
Lieutenant Generals Hans Speidel and Adolf Heusinger, the first Inspector General of the 
Bundeswehr from 1957 to 1961, Colonel Johann Adolf von Kielmansegg and Lieutenant 
Colonel Ulrich de Maizière, Inspector General of the Bundeswehr from 1966 to 1972. Yet a 
mastermind and the most outspoken advocate of the military reform was Graf Wolf von 
Baudissin, former major of the Wehrmacht, in 1942 captured in Africa, in the 1950s head of 
the section for Innere Führung in the Amt Blank. 
Baudissin initially introduced his vision of military reform at the secret conference in 
Himmerod in September 1950, where the first programme of German rearmament was 
articulated. Despite being one of the most junior participants,
15
 Baudissin managed to make a 





 So it is stated in the memorandum that, 
concerning an internal structure, ‘fundamentally new’ forms of armed forces must be 
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 These new forms were meant to contribute to ‘the development towards the 
convinced citizen and European soldier’.
19
 
The ‘Himmerod Memorandum’ presents the need for a reform as a response to social 
and political conditions of the day – i.e. the Cold War perceived as an ideological conflict 
between Western freedom and democracy and Eastern totalitarianism – which were said to 
fundamentally differ from the past. Yet, Baudissin’s vision did not lack a precedent. He 
intended to build on the reforms of the Prussian military initiated after the defeats at Jena-
Auerstadt by Napoleon in 1806. Proponents of the early 19
th
 Century reforms – Scharnhorst, 
Gneisenau, Boyen, Grolman and Clausewitz – wanted to build a truly national army 
consisting of citizens – ‘born defenders of the state’
20
. The term ‘citizen in uniform’ hence 
became a cornerstone of the West-German military reform. 
Baudissin understood this historical event as the point when the way of exercising 
leadership (Menschenführung) in the military experienced fundamental change. Instead of 
harsh discipline and drilled obedience, the state was to appeal to moral qualities possessed by 
individual soldiers/citizens in uniform – qualities built on the values of freedom, justice and 
human dignity. Baudissin saw the appeal to these moral values as crucially relevant also for 
his time: 
Their demand for the citizens with reasoned conviction that defence is meaningful seems to 
be very modern. Moral convictions of the people have become an existential question of our 
free world and its soldiers; freedom, justice, and human dignity have become its scale.... 
Freedom, justice and human dignity are the criteria to tell friend from foe, a good tradition 
from a bad one, and what is still worth defending in the face of the thermonuclear 
destruction. Freedom, justice and human dignity are the foundation, starting point and goal 
of any leadership in the troops.
21
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A recent manifestation of these moral values Baudissin recognised in the resistance of 
military officers against the Nazi regime culminating in the attempt by Lieutenant Colonel 
Claus von Stauffenberg to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944. In the eyes of Baudissin, the 
Resistance would have been unthinkable without political and moral maturity and 
responsibility of those who took part. Whereas the Nazi regime, like all totalitarian systems, 
in order to manipulate people had to make them abandon their moral and religious roots, the 
members of the Resistance proved a great moral strength. For freedom and justice they had to 
be ready for the sacrifice of their lives.
22
 Such a moral maturity was argued to be just as 
essential in the conflict with Soviet totalitarianism. 
The recent experience of Germans with the Nazi rule and the contemporary conflict 
with the Soviet totalitarianism provided an opportune moment for promoting Baudissin’s 
vision. However, the principles of moral maturity and individual freedom and responsibility 
were certainly not meant to be an opportunistic response to the international situation of the 
time. Baudissin’s philosophy covers all three areas of liberal principles – universal rules of 
humanity, democratic and cooperative society, and individual rights and freedoms.
23
 His 
work thus represents a clear and unambiguous articulation of liberal principles under the 
conditions of the Cold War.
24
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Universalism and commitment to peace 
The Cold War is not understood as a conflict between states or blocs of states. In the 
words of Baudissin, the Cold War is an ‘international civil war’ and the formation of the new 
German armed forces is meant ‘to be simply an act in the general context of international 
civil war’.
25
 Not only the state but also the individual is targeted by enemy attacks, primarily 
in the form of propaganda. The state, therefore, is rather a means in this conflict than an end 
in itself. ‘Fatherland’, Baudissin writes, ‘must never stand for just power – power which must 
be increased by any and every means against both external and internal obstacles. Nor can we 
agree that beside it all moral and human values shrink to secondary importance.’
26
 
It was not a threat to state or national interests, then, that was hence to be the true 
reason for taking up arms; rather, it is the ‘decisive questions of human existence’ which are 
at stake.
27
 The citizen is thus meant, in Baudissin’s design, to recognise war only as the last 
defence of human-worthy, i.e. free, existence. For this reason – and not just because the 1945 
UN Charter and quite recent Nuremburg war crimes trials declared that waging aggressive 
war was now an ipso facto unlawful act – the citizen should also find aggressive war 
absolutely unthinkable.
28
 Upon these fundamental principles the new armed forces should be 
built. Peace was their aim, defensive strength the means and deterrence the only possible 
strategy. 
However, when talking about the commitment to peace, it does not suffice to look at 
the sphere of governmental politics or at the military establishment as a whole. Baudissin 
stresses that prevention of war is the task for every responsible citizen. The soldier’s task here 
is twofold. First, through readiness to fight he should contribute to the credibility of 
deterrence. By doing so, he will support politicians in their effort to keep ideological and 
political differences within the realm of diplomacy and non-violent politics. Second, it is 
claimed to be the duty of soldiers, as experts in the field, to warn politicians against the use of 
violence as a means of confrontation and remind them of the necessity to exhaust all other 
peaceful instruments. Thus Baudissin argues that the capability to fight a war has to be in 
accord with the commitment of every soldier to peace. The commitment to peace is meant to 
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motivate towards the readiness to fight and at the same time the military expertise should 
always warn against hasty decisions to take up arms.
29
 
Principles of free society 
It is crucial to Baudissin’s thinking that the aims of peace and preservation of free and 
democratic society must be met with the means of the same kind. Since totalitarian methods 
are at odds with the idea of free society, the citizen of free society cannot adopt totalitarian 
methods for its defence. ‘If he did adopt them, even to fight totalitarianism, he would lose 
belief in himself.’
30
 Baudissin, therefore, proposes a concept of democratic armed forces, or, 
more precisely, armed forces in democracy. This concept consists of, first, ‘organic 
integration of the army into the democratic state’; second, ‘devotion of its leaders to the state 




Particularly social and ethical integration of the soldiers into society is the key point 
of Baudissin’s concept. It is obvious to Baudissin that the citizen-soldier cannot be asked to 
defend freedom, if at the same time all his personal freedom is taken away from him. The 
military organisation in particular will be the final evidence ‘whether the freedom within 
society is meant seriously or not’.
32
 Baudissin insists that values of freedom and democracy 
cannot hinder the defensive capabilities of the armed forces. Contrary to ‘traditional’ ways of 
military education, he stresses that not the ultimate sacrifice itself but life in free society 
ought to be the primary aim of military education and socialisation in military culture. ‘The 
one who knows how and is ready to live for and in society will also know what is defended 
and will then be ready to risk his life for it.’
33
 
In the same way, a democratic way of life is, according to Baudissin, not at odds with 
the life of soldiers; on the contrary, it is the precondition for every form of decent existence. 
This is not to say, however, that armed forces should adopt a parliamentarian way of 
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leadership. Baudissin does not oppose the need for military hierarchy and discipline, yet the 
military leadership should not be reduced to it alone. Citizens who serve under arms in order 
to defend the values of individual rights and freedoms could hardly have any sort of 
patriarchal authoritarian rule applied to them. The superior cannot exercise his authority like 
a father over immature children.
34
 ‘The superior ranks above his subordinates for purposes of 
coördination... he has to rely on the coöperation of his subordinates in thinking and acting just 
as much as they rely on him for leadership.’
35
 Thus between the superiors and the 
subordinates should emerge a mutual and reciprocal partnership which may resemble a 
picture of free society. 
Of course, this entire concept of integration requires the existence of genuinely free 
parent society in the first place. A ‘form of life and government which every citizen will 
consider worth defending’ is a prerequisite for defensive capability of such civilianised armed 
forces.
36
 Although the education within the armed forces has to contribute to the general 
citizenship education, and the armed forces are meant to be one of the social institutions 
which help young men in the process of socialisation, it is not the army that should serve as 




Individual rights and freedoms 
As described above, the model of the armed forces in democracy is almost entirely 
built upon the concept of the free and mature individual who is conscious of his responsibility 
towards society as a whole. ‘Only the man who knows that as a citizen he is at one here and 
now with the state and who sees its capacities for development as his own – only that man 
can survive in and win the cold war.’
38
 A soldier who is trained merely in the military 
craftsmanship and drilled to obey orders without thinking is, according to Baudissin, no 
longer fit for war.
39
 
The traditional way of military leadership that rests on a ‘secularized “soldier’s 
honor” which describes obedience, duty, hardihood and readiness for action as unquestioned 
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and absolute concepts’ is argued to be out of date for various reasons.
40
 First, the Second 
World War manifested how easily such a leadership can be abused by criminals. Second, the 
traditional leadership derived from the world of patriarchal feudalism fails in the face of 
technical progress, which requires specialisation and division of labour among all members 
of a unit. Last but not least, the traditional, patriarchal leadership stand in sharp contrast to 
the ideal of free society and the mature and responsible citizen in uniform.
41
  
The soldier in order to become the citizen in uniform has to feel that he has a stake in 
the community he is supposed to defend. The soldier should retain all the rights and freedoms 
as any other citizen except for those which would preclude the performance of military 
duties. Thus the citizen in uniform may keep participating in the life of society and the state. 
Moreover, the citizen in uniform as a morally mature individual cannot be rendered 
blind in obeying orders. No trustful obedience would be given unless the soldier feels that the 
order is both legally and morally right, on the one hand, and meaningful in respect to a given 
situation, on the other. These ideas of Baudissin are not meant to turn the exceptional case of 
‘responsible disobedience’ into standard military practice. Despite the fact that ‘the 20 July’ 
became one of the pillars of the reform, the reformers stress that the legacy of the anti-Nazi 
resistance sets no norm for resistance in a democratic society.
42
 General Heusinger, one of the 
strongest advocates of Innere Führung, hence advised soldiers accordingly: ‘I must point out 
that no norms for the soldiers’ behaviour in a free Rechtstaat can be drawn from a putsch 
against [a] totalitarian regime.’
43
 Yet, the conflict between freedom and totalitarianism 
compels the armed forces to rely on those who are prepared to risk their lives for a moral 
principle. Therefore, the concept of command and obedience in armed forces has to be 
adapted so as to support building up such a character among soldiers.
44
 
Despite the fact that Baudissin conceived of and approved a conscientious refusal to 
obey orders – after all, the men of 20 July were to become an example of morally mature 
soldiers – he said nothing about conscientious objection to serve under arms. Nonetheless, it 
logically follows from his philosophy that he would not be opposed to the right of 
conscientious objection. Although serving in such a force which Baudissin devised should 
                                                 
40
 Baudissin, "The New German Army," 5. 
41
 Ibid.: 5-6. 
42
 Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross, 157; David Clay Large, "'A Gift to the German Future?' The Anti-Nazi 
Resistance Movement and West German Rearmament," German Studies Review, 7, no. 3 (1984): 525-26. 
43
 Quoted in Large, "A Gift to the German Future?," fn.113. 
44
 Baudissin, "The New German Army," 9. 
125 
 
not contradict pacifism, Baudissin was calling for such soldiers only who are aware of their 
responsibility towards society. Such a moral commitment, although it may be encouraged, 
cannot be imposed from above. Moreover, a generous right of conscientious objection would 
be another manifestation of the freedom which society grants to the individual. 
Institutionalisation and Enactment of the Reform Concept 
The journey between a courageous vision and putting a reform into practice often 
necessitates travelling along a rocky road. An advantage of Baudissin’s concept might be 
seen in the fact that the core principles upon which the concept rests were clearly stated in the 
constitution (Grundgesetz) of the West German state. Already in the preamble ‘the 
determination to promote world peace’ is affirmed and the article 24, the so called ‘Peace 
Clause’, is explicit that disturbing ‘the peaceful relations between nations, especially to 
prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional’ and will be regarded as a crime. As 
for the personal rights, the Article 1 insists that human dignity is inviolable and to ‘respect 
and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority’.
45
 
Because of this constitutional backing, Baudissin and his colleagues perceived 
realisation of the reform concept not merely as a policy option but rather as a practical 
necessity. However, the full realisation of the reform required an existence of some particular 
institutions and legal regulations. In particular, in his article from 1955 Baudissin proposes a 
whole set of such provisions. First, a consensual organic military law is needed in order to 
provide for the integration of the armed forces into the state. Second, the young officer 
should be assigned for at least half a year to the ‘Academy for All Armed Forces’, where he 
would receive a university-style education from civilian instructors. Third, measures should 
be taken that enable the soldier to exercise ‘the right to vote and engage freely in political 
activities in so far as this takes place outside the service routine and off military reservations’. 
Fourth, all ranks should choose representatives to speak for their comrades before their 
commanding officer. Fifth, the superiors can exercise their official authority only in 
fulfilment of their own duties. Sixth, training for citizenship should be introduced as an 
essential part of the education of all ranks. And last but not least, the integration with civilian 
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society should be facilitated by ‘training in civilian professions’ and ‘maintenance of cultural 
civilian contacts during the period of military service’.
46
 
Yet the official power of Baudissin and his circle was confined only to issuing the 
‘Handbuch Innere Führung’.
47
 This handbook, however, was no official regulation with 
binding force on soldiers. Rather, the intention was ‘to make the intellectual exchange of the 
planning phase available in a book issued informally to all officers’.
48
 In order to make all the 
reform plans real, authorship a handbook could not suffice. The reform ideas had also to be 
embraced by political representatives in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, on the one hand, 
and by the military officers of the future army, on the other. Whereas the former, as this 
section is to present, almost fully adopted the reform concept, the section to follow will show 
that the latter’s reception was much less warm, to say the least. 
The legislative process of rearmament was introduced in March 1954 with 
amendments of the FRG constitution which invested the federation with ‘exclusive legislative 
power’ with respect to defence.
49
 Yet it was not until West Germany joined NATO on 9 May 
1955 that the laws which were to give shape to the future armed forces began to emerge. 
Already in July 1955 the Bundestag passed a bill which allowed the Ministry of Defence to 
recruit a first intake of volunteers whose task was to prepare the military for its later build-up. 
It is characteristic, however, that the final version of the ‘Volunteer Law’ significantly 
differed from the original ministry draft. Facing the threat of a complete refusal of the bill, 
Chancellor Adenauer and Theodor Blank, whose Amt Blank had become a ministry only in 
June of that year, had to accept a compromise concerning not only the recruitment of the first 
volunteers, such as a vetting of high-ranking officers by an independent screening board, but 
also the legislative process of rearmament as a whole.
50
 
A need for a compromise and an enormous influence of members of the Bundestag, 
and of the Defence Committee in particular, over the content of the military laws characterise 
the legislative part of building the armed forces. Almost regardless of party-political 
affiliation, the members of the Bundestag were well aware of ‘the luxury of having civilian 
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institutions in place before the creation of a military’ and did not want to lose this signal 
advantage due to a hasty legislative process.
51
 Thus in March 1956 the so called ‘military 
constitution’ (Wehrverfassung), a set of constitutional amendments putting the armed forces 
into constitutional order, was passed. These amendments, among other things, invested the 
Bundestag Defence Committee with the powers of the committee enquiry and created an 
institution of a Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces (Wehrbeauftragter). The 
‘Soldiers’ Law’ (Soldatengesetz) stipulating the rights and duties of soldiers followed in April 
1956 and the ‘Conscription Law’ (Wehrpflichtgesetz) was passed in July of the same year. 
Except for the Conscription Law, all the other bills were accepted by a vast majority of the 
members of the Bundestag and supported by the coalition parties as well as the opposition 
Social Democrats (SPD). 
Primacy of Peace and Superiority of Civilian Authority 
Following the ‘Peace Clause’ (Art.26/1), the Basic Law specified that the single 
purpose of establishing armed forces was defence (Art.87a/1). Nonetheless, their employment 
was also allowed for in cases of natural disasters (Art.35) and when a system of collective 
security requires military support (so called Bündnisfall, Art. 24/2). Thus, from a 
constitutional viewpoint, the newly established Bundeswehr was prevented from violating 
international peace. Defence was legitimising the Bundeswehr’s existence and only defence 
of allies, as the Basic Law was usually interpreted until the deployment in Somalia in 1993 
and the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994, could justify sending armed 
troops abroad. 
Probably the biggest effort of the legislature was aimed at subordinating the military 
to civilian authority. Actually the entire reform concept was meant to prevent soldiers from 
developing a sense of being outside general society and/or above politics, i.e. the so called 
‘state within the state’ syndrome.
52
 The members of the Bundestag developed a strong 
opinion that ‘parliament must not allow the most important powers of military command to 
reside “outside the civilian realm”.’
53
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Thus the new armed forces were designed as a parliamentary army, with the federal 
president as a titular commander-in-chief, the federal chancellor having highest command 
during the state of defence and the minister of defence being in charge in peacetime. The 
minister of defence actually became directly in command over the individual services, as, for 
the integration into NATO, no joint general staff existed. Moreover, the superiority of 
civilians was reinforced by the Bundestag Defence Committee, which as the only committee 
in the Bundestag was given the right of investigation without being authorised by the house 
(Art.45a). The parliamentary control over the military is assisted by the institution of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, who, apart from contributing to 
parliamentary oversight over the military, should also ‘safeguard basic rights’ of the 




Probably the most visible characteristic of the new Bundeswehr was conscription. 
From the viewpoint of the Government, there was no other way of recruitment which could 
provide not only enough manpower for the regular armed force with strength of half a 
million, a number promised to the NATO allies and perceived as the minimal necessity for a 
credible deterrence, but also generated large reserves in case of mobilisation. Thus, according 




Yet, when advocating the Conscription Bill in the Bundestag, Minister of Defence 
Blank put forward an ideological argument too. Almost as important as the perceived 
strategic necessity was, for Blank, the question of the citizens’ responsibilities.  
The defence and its preparation in peace is the responsibility of the nation as a whole.... The 
German citizen will always stand up for his democratic rights and thus affirm his democratic 
obligations in cases of emergency. Upon him rests the viability of democracy, of which 
universal conscription is the “legitimate child”.... 
The universal conscription distributes these loads evenly in a truly democratic manner. The 
citizen would otherwise easily tend to regard a professional army as the institution which has 
the sole responsibility of securing his freedom.
56
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Blank built his argument on the tenet that universal conscription is a ‘legitimate child of 
democracy’, which was coined for German discourse by the first West-German president 
Theodor Heuss as early as 1949 and then reiterated over and over again by advocates of 
military drafts until the 2000s. Moreover, Blank explicitly acknowledged the Prussian 
reformers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. From the viewpoint of the conservative government, it 
was the universal conscription that brings the citizen in uniform into existence. 
Despite the fact that the Social Democratic Party (SPD) embraced Baudissin’s system 
of Innere Führung and the concept of the citizen in uniform, they remained adamant in their 
opposition to the draft. In an attempt to persuade Social Democrats, Blank’s argument also 
made an explicit reference to the pre-1914 French socialist-internationalist Jean Jaurès and 
his German socialist-internationalist counterpart and contemporary, August Babel.
57
 In fact, 
support of universal conscription had always been a traditional socialist policy. However, the 
post-1945 situation made the SPD abandon this traditional attachment to the draft. In a party 
resolution from March 1956 the SPD stated:  
The SPD opposes the draft of the Conscription Law submitted by the Federal Government 
because it increases in a particularly disastrous way the division of our country, it threatens 
to completely interrupt all the human connections of Germans on either side of the zone 




Whereas for Adenauer the division of Germany had by this time become a matter of fact and 
hence he preferred the alignment with Western allies, for the Social Democrats a peaceful 
reunification remained a primary politico-strategic aim. Forcing young man to serve under 
arms in an army of which the most likely adversary would be the Germans from the other 
side appeared only ineluctably to jeopardise any chance for reunification.  
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The citizen in uniform and his rights and duties 
Rather than in the conscription, the Social Democrats saw the cornerstone of 
realisation of the concept of the ‘citizen in uniform’ in the ‘Soldiers’ Law’ which enacted the 
chief ideas of Baudissin’s Innere Führung. The ‘Soldiers’ Law’ is first and foremost a list of 
rights and duties of soldiers, hence sometimes called ‘new German soldiers’ Magna Carta’.
59
 
So the law echoes the constitutional principle (Art.17a/1) establishing the soldier as a citizen 
in uniform by stipulating that the ‘soldier has the same citizen rights as any other citizen’. It 
is constitutionally recognised, however, that the nature of military service requires some 
necessary but temporary limitations on rights and freedoms of soldiers, yet these restrictions 
must be explicitly stated in the law. Among such limitations are a ban on wearing a uniform 
in public party-political events, expressing political opinions while on duty or using the 
authority of the superior for influencing political opinions of subordinates.  
Discipline and the relationship between the superior and the subordinate are other 
crucial parts of the ‘Soldiers’ Law’. The superior is entitled by the law to give only such an 
order whose subject is related to official purposes and lies in the interests of service. ‘It is not 
a case of disobedience if the subordinate does not follow an order which violates human 
dignity or has not been issued for official purposes.’
60
 Moreover, the subordinate is obliged 
not to follow an order which would violate international law, the law of the state and service 
rules. Being aware of the fact that the order violates law and to follow the order anyway 
constitutes a crime in the same way as issuing the order itself.
61
 The Soldiers’ Law thus 
burdens every individual soldier with not only moral but also legal responsibility for the acts 
he commits in his official capacity. 
The development of an extra-legal authoritarian culture was to be prevented by 
subordinating the realm of military discipline to the competence of civilian justice. The Basic 
Law allows for military criminal courts only ‘during a state of defence or over members of 
the Armed Forces serving abroad or on board warships’.
62
 Only a disciplinary court could be 
established within the armed forces, competence of which was strictly limited to 
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misbehaviour by and complaints of soldiers. However, either party could appeal against the 
decision of the disciplinary court to the Federal Court of Administration. Special military 
crimes, such as desertion, absence without leave or disobedience, could be prosecuted only 
by a civilian attorney at an ordinary penal court.
63
 Thus the military establishment was 
invested with no judicial power in criminal matters of its soldiers and even disciplinary 
measures could be reviewed by civilian courts. 
Participation of soldiers in the leadership to be exercised over their unit was supposed 
to be realised by the institution of an elected representative (Vertrauensmann) whose task 
was to communicate with commanding officers on behalf of the soldiers and represent their 
will in the unit-level planning and decision making. The participation in leadership through 
an elected representative, qualified obedience, subjection to civilian judicial system and 
individual rights and responsibilities were the aspects through which the armed forces were to 
approximate a free community of mature citizens. 
An active approach to create an alignment between the soldier and the state was 
represented by the provision for citizenship education. Baudissin realised that after the 
Second World War the relationship between the individual and the state needed to be re-
established and the citizenship education was regarded as one of the ways to achieve this aim. 
Such education, however, should not resemble an indoctrination or propaganda; on the 
contrary, the ‘Soldiers’ Law’ insisted that the ‘overall picture of education must be designed 
in such a way that the soldiers are not influenced for or against a particular political 
opinion’.
64
 So as to assist the Bundeswehr officers with the citizenship education and with the 
leadership according to the philosophy of Innere Führung the School of the Bundeswehr for 
Innere Führung was established in October 1956. 
Conscientious objection 
An important question which the legislature needed to resolve was the issue of 
conscientious objection. It was affirmed in 1949 as one of the basic rights of West German 
citizens that no one can be ‘compelled against his conscience to render military service 
involving the use of arms’.
65
 Yet a legal provision (§25 of the ‘Conscription Law’) was 
                                                 
63
 Krueger-Sprengel, "The German Military Legal System," 22-23. 
64
 ‘Das Gesamtbild des Unterrichts is so zu gestalten, daß die Soldaten nicht zugunsten oder zuungunsten einer 
bestimmten politischen Richtung beeinflußt werden‘ "Soldatengesetz 1956," 388. 
65
 Basic Law, art.4/3. 
132 
 
required to regulate details of this constitutional principle. According to the proposal of the 
Government the conscientious objection was to be limited to a fundamental religious or 
moral conviction against all use of violence in international relations. The Social Democrats 
opposed this proposal on the ground that conscience cannot be reduced only to religious and 
moral conviction, also political reasons may and should cause a conscientious decision. In 
addition, the SPD objected to the point that the conscientious objector must refuse all use of 




Whereas the former objection was accepted by the majority of the Bundestag, the 
latter did not. The final version of the clause hence stated: 
Who opposes on grounds of conscience to participate in every use of weapons between states 
and therefore refuses military service with a weapon, shall instead of military service provide 
an alternative service outside the armed forces. On his own request he can be called up for 




Nonetheless, the last word in this issue was said by the Federal Constitutional Court. The 
court decided in 1960 that the clause was constitutional; however, the court’s decision was 
not unconditional. The clause could be preserved only if its interpretation would not be 
limited to fundamental pacifists. The court recognised that an objection against military 
service might be genuinely conscientious even if it is based on a particular political situation 




As demonstrated, the political representatives in the Bundestag embraced Baudissin’s 
concept and genuinely tried to provide a legislative setting for the new armed forces in 
accordance with the philosophy of Innere Führung and the concept of the citizen in uniform. 
For Baudissin and his colleagues, a crucial role was ascribed to the importance of military 
laws for the realisation of Innere Führung. ‘Perhaps more than any other single event or set 
of events’, stresses Donald Abenheim, ‘these laws simultaneously broke with the tradition of 
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the past and acted to foster what have become the Bundeswehr’s own traditions’.
69
 Most of 
the measures which Baudissin had specified were enacted by the Bundestag. Only the 
proposals for a university-style education of officers and training of soldiers in civilian 
professions remained unheeded. Yet these suggestions became a cornerstone of the 
subsequent military reform in the early 1970s. The reform of military education was meant to 
save Innere Führung from a complete failure which had been caused by a rather hostile 
reception of the concept by the majority of the Bundeswehr officer corps. 
Reception and Resistance in the Armed Forces 
Despite the fact that the authors of the concept of Innere Führung were career military 
officers, some of them with outstanding service records, the concept was espoused almost 
exclusively by civilians, in particular by members of the Bundestag for all main political 
parties. However, the legislative and institutional setting had to be implemented by 
professional non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers, usually veterans of the 
Wehrmacht, who proved to be much less enthusiastic.  
Looking through a Huntingonian prism, some sort of conflict was necessary. In liberal 
society the societal imperatives are claimed to remain in opposition to the functional 
imperatives. Therefore, the concept of Innere Führung as a pure example of a subjective 
civilian control over the military must have clashed with the notion of military 
professionalism. The question is, however, whether the ‘functional imperative’ and the notion 
of ‘military professionalism’ represent in any sense universal military requirements, as 
Huntington argues. A close look at a resistance of West German career soldiers to the reform 
could illuminate this issue. 
Traditionalists in the Amt Blank 
A resistance to the reform began even before the first soldiers were recruited. The 
roots of the conflict over Innere Führung go as deep into the past as the concept itself. 
Illustrative is the fact that the reform concept was originally called Inneres Gefüge, which 
means internal structure, organisation and cohesion and which term is sometimes regarded as 
more adequate. However, opponents of the concept were soon speaking, in a play of words, 
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of Inneres Gewürge, literally ‘internal retching’, so as to ridicule the concept. Hence Innere 
Führung had to be coined as a substitute.
70
 
In fact, a military-conservative reaction emerged even before Inneres Gefüge/Innere 
Führung took any discernible shape. A conflict arose over the issue of the 20 July 1944 
Resistance and to what extent its members and advocates should determine the character of 
the FRG’s future armed forces. The reformers, on the one hand, regarded the 20 July 
Resistance as an example of ethical maturity and responsibility which should become an ideal 
of the new armed forces. On the other hand, a significant part of the Wehrmacht veterans held 
the ‘men of 20 July’ as nothing but traitors and warned vociferously against ‘oath-violation’ 
becoming a principle in the new army.
71
 According to a survey from 1951, the majority of the 
former professional soldiers, 59 percent, took a negative view of the military resistance. 
Hasso von Manteuffel, a general of the Wehrmacht who was very well-known from his 
leadership role in the December 1944 Ardennes offensive and was Adenauer’s military 
advisor, insisted that he was proud of the fact that he kept his oath until the very end and 
Heinz Guderian, chief of the army general staff in 1945 and an advisor in the Amt Blank, 




In the Amt Blank the position and political influence of the men of the 20 July was 
relatively secure. However, this was less the case of the legacy of the 20 July and, as for the 
reform concept itself, the reformist ideals proved to be very controversial among former 
Wehrmacht officers. ‘Indeed, a bitter internecine conflict over the troublesome issues of 
Resistance and reform soon divided Blank’s staff and threatened its cohesion.’
73
 The 
traditionalist faction was given its leader in the personality of Bogislav von Bonin, himself 
imprisoned by the Gestapo for disobeying Hitler’s direct orders. Von Bonin, who, owing to 
his family history as well as personal experience, exemplified the spirit of the Prussian 
militarism, was regarded by many former officers as a counterweight to the influence of the 
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reformers. Some even believed that his appointment finally secured ‘the primacy of military 
requirements in Amt Blank’.
74
 
Von Bonin did not speak directly against a reform; in fact, he recognised a need for it. 
However, he opposed strongly the effort of Baudissin and his circle. Thus von Bonin 
explained that he ‘merely objected to the unrealistic exaggerations in the thought processes of 
Baudissin because these cannot withstand the harsh reality’.
75
 In order to prevent ‘softening’ 
of future soldiers due to the proposed reforms, von Bonin tried to disable Baudissin’s section 
through subordinating it to himself. This reorganisation was stopped by Blank; nevertheless, 
in protest against the growing influence of von Bonin and other traditionalists, the reformers 
Konrad Kraske and Axel von dem Bussche, the latter being one of the few survivors of the 20 
July, resigned from the Amt Blank. Kraske’s and Bussche’s resignation brought to public 
attention the conflict between traditionalists and reformers within the office.
76
 
Authority among former professional soldiers though von Bonin was, his leaning 
towards German neutrality made him rather uncomfortable for the Government. In 1955, 
after his memorandum proposing small all-volunteer armed forces leaked out to the press and 
was used by the opposition, von Bonin was released from the Amt Blank. However, at the 
time a new personality emerged to publicly represent the critics of Innere Führung – Heinz 
Karst.  
Karst, a member of Baudissin’s Section for Innere Führung, attracted public attention 
when, during Baudissin’s absence, Karst’s official memorandum presenting the position of 
traditionalists leaked out to the press and was put on the agenda of the Bundestag’s 
Committee for the Issues of European Security. Karst’s memorandum attacked the attempts 
to put soldiers under civilian control. Democratic civil-military relations, Karst argued, 
should not be based on primacy of civilians; rather, it ought to rest on ‘the primacy of politics 
and statecraft over the military leadership and military considerations. This primacy is 
recognized by all soldiers and genuinely affirmed.’
77
 It is all right, said Karst, that the 
                                                 
74
 Heinz Brill, "Der Konflikt um die Innere Führung in der Dienststelle Blank: Die Position Bogislaw von 
Bonins im Jahre 1952," Kampftruppen - Kampfunterstützungstruppen, 26, no. 5 (1984): 219. 
75
 ‘Ich habe mich lediglich gegen die unrealistischen Übertreibungen in den Gedankengängen des reinen 
Theoretikers Baudissin gewandt, weil sie der harten Wirklichkeit nicht standhalten können und somit 
unbewußt den Keim der Unehrlichkeit in sich tragen.‘ Ibid.: 221. 
76
 Krüger and Wiese, "Zwischen Militärreform und Wehrpropaganda," 103-04; Large, "A Gift to the German 
Future?," 520; Brill, "Der Konflikt um die Innere Führung in der Dienststelle Blank," 219-20. 
77
 ‘Es handelt sich ausschließlich um den Vorrang der Politik und Staatskunst gegenüber der militärischen 
Führung und militärischen Erwägungen. Dieser Vorrang wird von allen Soldaten anerkannt und aufrichtig 
136 
 
Bundestag exercises control over the executive branch, Ministry of Defence including. It was 
claimed to be unacceptable, however, that ‘within the armed forces and the Ministry of 
Defence only the soldiers are controlled, while the civilians remain uncontrolled, and in 
addition to parliamentary control further checks are carried.’
78
 An apparently hostile attitude 
of the politicians towards soldiers was claimed to be undermining soldiers’ self-respect, 
public status and technical effectiveness.
79
 
Karst’s criticism did not connote a refusal of the attempt to prevent alienation of 
soldiers from society. On the contrary, he presented himself as a strong advocate of the 
concept of the ‘citizen in uniform’. However, the ‘citizen in uniform’ would be a stillborn 
baby unless the soldiers were trusted and respected and the soldiering recognised as a sui-
generis profession. It was only by demonstrating a mistrust towards the soldiers, Karst 




Moreover, Karst’s views of the armed forces in democracy contradicted to 
Baudissin’s attempt to let the peace imperative permeate the military.  
It is not the soldier who has to prevent the war, but the political leadership which bears 
primary responsibility for the destiny of the state. The soldier has merely to prepare for war. 
It would be self-deception to say that the soldier is not there to win a possible war, but to 
prevent it. The soldier’s only task is to win a possible war, wherever he stands and fights. 




Like his appeal to the politicians and the public to trust soldiers and respect the peculiarity of 
their profession, here, too, was revealed the basic assumption of Karst and other 
conservatively thinking officers. The military ought to be an instrument of statecraft. It 
should be respected that the character of means may necessarily differ from the nature of 
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ends in order to achieve the latter effectively. Nevertheless, despite the necessary difference 
between means and ends, both should be seen as parts of one whole. On this ground the 
traditionalists understood the need for the organic integration of the military into society. 
From the viewpoint of Baudissin’s opponents in the Amt Bank, the reform 
contradicted the best experience which every one of the former officers had picked up not 
only during his military training but also on the battlefields of the Second World War. Karst’s 
major contribution was that he articulated the objections of traditionalists with the 
sophistication of an intellectual. Yet, no matter how sophisticated Karst’s thinking was, it 
merely represented the principles of the former German militaries. It remained questionable, 
however, whether these principles corresponded with the ideological and nuclear aspects of 
the Cold War. 
In any case, Karst’s criticism was, on the one hand, sharp enough to make him 
popular and influential among fellow-officers and, on the other hand, sufficiently 
constructive to qualify him as one of the main educators of soldiers in the first years of the 
Bundeswehr’s development. As a person in charge of soldiers’ education and a popular 
military intellectual Karst obviously bears his share of responsibility for the shortcomings of 
Innere Führung in the first decade of the Bundeswehr’s existence, yet the deficiencies of this 
period do not appear to stem primarily from intellectual reflections. 
Situation in the Bundeswehr 
In April 1957 the Bundeswehr inducted into its ranks the first eight thousand 
conscripts. Only two months later a tragic accident happened which revealed to the West-
German public that the vision of the modern leadership suffered severe shortcomings in the 
new armed forces. On 3 June 1957, 15 recently drafted paratroopers drowned in the river Iller 
while they tried to cross its swollen stream. Fault for this tragedy fell on the NCO in charge 
of the platoon who ordered this crossing without proper authorisation and under conditions 
clearly unsuitable for untrained recruits. However, apart from the individual’s fault, this 
accident also revealed that, in spite of the measures enacted in the ‘Soldiers’ Law’, recruits 
were willing to blindly follow orders of their superiors.
82
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The failure to implement Innere Führung was no surprise for observers within the 
armed forces. The hostile reception that Baudissin’s Innere Führung had already received 
from quite a few former officers in the Amt Blank had presaged the problems which the 
reform concept was facing in the Bundeswehr more widely. The fact that the vast majority of 
the Bundeswehr officer corps was born between 1913 and 1920 and hence had an experience 
with the way of leadership practiced in the Wehrmacht, while so called ‘white cohorts’ (years 
of birth 1925-1936) were almost completely missing had already determined that 
implementation of Innere Führung in the troops was to be an uphill struggle.
83
 
The realisation of the reform concept hence experienced serious shortcomings from 
the outset. Only a year after the recruitment of the very first officers, in November 1956, 
Baudissin issued a report in which he reflected a reluctance of career NCOs and officers to 
embrace the reform and warned against the restoration of the old practices of drill and 
leadership.
84
 ‘Troop instructors schooled in the Wehrmacht resurrected the Kommiss methods 
embodied in the 1936 regulations, a symptom of the growing movement in favor of 
restoration of the drillmaster mentality within the ranks’, so Donald Abenheim summarised 
Baudissin’s message.
85
 A similar picture shows the following recollection of a recruit from 
the 1950s: 
... almost all instructors (...) came from the old Wehrmacht. They still had the same attitude 
to soldiering and training as at the time of Nazism. They talked very enthusiastically about 
their heroic deeds. This personnel and substantive continuity with the Nazi era was 
obvious.86 
 
However, Baudissin pointed out that the deficiencies did not rest solely on bad will 
among the NCOs and officers; rather, adverse material conditions of rearmament rendered 
the reform ineffective. Inadequate accommodation, clothing and salaries did not motivate 
soldiers to adjust to the completely new way of leadership. Moreover, lack of training aids 
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and regulations made it impossible to effectively train even those officers who were open to 
new ideas.
87
 The worst obstacle to the reform, nonetheless, was said to be ‘the experience of 
some officers that they not only can get away with violating the rules of Innere Führung, but 




The first annual report of the Parliamentary Commissioner, Helmut von Grolman, in 
1959 only proved that little had happened to change Baudissin’s negative view of the 
situation in the Bundeswehr. 
The year under review has shown clearly all inevitably negative consequences of the rapid 
build-up of the Bundeswehr. The excessive demands on the troop leaders, lack of 
experienced officers (company commanders), the insufficient number of young officers and 
NCOs... inadequate equipment and insufficient training opportunities (local training courses, 




The picture painted in Grolman’s report was so gloomy that the defence minister Franz Josef 
Strauß considered it extremely damaging to the armed forces and hence tried to prevent 
publication of the report. 
However, despite being far from the ideals of Innere Führung, the new Bundeswehr 
was by no means a resurrection of the Wehrmacht. David Clay Large demonstrates this by an 
experience of Charles Thayer, a US diplomat, who visited the Bundeswehr’s officers’ training 
centre in 1956: 
Thayer found that the school was not, unlike the Wehrmacht cadet schools he had seen in 
1937, similar in style and atmosphere to West Point. ‘Each room I looked into was arranged 
differently from the one before. The lockers even had locks to assure a little privacy. Inside, 
horror of horrors! civilian clothes hung next to uniforms and linen and underwear were 
neatly enough piled but in any order and on any shelf the owner saw fit.’ Thayer concluded, 
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somewhat wistfully, that West Point, not the new German army, was now ‘the last 




Moreover, various reports from the early 1960s expressed a cautious optimism 
concerning the progress of Innere Führung in becoming an every-day reality among soldiers. 
General Ulrich de Maizière, a commander of the School Innere Führung, observed that the 
soldiers’ loyalty to the FRG’s constitution and their recognition of the primacy of politics was 
beyond doubt. Yet de Maizière saw Innere Führung in the troops as ‘coherent, but rather thin 
ice’, which can easily break under pressure.
91
 
An official situational report of the School Innere Führung from 1961 is even more 
optimistic. Officers and NCOs, the report said, had attained ‘greater certainty in the 
application of the principles of Innere Führung’. The resistance to the reform concept, which 
was so distinct at the beginning, was now on the wane.
92
 A similarly positive view was 
articulated in the ‘Annual Report 1961’ of the Parliamentary Commissioner Vice Admiral 
(ret) Hellmuth Heye. His regular visits to troops gave him the impression that soldiers were 
sufficiently aware of the principles of Innere Führung. It appeared to him that the legal norms 
stipulating ‘that the personality of the subordinate soldiers must be respected – regardless of 
individual failures – is increasingly becoming a matter of course’.
93
 
Yet only two years later the same Vice Admiral Heye subjected the situation in the 
Bundeswehr to severe criticism and as a consequence was forced to leave his office. At the 
origins of this episode was the so called ‘Nagold-scandal’ – a death of one conscript as a 
consequence of harsh training methods in the 6/9 parachute training company in Nagold. This 
incident attracted strong public attention and accordingly also brought about a reaction from 
the Ministry of Defence. Several NCOs and officers were held responsible and the disgraced 
training company 6/9 was withdrawn from the list of units.
94
 
Heye, nonetheless, did not consider Nagold as merely an individual incident, but 
rather a symptom of a fatal development of the Bundeswehr. In the Parliamentary 
Commissioner’s Annual Report for 1963, Heye identified a fundamental misconception 
shared among soldiers: 
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To train the recruits to hardness, it is necessary that they are – like the old-timers used to be – 
‘ground down’. From this site it is also often emphasized that the good soldier never 




Generally Innere Führung seemed to him to be in a shambles and the Bundeswehr was 
reported to be tending towards the ‘state within a state’. However, this annual report was, in 
Heye’s view, largely ignored by politicians and therefore he decided to publicise his 
perspective in a series of articles under the title ‘In Sorge um die Bundeswehr’ in the 
illustrated magazine ‘Quick’. Heye’s main argument read: 
The Bundeswehr is an institution built upon ancient organisational principles, which has 
learnt nothing from the American model of the performance-efficiency thinking, which 
maintains outdated hierarchies and traditions and which, even when innovations are 




However, it was not so much his argument as the fact of publicising the report which led to 
Heye’s resignation. Political and military leadership alike regarded his articles as an open 




An important aspect of Innere Führung was to make individual soldiers conscious of 
the necessity to defend the state in general and of the meaningfulness of military tasks in 
particular. Yet Baudissin, as well as the ‘Soldiers’ Law’, made abundantly clear that this 
should have nothing to do with propaganda. On the contrary, the moral commitment of 
soldiers was to be built upon unbiased information and free discussion. To provide an aid to 
this effort various journals and other informational and educational sources were being 
published and distributed to soldiers. However, the original idea to provide free and unbiased 
information obviously suffered heavy casualties in the collision with reality. Martin Kitchen’s 
analysis on this issue deserves to be quoted at length: 
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A detailed study of the educational material of the Bundeswehr, the Information for the 
Troops, shows how far the lofty ideals of Graf Baudissin have been abandoned. ‘Democracy’ 
is defined as being the political system of the Federal Republic, so that there can be no 
question of whether the Federal Republic is democratic enough, or how it could be made 
more democratic. Criticism of the system is denounced as ‘belly-aching’, and a compulsory 
stay behind the Iron Curtain is suggested as the best remedy. Great stress is placed upon the 
need for order, discipline and obedience both in civil and military life. Freedom is thus 
defined as subjection to authority. This definition of freedom is reconciled with the concept 
of democracy by insisting that: ‘The democratic leader... takes responsibility for his fellow 
citizens and makes decisions on their behalf which they, through lack of strength, 
responsibility and understanding are unable to make.... These people make up the active part 




Illustrative here is also the fact that General Friedrich Foertsch, shortly after his appointment 
to the position of Inspector General in 1961, considered it necessary to ban in discussions on 
communism the use of offensive expressions, such as ‘red devils’ and ‘Bolshevik 
Untermensch’. Such a ban, nonetheless, had already been stipulated by paragraph 33 of the 
‘Soldiers’ Law’. 
On the other hand, the apparent deviation of citizenship education towards agitation 
and propaganda did not turn the Bundeswehr into an effective ‘school of the nation’. In fact, a 
survey
99
 conducted in the early 1960s produced results which might be interpreted as a 
remarkable success of the education towards citizenship and democracy. Regarding beliefs in 
liberal democracy, the soldiers showed in general greater adherence to democratic principles 
than did the civilian population and, moreover, the democratic conviction showed signs of 
increasing with the rise in rank. No less remarkable is the fact that, despite the support given 
by a majority of the professional soldiers and even more so among the officers, for the 
Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), the performance of compulsory military service had 
absolutely no impact on the political preferences of conscripts (see the charts below). In fact, 
the survey noted a slight tendency to change during the military service one’s political 
allegiance in favour of the SPD.
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Figure 7 Success of the education towards citizenship and democracy demonstrated in the 




Considering the implementation of Innere Führung, the first decade of the 
Bundeswehr’s existence witnessed a mixture of failures and successes, with a vast 
predominance of the former. Obviously, the aims of the reform concept were not 
accompanied by adequate material or human resources. Officers and NCOs, who were proud 
of Wehrmacht’s achievements and their own careers in it, would have been reluctant to 
embrace the reform even if conditions had been favourable. However, the Bundeswehr’s 
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Question: What is your view on the 
role of opposition parties in 
democracy?  







Allegiance to a political party  
CDU/CSU SPD
53,4 53,4 39 21,8 
16,6 32,5 39,6 59,6 
Public Recruits NCOs Officers
Question: What is your view on the resistance to Hitler’s regime 
during the last war?  
Positive because the Nazi-regime violated human rights
Positive because Hitler was a megalomaniac and brought disaster to Germany
144 
 
build-up was so rapid that re-education and retraining of those officers and NCOs in 
accordance with the propositions of Innere Führung was bound to fail. The old practices of 
military training and discipline thus necessarily intermingled with the reform measures 
imposed by law and demanded by both the political representation and the public. As a result, 
Detlef Bald notes, there was evidence of a tendency to reduce the practice of Innere Führung 




The Second Reform in the Early 1970s 
The late 1960s brought profound changes into German politics and society. 
Externally, a nuclear stalemate was accompanied by the slow but steady reduction of tension 
between the East and the West. Within the FRG the Grand Coalition of the SPD and the 
CDU/CSU led by Kurt Georg Kiesinger from 1966 until 1969 and the government of the 
SPD and the Liberal Democrats (FDP) under Chancellor Willy Brandt from 1969 and, most 
important, the radicalisation of German youth, the year 1968 being its culmination, all 
affected the situation of and in the Bundeswehr. The 1968 revolt in particular brought about a 
remarkable liberalisation of West-German society. As Gerhard Kümmel puts it, the ‘1968-
ers’ ‘initiated and achieved nothing less than a democratisation of society and of the political 
system which translated into politics. This impulse towards political participation, towards 
transparency in a lively public debate could not leave the armed forces unaffected.’
103
 
Probably the most immediate effect was that the 1950s’ notion that armed forces are a 
‘necessary evil’ lost in perception of the radicalised youth its attribute of necessity. 
Aggressive demonstrations during public military ceremonies and dramatically rising 
numbers of conscientious objectors were the most tangible consequences of this attitude.  
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In such a situation it was generally understood that the Bundeswehr as a whole, and 
the concept of Innere Führung in particular, required a significant reform. Chancellor 
Kiesinger publicly referred to Innere Führung as ‘old clichés’ in need of revision. Minister of 
Defence Gerhard Schröder called for discussion on further development of the Bundeswehr 
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and General de Maizière, one of the spiritual fathers of Innere Führung, asked service chiefs 
to draft suggestions for a possible reform of the inner structure of the armed forces.
105
  
To some military opponents of Innere Führung this was an opportune moment to 
speak out in order to reverse what they regarded as the unfavourable trends in the military 
and society. Moreover, a generation of former Wehrmacht officers in the leadership of the 
Bundeswehr was approaching retirement age and hence was also losing scruples about 
challenging the very foundations of the civil-military relations that had been installed in West 
Germany. On the other hand, in October 1969 Helmut Schmidt became the first Social-
Democratic minister of defence in Germany since 1920 and brought with him to the ministry 
a determination to make Innere Führung work. 
Military counterreformation 1969 
Despite many shortcomings during the first decade, the term Innere Führung was 
increasingly perceived as ‘temenos’, a sanctuary, which ought to remain intact.
106
 Attacks on 
the term were confined to private conversations behind garrison walls, where the term Innere 
Führung was frequently being referred to as ‘soft wave’, ‘inner strangulation’ or ‘inner 
bullshit’.
107
 It was not until 1969 that the military resistance to the reform developed into an 
open stage. The first one whose views emerged before the public was Vice Inspector of the 
Army, i.e. vice chief of the army staff, Major General Hellmut Grashey, whose speech at the 
General Staff College in Hamburg leaked out to the Spiegel magazine. 
The Bundeswehr was, in Grashey’s view, in an unpleasant state due to, first, the 
civilian administration in the Ministry of Defence; second, the parliamentary commissioner 
as the symbol of the Bundestag’s ‘institutionalised mistrust’; and last but definitely not least, 
the concept of Innere Führung itself. As for the last point, Grashey asserted that the reform 
was nothing but a mask: ‘the entire concept of Innere Führung was bought as a new thing 
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merely in order to get the SPD’s agreement to rearmament.’
108
 Now, to Grashey, the time had 
become ripe to take off the mask and stop pretending that the Bundeswehr was in any sense a 
new organisation. 
A few months later in June 1969, General Albert Schnez, Inspector of the Army, 
presented a study prepared by his staff, Heinz Karst being among the contributors, called 
Thoughts on improvement of internal organization of the Army, or simply the ‘Schnez-
Studie’. The study maintained that the ‘point of departure for all reflections affecting the 
army’s size, structure, internal order, combat power as well as its integration into the state’ 
must be the armed forces’ mission, which the study defines as combat.
109
 Echoing Karst’s 
paper from 1955, the ‘Schnez-Studie’ asserted that the soldier ‘is not there only to deter, but 
to fight if the deterrence fails. He contributes to the deterrence only through his fighting 
capability. To be a soldier is, therefore, a task sui generis and not a “job like any other”.’
110
 
Innere Führung was a failure, the ‘Schnez-Studie’ claimed, because it rested on the 
erroneous assumption that all citizens are prepared to make voluntary sacrifices in order to 
defend their freedom. In the view of the army staff this assumption did not correspond with 
the reality of West-German society. The real state of society was argued to warrant some 
changes in the Basic Law, particularly the points governing conscientious objection and the 
military judicial system. Moreover, in order to improve discipline within the ranks, the study 
demanded measures to curtail the right of soldiers to complain to the parliamentary 
commissioner and to increase officers’ right to discipline their subordinates. However, the 
most courageous, or outrageous, passage was put into the conclusion. The army staff called 
for nothing smaller than a wholesale reform of West-German society: ‘Every attempt to cure 
symptoms promises as little effective success as the removal of individual deficiencies. Only 
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a root-and-branch reform of the Bundeswehr and society, which has the goal of going after 
the ills at its roots, can decisively raise the fighting power of the army.’
111
 
Immediately after the ‘Schnez-Studie’ had been publicised in December 1969, a group 
of eight lieutenants composed an open letter entitled ‘Der Leutnant 1970’. In nine theses the 
authors refused the reactionary demands of the army staff and, in contrast, required 
democratisation and civilianisation of the institutional culture of the Bundeswehr. One of 
their theses, for instance, stated: ‘I want to be an officer of the Bundeswehr who can question 
the conduct (= official order) of a superior while his own conduct can be questioned by 
subordinates, or rather by anyone. I want to be an officer who takes nothing for granted.’
112
 
Baudissin with satisfaction commented the paper: ‘For the first time, active officers have 
passed me from the left!’
113
 Yet, the nine theses were regarded as too radical to gain any 
considerable body of support among other officers. 
That was not, however, the case of another paper produced by low/middle rank 
officers – the so called ‘Hauptleute von Unna’.
114
 Thirty company commanders of the 7
th
 
Panzergrenadier Division in Unna drafted a paper which provided a complete support for the 
theses presented in the ‘Schnez-Studie’. But it has to be noted that, all the same, the captains 
from Unna were encouraged, or maybe tasked, by their divisional commander, Major General 
Eike Middeldorf, one of the authors of the ‘Schnez-Studie’.
115
 In any case, however 
spontaneous the work of the captains from Unna, their paper appears to reveal some authentic 
views of ordinary army officers. After all, more than eight hundred of the nine thousand 
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The problem of the Bundeswehr was, in the eyes of the captains from Unna, twofold – 
within the armed forces and in general society – although both aspects were interrelated. 
Regarding the former, the efficiency of the Bundeswehr was seriously hindered by lack of 
discipline in the troops. Officers could not maintain sufficient discipline because their 
educational and disciplinary tools were inadequate to deal with conscripted soldiers 
unconvinced of the utility of their military service. As for the latter, society was said to 
underestimate the military threat posed by the Warsaw Pact, for which political and military 
leadership was to blame. In general, the captains pressed for the primacy of military 
requirements. Unless society recognised the need for a uniqueness of the military institution – 
the soldier as a profession sui generis, a need for formal discipline etc. – the Bundeswehr 




In terms of Huntington’s concepts, despite all the effort to impose a subjective civilian 
control, the Bundeswehr became, after almost one and half decade since its establishment, 
only very imperfectly transmuted military (or one could say the actual identification with 
society was insufficient). The considerable changes in society and politics in the late 1960s 
rendered the threat of insulation and extirpation of the military more than conceivable. An 
action was, therefore, needed in order to ensure at least an elementary military security of 
West Germany. In the view of some military circles, as this section shows, the answer lay 
primarily in society. According to the relatively modest suggestion of the captains from 
Unna, raising a threat perception would be a feasible way to preserve and increase the 
Bundeswehr’s fighting capability. The more ambitious view of the army staff required a 
‘root-and-branch reform’ of society. As a result, it was believed, a more pro-militaristic 
society would permit objective civilian control and a tolerated military professionalism.  
The following subsection shows that the intentions of the Ministry of Defence under 
Helmut Schmidt were entirely opposite – by increasing subjective civilian control to more 
closely approximate the state of identification with society. Owing to the fact that at the end 
of the 1960s more than a half (55%) of the public did not feel threatened by the Soviet Union, 
in contrast to a third of the population who did,
118
 the increased identification/transmutation 
could not considerably improve the fighting power of the armed forces. However, it certainly 
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could preserve the Bundeswehr’s capability to become a powerful fighting force again if the 
need was felt. 
Helmut Schmidt’s response – re-institutionalisation of Baudissin‘s reform 
The effort of Helmut Schmidt to amend Innere Führung focused on two particular 
shortcomings of the implementation in the 1950s. The realisation of the reform was 
hampered, first, by the fact that the Handbuch Innere Führung published in 1957 in order to 
clarify the practical meaning of the reform concept was not issued as a regulation or an order 
and hence could be and was easily ignored. Second, Baudissin’s suggestions to introduce 
university-style education into the professional training of officers and ‘training in civilian 
professions’ for the long-term serving NCOs and rank and file soldiers
119
 had not been 
implemented. A response to the former shortcoming was a service regulation ‘ZDv 10/1: 
Hilfen für die Innere Führung’
120
 and in order to deal with the latter problem a commission 
led by Thomas Ellwein proposed a large reform of military education. 
Yet a first direct response of the Ministry of Defence to the criticisms and demands 
asserted in the ‘Schnez-Studie’ was presented in the  eißbuch   70: Zur Sicherheit der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr in a section on the Bundeswehr 
and society.
121
 Minister Schmidt here welcomed the contribution of the officers to a free 
discussion on a future development of the concept of Innere Führung, but at the same time 
insisted that the principles of ‘the primacy of politics, respect for the human dignity of the 
soldiers and the constitutional protection of the individual’ remained immutable.
122
 
Moreover, in response to Grashey, the  eißbuch   70 stated that the principles of Innere 
Führung, since they rested on the Basic Law, were ‘no “mask” which one can take off, but an 




The  eißbuch   70 also affirmed the fundamental principles of the liberal military 
policy: commitment to peace, the integration of soldiers in society and protection of 
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individual rights and liberties. ‘The Federal Government considers peace as the supreme 
good’, read the first words of the  eißbuch   70.
124
 To secure this good three policy aims 
were pursued: first, to collaborate on maintaining a stable balance of military force; second, 
to mitigate the East-West confrontation; third, limitation and reduction of armaments of all 
states. The mission of the military was hence stated to be the deterrence and preservation of 
peace. The  eißbuch   70 clarified these requirements by quoting Gustav Heinemann, then 
the Federal President: ‘It is not war that is the critical case in which the man has to prove 
himself... but peace that is the challenge in which we all have to prove ourselves.’
125
 
Regarding the principle of integration, Schmidt, among other things, countered the 
officers’ demand to recognise their profession as sui generis. Soldiering, according to the 
 eißbuch   70, naturally possessed several peculiarities, just like various other professions – 
the need for loyalty and obedience might be shared with civil servants, and police or 
firefighters had to face a similar level of personal danger. Those peculiarities, as long as 
being functional, should be recognised. However, the  eißbuch   70 reminded its readers 
that ‘war threatens lives and property of the entire nation, not only the soldiers’. Such 
consideration, contrary to the call for recognition of soldiering as a sui generis profession, 
ought to ‘determine the self-image of the Bundeswehr’.
126
 
Respect to the individual rights and freedoms of the soldiers was strongly emphasised 
in the  eißbuch   70. ‘Basic rights and rights guaranteed by law are not to be impaired’, 
proclaimed Minister Schmidt. In addition, he refused an ‘unnecessary regimentation in the 
private sphere’ (e.g. unification of the haircut).
127
 The institution of the parliamentary 
commissioner, the ‘ eißbuch   70’ also said, was not an ‘expression of a permanent mistrust 
towards the soldiers’, as the military critics claimed. On the contrary, the parliamentary 
commissioner was claimed to protect the individual rights of the soldiers. 
The main weight of Schmidt’s effort to amend Innere Führung lay in the reform of 
military education. Thomas Ellwein’s commission, which was established for this purpose, 
drafted in 1970 a report proposing that all long-term serving and career soldiers should be 
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given a qualification in civilian professions. The soldiers and NCOs were supposed to attend 
a vocational training, and gaining a degree in one of the newly established universities of the 
Bundeswehr in Hamburg and Munich would become an essential part of a career 
development of the officers.  
An immediate effect of the widened qualification of soldiers on each level of the 
military hierarchy could be a more efficient utilisation of modern military technology. 
However, the reform was intended to address a more fundamental problem of the 
Bundeswehr – its insufficient recruitment of long-term serving soldiers. Arguably, a notable 
part of the problems with the internal order and discipline in the troops that prompted the 
public attack by professional officers on the concept of Innere Führung was caused by a 
shortage in both quantity and quality of training personnel. This situation would, presumably, 
have deteriorated if the call for sui generis profession had been given an approval and the 
military hence were to become further divorced from society. The education reform, in 
contrast, transformed the military’s image from a combat organisation towards an 
occupational and educational organisation and the military profession now appeared as a 
job.
128
 This might have, on the one hand, adversely affected its combat efficiency on the 
battlefield; on the other hand, it considerably improved the position of the Bundeswehr in the 
labour market at a time of negligible unemployment in the economically booming FRG of the 
early 1970s. The latter consideration around this issue of recruitment was, from the strategic 
perspective of the Cold-War West Germany, the more important factor. 
In fact, even the diminishing effect on combat efficiency is open to dispute. 
Considering the fact that efficient utilisation of technology was increasingly perceived as the 
key factor in warfare, a cadre of short- to long-term volunteers who would bring into the 
Bundeswehr their technical professional skills was generally understood as crucial to this 
efficient exploitation of technology. However, as Rudolf Warnke proposed in 1969, the 
incentives offered to the volunteers at the time attracted primarily such a candidate whose 
intention was to stay in the armed forces after the end of his commitment and hence ‘has 
greater similarity with a candidate for the civil service or with an office clerk than with a 
technologically trained skilled worker’. Therefore, contrary to the original intention, the cadre 
of volunteers was dominated by people who had given up the civilian occupation they had 
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learned in order to take up bureaucratic and organisational activities.
129
 The educational 
reform was supposed to change this state by making the voluntary service attractive for 
technologically trained personnel from industrial companies. Such people could, after 
completing their Bundeswehr service, easily return to the industry and indeed do so with 
greatly enhanced professional knowledge. 
Moreover, the effects of the reform were supposed to go far beyond these practical 
advantages. As the report of Ellwein’s commission maintained, ‘an education reform in a free 
and democratic constitutional order will not only improve the professional qualification of the 
individual, but also allows for a greater political participation and shared responsibility.’
130
 It 
was believed that providing soldiers with non-military qualifications would also penetrate, or 
even tear down, the walls between the military and civilian worlds. Detlef Bald thus may 
have very aptly noted that in Ellwein’s reform ‘a contemporary interpretation of the values of 
Innere Führung found its expression... The connection between the objectives of the reform 




In the enquiry as to what extent liberalism determined the military capacities of 
Western armed forces, the case of the rearmament of the FRG in the 1950s and 1960s offers 
several apparent paradoxes. More than any other state, the FRG in the 1950s was an object of 
international politics rather than a powerful subject that exercised influence on the 
international structure. The international structure to which West Germany had to adapt was 
determined by the conflict between two blocs of opposing ideologies – the liberal West and 
the Marxist-Leninist East. Theoretically, such a constellation was quite unfavourable to an 
extensive influence of ideological imperatives on military policy. The domestic ideological 
forces, as Alexander Wendt proposes, may only adjust the performance of a structurally 
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 Yet, here comes the first apparent paradox: despite  est Germany’s obvious 
lack of power in international politics, the influence of liberalism on West-German 
rearmament was, as demonstrated above, notable. 
However, this paradox is only an appearance of one, due to the fact that the same 
liberal principles which determined the creation of the Bundeswehr were quite commonplace 
in the West. The NATO strategy, although it had to deal with and hence adapt to a non-liberal 
opponent, was naturally affected by the liberal preferences of its members. Therefore, the 
strategy of deterrence, to which West Germany had to contribute with a mass army of half a 
million soldiers, was compatible with the development of liberal military institutions.  
In terms of the concept of liberal military capacities (see Figure 9), to generate a mass 
army necessitated by the mission of deterrence equal participation of all capable citizens 
through universal conscription was required. However, although liberal society can appeal to 
individual responsibility to defend one’s society, this principle alone cannot justify the 
compulsory service in the armed forces. Conscription in West Germany was hence 
legitimised, on the one hand, by the right to refuse the military service on the ground of 
conscience and, on the other hand, by a rather civilianised institutional culture based on the 
concept of the ‘citizen in uniform’. The concept of the ‘citizen in uniform’ was supposed to 
ensure that personal rights and freedoms of soldiers would be observed and that the 
Bundeswehr’s internal life would not diverge from the life of society. 
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Figure 9 Model of liberal military capacity under the conditions of existential threat 
 
The explanation of the first paradox is, in fact, an essential part of understanding 
liberalism as a meta-ideology. It should be a matter of course that state borders should not be 
considered a crucial limitation when dealing with liberalism. The liberal West should be 
regarded as a relatively coherent community built on common liberal assumptions. Individual 
states and nations should be regarded merely as members of this community of values. 
However, here we must face the second paradox of this case: West German people in the first 
two decades after the end of the Second World War can hardly be referred to as a genuinely 
liberal society. 
The overthrow of the Third Reich in 1945, and its aftermath, certainly meant a great 
break from the past for the Germans. Ideologies and social institutions connected with their 
tragic history were discredited outright. The ideological and cultural rupture following the 
end of the 1939-45 war was believed to mean the Stunde Null (zero hour) in the development 
of (West) German society. Arguably, the post-war conditions were very favourable for 
liberalism to flourish in the western parts of Germany. Only after the defeat in the Second 
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World War ‘could bourgeois-capitalism, which had been retarded until then, develop in the 
Federal Republic’, notes Ludwig von Friedeburg.  
After the destruction of industry in the war and immediate post-war period, the industrial 
revolution had, as it were, to be carried out a second time. But it was only after the German 
upperclasses had lost their influence, the German state had been replaced and its army 





Yet, it takes time for society to internalise norms and values. Therefore, liberalism in the 
1950s in West Germany was very far from the state of meta-ideology – the ‘set of 
presupposition and sentiments of a supposedly neutral and universal kind which dominates 
political thinking across the ideological spectrum’.
134
 
In spite of all that, it is justifiable to argue that liberal principles significantly 
determined West German rearmament. The concept of Innere Führung represents, as 
demonstrated above, an accurate manifestation of liberal principles. The fact that the authors 
of the concept anchored their ideas in the principles stipulated in the West German 
constitution, the Basic Law, and, furthermore, that the reform gained a support of political 
representatives across the political spectrum signify that liberalism did play an important role 
in West Germany in the early years after the end of the Second World War. A liberal society 
was something that West German people were certainly trying to achieve.  
From the previous point follows the third paradox: West German liberalism was at the 
time an elite-driven project.
135
 This is certainly the truth regarding the process of 
rearmament. The reform concept of Innere Führung was created by a small circle of experts 
in the Amt Blank, most notably by Graf Wolf von Baudissin. Particularly Baudissin was very 
successful in gaining public and political support for the reform concept. Yet, the ‘public’ he 
dealt with were representatives of German churches, probably the most influential social 
organisations in the Western parts of Germany in the aftermath of the Second World War,
136
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and, most important, members of the Bundestag, chiefly the members of the Defence 
Committee.  
Particularly the Bundestag played the role of an agent of liberalism in the process of 
rearmament. In 1955/56 the cross-party majority of the members of the Bundestag passed the 
legislation implementing the concept of Innere Führung, partly in opposition to the wishes of 
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and later on it was the Parliamentary Commissioners of the 
Armed Forces who were actively promoting the realisation of the reform concept in the 
Bundeswehr. Not unimportant among the liberal agents was also the Federal Constitutional 
Court which in the issue of conscientious objection demonstrated its power to protect and 
promote the liberal principles of the FRG’s constitution. 
The effort of the agents of liberalism was, however, an unfinished project. The 
philosophy of Innere Führung became an ideal which would never be entirely attained. The 
fact that the liberal reform concept was unattainable might be, to some extent, inherent to any 
ideologically driven design. After all, Richard Bellamy might be right in arguing that modern 
liberalism preserves the ethical values which were created in and for a particular historical 
community.
137
 In any case, it can hardly be expected that any ideological model would 
manage to anticipate perfectly and deal with all problems that may emerge in a confrontation 
with reality. 
More important, however, is the fact that every military force is a human organisation 
with peculiar social dynamics which is rarely found to exist in absolute harmony with broader 
society. Specifically in the case of West German rearmament, the emerging Bundeswehr had 
to rely on veterans of the Wehrmacht and Reichswehr who possessed a very clear picture of 
how a military should look and be inwardly ordered, and hence showed a significant 
tendency to resist the reform ideas. One might, therefore, read the case as a proof of 
Huntington’s argument that an inherent conflict exists between liberalism and military 
professionalism.
138
 However, although a strong tendency of the professional military cadres 
to oppose practices introduced from the outside by societal actors is clearly manifested in this 
case study, it does not necessarily mean a conflict between the societal/ideological 
imperatives and the functional imperatives to ensure military security. In fact, here comes the 
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last paradox revealed in the case of West German rearmament: considering the West-German 
situation in the 1950s and 1960s, the expertise provided by the traditionalist officers would 





The Post-Cold War Transformation of the Bundeswehr 
– towards an Expeditionary Force 
The establishment of the Bundeswehr in the 1950s was, as the previous chapter was 
designed to demonstrate, a response of West German society to the challenges caused by the 
Cold War. The bipolar international confrontation, in which the FRG took the side of the 
Western alliance, posed, or certainly was believed to pose, a threat to the very existence of 
the West German state and society. Hence specific military capacities were required to face 
the threat. The mission of deterrence necessitating a mass army, universal conscription as a 
means of recruiting the mass army, and the concept of the ‘citizen in uniform’ to legitimise 
and mitigate the circumscription of individual rights and freedoms during the fulfilment of a 
person’s compulsory military service, all represented the fundamental characteristics of the 
Cold-War Bundeswehr. 
 However, while such military capacities perfectly fitted the international security 
situation of the bipolar confrontation between the East and the West, the end of the Cold War 
brought about a completely new security context. This was now one in which a direct 
existential threat effectively disappeared. The original military mission and the corresponding 
military institution were consequently rendered meaningless. The post-Cold War world 
demanded military capacities of its own. This chapter strives to show how German military 
capacities were adjusted to the new security environment. Specifically, it examines, first, the 
transformation of the military mission; second, the policy on conscription; and, third, the 
adaptation of the guiding image of the Bundeswehr soldier – the ‘citizen in uniform’. 
Transformation of the Mission 
The post-Cold War era, instead of entering the world of peaceful cooperation and 
bringing any much talked-about ‘peace dividend’, was ushered in by war. The Gulf War 
(1990-91) meant a sea change of the role of military power in world politics, a conversion 
which caught Bonn incapable of making an adequate response. The end of the Cold War 
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rendered military power a necessary, legitimate and once again practicable instrument of 
international society for contributing to the preservation of global peace and justice.  
This new imperative, however, stood in sharp contrast with the foreign and military 
policy practices which the FRG had developed and internalised by this time. As described 
earlier on, during the Cold War the Bundeswehr was tolerated for its necessary function of 
territorial defence against the threat from the East. The armed forces were seen as essential 




The end of the Cold War did not bring about a sudden end of this notion. Territorial 
defence and deterrence against an existential threat continued to be the primary mission of the 
Bundeswehr long after the international security situation had fundamentally changed.
2
 In the 
White Paper of 1994 the government made clear that attack against Germany and its allies 
was the most threatening risk to Germany’s security, but it was at the same time also the most 
unlikely. Yet the White Paper insisted that the ‘foremost objective of German defence policy 
remains that of preventing’ such a threat.
3
 Analogously, The Konzeption der Bundeswehr 
1996, a major doctrinal document composed by Inspector General Klaus Naumann, stipulated 
that ‘national and Alliance defence in Central Europe remained the primary tasks of the 
German armed forces’.
4
 Thus it had not been until Peter Struck’s reform of the structure of 
the armed forces in 2003 that the territorial defence ceased to be the strategic foundation of 
the Bundeswehr: 
According to Article 87a of the Basic Law, the Federation establishes Armed Forces for 
purpose of defence. Defence as it is understood today means more, however, than traditional 
defensive operations at the national borders against a conventional attack. It includes the 
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This persistence of what had become, in the changed circumstances, a now-outdated 
military doctrine in Germany may support the theses of German ‘culture of restraint’ and the 
concept of ‘civilian power’. According to these theses, during the Cold War Germany 
developed and deeply internalised a normative posture based on pacifism and antimilitarism. 
Arguably, as a consequence of this strategic culture, German military policy offered a strong 
resistance to the external pressure for fundamental transformation.
6
 Simultaneously, however, 
the change of security situation did engender within German society a change of attitudes 
towards their military power. This section will focus specifically on the shift of mission of the 
Bundeswehr towards an expeditionary force and argues that liberal principles within German 
society influenced this shift. 
The Bundeswehr marching abroad  
At the time when Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s government refused to contribute 
with military troops to the liberation of Kuwait, the role and legitimacy of the Bundeswehr in 
the new international context was being examined by a blue ribbon independent commission 
chaired by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Emeritus Professor of political science and history at the 
Bonn University. The report of the Jacobsen Commission,
7
 published in September 1991, 
outlined the form of the transformation of the Bundeswehr for the decade to come. The 
official strategic documents which were issued afterwards, such as the Defence Policy 
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Guidelines 1992 (VPR 1992)
8
 and the White Paper 1994
9
, followed the ideas drawn in the 
Jacobsen Report. 
The military security of Germany, as the Jacobsen Report was the first conceptual 
document to acknowledge, was ‘less than ever at risk’. The danger of an acute military threat 
was assessed, for the foreseeable future, to be highly improbable.
10
 This, nonetheless, does 
not mean that the role of the Bundeswehr in territorial defence would decline in importance. 
‘The main task and political legitimacy of the armed forces are and will remain the capability 
and willingness to defence.’
11
 Yet, the report is explicit that territorial defence can no longer 
remain the only task of the Bundeswehr. The new international situation poses new 
challenges which need to be faced, among other things, with the deployment of the armed 
forces. ‘German forces should in the future, when the federal government is requested by the 
UN institutions, participate in international operations according to the UN Charter.’
12
 
The call for the Bundeswehr to assume new tasks in international peacekeeping did 
not follow on only from Germany’s loyalty to the United Nations. The Jacobsen Report also 
reflected a strongly positive attitude within German society to international peacekeeping and 
expected that ‘the majority of the population might be in favour of the Bundeswehr’s 
participation in peacekeeping’.
13
 Another document submitted by the Ministry of Defence to 
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the Bundestag in January 1992 seemed to take for granted that ‘the maintenance of peace, 
humanity and international security’ is Germany’s responsibility as well as is in her interest.
14
 
Kohl’s liberal-conservative government eventually completely embraced the notion of 
cosmopolitan responsibility for peace and security. Kohl in his foreword to the White Paper 
of 1994 was explicit about the role of Germany, her military included, in international affairs. 
Germany will not enjoy a secure future in peace and freedom unless we continue to make our 
contribution, as a member of the Euro-Atlantic community of shared values with a common 
fate, to preventing war and averting dangers and to building a just and stable international 




In terms of practical steps, Minister of Defence Volker Rühe is said to have acted 
entrepreneurially when he introduced the out-of-area operations into the agenda of the 
Bundeswehr and also tactically in relation to the public as he was gradually increasing the 
intensity of missions, using the so called ‘salami tactics’. In that sense, a field hospital was 
sent to Cambodia in May 1992, from July 1992 German navy (Bundesmarine) took part in 
monitoring, but not enforcing, the UN arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia and the year 
1993 witnessed the first armed operations of the Bundeswehr abroad. The German personnel 
in the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) became part of the operation 
enforcing the UN-sanctioned no-fly zone over Bosnia and a contingent of German soldiers 
was deployed in Somalia as a part of UNOSOM II.  
In terms of public opinion, the Jacobsen report was not wrong when expecting the 
public to give its support to peacekeeping operations. Jörg Jacobs reports the favourable 
attitude of German society to the UN peacekeeping operations during the 1990s always 
sitting at well above 60%: 
The German citizens support international commitments, those with military means included, 
as long as it contributes to make the conflict situation more stable and secure. However, 
society is split on the issue of combat missions, even if they are carried out under a mandate 
of the United Nations and with the aim to establish peace.
16
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The peace-enforcing combat operations have never received the same amount of support as 
the peacekeeping ones. In the early 1990s the reported approval for peace-enforcing combat 
operations was fluctuating between 40 and 50%.
17
 
Despite the relatively positive attitude of the public, the out-of-area deployments in 
the early 1990s, including the peacekeeping operation in Somalia, did generate a strong 
political controversy. The issue, however, was not as to whether the operations were morally 
right or wrong, but exclusively about their constitutionality. Not their legitimacy but their 
legality was questioned. The authors of the Basic Law, in order to minimise the risk that the 
Bundeswehr could be abused against international peace or democratic order at home, 
delimited quite precisely the role of the armed forces. ‘The Federation shall establish Armed 
Forces for purposes of defence’, Article 87a, §1 of the Basic Law stipulates. In addition, §2 
makes clear that ‘the Armed Forces may be employed only to the extent expressly permitted 
by this Basic Law’.
18
 Quite understandably, the authors did not conceive of the possibility to 
send armed troops abroad in the role of peacekeepers and, furthermore, the official Cold-War 
interpretation of the constitution explicitly prohibited this option.
19
 
The constitutional issue remained a valid argument for Kohl when he refused to send 
troops to the Gulf War in 1990.
20
 Nonetheless, the Jacobsen Commission insisted, and Kohl’s 
government then followed suit, that the Basic Law permitted the use of armed forces in 
cooperation with major international organisations of which Germany was a member.
21
 This 
interpretation of the constitution, however, found support neither among opposition parties 
nor in the junior coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The dispute had to be 
settled by the Federal Constitutional Court, which in July 1994 decided in favour of the 
Government. 
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It is important to reiterate that this ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court was far 
from uncontroversial.
22
 The extensiveness of the ruling is clearly demonstrated by the fact 
that the Federal Constitutional Court had to create a mechanism of parliamentary agreement 
to the foreign deployments, a procedure which the Basic Law had not known.
23
 The judges 
thus appeared to be less interested in the text of the Basic Law itself than in the ideological 
foundation of the constitution. The court did not act merely as a mechanical, value-neutral 
interpreter of a codified text but rather took the role of a liberal agent applying principles 
appropriate for a given situation.
24
 
Despite the controversy about the constitutionality of foreign operations for the 
German armed forces, a basic consensus around the subject itself existed among all the 
mainstream parties in the Bundestag. During the months preceding the Federal Constitutional 
Court ruling each party in the Bundestag submitted a draft of constitutional amendment 
expressing its view on the Bundeswehr’s role in the world. Except for the post-communist 
PDS, all parties felt that the Bundeswehr’s abstinence from international peacekeeping effort 
would be untenable. The parties naturally had different views regarding specific conditions of 
international engagements; but they shared and embraced the moral responsibility for 
international peace. The explanation of the left-centre SPD’s proposal may illustrate this 
point: 
The international responsibility of the Federal Republic of Germany and the credibility of its 
foreign policy make necessary the formulation of constitutional rules for the involvement of 
individual army units in peacekeeping non-combat missions of the United Nations (so called 
‘blue helmets’)... The Federal Republic of Germany can no longer require such deployments 
in war zones, without being willing to participate in them themselves. Our history dictates 
restraint, but also forbids us to refuse help, especially when such operations are allowed by 
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In comparison with other countries, Germany’s military engagement in international 
affairs certainly appeared restrained. Moreover, the foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr 
were by no means lacking severe elements of controversy. Having said that, it is important to 
emphasise that a general consensus supporting the principle of international peacekeeping 
emerged very early in the 1990s. The political representatives in the Bundestag, the Federal 
Constitutional Court, and public opinion recognised the essential moral imperative behind 
German participation in international peacekeeping. These societal actors might have had 
different views on means – such as whether a revision of the constitution was necessary or 
whether peace-enforcement was an acceptable instrument. As for the former, the 
constitutional court’s ruling settled for good the constitutional dispute. Regarding the latter, 
no clear consensus was reached, but the attitude within the re-unified German society towards 
peace-enforcing or other combat operations was in the 1990s, and has remained until today, 
decidedly cautious. In any case, the end – a moral responsibility for peace and security 
around the world – was widely recognised. 
The Bundeswehr marching to war 
As argued above, German society relatively quickly accepted the idea that German 
soldiers should actively help other people around the world. After the 1994 ruling of the 
Federal Constitutional Court the number of soldiers deployed abroad grew dramatically. By 
the end of the 1990s the overall size of German contingents in international missions, mostly 
in the Balkans, had risen to 7,000 members of the Bundeswehr and at some point in the early 
2000s over 10,000 soldiers were deployed worldwide.
26
 The humanitarian and almost non-
violent character of the peacekeeping operations appealed to German society and granted a 
secure foundation in broad-based public support.
27
 
Attractive though the non-combat humanitarian and peacekeeping engagements of the 
Bundeswehr were perceived to be, combat operations are not absent in the records of German 
foreign missions. Bundeswehr soldiers have already taken a role as belligerents in two wars - 
the Kosovo War and the War in Afghanistan. Germany’s engagement in these two cases tells 
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two different stories. Their comparison might illuminate the attitudes of German society 
towards the use of military force. 
The air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 represents a landmark in the history of 
re-united Germany. German military aircrafts were participating in a violent military 
operation without a UN mandate against a sovereign state, yet this fact engendered very little 
disagreement. The process of decision-making before the campaign is remarkable for its 
swiftness, as Adrian Hyde-Price wittily describes: 
The decision to participate in operation Allied Force took 15 minutes, from the time of 
Clinton’s phone call to the final ‘yes’. The subsequent debate in the Bundestag was 
remarkable for its lack of controversy, with only the former East German Communist Party, 
the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) opposing the war. Indeed some critics noted that 
more controversy surrounded a proposed law against graffiti-artists than the debate on 




After the formative experience with the massacre in Srebrenica in July 1995, the conflict in 
Kosovo came to represent in German discourse another case of starting genocide and thus 
raised a strong sense of moral responsibility. Such a normative ethical commitment towards 
those who suffered in Kosovo was, furthermore, supplanted by responsibility towards NATO 
allies and worries about another wave of asylum-seekers and refugees.
29
 These concerns were 
by no means exclusive to political elites. Also the public embraced the case for an armed 
humanitarian intervention. At the beginning of the campaign in March 1999 over 60% of the 
population was reported to support the NATO operation. Admittedly though, these numbers 
started wavering as the campaign went on.
30
  
The situation was, in the eyes of German society, severe enough to legitimise the use 
of armed forces. However, the mode of deployment of Bundeswehr troops presents a telling 
picture of the German approach to the use of military power. Since the aim of the campaign 
was to relieve civilian population from humanitarian suffering, the means were supposed to 
correspond, in part at least, with the end. The Bundeswehr hence formed two distinct 
contingents with completely different tasks – the air-force group participating in the coercive 
strikes against Yugoslavia (Operation Allied Force) and the army contingent in Macedonia 
and Albania (Operation Enabling Force). 
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Germany contributed to the Operation Allied Force with 10 ECR (electronic combat 
reconnaissance) and 4 RECCE (reconnaissance) Tornados supported with 200 technical 
personnel stationed in Italian Piacenza. The fourteen planes performed during the campaign 
approximately 500 sorties and launched about 200 HARM anti-radar missiles.
31
 Yet, whereas 
the air-force contingent represented less than 2% of the allied air force,
32
 4200 German troops 
of the Enabling Force in Macedonia and Albania formed the second largest contingent at the 
beginning of the campaign. The troops in Macedonia and Albania, however, were not 
intended as a possible invading force and German politicians strongly opposed any plans to 
mount a ground operation into Kosovan territory. The task of these troops was, rather, to 
secure conditions for a future peace agreement. Therefore, in the German view, soldiers 
designated for peacekeeping tasks should not be compromised by participation in combat 
operations. In the words of Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping: ‘If one wants to retain a 
chance to achieve a peace in Kosovo that is based on an agreement and secured by civil as 
well as military presence, then the potential peacekeepers must not take part in the preceding 
combat.’
33
 Accordingly, during the air campaign the soldiers in Macedonia and Albania were 
primarily engaged in humanitarian assistance to refugees who had fled Kosovo. 
The engagement in Afghanistan is, in number of aspects, a contrasting case. In terms 
of social consent for German action, the terrorist attacks in September 2001 engendered an 
intensive sense of threat and spawned a strong support for the US military response against 
al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
34
 Yet, when the Bundestag had to decide about the 
deployment of the Bundeswehr troops in the counterterrorist Operation Enduring Freedom 
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(OEF) and in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the 
German government could not avoid controversy as it had in the case of the Kosovo War.  
Similarly as in the Kosovo case, the Bundeswehr engaged in two different missions – 
the counterterrorist OEF and ISAF. OEF, in particular, became a serious issue for the 
government coalition. Despite the effort to present the German contingent as militarily 
harmless – the Special Forces (Kommando Spezialkräfte, KSK), a combat unit engaged in the 
terrorist hunt, were said to perform merely ‘police work’
35
 – the question of German 
participation created a split within the coalition parties, the SPD and the Greens. In order to 
gain support for the mission among the coalition members of the Bundestag, Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder resorted to connect the vote on the Bundeswehr’s mandate with a vote of 
confidence.  
The support for ISAF was overwhelming. 538 out of 581 members of the Bundestag 
voted in December 2001 for the participation of Bundeswehr soldiers. Yet the discussion on 
this issue was remarkable for a strong effort to draw a clear distinction between the US-led 
OEF and UN-mandated ISAF. In contrast with the anti-terrorist campaign, the mission of 
ISAF was to assist in post-conflict reconstruction and state-building, which is the kind of 
mission strongly preferred by the German public.
36
 
The Bundeswehr engagement in Afghanistan was not meant to be seen as a combat 
mission whatsoever. Only one hundred special troops of the KSK were designated for combat 
counterterrorist operations, however, the operational secrecy requirements of special forces 
operations, Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer pointed out, ‘prevented these activities from 
triggering a domestic debate about the role of military force within Germany’s overall 
involvement in Afghanistan’.
37
 Furthermore, as revealed in a session of the Defence 
Committee of the Bundestag in 2008, during their engagement in Afghanistan, the KSK 
soldiers killed or wounded no-one.
38
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Peaceful intentions notwithstanding, German forces slid slowly into a quagmire of 
violent conflict. As the security situation in Afghanistan began deteriorating, first in the south 
of the country and later also in the German area of responsibility in the north, controversial 
decisions became necessary and public support began to waver. So in March 2007 a serious 
political issue was made of the decision to dispatch six RECCE-Tornados (reconnaissance 
aircraft), which, allegedly, could be used in support of other forces’ counterinsurgency 
operations.
40
 In July 2008, the Bundeswehr built the Quick Reaction Force and a year later 
the Rules of Engagement of the German contingent were silently adjusted to allow for the 
offensive use of lethal force.
41
 In September 2009 up to 142 people were killed in an air strike 
ordered by a German commander in Kunduz (for details see the subsection ‘Militarised 
professional identity - danger to life and limb’ below), which event led to the resignation of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Afghanistan: Sozial- und politikwissenschaftliche Perspektiven, ed. Anja Seiffert, Phil C. Langer, and 
Carsten Pietsch (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012), 34. 
39
 Source of data: Ibid., 42-43.Source of data: Ibid., 42-43.Source of data: Ibid., 42-43.Source of data: Ibid., 42-
43.Source of data: Ibid., 42-43.Source of data: Ibid., 42-43.Source of data: Ibid., 42-43.Source of data: 
Ibid., 42-43.Source of data: Ibid., 42-43.Source of data: Ibid., 42-43.Source of data: Ibid., 42-43.Source of 
data: Ibid., 42-43.Source of data: Ibid., 42-43.Source of data: Ibid., 42-43.
 
40
 As a member of the Bundestag for SPD expressed: ‚Die bisherige relative Sicherheit deutscher Soldaten 
beruht nicht zuletzt auf der erkennbaren Trennung beider Operationen [ISAF and OEF].... Es steht also zu 
befürchten, dass Widerstandsgruppen in Afghanistan eine solche Differenzierung nicht nachvolziehen 
werden und die deutschen Tornados als Flugzeuge im Kampfeinsatz bewerten. Deutsche soldaten könnten 
damit für Kriegsoperationen verantwortlich gemacht werden, auf deren Planung und Durchführung sie 
keinerlei Einfluss haben.‘Quoted in Stefan Jungbauer, Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: Die 
innerstaatlichen Restriktionen des deutschen ISAF-Einsatzes (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2010), 103. 
41
 Benjamin Schreer, "Political Constraints: Germany and Counterinsurgency," Security Challenges, 6, no. 1 
(2010): 105. 
0 0 0 0 
4 4 2 
35 




















Defence Minister Franz-Joseph Jung. Jung’s successor Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg became 
the first member of the Government who acknowledged ‘that in colloquial language one may 
actually speak of war-like circumstances in parts of Afghanistan’ and, finally, in February 
2010, Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle announced before the Bundestag that Germany 




This section has so far examined how societal attitudes towards military policy 
affected Germany’s engagement in the Kosovo and Afghan wars. Yet, these wars had also an 
effect on the further development of societal attitudes. The experience of both wars 
emphasised a need for a major reform of defence policy and to some extent determined its 
form as well. Predictably, the different histories of the Kosovo and Afghan wars also 
produced distinct reforms of defence policy and the organisation of the Bundeswehr. 
The Kosovo War completed the trend of growing public acceptance of peace-
enforcement combat missions, a trend which had been initiated by the experience with 
atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1999 and 2000 around 70% of the 
German population was reported to believe that it was right if the Bundeswehr contributed to 
a peace-enforcement operation.
43
 Nonetheless, the Kosovo War manifested not only the 
utility of the use of force in crisis management, but also the deficiencies of European 
militaries, the Bundeswehr being a blatant example, to carry out such operations. 
As early as May 1999 Schröder’s government appointed a commission chaired by 
former Bundespräsident Richard von Weizsäcker. The task of this commission was to outline 
a plan for a transformation of the Bundeswehr in accordance with the current requirements. 
After a year of work, the Weizsäcker Commission published a paper recommending the 
Bundeswehr to concentrate on ‘the most likely tasks of crisis prevention and crisis 
management’.
44
 The proposal of the Weizsäcker Commission was, however, shelved by 
Minister of Defence Rudolf Scharping, mainly because of its radical demands for a reduction 
of conscription. Nonetheless, the demand to render the Bundeswehr more fit for deployment 
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did not fade away. The reforms set in train by Peter Struck, the minister of defence from 2002 
to 2005, rested on the same strategic assumption.
45
 
Admittedly, it is far from certain to what extent it was particularly the success of the 
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo that determined the acceptance of expeditionary 
activities for the Bundeswehr. However, the German contribution to ISAF might be seen to 
be affected by the interventionist zeal sparked by the Kosovo operation and it is a hard fact 
that since the Kosovo War until the end of the first Schröder’s government in 2002 the 
number of German soldiers in various operations abroad increased four-fold.
46
 
Yet the experience with the war in Afghanistan resulted in a different attitude of 
German society towards the use of force. As the Bundeswehr became associated in public 
discourse primarily with the Afghanistan operation,
47
 the weariness of the protracted 
engagement in Afghanistan and the experience with the violent insurgency led to a declining 
support for foreign missions in general (see Figure 11). The reluctance to get militarily 
engaged in any new major foreign mission is apparent both in the current strategic doctrines 
as well as in responses to specific crises. 
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As for the response to a concrete crisis situation, the legacy of Afghanistan did affect 
the position of Germany with regard to the Libya crisis in 2011. Angela Merkel’s government 
decided to abstain in the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1873 imposing a no-fly 
zone over Libya and not to contribute to such a military effort. Potential risks accompanying 
an armed humanitarian intervention were presented as the main reason for the decision. So 
Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle asserted that the abstention ‘does not mean that we are 
neutral, it does not mean that we have any sympathy with Colonel Gaddafi, but it means that 
we see the risks’. Though in different manner, the same message was conveyed also by 
Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière: ‘Although the heart says yes (to a military mission), 
the cool head says: leave it alone.’
49
 
Interestingly enough, German soldiers actually did engage in the Libya War. In 
February 2011 the German air force conducted a rescue operation to evacuate employees of a 
German company. This fact corresponds quite well with the current trend of deployment of 
the armed forces. Since 2008 Germany contributed to only two new relatively large 
operations. German naval vessels of the Bundesmarine are protecting sea trade off the coast 
of Somalia and German anti-missile systems are defending Turkey. A direct threat to security 
                                                 
48
 Source: Ibid., 39. 
49
 All quoted in Alister Miskimmon, "German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis," German Politics, 21, no. 4 


















of German citizens and Germany’s allies seems to have become the limiter on the use of 
military force nowadays.  
* * * 
The end of the Cold War rendered the exercise of cosmopolitan responsibilities with 
military means possible. As liberal thinkers insist, resourceful liberal states have a duty to 
assist those societies which are deprived of basic achievements of civilisation, such as basic 
human rights and human security. Yet such a responsibility could not be exercised in its full 
extent until the risk of major war between the East and the West eased up. Therefore, it has 
been only since the early 1990s that Germany conceived of its armed forces as a potentially 
useful instrument when cosmopolitan moral responsibility dictated to deal with other 
peoples’ crises and emergency situations. 
 
 
Figure 12 The old (left) and the new (right) slogan of the Bundeswehr. 
 
However, liberalism – despite its tendency towards occasional crusading, using the 
terminology of Martin Ceadel
50
 – does not consider the use of military force alone as a just 
and proper means to this end. If military force is deployed, it should always be followed by 
other instruments that are more capable than the military forces of bringing about social 
improvement. This view is very strongly present in and manifested by German society. Even 
if the use of violence is necessary, the primary role of the Bundeswehr should be to help the 
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civilian communities in need. Thus even during the relatively short spell of crusading fervour 
around the Kosovo War, the Bundeswehr was primarily focused on the humanitarian aspects 
of that international engagement. 
Nonetheless, since the operation in Afghanistan became a war, discursively as well as 
materially, the nature of the Bundeswehr’s role has been undergoing a slight yet noticeable 
shift from an ‘instrument of justice’ towards a ‘tool of policy’. The last Defence Policy 
Guidelines issued in May 2011 characterise armed forces as an ‘indispensable tool of 
[Germany’s] foreign and security policy’.
51
 This sentence, not very noteworthy in itself, 
represents a significant departure from the traditional style of German strategic writing. 
Authors of previous documents considered necessary to qualify the character of the security 
policy or the nature of the Bundeswehr’s instrumentality. For instance, the role of the 
Bundeswehr was quite clearly defined in the White Paper of 1994: ‘The Bundeswehr is one 
of several tools of German foreign and security policy. The aim of this policy is to advance 
international cooperation and to prevent crises and conflicts.’
52
 In a similar vein, the 
Bundeswehr’s slogan Im Einsatz für den Frieden (‘In action for peace’), was replaced with 
the less lofty and significantly less cosmopolitan motto: Wir.Dienen.Deutschland. 
(‘We.Serve.Germany.’; see Figure 12). All of these might be viewed as merely changes in 
self-presentation; yet the attitude of the German public to the Bundeswehr and military policy 
has transformed since the war in Afghanistan – ‘friendly disinterest’ being an apparent 
effect.
53
 German society seems to lose a clear understanding about what the armed forces 
should be used to do. Such a situation may approximate Huntington’s model of the insulated 
military – armed forces which lack any considerable position in society as well as any 
importance in security policy, but are free to develop their autonomous professional ethos.
54
 
It would be a great exaggeration, however, to claim that the Bundeswehr is anywhere 
close to being a tool of Real-Politik, as shown in the case of Bundespräsident Horst Köhler. 
In May 2010 Köhler resigned in response to a fierce criticism of the comments he made about 
the possible utilisation of the armed forces. In an interview he said that ‘military deployments 
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are necessary in an emergency to protect our interests - for example when it comes to trade 
routes, for example when it comes to preventing regional instabilities that could negatively 
influence our trade, jobs and incomes.’
55
 In 2010 it was still inappropriate for the German 
Federal President, whose role in German politics is merely symbolic, to pronounce publically 
that German soldiers might fight for the sake of national economic interests. 
Transformation of the Make-up – from a Conscript to an All-Volunteer 
Force 
A strong tension is present in liberal thinking and liberal principles, as shown earlier 
on, when the desirability of compulsory military service is concerned. On the one hand, 
national defence is considered a responsibility of all citizens and the ultimate sacrifice made 
on behalf of the community should not be seen as merely an occupational hazard of a few 
professionals. On the other hand, the coercion necessary to uphold the compulsory service is 
a serious infringement of individual rights and freedoms. Only the necessity of defending 
society and its state against an external threat, regardless of whether real or only imagined, 
can justify compulsory service.  
In 1956, when universal military service was established in West Germany, the 
security situation and military needs were considered serious enough to justify the coercion. 
The threat posed by the Warsaw Pact forces of the Soviet bloc was argued to require a 
standing force of half a million German soldiers and large reserves. In order to recruit a force 
of such strength conscription was necessary. To justify it further, universal conscription was 
argued to distribute the necessary sacrifice ‘evenly in a truly democratic manner’.
56
 In 1973 
the Wehrstruktur Kommission, initiated by the SPD/FDP coalition government of Chancellor 
Willy Brandt, confirmed the necessity of universal conscription, but also suggested that 
reconsideration of the practice would be required if the strategic conditions changed.
57
 Such a 
change happened in 1989 when the direct threat posed by the Eastern Bloc vanished and 
Germany ceased to be a front-line state. ‘Instead, she is surrounded nowadays exclusively by 
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allies and friendly partners’, as the Defence Policy Guidelines 1992 pointed out.
58
 Thus, 
arguably, along with the disappearance of the Soviet threat also disappeared the necessity that 
brought about the establishment of universal conscription in the 1950s. 
Yet, in spite of the sea change in Germany’s security environment, the White Paper of 
1994 stated emphatically that universal conscription ‘is and will remain the expression of the 
individual citizen’s personal share of responsibility for a life in peace and freedom’.
59
 Indeed, 
compulsory military service remained until as late as 2011. Thus the question arises as to 
whether the strong persistence of compulsory military service in Germany falsifies our 
assumption that liberal society will oppose compulsory service if the necessity of defence is 
lacking. 
The legitimacy of conscription questioned in the 1990s 
Despite the official policy, it is not true that the change of security environment would 
have no consequences whatsoever for the acceptance and acceptability of compulsory 
military service in Germany. The liberal position was clearly articulated in 1995 by Roman 
Herzog, the Bundespräsident from 1994 to 1999 and previously a judge of the Federal 
Constitutional Court: 
Conscription is such a deep interference with the individual freedom of the young citizen that 
the democratic state can require it only if the external security of the state dictates so. It is no 
universal principle either, but is dependent on the concrete security situation. Its maintaining, 
suspension, or abolition, as well as the duration of the military service must rest on security 
policy. Socio-political, historical, financial and military-organisational arguments can then 
be used as supplements. But, in discussion with the citizens, these arguments can never be 
the sole basis for consensus. Conscription will retain credibility only if we make clear why it 
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However, contrary to Herzog’s statement, it seems that military conscription in 
Germany retained some credibility even in ‘the absence of direct external threat’. 
Nonetheless, the call to rethink the need for compulsory service was certainly not 
unsubstantiated. The end of the Cold War was marked by a surge of the applications for 
exemption on grounds of conscientious objection. Whereas at the end of the Cold War the 
conscientious objectors amounted to the number of 77,000 men, between 1991 and the end of 
compulsory service in 2011 the number did not drop below 125,000. In the new security 
situation, many young men who were expected to make the personal sacrifice could not 








The rapid surge of applications for conscientious objection naturally warranted the 
attention of Alfred Biehle, the parliamentary commissioner of the armed forces. In his Annual 
Report 1991 he identified the Gulf War as the primary cause of the surge: 
During the Gulf crisis, the number of applications for recognition of conscientious objection 
doubled. In the wake of this development, the Bundeswehr should ask the question as to 
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As the Annual Report 1991 demonstrates, the engagement of the international community in 
the Gulf War was the first occasion to pose the question about the legitimacy of conscription 
and the utility of conscripts in non-defensive missions. 
This question was answered in a clearly consensual manner. From the very beginning 
there was no significant voice in Germany that would challenge the assumption that only 
territorial defence can legitimise universal conscription.
64
 The Bundeswehr’s missions abroad 
must, it was generally agreed, consist of regular soldiers and volunteers only. This conviction 
is expressed, for instance, in a draft of a constitutional amendment submitted by the SPD: ‘It 
follows from the nature of compulsory military service that conscripts cannot be allowed to 
participate in such operations which are not required by the defence mission of the armed 
forces.’
65
 The government coalition appeared to be slightly more permissive than the SPD or 
The Greens on this issue; nonetheless, the same principle was followed when the White 
Paper 1994 posited that conscripts can take part in peacekeeping missions and humanitarian 
relief activities, but only on a voluntary basis.
66
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Figure 14 Results of the opinion survey on the issue of who should participate in various 




The clear distinction between the defensive mission and conscription, on the one 
hand, and the out-of-area operations and the volunteers, on the other, was the assumption on 
which the reform of the Bundeswehr in the early 1990s rested. The Bundeswehr was divided 
into the Reaction Forces and the Main Defence Forces. Only the Reaction Forces, which 
consisted exclusively of regular and temporary-career soldiers, were to be available for 
‘conflict prevention and crisis management within an Alliance framework and as a 
contribution to international peace missions.’
68
  
Conscription defended in the 1990s 
In considering its justification and legitimisation, universal conscription did remain 
during the 1990s strongly connected with the mission of territorial defence. ‘The primary task 
of the armed forces remains that of defending the territory of the Federal Republic of 
Germany’, stated the White Paper 1994, and in order to achieve this task it was claimed to be 
‘of decisive importance that Germany has sufficient augmentable forces’.
69
 Yet, the question 
arises as to whether the persistence of conscription was really only a practical response to the 
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strategic analysis of the security environment, or, in reverse, the strategic environment was 
interpreted this way in order for conscription to remain relevant. 
Little to no incentive to change the status quo came from within the military. 
Universal conscription ensured that the armed forces would always obtain all the manpower 
they needed without an extra effort and great expenditures. Moreover, around half of the 
Bundeswehr’s regular and temporary-career soldiers were recruited from the pool of 
conscripts.
70
 However, to the military establishment, conscription was not regarded as merely 
a way of ensuring sufficient quantities of soldiers. Territorial defence, universal conscription 
and the citizen in uniform were understood as the constitutive elements of the Bundeswehr’s 
identity. As the Bundeswehr itself liked to emphasise, it was thanks to universal conscription 
that the Bundeswehr could consider itself ‘intelligent armed forces’.
71
 In this sense, the 
Bundeswehr’s capabilities could rest on ‘professionalism’, which in this context means that 
the Bundeswehr ‘can fall back on a cross-section of young men’s abilities, skills and 
professional qualifications’.
72
 Such an interest of the armed forces is in complete accord with 
the liberal view that civilian skills, not martial virtues, are the major contribution to the 
military power. Thus these arguments were bound to resonate in society. 
In fact, the interests of the military in upholding conscription were to a large extent in 
harmony with the contemporary concerns of society. In this sense, the Bundeswehr also 
adopted the principle of integration of the armed forces in parent society.
73
 It was of greatest 
importance in the 1950s, when the Bundeswehr was established, that it should never 
degenerate into a ‘state within a state’, as did the Reichswehr in the Weimar Republic.
74
 
Universal conscription was one of the instruments to prevent such a development. The 
military itself embraced this concern, but interpreted it in its own way: ‘Conscription creates 
a high degree of social awareness and interest in issues concerning security and the armed 
forces among policy-makers and in society.’
75
 In the view of the armed forces, universal 
conscription was instrumental for maintaining the political authority of the military 
                                                 
70
 Ibid., § 517. 
71
 Longhurst, "Why arent the Germans debating the draft? path dependency and the persistence of conscription," 
160. 
72
 White Paper 1994, § 517. 
73
 A German admiral observed: ‘If I sit together with 20 officers, 18 or 19 of them argue in favour of retaining 
the conscription’, because an all-volunteer army would become detached from society. "Wehrpflicht am 
Ende?," Der Spiegel, no. 6 (1993): 44-45. 
74
 See e.g. Francis Ludwig Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics: 1918-1933 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); 
Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945; Hans von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten (Leipzig: 
Koehler, 1935). 
75
 White Paper 1994, § 517. 
182 
 
representatives and for preventing the Bundeswehr’s ‘insulation’ or ‘extirpation’, to use 
Huntington’s terms. The system of subjective civilian control enhanced and necessitated by 




Indeed, no considerable challenge to conscription came from society in the 1990s. 
Both major political parties, CDU/CSU and SPD, defended this institution so vigorously that 
some commentators speak about the conscription ‘taboo’ and the imposition of an effective 
‘Diskussionsverbot’ (‘ban on discussions’).
77
 A consistent support between 70 and 80% was 
also reported in opinion surveys throughout the 1990s and 2000s.78 Apparently, since 1956 
conscription grew to be perceived as a normal institution, ‘part of the defence culture that has 
evolved over the decades’ in Germany.
79
 Thus only the junior parties in the Bundestag, The 
Greens, PDS, and partly also the FDP, came to be in favour of abolishing compulsory 
military service. 
Moreover, universal conscription was not only deeply rooted in hearts and minds of 
the Germans.
80
 It also evolved into a complex social institution far surpassing its original 
military purpose. Conscription did not generate manpower only to the military, but also 
through alternative civilian service (Zivildienst) for public services. The exemption from 
military service for the members of the fire brigades, emergency relief services or 
development agencies was certainly an effective incentive for recruitment to these 
organisations also. Members of the public could therefore enjoy very tangible benefits of 
universal conscription on a daily basis. Despite the fact that from the liberal perspective a 
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mere budgetary convenience can hardly justify forced labour, the alternative civilian service 
represented another reason why abolishing conscription appeared to be politically unrealistic. 
After all, the compulsory military service was not practically inconsequential either. 
From the perspective of Kohl’s government, universal conscription was an effective tool to 
bring together young people from the old and the new Bundesländer. It was a fundamental 
part of the ‘Army of Unity’ (Armee der Einheit), as the Bundeswehr in the 1990s was 
called.
81
 In addition, the soldiers were called out to help during the floods in Bonn and 
Koblenz in 1995, on the Oder in 1997 and on the Elbe in 2002.
82
 Particularly in 1997 on the 
Oder, about 15 thousand soldiers, mostly conscripts, showed themselves in spotlights when 
fighting the catastrophic floods. ‘Those who were there could see the young generation which 
through their actions gave an example of lived patriotism and public spirit,’ and with these 
words Helmut Kohl paid tribute to the participating soldiers.
83
 Pictures of soldiers filling sand 
bags were also used in a TV-advertisement of the Bundeswehr.
84
 In this way, the conscripts 
were associated with disaster relief, which is, together with national self-defence, the most 
esteemed mission of the Bundeswehr.
85
 
Conscription undermined in the 2000s 
The Kosovo War in 1999 dramatically challenged the primacy of territorial defence. 
Development of expeditionary and interventionist capabilities became the order of the day. 
‘A continuation or a mere adaptation of the present structure will only cure the symptoms’ 
observed the General Inspector of the Bundeswehr Hans Peter von Kirchbach in November 
1999. ‘A fundamental change of the Bundeswehr’s structure is inevitable’.
86
 Accordingly, 
during the early 2000s several plans were drawn to augment the expeditionary capabilities of 
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the Bundeswehr – the Weizsäcker Report,
87
 General Kirchbach’s ‘Eckwerte-Papier‘,
88
 and 
Minister of Defence Scharping’s ‘cornerstones’.
89
 Yet, it had not been until Minister of 
Defence Peter Struck came into office in October 2002 that the Bundeswehr’s structure began 
a transformation towards an ‘army in operations’ (Armee im Einsatz). However, despite the 
doctrine of territorial defence being abandoned in 2003, compulsory military service survived 
for eight more years. 
According to Struck’s reform plans, the armed forces were to be restructured into 
three groups, each with a specific role with regard to the foreign missions. The Rapid 
Response Forces (Eingreifkräfte), 35,000 troops, were designed to engage in high-intensity 
operation; the Stabilising Forces (Stabilisierungskräfte), 70,000 soldiers, were earmarked for 
low-to-medium intensity peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction missions; and the 
Support Forces (Unterstützungskräfte), 134,500 soldiers, whose main task was to provide 
logistical and other support to the forces in operation.
90
 In this force structure conscripts 
could serve only in the Support Forces and on a voluntary basis they could take part in the 
operations of the Stabilising Forces. 
Despite the fact that the primary role of conscripts was reduced to the support of 
operational troops, Struck’s Defence Policy Guidelines of 2003 provide a strong defence of 
the compulsory military service. In Struck’s view, the transformation of the Bundeswehr’s 
structure into an expeditionary force necessitated the retention of conscription: The ‘army on 
operation’ was said to need ‘a capability allowing reconstitution, within a foreseeable, albeit 
prolonged, period of time, of the assets needed to conduct national defence against a 
conventional attack.’
91
 Moreover, the risk of terrorist attacks required capabilities for the 
protection of the population and vital infrastructure – ‘Conscripts and reservists will thus be 
employed in their classic role, the protection of their country and fellow citizens.’
92
 
However, the idea of compulsory service as a backup which allows the Bundeswehr to 
focus on expeditionary missions cannot be sustained once it is placed under closer scrutiny. It 
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is generally accepted that a basic military service of relatively short duration, such as nine 
months, makes sense only when the skills acquired during the basic service are being 
repeatedly refreshed in regular reserve training periods or under the framework of a militia 
system.
93
 Yet, considering the cohort born in 1981, almost 115,000 men had done their 
military service by the end of 2008, but only 1021 (0.9%) of them took part in at least one 
military exercise after completing their basic service.
94
 As Paul Klein comments, the 
conscripts were trained for nine months and then sent home. ‘As a rule, they soon forget the 
things they have learned as soldiers because reserve training is only planned for a small 
minority of dismissed soldiers who are earmarked as a reserve for active soldiers.’
95
 
Furthermore, between 2004 and 2010 only a small proportion of the Bundeswehr, about 60-
70,000 out of 250,000 soldiers, were conscripts (about 40,000 doing the basic military service 
and about 23,000 voluntarily signing up for the extended military service).
96
 Taking into 
account that a significant part of the nine-month service was spent in training and hence a 
large number of the regular soldiers had to work as instructors,
97
 the compulsory service 
became a hindrance rather than an indispensable contribution to the Bundeswehr’s 
functionality. After all, Struck himself admitted that, although he and his party (SPD) were 
strong advocates of conscription, at the time the reform tasks were being pushed through ‘the 
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From the perspective of politicians and general society at large, it certainly was not 
inconsequential that conscription carried on bringing benefits in the form of alternative 
civilian service. Yet the argument which was supposed to legitimise the continuation of 
compulsory service was based on the notion that conscription was an instrument linking 
society with the Bundeswehr. Men from all social groups were supposed to represent society, 
its interests and concerns within the military. However, because of the relative insignificance 
of conscripts in the military structure, this kind of argument lost some of its original 
persuasiveness. It is probably fairer to say with Sven Gareis that conscription continued to 
play the role of an important symbol – the symbol which reminds that the security of 
Germany continues to be a responsibility of society as a whole.
100
 In a similar vein Peter 
Struck defended the need for conscription: ‘If we had no conscripts coming from practically 
all walks of life, society might turn away from the army and isolate it under the motto: The 
soldiers have chosen this profession; therefore they should do their job.’
101
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regular and temporary-career soldiers
conscripts (including volunteers for prolonged basic service)
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However, such a symbolic role could hardly rely on a strong public support to persist 
when economic recession necessitated radical cuts in military expenditures. On the one hand, 
opinion polls manifested a constant and seemingly robust endorsement for compulsory 
service; on the other hand, people, or media in the first place, were very little concerned with 
this issue. As a survey in 2004 revealed, the political controversies about the future of 
universal conscription were hardly ever reported and discussed in the media. Only 2.3% of 
media coverage of the Bundeswehr was concerned with the issue of conscription, while 
international missions vastly prevailed in the media discourse.
102
 This lack of public interest 
may also be demonstrated in the way the German public easily accepted the decision to 
suspend conscription as a simple matter of fact. 
 
Figure 16 Public preferences about the future of conscription.  
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Throughout the 2000s the legitimacy of conscription was seriously undermined. The 
single decisive argument that can justify compulsory service – the necessity of sufficient 
defensive military capabilities – was definitely written off by Struck’s reform. All the other 
justifications, however persuasive they were, could not uphold the legitimacy of universal 
conscription for too long. The foreseeable death blow finally came in 2010 with the global 
economic recession. The Ministry of Defence was tasked to save 8.3 billion Euros over the 
following four years - an equivalent of 40,000 professional soldiers. These radical cuts in the 
military budget promptly initiated a discussion about the utility of compulsory military 
service under the current conditions.  
In April 2010 Minister of Defence Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg appointed a 
commission chaired by Frank-Jürgen Weise, head of the Federal Labour Agency, to outline a 
plan of a reform of the Bundeswehr’s structure. At the end of October 2010 the ‘Structure 
Commission’ issued a report proposing that conscription should be suspended. Despite the 
fact that the original and chief motivation of the reform lay in the military budget, the 
commission examined the societal aspects of universal conscription and argued accordingly. 
On the one hand, they acknowledged the benefit of conscription for the integration of the 
armed forces in society; on the other hand, it was emphasised that ‘the social acceptance of 
conscription is dwindling’.
104
 The latter, however, cannot be understood in terms of public 
opinion, which appeared to be consistently in favour of conscription. Nor did conscription 
become part of controversial public debates long before the report appeared. What the 
Structure Commission must have had in mind was the fundamental unsustainability of 
compulsory military service, absenting any conceivable strategic requirement: ‘Generally 
speaking, conscription is meaningful only if it is necessitated by external security 
requirements. After the elimination of a massive, immediate military threat conscription in its 
present form can no longer be justified in the terms of security policy.’
105
 
Minister zu Guttenberg accepted the recommendation of the Structure Commission 
and started the reform process along these lines. Guttenberg’s reform plans attracted strong 
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criticism for being too radical and Thomas de Maizière, who succeeded Guttenberg after the 
latter had resigned due to the PhD plagiarism affair in March 2011, significantly moderated 
the impacts of the reform. Nonetheless, this does not apply to conscription. The fact that the 
continuation of conscription was no longer justifiable was accepted not only by the new 
minister, but also in both the traditionally pro-conscription parties, CDU/CSU and SPD. 
As for the CDU/CSU, the determination of Minster of Defence zu Guttenberg played 
a crucial role in the rapid change of attitudes of this (double) party towards conscription. As 
Berthold Meyer points out, zu Guttenberg did not allow for any alternative way towards re-
establishing cost-effective armed forces. The CDU/CSU hence reluctantly, yet completely, 
accepted Guttenberg’s plans. 
 ‘Following the conclusion of [the security analysis of the Ministry of Defence from August 
2010], the conscription of young men into basic military service has been rendered 
unnecessary by the current security situation. [The Executive Committees of the CDU and 
CSU] support the Minister of Defence in his effort to align the armed forces with the current 




The opposition SPD formulated its own distinct plan with regard to compulsory 
service. Although their proposal suggested retention of the basic military service in a semi-
compulsory/semi-voluntary form – selective conscription would be applied only if there were 
not enough volunteers for the basic military service – the SPD referred to the same principles 
as zu Guttenberg and the Structure Commission: 
Conscription is not a natural universal civic duty. Its retention, reconfiguration, or abolition, 
and also the duration of military service must be founded on compelling security-political 





                                                 
106
 ‚Schlussfolgerung aus der (Sicherheitsanalyse des Bundesministers der Verteidigung vom August 2010) ist, 
dass eine sicherheitspolitische Notwendigkeit für die allgemeine Wehrpflicht nicht mehr gegeben ist. (Die 
Präsidien von CDU und CSU) unterstützen den Bundesminister der Verteidigung dabei, die Bundeswehr 
an den aktuellen sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen und Aufgaben auszurichten.‘ Meyer, 
Bundeswehr ohne  ehrpflichtige:  as folgt daraus für die  arlamentsarmee im Einsatz? , 19. Emphasis 
added. 
107
 ‚Die Wehrpflicht ist aber nicht irgendeine selbstverständliche allgemeine Bürgerpflicht. Ihre Beibehaltung, 
ihre Ausgestaltung oder Abschaffung und ebenso die Dauer des Grundwehrdienstes müssen zwingend 
sicherheitspolitisch begründet werden können. Das heißt, die Wehrpflicht muss für die Sicherheit der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland unbedingt erforderlich sein.‘ Rainer Arnold, "Das Wehrdienstmodell der 
SPD," in Wehrpflicht - Legitimes Kind der Demokratie, ed. Andreas Ahammer and Stephan Nachtigall 
(Berlin: BWV Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2010), 173. Emphasis added. 
190 
 
A ‘culture of volunteerism’ now grew to be accepted as a new imperative necessary to 
replace universal conscription and the complex web of social institutions which were based 
upon it.
108
 ‘Our society needs a culture of volunteerism’,
109
 posited the Structure Commission 
and hence proposed a system of voluntary service to replace both the compulsory military 
service and the alternative civilian service. 
With a voluntary service young people will be given an offer that brings personal, 
professional, social and security interests in harmony. The options can range from nursing 
and welfare, over the field of education, the environment protection and disaster relief, 




The Structure Commission expected that about 15,000 posts in the Bundeswehr would be 
held by these short-term volunteers, whereas de Maizière’s more modest assessment was 5 to 
15,000. Yet the actual response of the young people has, overall, been positive. According to 
a survey by SOWI, about a quarter of young people (up to the age of 30 years) responded to 
be willing to carry out the voluntary military service.
111
 More importantly, in the first year 
over 12,000 men and women joined the voluntary military service and similarly positive 




Consequently, the end of conscription does not mean that the secondary, or – as 
Roman Herzog put it – supplementary, liberal principles which were originally seen as 
inherent to universal conscription, such as the integration of the military in society and the 
notion that civilian skills are of crucial importance in the military field, were abandoned. On 
the one hand, with regard to the integration, it is being emphasised now, as General Klaus 
Naumann does, that ‘we do not need conscription as a way of linking the army to society. 
The principle of the “citizen in uniform” ... has always applied to all professional and career 
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 On the other hand, the role of conscripts in linking the military and society was 
now claimed to be taken over by short-term volunteers and reservists, whose role in the 
Bundeswehr is to be enhanced. Short-term volunteers and reservists were to function as 
‘mediators between the Bundeswehr and society and as citizens in uniform, they serve as an 
indispensable link that will benefit both recruitment and the integration of the armed forces 
into society’.
114
 Moreover, in contrast with the conscripts, the short-term volunteers, owing to 
their longer period of training, should be able to participate in most of the missions of the 
Bundeswehr and hence become an integral part of the military organisation. Similarly, 
regarding the concept of ‘professionalism’ in the Bundeswehr, which means to draw on 
civilian qualifications and skills among soldiers, the skills are now supposed to be brought in 
by reservists, instead of young inexperienced conscripts. Thus the principles of integration 
and ‘professionalism’ under the voluntary system appear to be more plausible than in the 
draft army of the 2000s. 
* * * 
To sum up, the discourse accompanying the suspension of conscription in 2011 
perfectly reflects the fundamental liberal norms. The coercion involved in universal 
conscription can be justified only if being necessary for security reasons. In 2010 and 2011 it 
became generally accepted that basic military service had been rendered unnecessary by the 
altered current security situation and hence had lost its justification. However, the security 
situation had changed already in 1989/1990, whereas the compulsory military service 
remained active and relatively unchallenged for two more decades. This two-decade long 
persistence of conscription warrants the question as to whether this strong persistence 
falsifies our assumption that liberal society will oppose compulsory military service if the 
necessity of defence is lacking. 
The case of the Bundeswehr’s transformation does not allow for a simple and 
straightforward answer. For the falsification of the assumption speaks the fact that during the 
1990s the mission of defence became more abstract, more detached from the real security 
conditions. Analogously, the interpretation of compulsory military service moved towards a 
universal civic duty independent of a current security situation. Moreover, secondary, or 
supplementary, reasons and justifications grew into prominence. The need to maintain links 
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between the armed forces and society was the main normative argument, while the benefits of 
alternative civilian service for public services and of the compulsory military service for the 
recruitment of military professionals were important practical reasons in the defence of 
conscription. 
In support of our assumption stands the fact that from the very beginning there was no 
ambiguity about the appropriate use of the conscripts. People clearly understood that the 
conscripts could be deployed only in the case of national or collective self-defence, while 
out-of-area missions could be carried out only by career soldiers and volunteers. This 
consensus was manifested in the public opinion, in the discourse of political elites as well as 
in military doctrines. Furthermore, the conscript army found its niche in defence against 
large-scale environmental disasters, such as floods. It would be hard to argue that this kind of 
defence is of lesser importance than the proper military defence of the state, though it remains 
questionable whether the military is an institution most suitable for this task. Last but not 
least, the stance of universal conscription was undermined during the period from 2003 on, 
when territorial defence disappeared from the missions of the Bundeswehr. Arguably, the 
absence of the defensive mission significantly facilitated the emergence of the general 
consensus about the end of compulsory military service in 2010. 
The debate about conscription, however, is not only about the clash of the principles 
of common responsibility of all members of society for the defence of their state, on the one 
hand, and the rights and freedoms of the individual, on the other. It concerned also other 
norms, specifically the principle prohibiting social segregation of the military community and 
the notion that civilian competencies are at least as important as exclusively martial skills in 
the military activities. The concept of universal conscription was traditionally justified also 
by these norms and after 2003 an effort was made to use these principles as the chief 
normative justification of conscription. However, the discourse surrounding the suspension of 
universal conscription in 2010/11 demonstrated two things. First, these principles cannot be 
the sole basis for justification of compulsory military service. They can only add weight to 
the support of conscription if the primary justification based on the strategic necessity is 
present. Second, conscription is not the only instrument for application of these norms. All-
volunteer forces can be organised in such a form that links between the armed forces and 
society remain strong and civilian skills find their way into the military. 
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Transformation of the Culture - ‘World -Citizen in Uniform’? 
Next to the territorial defence and conscription, the philosophy of Innere Führung 
with the guiding image of the ‘citizen in uniform’ (Staatsbürger in Uniform) constituted the 
identity of the Bundeswehr during the Cold War. The ‘citizen in uniform’ represented the 
unity between the state, the military and society. ‘Only the man who knows that as a citizen 
he is at one here and now with the state and who sees its capacities for development as his 
own – only that man can survive in and win the cold war.’
115
 From the liberal viewpoint, the 
validity of this statement of Baudissin should not be limited to the context of the Cold War. 
Various aspects of the concept of the ‘citizen in uniform’ are considered timeless. Thus the 
Defence Policy Guidelines 2011 is certainly not the last document to emphasise that the 
principles of ‘the “citizen in uniform” will remain unchanged’.
116
 Yet, this section is to 
demonstrate that a certain modification of this concept is warranted in order for the ‘citizen in 
uniform’ to remain relevant in the post-Cold War context. 
With regard to the surge of conscientious objectors at the time of the Gulf War in 
1991-92, Admiral Elmar Schmäling drew attention to the limitation of the Cold War concept 
of the ‘citizen in uniform’: 
What is now expressed with the increased number of applications for recognition as a 
conscientious objector – also by professional soldiers – is the result of 35 years of education 
and training to the ‘peace service’. The young men who now refuse to serve have logic and 




According to the original concept, the ‘citizen in uniform’ is seen as a ‘born defender of the 
fatherland’ (geborener Vaterlandsverteidiger). The soldier is assumed to be a free and mature 
individual who is conscious of his responsibility towards society. No doubt, the civic 
responsibility to defend one’s country remains valid at all times; however, the relevancy of 
this appeal with regard to an expeditionary force is questionable. Being closely related to 
conscription, the responsibility to society can be claimed by the state only when the state and 
society face an existential threat. However, if the state claimed the civic responsibility with 
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regard to the expeditionary missions, the individual citizen would then be used only as a 
means to an end. In the liberal eyes, the responsibility of the individual to society and the 
state cannot legitimise the sacrifice that expeditionary missions – even if their benevolent 
humanitarian character is undisputable – entail. 
The image of the ‘born defender’ also stipulated a specific character of the military 
service. On the one hand, the soldier was trained to fight in war. To create the capability to 
war-fighting was the only purpose of the military training. On the other hand, the capability 
to fight in war was supposed to be in accord with the commitment to peace. ‘To be ready to 
fight in order not to have to fight’ (Kämpfen können, um nicht kämpfen zu müssen) was the 
central tenet of the Cold War Bundeswehr. Such an ethos, combat-focused though it was, 
caused no considerable distinction between the citizens with and without uniform due to the 
fact that war would threaten ‘lives and property of the entire nation, not only the soldiers’, as 
the White Paper 1970 put forward.
118
 Yet the engagement in foreign missions demands much 
broader skills than those required to face an enemy’s armoured divisions, on the one hand; on 
the other hand, it brings about risks which have no parallel in the life of society.
119
 
Therefore, without adaptation the concept of the ‘citizen in uniform’ and the 
institutional philosophy of Innere Führung, as Elmar Wiesendahl aptly points out, might be 
taught and practiced without questions in a politically correct way, but at the same time these 
concepts will be rendered empty as far as their guiding role in everyday conduct is 
concerned.
120
 Indeed, Wiesendahl presents a strong case that, because of the lax effort to 
adapt the guiding concepts, an image of the ‘archaic warrior’, also called ‘Spartan’ or miles 
bellicus, is growing into prominence within the Bundeswehr.
121
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A major proponent of this martial image is General Hans-Otto Budde, inspector of the 
army 2004-2010.
122
 On the one hand, being a soldier of the Bundeswehr since 1966, General 
Budde automatically acknowledges in his public writings the fundamental concepts of the 
Bundeswehr: 
The Innere Führung with the concept of the citizen in uniform is the basis for the identity of 
the Army.... The concept of the ‘citizen in uniform’ commits us soldiers to an ethos of 




On the other hand, he became known as a promoter of the image of the ‘archaic warrior’, 
which stands in an effective opposition to the core ideals of the Innere Führung and the 
‘citizen in uniform’. 
The recognition of the principles of the Innere Führung and the ‘citizen in uniform’ is 
particularly emphasised with regard to a responsibility of the individual soldier. General 
Budde affirms that soldiers are and ought to be subordinated to politics and that the support 
by politicians and society is a necessary condition for the success of each mission. The 
individual responsibility of the soldier is argued to be of the utmost importance in order to 
utilise the ‘mission command’ (Führen mit Auftrag). ‘We do not need the “obtuse” order 
taker’, insists Budde, ‘but the thinking soldier, who can justify his actions to himself, his 
superiors and his country’.
124
 The individual responsibility of the soldier is thus confined to 
the subordination to political decision-making, on the one hand, and, as a so-called ‘strategic 
corporal’ (strategischer Gefreiter), to the freedom to follow orders in accordance with their 
aim, not exact wording. Such a limitation might be reasonable if the only mission of the 
military was the territorial defence against a potential external aggression. Yet, with regard to 
the foreign missions, the subordination of an individual conscience to political decision-
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making contradicts Baudissin’s liberal view of the ‘citizen in uniform’ as a morally mature 
and empowered individual. 
General Budde’s view, however, is not confined to the mission of territorial defence. 
On the contrary, the image of the ‘army on operations’ is asserted to represent the identity of 
the Bundeswehr.
125
 In contrast with the Cold War Bundeswehr, General Budde insists that 
‘today the soldier needs to know how to fight and be willing to fight when he has to fight’.
126
 
Combat is claimed to be the fundamental aspect, the common denominator, of the soldierly 
profession. ‘Protection, mediation and assistance are to be considered rather subsidiary.’
 127
 
The soldier should not be regarded as an ‘armed social worker’ or an ‘armed THW’ 
(Technisches Hilfswerk, German disaster relief agency).
128
 For combat being the core aspect 
of soldiering, the timeless soldierly values and virtues, such as ‘bravery, courage, 
commitment and a strong will to prevail’, are argued to be the cornerstones of soldierly 
identity. In contrast, the principles of ‘justice, fairness, tolerance, respect and honesty’ are 
said to be merely additional.
129
 
The kind of martial thinking as manifested by General Budde is certainly not new in 
the Bundeswehr. As demonstrated earlier on, the notion of soldiering as a profession sui 
generis was present in varying strength throughout the entire existence of the Bundeswehr. 
For instance, the 1980s witnessed a surge of the martial mentality, as Detlef Bald argues. At 
the time the ‘combat motivation’ (Kampfmotivation) was prevailing within the Bundeswehr 
over the ‘defence motivation’ (Wehrsmotivation) and hence the Innere Führung was 
declining in relevance.
130
 However, General Budde’s writing clearly shows that the 
expeditionary engagement of the Bundeswehr since the 1990s represents an added challenge 
to the principles of Innere Führung and the ‘citizen in uniform’. 
An adequate liberal adjustment of the ‘citizen in uniform’ is presented by authors, 
such as Elmar Wiesendahl, Wilfried von Bredow, Karl W. Haltiner, Joachim Arenth and 
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 With concepts, such as the Athenian type of soldier or the miles 
protector,
132
 they propose an adaptation of the meaning of individual responsibility and the 
professional identity in such a way that follows the liberal principles upon which the original 
concepts were built. 
As early as 1994 Arenth and Westphal introduced the thesis that the out-of-area 
deployments require a new guiding image of the soldier – the ‘world-citizen in uniform’ 
(Weltbürger in Uniform). Germany ‘cannot afford soldiers with the mentality of a “foreign 
legionnaire”’, argue Arenth and Westphal. Instead, they propose an alternative in the form of 
‘a humanistically educated, ethically acting homo politicus’.
133
 The risk of one’s own life by 
protecting strangers requires from a soldier that he or she exercises a strong altruism.
134
 
Individual ethical commitment to the cosmopolitan cause of the mission is hence held to be 
necessary in order to uphold the notion of the soldier being a morally mature individual. 
The character of the foreign missions should determine the professional identity of the 
soldiers. The aim of these missions is not to win a war over a conventional enemy, but to 
manage crises and conflicts and to enable a peaceful development of war-torn societies. In 
such a situation the line between the military and non-military worlds become blurred. The 
armed violence would still play an important role here as it is necessary to provide security, 
but the application of violence ‘can only deal with the symptoms, while the key to the lasting 
resolution of conflicts and crises lays elsewhere’.
135
 In order to accomplish the complex task 
of conflict resolution and state building, the soldiers, first, besides their role of combatants, 
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need to adopt a role of ‘cosmopolitan social worker’ whose task is to protect, assist, rescue 
and mediate. Second, they need to cooperate with a whole range of non-military actors. 
Civilianisation of the military professional identity, or rather approximating the character of 




Exercising the individual moral responsibility in everyday conduct, however 
encouraged it would be, might face serious obstacles. In this subsection we will confront the 
ideal image of the morally mature individual with the findings of German military 
sociologists Anja Seiffert and Maren Tomforde about the power of foreign deployments to 
transform the individual perception of identity and legitimacy.
137
 Subsequently, the practical 
possibility to refuse orders on the ground of conscience will be manifested in the ground-
breaking case of Major Florian Pfaff.
138
 
The sociological surveys reveal that the original motivation of German soldiers to 
take part in a foreign military mission is largely based on personal convictions and social 
background of the soldiers.
139
 Indeed, the training and service at home does not effectively 
mould the individual into an automatically obedient soldier. This may be illustrated with the 
case of several pilots of the German Air Force who refused for moral reasons to take part in 
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the strikes against Serbia in 1999.
140
 However, the strains caused by a long-term deployment 
significantly contribute to the development of a corporate identity and to socialisation of the 
participating soldiers into it. ‘Dealing with long working hours, no weekends and the 
permanent dress code even outside the working hours and outside the camp connects the 
soldiers. The creation of a corporate identity helps to overcome the problems in the place and 
the separation from home.’
141
 The military camp functions as a ‘total institution’ and hence 
the socialisation in it, as Seiffert’s research demonstrates, significantly affects the moral 
individuality and independency of its occupants. 
  
Figure 17 Change of the individual legitimisation of participation in the SFOR mission in 




The legitimisation of the individual participation, which is largely based on personal 
motives at the beginning of the deployment, would fade away throughout the process of 
socialisation in the camp in favour of ‘politically-formal’ legitimisation (see Figure 17). In 
this latter kind of legitimisation the soldier shifts the responsibility for the mission from the 
judgement of their own conscience towards the political masters – the Bundestag and the 
                                                 
140
 Rose, "Gehorsam bis zum Hindukusch?," 135. 
141
 ‚Der Umgang mit längeren Dienszeiten, fehlenden Wochenenden, dem ständigen Dresscode auch außerhalb 
der Dienstzeiten und des Lagers verbindet die Soldaten. Die Schaffung einer corporate identity hilft, 
Schwierigkeiten vor Ort und die Trennung von zu Hause zu Überwinden.‘ Tomforde, "'Einmal muss man 
schon dabei gewesen sein ...' - Auslandseinsätze als Initiation in die 'neue' Bundeswehr," 111. 
142
 Source of data: Seiffert, "Veränderungen des soldatischen Selbstverständnisses unter Einsatzbedingungen," 

























during the mission after the mission
200 
 
Government. The deployment therefore dramatically strengthens the personal connection 
between the soldier and the state and simultaneously renders the soldier apolitical. ‘The 








 I need to reconcile the 
mission with my conscience. That is 
the most important. 
 I can very well distinguish 
whether a mission is appropriate. I 
can assess whether it makes sense 
and then say, for these people I do 
want to be deployed or I don’t, that’s 
it. 
 If the Bundeswehr takes a 
step one day towards an intervention 
force which will, for example, 
represent economic interests and be 
deployed throughout the world, then 
I will have to reflect on whether I 
can still serve in this army. I 
certainly could not accept to be sent 
sometimes in the Gulf and then to 
Africa and another time to Asia. 
 The parliament's 
approval is decisive for 
me.... If the Government 
says that we are to do 
this, then this will be 
done. 
 ...we are now the 
executive of politics and 
we have to do what the 
politicians say. I agree 
with this, as we are not 
here to object to it.... We 
are a democracy and we 
have to do what the 
people representatives 
say. 
 I have sworn to 
the Federal Republic to 
serve bravely and 
loyally. Whether this is 
in the context of national 
defence or within the 
alliance does not matter 
to me whatsoever.... If 
we get an order 
tomorrow to board a 
machine to Africa, I will 
simply fly to Africa. 
 ...the duties count 
first for me. The 
obligation to loyally 
serve is to me in the first 
place. I cannot always 
want to discuss 
everything. 





The service abroad tends to create an informal corporate culture that promotes formal 
obedience and suppresses individual conscience. On the other hand, the case of Major Florian 
Pfaff successfully challenged and changed the interpretation of the law concerning the 
relations between conscience and obedience in favour of the former. On 20 March 2003, at 
the beginning of the Iraq War, Major Pfaff, a staff officer working on an IT-project which 
was to improve the management of international logistics, declared an objection to participate 
indirectly in, in his view, an illegal war and hence refused to continue in the project, for this 
would involve cooperation with the US Army. He was convinced that collaboration with the 
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US Army would mean a support of a war of aggression and therefore, among other things, 
also constituted a crime.
145
 
The Bundeswehr superiors of Major Pfaff recognised neither his argument about 
illegality of the Iraq War nor, more importantly, his right to conscientious refusal to obey 
orders. Major Pfaff was first subjected to psychiatric examination and then, when declared 
sane, prosecuted before a military court and sentenced to demotion by one rank. It is 
remarkable that the military court showed relative leniency on the account of honourable 
motives for the disobedience.
146
 Nonetheless, Major Pfaff appealed against the ruling to the 
Federal Court of Administration which decided in June 2005 in his favour.  
According to the Bundeswehr the law stipulated that the state was entitled to coerce 
the individual into a morally burdensome conduct if it was necessary to secure a greater 
constitutional good and the operational capability and effectiveness of the armed forces was 
affirmed to be such a good. Therefore the order was claimed to prevail over conscientious 
objection. However, the Federal Court of Administration ruled the contrary. The decision 
made abundantly clear that the constitutionally guaranteed ‘freedom of conscience is 
unconditional; the individual cannot be forced to actions that would incriminate their 
conscience‘.
147
 As a consequence of this judicial decision, freedom of conscience was added 




Civilianised professional identity – helper in uniform 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, public discourse in Germany was united in the view 
that the job of the members of the Bundeswehr should not be defined in exclusively or 
predominantly martial terms. On the contrary, soldiers were expected to play a significant 
role in the management of humanitarian aid – the type of mission which has been constantly 
receiving by far the greatest support in public surveys.
149
 The preference for the engagement 
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in humanitarian assistance over combat was blatantly manifested during the Kosovo War in 
1999. The media coverage of the German troops stationed in Macedonia and Albania whose 
main activity during the air campaign was to provide humanitarian aid to refugees from 
Kosovo considerably outweighed the reports about the engagement of German military 
aircrafts directly participating in the campaign.
150
 This subsection will further demonstrate 
the predominance of the image of civilianised soldier, or miles protector, in the societal view, 
as well as the acceptance of such a professional identity within the military. 
The predominance of the image of miles protector might be illustrated by the 
parliamentary discussion concerning the lifting of all restrictions for service of women in the 
Bundeswehr. In January 2000 the European Court of Justice decided in favour of Tanja Kreil, 
an electronic technician, whose application for employment in the weapon electronics 
maintenance section of the Bundeswehr was rejected on the ground that the constitution does 
not allow women to serve in military posts involving the use of arms. The European Court of 
Justice decided ‘that German legislation generally barring women from military posts 
involving the use of arms was contrary to the Community principle of equal treatment 
between men and women, although derogations concerning certain special combat units were 
possible.’
151
 Remarkably, the ruling engendered no significant opposition at all. On the 
contrary, in an immediate response to the decision Minister of Defence Scharping announced 
that from the beginning of 2001 onwards all posts in the military would be available under 
equal conditions to both men and women and later in the year the Bundestag passed with an 
overwhelming majority (512 out of 543) the constitutional amendment permitting this 
change. 
Concerning the professional identity of the Bundeswehr soldiers, it is of significance 
that in the parliamentary discussion nobody raised the issue of combat efficiency and of the 
advantage of the masculine military culture.
152
 On the contrary, some members of the 
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Bundestag accentuated the benefits of women’s participation in contemporary military 
missions. So Hans Peter Bartels (SPD) asserted: ‘Nowadays the Bundeswehr must be set for 
other missions than ten years ago. It requires some other skills. Women bring those other 
skills.’
153
 In a similar vein Margot von Renesse (SPD) emphasised the contribution of women 
to adequate military performance: ‘The Bundeswehr is not the El Dorado of adventurers, 
certainly not in the operations in Kosovo or East Timor.... I do not want the Bundeswehr to 
change the women, but I will be very pleased if the women change the Bundeswehr.’
154
 The 
presence of women in the Bundeswehr and, more importantly, in the missions abroad was 
thus assumed to prevent the soldierly identity from turning into a warrior and adventurer. 
In fact, sociological surveys conducted in the early 2000s manifest significant 
congruence between the societal view of the image of soldier and soldiers’ self-perception. 
Considering the survey conducted among the soldiers in the German SFOR contingents in 
2003 and 2004, only a negligible minority associated themselves with the combat-oriented 
image of a masculine warrior or with the desire for adventure and experience. On the 
contrary, the self-image of the ‘helper in uniform’ whose mentality suits peace more than 
combat was predominant among the participating soldiers (see Figure 19).
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It was the deployment in foreign missions that, Maren Tomforde proposes, 
civilianised the self-image of soldiers. On the one hand, older NCOs and officers who joined 
the Bundeswehr in the Cold War internalised a combat-oriented identity. ‘For them, combat 
rather than peacekeeping is what makes an army relevant and legitimate.’
157
 This was 
because their primary mission from basic training onwards had been the existential fighting 
in defence of the Federal republic itself. The younger generation, on the other hand, regards 
the deployment in a foreign mission ‘as a rite of passage, an “initiation” which each modern 
soldier should have experienced at least once during their military service.’
158
 The soldiers of 
the Bundeswehr thus developed a new identity of the ‘military Einsatzprofis’.
159
 Since most 
of the Bundeswehr’s missions abroad have been peaceful with little need for robust rules of 
engagement, the new professional self-image is not characterised in martial terms – hence the 
tendency of the SFOR soldiers to identify themselves with ‘helpers in uniform’ and aid 
volunteers. Consequently, as Gerhard Kümmel’s research on the acceptance of women in the 
Bundeswehr suggests, the two-third majority of soldiers recognised that women’s 
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communication skills would be a significant contribution to foreign missions, where the 
ability to peacefully de-escalate tense situations is of the utmost importance.
160
 
Militarised professional identity - danger to life and limb 
The mission in Afghanistan, though designed and declared as non-combat post-
conflict reconstruction, reminded participants and observers alike that the danger to life and 
limb is an inherent part of the military profession. Although this mission was not the first one 
in which a soldier of the Bundeswehr was killed – one German military medic was 
assassinated in Cambodia as early as in 1993 – the ISAF operation is the first and, so far, the 
only one in which casualties have become a regular occurrence (see Figure 20). Thus an 
improvised commemorative stone erected by the German soldiers of ISAF was claimed to 
inspire Minister of Defence Franz Josef Jung to build a memorial (Ehrenmal) of the 
Bundeswehr in Berlin. Minister Jung’s effort to acknowledge the risk of life as an intrinsic 
part of the military profession will be contrasted in this subsection with the promotion of war-
fighting soldiers under Jung’s successor in the office Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. 
 
Figure 20 German casualties taken in Afghanistan.
161
 
*) The data on wounded soldiers in 2010 are incomplete. 
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The memorial, which was inaugurated in September 2009, represents a symbolic 
recognition of the fact that the supreme sacrifice is an essential part of the military 
profession.
162
 Such an act naturally invited criticism. The idea of the military memorial was 
opposed, among other things, on the ground that Germany should not commemorate only the 
soldiers in separation from other German citizens (police, diplomats, aid volunteers) who lost 
their lives in the service of Germany abroad. As a commentator in the Berliner Zeitung has 
proposed: ‘This pathetic sacred commemoration reclaims a special status for soldiers in this 
state. Yet, if it is true that the army is acting merely in a humanitarian way, what about the 
civilian casualties – the technicians, doctors and aid workers?’
163
  
Despite this and other criticisms, Minister Jung was quite successful in gathering 
support, avoiding controversies and creating a positive public relations image of the project. 
Under the dedication: ‘To the dead of our Bundeswehr. For peace, justice and freedom’, the 
memorial is to commemorate the death of 3200 members of the Bundeswehr, both soldiers 
and civilian employees, who have died in service since 1956. Of this total number only one 
hundred soldiers died in foreign missions and only 36 were killed by an enemy action.
164
 The 
memorial, however, makes no difference between various causes of death. It is not the cause 
or situation – regardless if a suicide, accident or battle – but the danger to life itself that is 
suggested to render the military profession unique. The memorial, Minister Jung asserted, 
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‘illustrates the peculiarity of military service: the fulfilment of a task which may ultimately 
require the risk of one’s life’.
165
  
Jung’s advocacy of the plans for the memorial succeeded in avoiding the connection 
between death and combat. After all, the vast majority of the commemorated members of the 
Bundeswehr died in accidents. However, in the inauguration of the memorial on 8 September 
2009 Bundespräsident Horst Köhler pronounced that the Bundeswehr had become ‘an army 
in combat’.
166
 This statement of Bundespräsident Köhler was necessitated by the events 
which happened only four days before. On 4 September shortly after midnight the 
commander of German Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kunduz, Colonel Georg Klein, 
ordered an air strike on two hijacked tankers. According to the NATO account, up to 142 
mostly innocent civilians were killed during the strike. ‘And that night’, as an article in Der 




Shocking though the information about numerous civilian victims was for the German 
public, it is the profound change of the character of the German involvement in Afghanistan 
that the airstrike in September 2009 really signified. Since the spring 2009, the security 
situation in the German sector had dramatically deteriorated. The Taliban switched its tactics 
from small hit-and-run attacks towards larger, company-strong strikes (see Figure 10). 
Consequently, the Rules of Engagement of the German contingent were amended to allow for 
the offensive use of lethal force.
168
 The Kunduz airstrikes thus became an open manifestation 
of this recent progress. In contrast with the ingrained image of peaceful soldiers concentrating 
on reconstruction and development of the Afghan civilian communities, Colonel Klein did 
not order the bombing of the two hijacked tanker trucks so as to prevent an imminent threat 
to his soldiers; he did so, rather, with the acknowledged intention to ‘destroy’ the enemy 
combatants. Having been assured by his intelligence source that only combatants were 
present, ‘to take out the people’ was reported as the aim of the action. Moreover, Colonel 
Klein had deliberately presented false information, such as that there were German ‘troops in 
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contact’ and that the target constituted an imminent threat, in order to persuade the hesitating 





The communication between the forward air operator in Kunduz 
(‘Red Baron’) and the US fighter jets (‘Dude 15’ and ‘Dude 16’) 
1.08 am Two American F-15 fighter jets appeared in the skies over Kunduz responding to Colonel 
Klein’s report that there are ‘troops in contact’. 
1.12 am The first instruction of the German forward air controller, ‘Red Baron’, to the US F-15 
pilots, ‘Dude 15’ and ‘Dude 16’, is to circle the target area, but as wide as possible. ‘Stay 
away from the target, as far as it goes.’ The pilots are told to prepare to drop six 500-
pound bombs. 
1.18 am Red Baron: ‘the vehicles and some individuals are the target’. Dude 15 suggests flying 
at low altitude over the sandbar where the two tankers the Taliban had hijacked were 
stuck. It was intended as a ‘show of force’. Red Baron rejects the proposal. He wants the 
F-15 to ‘hide’.  
1.22 am Dude 15 reiterates his previous suggestion to fly at low altitude over the site, so as to 
scatter the people on the ground and then destroy the trucks. No response from Red 
Baron. 
1.28 am Dude 15 asks about the status of the people. Red Baron replies that, according to 
reliable sources, they are all enemy combatants. 
1.29 am Red Baron urges the pilots to treat the trucks as a ‘time-sensitive target’. He orders to 
drop one 2000-pound bomb between the trucks.  
1.32 am Dude 15 enquires as to whether the trucks or the people are to be targeted. Red Baron 
replies that the aim is ‘to take out the people’. 
1.36 am Dude 15 proposes for the third time to fly at low altitude over the target 
1.38 am Dude 15 repeats for the fourth time his suggestion to fly at low attitude over the target. 
He also suggests to attack with two 500-pound bombs. Red Baron reports the 
commander’s agreement with the use of two 500-pounds bombs. 
1.39 am Dude 15 proposes for the fifth time to fly at low altitude over the target. Red Baron 
replies: ‘negative, I want you to strike directly’. 
1.46 am The American pilots ask the Germans one more time whether the people on the ground 
truly constitute an ‘imminent threat.’ Under the NATO rules of engagement, only an 
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imminent threat may justify an air attack. Red Baron replies: ‘Yes, those pax (people) 
are an imminent threat.’ He says that the insurgents are trying to tap the gasoline from the 
trucks, and when they finish that, they will ‘regroup and we have intelligence information 
about current operations’ and they will probably be ‘attacking Camp Kunduz.’ 
Dude 15 starts the countdown. They will strike in two minutes time. 
1.49 am Weapon-system officers in the US F-15 fighter jets drop two 500-pound bombs, type 
GBU-38. 
Figure 21 The communication between the German forward air operator, carrying out orders 




According to the NATO investigators, Colonel Klein severely violated the NATO 
rules and procedures.
171
 Yet, at the beginning of November Minister of Defence Karl-
Theodor zu Guttenberg, who took over the office after the Kunduz affair having enforced the 
resignation of Franz Josef Jung, regarded these violations as merely ‘procedural errors’ which 
did not alter the fact that ‘the airstrike was inevitable’. A month later Minister zu Guttenberg 
changed his mind about the military value of the airstrikes, yet his support to Colonel Klein 
remained firm: ‘Although Colonel Klein undoubtedly acted to the best of his knowledge and 
belief, as well as to protect his soldiers, it was, from today’s objective viewpoint..., militarily 
inappropriate.’
172
 This stance was warmly welcome within the military. For instance, Ulrich 
Kirsch, the president of the Bundeswehrverband (an independent organisation representing 
the interests of soldiers), said: ‘Guttenberg made it very clear that he was behind Colonel 
Klein and would not let him fall and that uncertainty was a necessary companion of this 
military decision.... That is the political greatness that we need.’
173
 Vilified though Colonel 
Klein became in public, his action in Kunduz was seen with sympathies within the 
Bundeswehr. Colonel Klein had turned into a symbol of the soldiers engaged in a genuine 
war and Minister zu Guttenberg implicitly granted a recognition to the image of war-fighting 
soldier. 
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Moreover, the emerging identity of the miles bellicus was explicitly recognised in the 
act of awarding the Cross of Honour for Bravery (Ehrenkreuz der Bundeswehr für 
Tapferkeit), which was introduced in September 2008 by Minister Jung, and the Combat-
Mission Medal (Einsatzmedaille Gefecht) decreed in November 2010 by Minister zu 
Guttenberg. The combat medal, being awarded to each soldier who has taken part in a combat 
operation (22 soldiers were awarded in 2010), is a straightforward attempt to acknowledge 
the fact that combat have become an essential part of soldiers’ life in mission.
174
 As for the 
Ehrenkreuz, however, Minister of Defence Jung intended to recognise with the highest 
military honours the personal bravery in situations presenting danger to life and limbs, but 
not necessarily under fire. In accordance with this intention, the four soldiers who received 
the first crosses for bravery in July 2009 were awarded for exercising courage and 
determination in the rescue of comrades and civilians from a burning vehicle. Their bravery 
was said to be proved by the fact that detonations of ammunition in the vehicle ‘did not stop 
the four soldiers from continuing their efforts’.
175
 In contrast, under Minister zu Guttenberg 
the Ehrenkreuz turned into awards for deeds of bravery in battle. Thus the first two soldiers 
awarded by Minister zu Guttenberg distinguished themselves by leading their men into battle 
to relieve an ambushed patrol.
176
 
The image of soldiers in the view of official military doctrines 
‘The soldiers of the Bundeswehr have to develop a new identity in order to face 
successfully the challenges of the future.’
177
 With these words the Ministry of Defence 
introduced its vision of the new guiding image as early as 1992. Indeed, at the time when the 
Bundeswehr was making the first hesitant steps towards the expeditionary engagements, the 
Defence Policy Guidelines exercised a very forward-looking view of soldierly identity. The 
German soldiers were urged to ‘take on responsibility for the threatened freedom and the 
welfare of other nations and states’ and to devote their energy to develop skills necessary for 
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international cooperation and for the rescue of and help to people in need. ‘Soldierly 
professionalism must be geared to the real conditions of war, danger, and human misery in 
which soldiers will perform their service in future.’
178
 
Whereas the Defence Policy Guidelines 1992 outlined a straightforward way towards 
a conscientious miles protector, the doctrinal documents to come in the following years, 
ZDv10/1 1993
179
 and the White Paper 1994,
180
 presented significantly less clearly defined 
images of the soldier. On the one hand, it is acknowledged, in accordance with the concept of 
miles protector, that the task of territorial defence ‘is supplemented by that of providing 
protection, furnishing aid and helping to build a base for humanitarian operations and peace 
missions’
181
. In fact, the ability to ‘protect, help and mediate’ has since the early 1990s 
become a part of the soldierly identity that is constantly promoted.
182
 Moreover, this new 
calling is affirmed in the White Paper to require a kind of soldier who is able to assume 
‘responsibility for the freedom and human dignity of others’ and ‘who recognizes and is a 




On the other hand, the White Paper states that combat will remain the ‘ultima ratio’ of 
the military profession and that the willingness to fight and risk one’s own life is a ‘moral 
core of military service and is as true today as it ever was’.
184
 Despite not being so defined, it 
seems evident that the emphasis is placed on combat due to the, at the time still dominant, 
doctrine of territorial defence. After all, the foreign deployments throughout the 1990s and 
beyond may demonstrate the unease of the Bundeswehr to engage in any forceful action.
185
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Dramatically more noteworthy is the attempt to portray the soldier as a passive 
receiver of orders from the politicians. The White Paper, for example, declares that  
...military personnel can rest assured that the decisions taken by the executive are lawful and 
are open to public scrutiny and judicial review.... The serviceman can therefore be certain 
that he will only be employed after thorough and conscientious consideration has been given 




However, this attempt to detach the individual soldier from his own moral agency with regard 
to his deployment does not appear to be a result of an intentional effort to steer the 
development towards the archaic-warrior type of soldier. It is more plausible to consider this 
image of the soldier as an inadequate translation of the Cold War concepts. At the time when 
the defence against external aggression was the only mission of the military, to apply or not 
for the status of a conscientious objector represented the moral choice of every individual 
whether to accept the mission of the Bundeswehr. After this decision had been made, the 
soldier was supposed to be receiving information, explanations and justifications in the form 
of political education so as to keep his motivation strong. The ‘Working Group on Further 
Development of Innere Führung’ (Arbeitskreis  eiterentwicklung der Inneren Führung) at 
The Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) in Hamburg pointed out in 2002 
that the concept of ‘adult education’ (Erwachsenenerziehung) promoted in the Bundeswehr as 
an essential part of Innere Führung is anachronistic and inadequate, as it evokes an 
immaturity of the soldiers.
187
 However, the ZDv 10/1 from 1993 still followed closely the 
Cold War Innere Führung; and the White Paper 1994, though very progressive in many 
aspects, also maintained this image of soldiers passively adopting and internalising the 
reasons and justifications. 
More than a decade later the White Paper 2006 and ZDv 10/1 2008 present quite a 
contrasting view. Surprisingly though, some commentators, such as Elmar Wiesendahl, insist 
that, in terms of the form and content, the ZDv 10/1 2008 largely reproduces the regulation 
from 1993. The only considerable difference from the 1993 regulation, Wiesendahl argues, is 
with regard to the issue of killing and dying in service.
188
 The practical experience with 
foreign missions of various intensities evidently rendered this issue important. Whereas the 
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previous documents speak only about the ultimate sacrifice by protecting Germany,
189
 in 
2008 it became blatantly clear that the military service ‘involves risking life and limb and, in 
the final analysis, the obligation to kill in battle’.
190
  
What did not change at all, according to Wiesendahl, is the concept of the ‘citizen in 
uniform’ whose civic morality is argued to provide little adequate motivation for the 
engagements abroad.
191
 However, specifically the aspect of moral responsibility of the 
individual does represent a stark contrast to the documents from the 1990s. According to the 
ZDv 10/1 2008, the Bundeswehr soldiers are supposed, ‘out of personal conviction’, to 
‘actively defend human dignity, freedom, peace, justice, equality, solidarity and 
democracy’.
192
 They should be able to ‘assume responsibility for other people’ and 
‘distinguish right from wrong conduct’.
193
 The concept of the ‘citizen in uniform’ presented 
in ZDv 10/1 2008 consistently encourages soldiers to use their individual conscience. In this 
sense, the decision of Federal Court of Administration in the case of Major Pfaff recognising 
the right to freedom of conscience is not at all inconsistent with this image of the soldier. The 
ZDv 10/1 2008 hence explicitly legitimises disobedience based on ‘freedom of conscience’. 
This personal right is affirmed to guarantee that ‘the state does not have the right to force an 
individual to commit acts that violate ethical standards of good and evil’.
194
 
* * * 
To sum up, the experience with various foreign missions did affect the concept of the 
‘citizen in uniform’. It was evident from the very beginning that the soldiers would need to 
broaden their professional identity by incorporating the police-like capabilities to ‘protect, 
help and mediate’. For quite a long time society perceived soldiers as an ‘armed THW’ and 
the politicians were accordingly sending the troops into missions which suited the identity of 
miles protector. Even soldiers tended to conceive of themselves as ‘helpers in uniform’. 
However, this does not mean that in the reading of official military doctrines the soldierly 
professional identity would be completely civilianised. In the early 1990s the concept of the 
‘citizen in uniform’ remained orientated towards war-fighting. Yet, this combat orientation 
was focused only on the abstract possibility of repulsing an external aggression against the 
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land of Germany itself. Although this accent on territorial defence eased up in the 2000s, 
owing to the involvement in Afghanistan the professional military identity remained distinct. 
Numerous casualties sustained during the mission prompted the recognition of the ultimate 
sacrifice as an intrinsic part of the military profession. It was the ministerial policy during 
Franz Josef Jung’s term in office to acknowledge properly the danger to life and limb the 
soldiers had to take, but, simultaneously, to uphold the image of miles protector whose 
identity is not primarily defined by combat. After the security situation in Afghanistan 
dramatically deteriorated and Jung was replaced by Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, combat and 
bravery in battle began to be recognised as the core of the military profession. Thus the latest 
Defence Policy Guidelines declares, as a distinctive part of military service, that soldiers must 
be prepared to put ‘their lives on the line in combat’.
195
 
Partly because of the emerging risk of dying and killing, the moral responsibility of 
the individual came into prominence in the 2000s. While the uniformed life in the military 
camp tends to suppress individual moral judgement about the causes and utility of the 
particular mission, from the perspective of the military and political leadership in the 
Ministry of Defence, simple obedience would be unsustainable in such ethically challenging 
conditions. The soldier must be aware of the risks and challenges the mission entails and feel 
convinced that the cause of the mission is worth them. Moreover, the humanitarian character 
of most of the missions requires genuinely motivated soldiers in order to provide an effective 
aid to the people in need. 
Conclusion 
Instead of the threat posed by Soviet armoured divisions on the other side of the Fulda 
Gap, the international politics after the end of the Cold War has become concerned with 
crises and armed conflicts in the Balkans, Africa or the Middle East. None of these problems 
had a potential to cause a threat approximating the severity of a hot conflict between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact. In terms of German security, the worst possible consequence of these 
crises and conflicts was an increased risk of terrorism at home, while probably the most 
tangible effect were waves of immigrants from the conflict regions putting strain on 
Germany’s welfare system and social cohesion. However, as important as the national self-
interest, or as even more prominent, was a perceived responsibility to help people in need. It 
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stems from the liberal perspective on humankind as a universal whole, a cosmopolitanism 
that proposes that those who have the means and opportunity are morally obligated to help 
other human beings out of misery.
196
 
This moral obligation does not necessarily include a military involvement and 
German society, for historical reasons, manifests a strong tendency to avoid the use of armed 
force in honouring its moral obligations. However, the experience of the international 
community with crisis management and conflict resolution in the early 1990s made clear that 
military force is sometimes a necessary instrument available to deal with critical situations 
effectively. Germany, partly under external pressure and partly on its own, came to adopt the 
same view. The Bundeswehr thus had to convert into an instrument possessing the capacities 
to deal effectively with international crises.  
 
Figure 22 Model of the military capacities in post-Cold War Germany 
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Consequently the out-of-area military operations other than war (MOOTW) 
supplemented in the 1990s the persisting mission of territorial defence and in 2003 the former 
missions completely replaced the latter. Humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace-
building and post-conflict reconstruction came to justify and legitimise the Bundeswehr’s 
existence in the eyes of society and these kinds of mission were also to determine the 
organisational structure and institutional culture of the Bundeswehr.  
As for the organisational structure, the out-of-area deployments, though supposedly 
responding to the call of cosmopolitan responsibility, could not justify the circumscription of 
the rights and freedoms of the individual which is inherent to the compulsory military 
service. The state cannot justify the invocation of the individual’s responsibility towards 
society, if no threat is present or at least conceivable. The less, then, the conscripts could be 
deployed, without their explicit consent, in missions other than national or collective self-
defence. An all-volunteer force therefore remains the only legitimate form of military 
organisation suitable for humanitarian deployments abroad. The long persistence of 
conscription in Germany seems to challenge this assumption, but it only serves to 
demonstrate the glacially slow adaptation of the German military capacities to the new 
security context. The rapid surge of conscientious objectors after 1989, the explicit 
confinement of conscripted units to the mission of territorial defence during the 1990s and the 
obvious unsustainability of conscription after the doctrine of territorial defence was at last 
pushed aside in 2003 prove the assumption right also in the case of Germany. 
In 2011 the Bundeswehr was finally transformed into an all-volunteer force; however, 
with respect to the out-of-area operations, it has been effectively acting as a 
volunteer/professional force since the early 1990s. Individual choice is a necessary liberal 
prerequisite for non-defensive missions. Whereas the military might be used as an instrument 
of the state, the soldier should never be treated merely as an instrument and object with no 
regards to the individual as an end in itself. It is therefore the individual consent that retains 
and preserves the moral subjectivity of the soldier. The soldier in liberal society is hence 
supposed to join the service of the state according to their own will. Yet the soldiers should 
not be recruited merely for pecuniary interest; they are assumed to feel a moral commitment 
to the cause they serve. In that sense, the right to refuse orders on the ground of conscience 
was granted to the soldiers by the ruling of the Federal Court of Administration in the case of 
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Major Pfaff in 2005 and subsequently the importance of individual ethical commitment was 
emphasised in the joint service regulation on the Innere Führung (ZDv 10/1). 
Yet, the very nature of military professionalism also contains the tendency to develop 
a caste identity based on the peculiarity of the soldierly calling. The tendency of liberalism, 
on the other hand, is to preclude the alienation of the military from its parent society. 
Whereas during the Cold War, the concept of the ‘citizen in uniform’ was supposed to ensure 
the social integration of soldiers in society, in the post-Cold War Bundeswehr it became the 
character of the military occupation/profession which is to prevent the segregation of soldiers 
from society. While the soldierly profession, in comparison with other occupations, maintains 
a certain uniqueness due to the danger to life and limbs it involves, as represented by the 
Memorial of the Bundeswehr in Berlin, the dedication of the Bundeswehr ‘to protect, help 
and mediate’ renders soldiering comparable to other civilian professions, such as police, 
social workers or ‘first responder’ rescuers. 
The individual ethical commitment and the civilian character of the military business 
constitute the concept of miles protector which is not only positively perceived by liberal 
society, but also functionally fits the tasks of humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace-
building and post-conflict reconstruction – the missions to which liberal societies are ready 
and willing to deploy their armed forces. Hence as long as liberal states are in control of their 
foreign policy, the concept of miles protector is an adequate response to both societal and 
functional imperatives.  
Opposite to the concept of miles protector may stand the image of a warrior soldier, 
or miles bellicus. This concept emphasises the peculiarity of the military profession due to its 
inevitable intimate connection with combat and killing. The self-identification with the 
warrior is a more or less latent tendency within every military force, the Bundeswehr being 
no exception. Nonetheless, the image of the war-fighting soldier has grown into political 
relevance in Germany since the security situation in the German area of responsibility in 
Afghanistan deteriorated in 2009. The German involvement in Afghanistan gradually crept 
from the mission of post-conflict reconstruction towards a war against insurgents. In that 
sense, official foreign and defence policy of the German government ceased being in 
command over the situation; instead the Ministry of Defence had to accommodate measures 
necessitated by the development in the Afghan theatre. The introduction of the combat medal 
in 2010 is just a token of this latest development. 
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Following the development in Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr set a course towards the 
Huntingtonian model of the professional military. The motto ‘We.Serve.Germany’ is an open 
declaration of the conversion of the Bundeswehr towards the instrument of policy. However, 
as Huntington postulates, a professional military in an antimilitaristic liberal society tends to 
suffer from insulation – this means, on the one hand, deepening the gap between parent 
society and the military, on the other hand, loss of any importance of the military in the 
foreign and security policy.
197
 The growing reluctance of Merkel’s government to engage the 
Bundeswehr soldiers in any new mission might support the thesis that this development 
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British Military Capacities 
Historical experience compelled German society to be extremely sceptical about the 
utility of the use of force in international politics and suspicious of the political and social 
influence that powerful armed forces might exercise. Therefore, the creation of the 
Bundeswehr had to reflect these societal feelings. In order to dispel the hostility of German 
society, a strict delimitation of the military roles and close identification with and integration 
into society was a prerequisite of the Bundeswehr’s establishment, survival and relative 
wellbeing. Because of the specific conditions under which the Bundeswehr was set up and 
had to function, the Bundeswehr presents a unique case of armed forces that have been very 
deeply and systematically penetrated by liberal norms. 
The British military capacities, to which we now turn our attention, could not offer a 
more contrasting case. The British military, which became irreversibly rooted into the fabric 
of British society since the time of the English Civil War of the mid-17
th
 Century, has 
become characterised by the embeddedness of its traditions and institutions rather than its 
sensitivity and susceptibility to the development of societal imperatives. The question of the 
utility of force in international politics has never presented the scale of concern within British 
society that it has in the FRG. Yet it is not true that British society would not evince much 
suspicion about the military; on the contrary, a strong mistrust or even hostility to a powerful 
regular army and the soldierly profession, as captured in Rudyard Kipling’s poem ‘Tommy’, 
was a prevalent sentiment in Britain at least until the Second World War. Yet, because of the 
specific security requirements of the vast empire and the island position of Great Britain, the 
British antimilitarism of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 Century, in contrast with the German 
Bundeswehr in the second half of the 20
th
 Century, resulted in an isolation of the armed 
forces from society, rather than an identification with it. Although the Second World War 
with its notion of being a ‘People’s War’ changed the societal sentiments towards the military 
somewhat, the basic patterns of societal-military relations in Great Britain have manifested a 
significant measure of continuity with the past.
1
 
                                                 
1
 See Angus Calder, The People's War: Britain 1939-45 (London: Cape, 1969); Jeremy Crang, The British Army 
and the People's War, 1939-1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). 
220 
 
Despite the apparent detachment and even isolation of the UK armed forces from their 
parent society, it should not be assumed that the normative imperatives of liberal society had 
no effects on the development of British defence policy and military institutions. Thus this 
chapter is designed to analyse British military capacities and to identify the outcomes of 
ideological imperatives on the constitutive parts of the military capacities. In the first section 
of this chapter the functional roles and missions of the UK armed forces will be briefly 
described. The subsequent section will examine the political debates concerning compulsory 
military service. The effect of liberalism on the institutional culture of the British Army will 
be analysed in the last two sections before the conclusion. Unlike the German Bundeswehr, 
the individual services of the UK armed forces – Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and British 
Army – maintain a considerable institutional autonomy and, therefore, have distinct 
institutional cultures. Thus for practical reasons, the examination of the institutional culture 
will be chiefly confined to the British Army. In comparison with the technical character of 
the work in the navy and the air force, the land forces have a greater tendency to emphasise 
the violent part of the soldierly profession. It is, therefore, the British Army that presents the 
strongest challenge to the influence of liberal principles. To reflect this resistance of the 
military culture, the fourth section will look at the Army’s self-proclaimed need for a distinct 
ethical system. The fifth section will then examine to what extent the professional identity of 
the British soldier adopted features of the police profession. 
Missions and Roles of the British Armed Forces 
Military power is the ultimate instrument and expression of national power, in circumstances 
ranging from coercion through to the deliberate application of force to neutralise a specific 




The latest British Defence Doctrine describes the armed forces as a universal instrument at 
the disposal of the government’s foreign and security policy. Unlike the German Bundeswehr 
during the Cold War, the British military’s raison d’être has rarely rested on one core 
mission. Rather, the armed forces have always been regarded as the ultimate executive tool of 
the government of the day to assert its interests both overseas as well as at home. 
The instrumentality of the British military is not confined to the use of force either. 
The armed forces are, the British Defence Doctrine of 2001 explains, ‘potentially useful 
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instruments of domestic policy in reserve, capable of dealing with a range of contingencies as 
required by HM Government’.
3
 The military has often been called out to perform disaster 
relief in emergency situations, so called ‘Military Assistance to Civilian Communities’ 
(MACC). It has not been unusual, either, that soldiers were requested to provide essential 
services during industrial disputes, so called ‘Military Assistance to Government 
Departments’ (MAGD), or previously the ‘Military Assistance to Civil Ministries’ 
(MACM).
4
 In contrast with the MACC, the latter kind of military deployment is by no means 
uncontroversial. The normative issue in such a deployment was highlighted by Winston 
Churchill as early as 1919:   
To use soldiers or sailors, kept up at the general expense of the taxpayer, to take sides with 
the employer in an ordinary trade dispute... would be a monstrous invasion of the liberty of 
the subject, and ... would be a very unfair, if not an illegal, order to give to the soldier. But 
the case is different where vital services affecting the health, life or safety of large cities or 




Similar justifications of military interventions in industrial disputes, as a moral imperative to 
provide essential services, became relatively commonplace among British politicians.
6
 As a 
consequence, British soldiers were deployed in such diverse roles as meat-handlers (1946, 
1947, and 1950), refuse collectors (1970 and 1975), fire-fighters (1973 and 1977-78), or 
ambulance drivers (1979).
7
 However, as Christopher Whelan reminds us, the ‘distinction 
between strikebreaking and safeguarding essential supplies is often a very fine one’, 
especially if the government is a party in the industrial dispute. In the 1970s it hence 
appeared that the technological and industrial skills which the military possessed were a 
factor more decisive than normative principles.
8
 
However, the missions of MACC and MAGD/MACM are obviously only of 
secondary importance to the military. The primary purpose of the armed forces has always 
been the threat or use of violence. The following parts of this section are set to show that the 
UK armed forces were equally instrumental for operations within the British Empire and the 
United Kingdom, and against external challenges. While there can be little doubt that the 
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military was considered as a tool of Real-Politics and the major limitations of its use were 
caused by financial constraints, the United Kingdom entered the 20
th
 Century as a satisfied 
power. It was concerned almost exclusively with preserving the existing order in international 
politics and upholding the rule of law within the Empire. It was only after the UK had left the 
Cold War behind and was thus not only stripped of most of the imperial duties but, more 
importantly, also had no relevant threat to its very existence that the military began to be 
considered in distinctly ethical/normative terms as a ‘force for good’. 
Defence and deterrence 
The island position of Great Britain determined that home defence has rarely played a 
key role in the UK’s defence strategy. There were still good reasons to believe at the 
beginning of the 20
th
 Century that as long as the Royal Navy remained capable of asserting 
command of the sea the British Isles would be safe from invasion. In the view of the military 
authorities in the 1900s, a flotilla large enough to transport an invasion force could never 
avoid interception and heavy damage while crossing the Channel. Hence the worst case that 
the home-defence forces might face was argued to be small scale raids, an eventuality which 
did not require a large land force for home defence.
9
 
Rather than defence of metropolitan Great Britain, it was the Empire whose security 
had to be provided by the British Army. As a commentator in the early 20
th
 Century put it, 
‘To run the risk of destroying our Imperial Army for the sake of providing the British Islands 
with an additional security which they do not need might not unjustly be described as “Little 
Englandism” in a panic.’
10
 For the most of the first half of the 20
th
 Century the imperial 
duties, both defence and policing, presented the primary mission for the British Army. Thus 
to check the Russians on the north-west frontier of India was the main strategic challenge for 
the pre-1914 Army, and likewise to meet an  Italian invasion of Egypt was the key task for 
the Army in the 1930s.
11
 Though becoming of steadily lesser relative importance, the mission 
of imperial defence remained one of the main pillars of UK defence strategy until the late 
1960s. In 1968 the budgetary pressure that had already forced an embarrassing devaluation of 
Sterling in November 1967 forced the Labour Government’s Defence Secretary, Denis 
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Healey, to propose a withdrawal of most of the British forces from east of Suez. ‘The 1968 
white paper stated for the first time that Britain’s defence effort would in future be 
concentrated on Europe and the North Atlantic.’
12
 
The Cold War compelled the UK to consider defence of the European mainland as 
crucial for its security and commit a substantial part of its land forces to that mission. In fact, 
arguments that the defence of the Channel depended on the security of the Low Countries had 
been voiced since the beginning of the 20
th
 Century. In the 1930s the question of continental 
commitment engendered heated discussions and considerable opposition in military circles.
13
 
So it was not until the Second World War that it became abundantly clear that without 
security for Western Europe there was no security for the United Kingdom either. 
Technological innovations, such as long-range bombers and ballistic missiles, rendered the 
strategic or at any rate protective significance of the Channel negligible and thus Britain was 
forced for the first time to make ‘a definite military commitment to Europe while at peace’.
 14
 
However, the technological innovations not only necessitated the continental 
commitment but also brought about a new strategic importance for UK home defence. The 
ascent of air power in the interwar period led to the idea of deterring aggression by a threat of 
massive retaliation through air strikes against civilian targets. Consequently, when air 
domination was lost in the late 1930s, the priority mission of the Army and the RAF became 
the defence against an enemy’s aerial bombing.
15
 In a similar way, during the Cold War the 
ultimate defence of the British Isles was entrusted to the deterrent power of nuclear weapons. 
It is an unfortunate fact about British defence policy that the wars the UK had to fight 
rarely corresponded with the kinds of conflicts she had planned for. Hence the oft-repeated 
quip that the British Army is always mistakenly preparing to re-fight the last war. Thus while 
the armed forces during most of the first half of the 20
th
 Century expected and were preparing 
for a limited war somewhere on the fringes of the British Empire, they had to fight two total 
wars with the main operations concentrated in the European theatre. The first Cold War 
strategy of 1948 postulated that the security of the United Kingdom depended upon three 
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pillars: defence of the UK, maintaining vital sea communications and securing the Middle 
East as a defensive and striking base against the Soviet Union.
16
 Only two years later British 
soldiers were sent to the Korean War. The period that followed was, as Colin McInnes notes, 
‘something of a transitional phase whereby the Army lost its overseas role and gained one in 
Europe’.
17
 The steady process of concentration of all resources to deter a Soviet aggression in 
Europe culminated in the Defence Review of Sir John Nott, Defence Secretary in Margaret 
Thatcher’s forst government, in 1981. The Nott Review confirmed the modernisation of the 
UK’s nuclear deterrent and re-equipment of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), whit the 
Royal Navy set to bear the costs. One aircraft carrier, two amphibious ships and 
approximately one fifth of its destroyers and frigates were earmarked to be scrapped. This 
would have effectively eliminated the UK’s expeditionary capability.
18
 However, only a few 
months later, and just before the naval cuts embedded in the Nott Review could be 
implemented, the UK had to mount a task force for an old-fashioned limited conflict with 
Argentina over the Falkland Islands in April-June 1982.
19
 
Imperial policing and counterinsurgency 
An interstate armed conflict, though being considered the raison d’être of almost 
every military organisation in the world, is usually only a very unlikely, though conceivable, 
possibility for soldiers. It is quite commonplace that a soldier’s entire career is devoted to the 
preparation for a war which would never come. Though the UK in the 20
th
 Century has been 
engaged in more interstate wars than most other countries, even in her case a hot international 
conflict presented a rather rare occurrence. During the Cold War, in particular, British 
soldiers were preparing for an apocalyptic war in order not to have to fight it. Yet, the year 
1968 is often remembered as the only one in the 20
th
 Century when no British soldier was 
killed in action. While interstate armed conflicts were uncommon events in the life of British 
soldiers, duties within the British Commonwealth were the everyday business of the military.  
Indeed, the reforms of Edward Cardwell, Secretary for War in the 1870s, were 
intended to establish a force designed primarily for asserting British power over the Empire. 
Although in the late 19
th
 Century soldiers did engage in various small wars beyond the 
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borders of the Empire, as colonial expansion in Africa and Asia came to its end, most of the 
armed conflicts would take place within the imperial borders and thus be considered civil 
unrest rather than war.
20
 Arguably it was only with the establishment of a General Staff in 




With the acquisition of the mandate territories as a consequence of the 1919 peace 
settlement, imperial policing became, in practical terms, the primary focus of the Regular 
Army.
22
 Although the home forces tried to preserve and further develop their warfighting 
capabilities, in some instances the mission of imperial policing came to prevail outright. So in 
1922, the General Staff instructed all Commands to train ‘for the most probable war, i.e. 
against an enemy rather worse armed than ourselves’,
23
 and in 1931, at the time of 
disarmament negotiations, the Army was told to regard imperial policing as its first training 
priority, whereas preparing for a great national war was to come last.
24
 
The Cold War period was not short of police-like deployments of the Army either. 
Colonial counter-insurgency, such as Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-56), Cyprus (1954-59) 
or Aden (1964-67), and other low-intensity operations within the Empire were until the late 
1960s the most frequent form of military deployment.
25
 According to the calculations of John 
Van Wingen and Herbert K. Tillema, between 1949 and 1970 Britain initiated 34 military 
interventions.
26
 An examination of these interventions brings the authors to the conclusion 
that the UK’s interventions were supposed only to assist in an orderly withdrawal from the 
colonies. ‘Britain did not systematically channel force to serve her greatest interests near her 
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bases in the Empire. Violence was a necessary catalyst. Without violence the United 




By the 1970s the overt deployments in Africa, Middle East and Asia came to an end.
28
 
Consequently, ‘the British army was to be left with one primary responsibility, apart from its 
contribution to NATO – that for which it had been originally established on a regular basis at 
the end of the seventeenth century: the maintenance of peace in Ireland’.
29
 Peacekeeping and 
internal security operations in Northern Ireland (1969-98) then came to characterise 
soldiering for almost three decades after the withdrawal from empire. Although, as McInnes 
puts it, the Army probably considered the peacekeeping operations as ‘something of a 
diversion from its real business – preparing for a war against the Soviet Union – it may be 




‘Force for good’ 
In the context of the Kosovo crisis, the Labour government’s Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR) of 1998 was introduced by Defence Secretary George Robertson in the House 
of Commons with the following words: 
Our armed forces are a vital part of our armoury in helping to enforce the rule of law in an 
unstable world. Their response to the call in the Gulf, in the Balkans, in west and central 
Africa and elsewhere is a living demonstration of the policy that underpins the strategic 
defence review.... 
We as a nation are not prepared to stand idly by. When it matters, we want to make a 
difference, and we are prepared to take a lead in doing so. That is not a question of abstract 
philanthropy. We have international responsibilities that it is right for us to discharge, but we 
also have hard-nosed interests in a peaceful, stable, prosperous and democratic Europe, in a 




The novelty of the SDR of 1998 was its explicit foundation on an unambiguously 
cosmopolitan morality. ‘We do not want to stand idly by and watch humanitarian disasters or 
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aggression of dictators go unchecked’, stated Defence Secretary Robertson in the introduction 
to SDR, ‘we want to be a force for good’.
32
 
Yet the SDR of 1998 does not represent the beginning of British military 
cosmopolitanism. Exercising an enormous effort, the UK armed forces provided the coalition 
forces in the 1991 Gulf War with the second largest contingent. Christopher Bellamy points 
out,  
...the United Kingdom did not have to do it. It was a political choice, a reflection of what the 
government thought the country could afford and what it thought was an appropriate 
contribution. Before the April general election, both Conservative and Labour Parties in 
Britain stood by the latter option. Britain not only had to be able to defend itself against 




The Defence White Paper of 1992, the so called ‘Options for Change’, which followed soon 
after the Gulf War, defined the promotion of ‘wider security interests through the 
maintenance of international peace and stability’ as one of the three main defence roles.
34
 The 
government emphasised that Britain – as a major trading power with a vested interest in 
international stability and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council – had a world 
role and global responsibilities.
35
 
Immediately after the end of the Cold War it thus became clear that the commitment 
to collective defence would decline in importance, whereas ‘wider security interests’ would 
grow in prominence.
36
 However, ‘Options for Change’ still asserted that ‘the forces required 
to meet these requirements will be drawn from those with other roles’.
 37
 It was not until the 
Strategic Defence Review of 1998 that a strategic attack against NATO was officially 
declared to be ‘no longer within the capacity of any conceivable opponent and to recreate 
such a capacity would take many years’.
38
 
The strategic assumption of the SDR of 1998 that the UK faced no clear threats had to 
be re-examined after the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent declaration of the 
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global war on terror by the US government. The SDR New Chapter of 2002 and the Defence 
White Paper of 2003 newly provided for a flexible range of military and non-military options 
in order to deter or actively prevent any potential terrorist threat.
39
 However, the adaptation of 
the UK defence strategy to meet the potential terrorist threat did not expunge the original 
cosmopolitan ethos of the 1998 SDR.  
The direct consequences of the post-2001 strategic environment were the operation in 
Afghanistan from 2001 onwards and the invasion and occupation of Iraq, in which the British 
forces took part from 2003 to 2011. While the US-led coalition justified the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq primarily in terms of pre-emptive action to stop the threat of weapons of mass 
destruction, the Blair Government felt the need to justify the deployment of its armed forces 
in terms of cosmopolitan morality too. The aim of the British armed forces hence was to 
liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein’s tyranny.
40
 In a similar vein, the 
cosmopolitan ethics and the principles of humanitarian intervention were invoked when 
Britain took over responsibility for operations in Helmand in 2006. As Hew Strachan put it, a 
US-led campaign to target terrorists has been transformed into a mission ‘to bring to 
Afghanistan good governance, aid and construction’.
41
 
However, the warlike cosmopolitanism of the Blair Government caused a strong 
backlash within British society. Instead of short and decisive operations which would lead to 
unambiguously improved living conditions of the people in need, the British forces sank into 
a quagmire of protracted violence and instability. As an inevitable consequence of this 
experience over more than a decade, the subsequent governments took a more sober view on 
the utility of force. Yet, the commitment to global responsibilities and humanitarian ethics, 
which has underlined British defence policy since the end of the Cold War, has not been 
abandoned. The National Security Strategy of 2010 maintained: 
Our strategic interests and responsibilities overseas could in some circumstances justify the 
threat or use of military force. There will also be occasions when it is in our interests to take 
part in humanitarian interventions. Each situation will be different and these judgements will 
not necessarily be easy.
42
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The intervention in Libya in 2011 may be evidence that humanitarian ethics remains a valid 
justification for the use of force and the difference of situations and difficulty of the 
judgement calls to be made is surely well borne out by the non-intervention in Syria after the 
UK parliamentary vote in autumn 2013. 
*** 
Huntington’s concept posited that military professionalism and objective civilian 
control rest on the idea that armed forces are a ‘tool of the state’.
43
 As the instrument of the 
state the professional military can be deployed when-, where- and however the government 
wishes. The role of the British armed forces has usually been identified in exactly such real-
political terms. The UK governments have rarely felt uncomfortable to speak about the armed 
forces and their use in the service of the national interest. For example, according to the 
Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2010, the armed forces give Britain ‘the means to 
threaten or use force when other levers of power are unable to protect [her] vital national 
interests.’44 However, as J.S. Mill pointed out as early as 1859, ‘The thought they have in 
their minds, is not the interest of England, but her security. What they would say, is, that they 
are ready to act when England's safety is threatened, or any of her interests hostilely or 
unfairly endangered.’
45
 It is not true that normative principles would have no bearing on 
decisions concerning the use of force. For instance, the practice of military interventions 
during the withdrawal from empire demonstrated that Britain ‘did not systematically use 
force in favor of her greatest trade monopolies, nor her most profitable overseas investment, 
nor her largest overseas populations. Where, when, and why Britain intervened reveal that 
she used force to cope and not to conquer.’
46
 Moreover, when the existential security 
concerns disappeared at the end of the Cold War, British defence policy gained the liberty to 
justify deployments of British soldiers in explicitly ethical terms, as a ‘force for good’. 
The British armed forces should be ready to carry out any mission the government 
requires. That demands a great deal of flexibility on the part of the military. However, every 
individual service – Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and Army – was designed for a particular 
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task or gradually adapted to fit the requirements of a specific mission. Thus probably most of 
the main features of the British Army were created under the conditions of imperial duties. 
Until the Second World War, the Army’s major strategic role lay in the defence of the 
Empire against other colonial powers and maintaining the rule of law within the colonies was 
its everyday business. As the issues of compulsory military service and citizenship education 
in the following parts of this chapter will demonstrate, the predominance of imperial 
commitments rendered the Army incompatible with the requirements of total warfare during 
the First and, more significantly, the Second World War. On the other hand, the imperial 
duties endowed the British Army with constabulary skills – a topic of the last section – and 
thus made the Army an adequate instrument for later low-intensity operations, such as 
Northern Ireland, the Balkans or Afghanistan. 
Make-up of the Armed Forces: Compulsory or Voluntary Service 
Conscription, or national service,
47
 has never become rooted in the organisational 
structure of the British armed forces. In the last century, Britain conscripted young people 
into her armed services for no more than 25 years in total. The first modern conscription law 
(Military Service Law) in the United Kingdom was introduced in January 1916, at the time 
when voluntary recruitment for the battlefields of the First World War not only was unable to 
secure sufficient intake of fresh recruits but also proved to be detrimental to the effective 
distribution of manpower between the armed forces and war industry. Call-up of conscripts 
ended shortly after the end of the war in mid-1919. The second period of compulsory military 
training and service started on the eve of the Second World War in April 1939 and after the 
war conscription was maintained until the end of 1960 (the last conscripts leaving the armed 
forces in 1963). The United Kingdom was not only the last European power that resorted to 
conscription but also the first to decide it could resume the system of all-volunteer forces in 
the post-1945 period. 
                                                 
47
 The term ‘conscription’ was being systematically avoided by the advocates of compulsory service for its 
negative connotations in British society. They preferred the term ‘National Service’ because ‘conscription’ 
was associated with the purchase of substitutes, on the one hand, and with the continental model of 
conscription that was seen as the basis of national aggression, on the other. Dennis, The Territorial Army, 
1906-1940, 18; see also Peter Dennis, Decision by Default: Peacetime Conscription and British Defence, 
1919-1939 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 206-25; Denis Hayes, Conscription Conflict: The 
Conflict of Ideas in the Struggle for and against Military Conscription in Britain between 1901 and 1939 
(London: Sheppard Press, 1949), 38. 
231 
 
Unsurprisingly, the international situation of the UK in 1916 and 1939 led public 
opinion to grow strongly in favour of the introduction of conscription,
48
 but apart from the 
time of emergency, certainly during most of the first half of the 20
th
 Century, conscription 
was generally regarded as illiberal and at odds with British democratic traditions.
49
 As one 
radical MP noted in the discussion on the 1916 Military Service Bill, the people of Britain 
were believed to be engaged in ‘a fight for Liberty against Bureaucracy, for British ideals and 
for Liberalism in its widest sense against Prussian Militarism and Tyranny’. The recourse to 
compulsory service was therefore viewed as embodying nothing less than ‘the negation of 
Liberalism’.
50
 The defence commentator, military historian and 1914-18 veteran Basil Liddell 
Hart approached the same issue at the time of the Second World War with an identical 
sentiment: 
The principle of compulsory service, embodied in the system of conscription, has been the 
means by which modern dictators and military gangs have shackled their people after a coup 
d’état, and bound them to their own aggressive purposes. In view of the great service that 
conscription has rendered to tyranny and war, it is fundamentally shortsighted for any 
liberty-loving and peace-desiring peoples to maintain it as an imagined safeguard, lest they 




The same author expressed elsewhere more specifically why, in his view, conscription is not 
compatible with the liberal nature of the British nation. Compulsory service is said to entail 
‘the suppression of individual judgement – the Englishman’s most cherished right.... In 
respect of personal service, freedom means the right to be true to your convictions to choose 
your course, and decide whether the cause is worth service and sacrifice. That is the 
difference between the free man and the state-slave.’
52
 As also shown below, individual 
initiative and freely developed enthusiasm are among the main virtues which were ascribed to 
voluntary service by its advocates. 
                                                 
48
 See Hayes, Conscription Conflict, 145; Daniel Hucker, "Franco-British Relations and the Question of 
Conscription in Britain 1938–1939," Contemporary European History, 17, no. 04 (2008): 443. 
49
 Enforced military service was, in fact, not as strange in Britain as the 20
th
 Century discourse might suggest. 
‘In their more romantic moments [the supporters of conscription] harked back to the Anglo-Saxon fyrd. 
More relevantly they cited the Militia Act, [which sanctioned the use of ballot and] which, at least in 
name, had only been suspended rather than positively repealed.’ Hew Strachan, "Liberalism and 
Conscription 1789-1919," in The British Army, Manpower, and Society into the Twenty-First Century, ed. 
Hew  Strachan (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 7. 
50
 Johnson, "The Liberal War Committee," 400. 
51
 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare (London: Faber & Faber, 1946), 82. 
52
 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Willing Service or Compulsion (Swindon: Swindon Press, 1939), 8. Quoted in 
Hayes, Conscription Conflict, 358. Cf. Charles Trevelyan: ‘Of all forms of subservience short of positive 
slavery, military subservience is by far the worst.’ Quoted in Hayes, Conscription Conflict, 143. 
232 
 
However, to conclude that peace-time conscription was seen to contradict the highly 
esteemed principle of individual freedom would do a great injustice to the issue. An 
examination of the debates between proponents of universal conscription and advocates of 
voluntary recruitment into the armed forces, particularly the rich debate from the early 1900s 
until the introduction of National Service in 1916, and details of the institutionalisation and 
practice of conscription, such as conscientious objection, will give a more nuanced view on 
the ideological background of the recruitment system.  
The conscription debate 
The 1899-1902 Second Boer War revealed, among other serious shortcomings, an 
inefficiency of the British military system to generate reserve forces sufficient to sustain a 
prolonged campaign. Military reform was thus required. A lively discussion emerged at the 
time as to whether Britain should adopt compulsory military service, as was commonplace all 
over the Continent, or should completely rely on voluntary service. As early as 1902 the 
National Service League (NSL) was established – a pressure group which took the lead in the 
public campaign for compulsory military training in the United Kingdom. The publications of 
the NSL,
53
 though not ultimately successful in attaining their aim, were effective in opening 
the public discussion on this issue. On the other side of the debate stood the Secretary of the 
State for War Richard Haldane, whose reform of home-defence and reserve forces rested on 
part-time voluntary service of citizens. To counter the campaign of the NSL, Haldane 
commissioned the publication of Compulsory Service,
54
 a book defending his reform 
composed by a senior army officer, Sir Ian Hamilton, Adjutant-General until 1910. 
The island position of Britain and the vast empire determined that her military 
strategy was bound to rest on a large navy capable of the command of the sea and a regular 
army consisting of long-term serving soldiers who could be posted anywhere in the empire. 
None of the parties in the conscription debate before the outbreak of the First World War 
challenged this fundamental assumption. A dividing line, however, existed with regards to 
the question of the impenetrability of Britain’s maritime defence. Whereas the 
conscriptionists justified their call for compulsory military training and a large reserve force 
upon the assumption that the navy could not guarantee that no invasion force whatsoever 
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might ever cross the Channel, the so called ‘bolt from the blue’ argument, Haldane’s reform 




In Haldane’s eyes, a draft-based home-defence army would be an unnecessary drain 
on economic resources which could be more effectively used to the benefit of the navy and 
the regular army.
56
 However, despite the fact that the question of home defence was in the 
forefront of this debate, neither party considered the defence of the homeland territory to be 
the only reason for the establishment of National Service, on the one hand, or the voluntary 
Territorial Force, on the other. The debate had arisen because of the deficiencies revealed in 
attempting to maintain a sufficiently strong force throughout the entire course of the Boer 
War. Therefore, the main intention of either party was to prepare the armed forces for another 
large-scale military engagement overseas. Not merely to maintain a home-defence army, but 
also to create a second-line force was among the chief intentions of both Haldane and the 
NSL.
57
 A militarisation of British society was deemed necessary; the controversy lay in the 
question about what way British society should get prepared for war. The arguments in the 
debate were therefore largely of an ideological nature.  
To be clear, neither side represented an unambiguously liberal position. Haldane was 
a liberal imperialist and the NSL, even if non-partisan, associated mostly members and 
supporters of the Conservative Party and its arguments reflected nationalist and civic-
republican political views.
58
 The imperialist dimension of Haldane’s reasoning occurred in 
his emphasis on aggressive military strategy, for which a voluntarily recruited army was 
claimed to be necessary: 
Voluntary service is inspired by the spirit of self-expansion, by a spirit of self-confidence so 
genuine and so deep as to engender a belief that others will be benefited by being brought 
under the Flag. The spirit of Imperialism, the adventurous spirit, the appreciation of the 
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Compulsory service, in contrast, was said to be inspired by the spirit of self-conservation and 
nationalism and would naturally lead to a defensive or passive state of mind. Such an attitude 
was regarded as damaging to the vital interests of the British Empire. ‘If a rich nation turns its 
mind entirely to defence, it commits the deadly sin of tempting others to transgress. By 
renouncing the offensive idea it goes just half-way to inviting its rivals to attack...’
60
 Thus, in 
Haldane and Hamilton’s views, voluntary service was preferable for being aggressive and 
imperialist, whereas compulsory service was deplorable for its defensiveness and ‘Little 
Englandism’.  
Denis Hayes passed a telling comment that in the ‘changed thought of to-day the 
voluntarists must have seemed to plead for war and the conscriptionists for peace’.
61
 
However, the cause of the NSL was not considered in such positive terms by their 
contemporaries. Rather, the NSL became notorious for awaking invasion scares. Moreover, 
for many conscriptionists, compulsory service was sought to arrest national decline and 
preserve military and masculine qualities in the nation.
62
 As Lloyd George pointed out in his 
memoirs, the pre-war conscriptionists were commonly associated ‘with extreme Jingoism, 
and in consequence opposition to any suggestion of national military service had become an 
article of faith with some liberals and socialists.’
63
  
Yet to be comprehensible and acceptable to British society at large, both parties also 
had to undergird their causes with liberal arguments. As mentioned above, home defence was 
publicly asserted to be the chief reason for both compulsory National Service and the 
voluntary Territorial Force. So, despite Haldane’s intention to build the Territorial Force as a 
second line behind the Regular Army component of the Expeditionary Force, he did not find 
sufficient political support for his plan to make the Territorials liable for overseas service.
64
 
The effort of the civilian society, but on a voluntary basis, to defend their homes could not be 
compromised by a liability for overseas military adventures. 
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Indeed, creating the nation-in-arms was claimed to be the aim of Haldane’s reform. 
He declared his reorganisation of the military forces in such a fashion as to create a genuine 
‘National Army, not separated from itself by artificial barriers of caste and class, but regarded 
by the people as something that is their very own.’
65
 Haldane emphasised that the concept of 
‘nation-in-arms’ had to reflect the nature of British society and, therefore, should be based on 
the voluntary system controlled by local organisations. Only under these conditions would 
the Territorial Force be effectively integrated in local communities and thus, it was believed, 
become an organic part of the life of society.
66
  
The principle of voluntary recruitment into the Territorial Force was said not only to 
reflect the democratic and liberal traditions of British society, but also to suit the strategic 
requirements of the British Empire. ‘If the first or Regular Line must be recruited, as it is to-
day, on a voluntary basis, then,’ as reads one of the main ideologically based theses of 
Haldane and Hamilton, ‘recruiting for it would be seriously jeopardised if a general system of 
training were made compulsory during the period of life at which recruits enlist for the 
Regular Army.’
67
 The belief that compulsory service undermines recruitment of career 
soldiers became firmly rooted in Britain. As late as 1957, Duncan Sandys, Minister of 
Defence in Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government, applied this notion when he 
advocated doing away with National Service: ‘It is, I think, generally recognised that the 




The truly liberal aspect of Haldane’s and Hamilton’s thinking lay in their 
interpretation of conscription as a ‘tremendous leveller’. Examining the German military 
system, Hamilton portrayed this system as the ‘greatest engine the world has yet seen for the 
manufacture of a particular type of human intellect and body.’ This system was 
acknowledged to produce citizens with ‘backs straightened, chests broadened, clean, 
obedient, [and] punctual’. The other side of the coin, however, was said to be the weakening 
of the individual initiative of the citizens and sacrifice of ‘the interplay of varying ideals’ in 
society. ‘Good or bad, black or white, all are chucked indifferently into the mill, and emerge 
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therefrom, no longer black or white, but a drab, uniform khaki.’
69
 Compulsory service in any 
form was then claimed to severely damage plurality, free spirit and individual initiative, 
virtues which not only should be defended but were also believed to be the main strengths of 
a liberal society against any adversary. As Clement Attlee, Leader of the Labour Party (1935-
55), asserted during the conscription debate before the Second World War, ‘the voluntary 
efforts of a free people are far more effective than any regimentation by dictators’.
70
  
Advocates of compulsory service, on the other hand, based their argument on the 
principle of democracy, and fairness and equality between social classes. The voluntary 
system was often accused of being ‘an elaborate system of substitution’, as Lord Newton put 
it in 1904.
71
 Upon the intrinsic unfairness of the voluntary system was based the advocacy of 
conscription by the Liberal War Committee during the First World War. In the eyes of these 
progressive liberals, the ‘voluntary’ system has little to do with a genuine free choice as it 
filled the ranks of the British army ‘with the dregs of the working classes – men for whom 
military enlistment was often the last alternative to poverty.’
 72
 More than three decades later, 
George Isaacs, minister of labour in the Attlee Government, found this argument still 
powerful when he put forward that ‘recruiting statistics show that we had a greater intake into 
the Army in days of serious unemployment, when men turned to that kind of opportunity of 
getting their livelihood, when no other means were open to them.’
73
 
Compulsory service, in contrast, was meant to impose fair and equal obligation 
regardless of social class and wealth. Upon this argument was based the bill submitted to 
Parliament by George Sandys in 1913 proposing a compulsory military training within the 
ranks of the Territorial Force. Sandys introduced the bill insisting that the same liability to 
serve the state under exactly the same conditions reflects the very essence of true democracy. 
‘It is only by uniting high and low, rich and poor, in a common liability to defend their 
country that we shall secure for ourselves, and for those who come after us, uninterrupted 
progress in democratic development and constitutional liberty.’
74
 In the same vein as by 
Sandys, conscription was being justified during all the main discussions afterwards. Ernest 
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Brown, minister of labour in the Chamberlain Government, defended the Military Training 
Bill in 1939 by maintaining that the scheme is completely democratic: ‘All will serve in the 
ranks, all will carry the ordinary soldier's pack, all will eat the ordinary soldier's ration, and 
all will live in the ordinary soldier's barracks.’
75
 In 1947, when leader of the Conservative 
opposition, Winston Churchill, threw his support behind the Labour Government’s National 
Service Bill, Churchill asserted that compulsory service ‘emphasises the principle of equality 
of sacrifice, and by mingling all classes together, in common duty and honourable service, it 




Yet universal conscription was invoked for the first time in the course of the First 
World War to provide numbers for field forces and then again on the eve of the Second 
World War in 1939 so as to show Britain’s resolve and determination. This clearly 
demonstrates that the most crucial factor in the decision for conscription was the perception 
of strategic necessity. ‘Britain’s grim determination to win had led the land of liberty to a 
degree of compulsion unsurpassed by friend or foe,’ commented Hayes on the National 
Service system during the 1939-1945 conflict.
77
 Yet, the account above was to give evidence 
that strategic necessity does not completely override the liberal normativity as a whole. If 
need be, the imperative of voluntarism may be replaced by the principle of democratic 
equality and fairness manifested in universal conscription. Specifically the First World War 
showed that voluntarism might lose its meaning in situations of national emergency. As 
Harry Morris, a Labour MP and ardent opponent of conscription, explained during the 1947 
discussion: 
We have favoured conscription in time of national emergency and in time of war, and I think 
that we are entitled to do that, because conscription in time of war is the best system. There 
are other coercions besides the coercion of law that can be brought to bear—there is the 
coercion of opinion. Anyone who remembers the state of this country at the beginning of the 
first world war, will remember that the issue of white banners and similar devices made the 
position of the young men in the country subject to far greater oppression than conscription. 
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Morris’s speech was directed against the National Service Bill of 1947, which was to 
introduce for the first time a system of peace-time conscription. At the time, obviously, the 
threshold of strategic necessity significantly decreased. The government’s rationale was 
based on the fact ‘that the regular components of our Forces have seriously run down, owing 
to the fact that there has been no regular recruitment during the war’ and conscription was 
thus meant to be merely a temporary measure.
79
 As Churchill also affirmed: 
Now, at this time, after a war in which the whole people took part has been waged and 
extraordinary confusion reigns in the world, it is necessary to have compulsion for service 
overseas – a hard thing for any Government to maintain. But that is not a basis on which our 




Important, nonetheless, is that compulsory service was in all cases maintained for the external 
instrumental purposes of foreign and defence policy. Even in the case of peace-time 
conscription from 1947 to 1960, as demonstrated by Len Scott, ‘advocacy on domestic 




However, even when the strategic necessity in conjunction with the principle of 
equality overrode the voluntary imperative, the principle of individual freedom was by no 
means silenced. In fact, at least as much as the issue of equality, it was the allowance for 
conscientious objection which was supposed to render the existence of conscription 
justifiable and assure its broad acceptance. The institution of conscientious objection to 
combatant service became a natural and necessary part of the Military Service Law in 1916 
and the subsequent laws establishing compulsory military service extended the right to object 
to any service whatsoever. 
Conscientious objection 
Particularly owing to the religious diversity of British society, the issue of objection to 
compulsory service on ethical and religious grounds accompanied the conscription debate 
from its onset. Pacifism and rejection of any use of violence lay in the very foundations of 
The Society of Friends, or Quakers, and hence the Quakers naturally assumed the lead in the 
campaign against compulsion. When the first National Service Bill was discussed in 
                                                 
79
 Ibid., vol 435 c1671. 
80
 Ibid., vol 435 c1695. 
81
 Scott, Conscription and the Attlee Governments, 271. 
239 
 
Parliament in 1913, Arnold Rowntree, a Liberal MP and Quaker, pointed out some of the 
consequences of compulsory service:  
Rightly or wrongly, there are large numbers of people in this country, with a profound regard 
for the sanctity of human life, who believe that in every human personality there is 
something of the divine, and that for Parliament to force men against their will to train to kill 
one another is a function that it has no right to perform.... if a law like this is passed you turn 
these people really into rebels, and you practically say to them that they have to teach their 




According to Rowntree, the proposed National Service would, in the long run, destroy 
‘religious freedom for many people’.
83
 
Conscientious objection became an essential part of liberal opposition to compulsory 
service and, therefore, the allowance for conscientious objection to undertaking combatant 
service was automatically incorporated into the Military Service Bill in 1916. Yet, the history 
of conscientious objectors in the First World War reveals a huge gap between abstract 
normative assumptions and actual social attitudes and practices. According to the law the 
scruples of those objecting to combatant service on grounds of conscience were to be 
respected through the operation of Local Tribunals. The tribunals could grant an exemption 
from combatant service (although in this case the applicant would still have to join the armed 
forces), or a complete exemption from armed service, but this latter option being ‘conditional 
on the applicant being engaged in some work which in the opinion of the Tribunal is of 
national importance’.
84
 However, the tribunals functioned either badly or indifferently.
85
 Out 
of 13,866 men who applied for exemption, nearly six thousand did not accept the decision of 
the Tribunal and were consequently court-martialled and sentenced. Due to the application of 
the ‘cat and mouse’ system, at least 655 objectors were court-martialled twice, 521 three 
times, 50 five times and three six times for their refusal to serve.
86
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Beyond this application of the law, the conscientious objectors, or ‘conchies’, were 
regarded by the general public as ‘the most heinous cultural criminal’, as Lois Bibbings 
describes. ‘Regardless of his exemption status, his disobedience was committed against the 
interlinked laws of duty, patriotism and manliness’ and therefore the conscientious objection, 
though not formally designated by the Parliament as crime, was nevertheless assumed to be.
87
 
In the view of some people, the objectors were even guilty of treason. ‘The Daily Express 
described objectors as traitors who were helping to stab the army in the back, they were 
“either crazy or agents of the enemy” and the [No-Conscription Fellowship] was financed 
with German money (10 April 1916); in short, they were “fighting for Germany” (11 
September 1914).’
88 
After the war the unfairness of the way the men with a genuine conscientious 
objection were dealt with was realised and constituted an important memento. In 1939, when 
the new conscription bill was drafted, Neville Chamberlain’s government made use of the 
lesson learned. ‘We all recognise that there are people who have perfectly genuine and very 
deep-seated scruples on the subject of military service’, stated Chamberlain when presenting 
the Military Training Bill in May 1939, ‘and even if we do not agree with those scruples at 
any rate we can respect them if they are honestly held.’
89
 
The prime minister emphasised that a great variation existed in the way in which 
conscientious objection affected people. This time, therefore, conscientious objection was to 
be possible not only to combatant service, but also to performance of any military service and 
even to being registered in the military service register and thus to undertaking any 
compulsory service at all. With regard to the last group, Chamberlain acknowledged that 
some individuals might feel it their ‘duty to do nothing even to aid or comfort those who are 
engaged in military operations’. He explained the position of the government to this group of 
objectors as follows: 
Probably that is the smallest of all classes of conscientious objectors. But it often happens 
that those who hold the most extreme opinions hold them with the greatest tenacity. We 
learned something about this in the Great War, and I think we found that it was both a 
useless and an exasperating waste of time and effort to attempt to force such people to act in 
a manner which was contrary to their principles.
90 
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The ethical principles thus married up with utilitarian considerations. It was the lesson 
learned from the previous war that not only the objectors but also the state suffered in the 
effort to compel genuine conscientious objectors into service. ‘If a man honestly believes that 
the use of lethal weapons under any circumstances is wrong’, a government publication 
noted, ‘then it is unfair both to him, and to the men who would have to soldier with him, to 
drag him into the Forces’.
91
 In accordance with this view, the practice of recognising 
conscientious objection was relatively lenient. So the tribunals interpreted the reasons for 
objection quite widely, having even registered as conscientious objectors those who would 
fight for Ireland but not for the UK.
92
 Only about twenty-five percent of the applications for 
registration as COs were rejected by the tribunals and only one out of ten applicants would 
end up in prison.
93
 Even those unrecognised objectors who were imprisoned would not be 
trapped in the ‘cat and mouse’ system, owing to the new possibility to re-submit the case to 
the appellate tribunal after a certain time had been served in prison. 
*** 
The appeal to equal obligations among citizens, which the National Service League 
considered a universal legitimisation of conscription, the strategic situation notwithstanding, 
was very effectively applied at the time of direst emergency. In fact, the scope of compulsion 
during the 1939-1945 conflict – besides the young men for military service, the state 
authority also assuming control over children, women and the elderly – was without 
precedent in British history. It was also without comparison among the other belligerents, 
save perhaps for the Soviet Union.
94
 Yet, in the absence of any emergency and strategic 
necessity the principle of individual freedom reasserted itself. In the post-1945 period it was 
only the argument of strategic necessity that allowed the government to extend compulsory 
service temporarily and let young conscripts ‘fight and die in foreign parts without it being 
manifestly essential to the nation’s survival’.
95
 After all, during the period of national service 
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as many as 395 conscripts were killed in action.
96
 By the mid-1950s, the justification for 
compulsory service was declining sharply. As the Prime Minister Anthony Eden remarked in 
1956, he did not believe that ‘the nation would continue to accept, after 1958, National 
Service as it now [was] unless the international situation deteriorated’.
97
 
Hew Strachan proposes that the abandonment of the mass army at the end of the First 
World War was facilitated by the belief that ‘new machinery – the tank and the aircraft – 
would act as a substitute for manpower’.
98
 In a similar way, the introduction of the nuclear-
armed V-bombers provided an opportunity for the abolition of National Service in the 
1950s.
99
 Already the 1952 Global Strategy Paper advocated that much greater reliance 
should be placed in future upon atomic weapons than upon conventional forces and this 
process of strategic recalibration came to culminate in the 1957 Defence White Paper (the 
Duncan Sandys Review), which presented a plan for the phased ending of National Service, 
while priority was to be placed on nuclear deterrence, aircraft carriers and ground-to-air 
guided missile systems.
100
 The belief has been by no means uncommon in British military 
thinking that the adoption of cutting-edge technology, rather than the nation-in-arms, should 
be the main means to assure national defence. 
Military Ethos: The Right to Be Different 
With the end of the Cold War the unique institutional culture of the British armed 
forces came under threat, in the perception of the military authorities. The sentiments of the 
military authorities were expressed in the Discipline and Standards Paper of 1993: 
The Army has been able to maintain high moral and ethical standards largely unaffected by 
the changes in patterns of behaviour in society in general. In more recent times, however, 
this divergence between the standards expected in the service, and what many take as 
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acceptable in this civilian society, has led to an increased questioning and lack of 




In 2000, the British Army first published the concept of a Military Covenant, which 
represents an attempt to define explicitly the relationship and the mutual commitments 
between the armed forces and the nation. Among other things, the covenant states: 
Soldiers will be called upon to make personal sacrifices – including the ultimate sacrifice – 
in the service of the nation. In putting the needs of the nation and the Army before their own, 
they forego some of the rights enjoyed by those outside the Armed Forces.... the unique 
nature of military land operations means that the Army differs from all other institutions, and 
must be sustained and provided for accordingly by the nation. This mutual obligation forms 
the Military Covenant between the nation, the Army and each individual soldier; an 
unbreakable common bond of identity, loyalty and responsibility which has sustained the 




The soldier’s acceptance of ‘a potentially unlimited liability to lay down their lives in the 
service of the Nation’
103
 is the point which is to determine the character of the relationship. 
General Sir John Hackett, who coined the term ‘unlimited liability’, maintained that it is the 
unlimited liability itself that ‘sets the man who embraces this life somewhat apart. He will be, 
(or should be) always a citizen. So long as he serves he will never be a civilian.’
104
 With the 
concept of covenant, the Army proposes a contract with society – only morally, not legally 
binding
105
 – that in exchange for defence of the society’s values, the ‘Armed Forces expect 
the nation to recognise their “right to be different”’.
106
  
Interestingly enough, the quoted report of the Task Force on the Military Covenant, 
chaired by a distinguished academic, the Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford, 
Professor Hew Strachan, used the phrase ‘right to be different’, which the military had 
already abandoned for a less assertive expression ‘the need to be different’. In April 1996 the 
British Army Board issued a policy paper called The Extent to Which the Army has a Right to 
be Different, in which the Army Board asserted its authority to make policy decisions in 
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terms of military tradition, culture and ethos.
107
 Soon after that, however, the armed forces 
came to justify their difference from the rest of society exclusively on the ground of 
operational effectiveness. ‘It is operational effectiveness that requires the Army to have 
values and standards that are different from society – “need to be different” not right to be 
“different”’, is what is insisted upon in the Values and Standards of the British Army.
108
 
However, the vocabulary of both the ‘right’ and the ‘need’only reflects the urge of the 
military authorities to stress the divergence between the armed forces and society and the 
essentiality of defending the status quo. As Strachan points out in another of his articles, the 
services have ‘chosen a policy that emphasises the existence of the “gap” rather than aims to 
highlight the areas of comparability. This sense of beleaguerment is at least partly self 
induced.’
109
 Yet, it is by no means surprising that the armed forces, the Army in particular, 
naturally tend to emphasise the uniqueness of their ethical values and standards. Since the 
1880s, the army’s institutional culture was based on the regimental system and the regimental 
esprit de corps provided soldiers with their identity in a socialised and totalising sense, and 
not merely in professional terms. Exclusiveness and separation of military communities from 
their parent society, and also from each other, have always been the main characteristic of the 
British military culture and, according to the advocates of the regimental system, also its 
main strength. For instance, Robert Graves, English poet and novelist, acknowledged in his 
memoirs from the First World War that ‘regimental pride’, by way of contrast with patriotism 




The self-professed separation and exclusiveness of the regimental system, however, is 
at odds with the liberal preference for the unity of military and society. Yet, the development 
of British military culture has not been short of liberal influence. As will be demonstrated in 
the following subsection, the regimental system was quite accidentally built on genuinely 
liberal intentions. The function of the regimental system to generate strong morale will 
subsequently be contrasted with the liberal approaches to keeping up morale and motivation 
in the Second World War citizen army. Last but not least, we will examine the extent to 
which the modern regular army permits individual thinking and freedom of conscience. 
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The regimental system 
The British Army has certain enduring characteristics which are part of this, embodied in its 
regimental system.... arms, corps and regiments acquire tremendous spirit and distinctive 




The regimental system has seen many changes over the last century, yet its main 
characteristics managed to keep a prominent position in the British military culture until the 
present day – the distinctive regimental identity and regimental esprit de corps. It is a 
remarkable fact that this still surviving culture of exclusiveness or even regimental tribalism 
emerged from the liberal military reforms of Edward Cardwell, secretary of state for war 
from 1868 to 1874. If the intention of the reformer was not the exact opposite, it certainly is 
plausible to say that the lasting culture of regimental tribalism was not the aim of the 
Cardwell reforms. 
A reform of the British military establishment was made urgent by the severe 
deficiencies revealed in the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Indian Mutiny of 1858, 
namely the incompetence of the officer corps and the lack of reserves. Cardwell’s answer to 
the shortcomings that had been revealed was not liberal only because it was pursued by the 
liberal government of William Ewart Gladstone, but primarily for the reformer’s conscious 
attempt to remedy the military’s functional problems by shifting the Army closer towards 
wider society and making it more integrated into the democratising social structure. Among 
the main reforms of Cardwell were, hence, the abolition of purchase of commission, 




The issue of purchase of commission became one of the battles in the 19
th
 Century 
political conflict between the conservative propertied upper class and the liberal professional 
middle class. By the 1870s the representatives of the conservative upper class had come to 
regard the purchase as a constitutional principle ensuring the unity of the army and society. 
As it had restricted the officer corps recruitment to the members of the propertied class, 
which also ruled the state, purchase was argued to guarantee the security of the established 
order. For the liberals the purchase was at odds with the ideal of political democracy and 
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strikingly contradicted the Liberal Party’s effort to reduce the power of privilege in British 
society.
 113
 According to Gladstone, purchase of commission clearly demonstrated ‘the extent 
to which the government of this country has been worked in the spirit of class, and to the 
disadvantage of the mass of the community’.
114
 
More practically, the abolition of purchase was supposed to create a professional 
officer corps. Entry by competitions was believed to attract high-quality candidates from a 
much wider pool of the middle class. Moreover, promotion by merit, in contrast to purchase, 
was expected to develop a professional attitude towards the service. None of these aims, 
however, was fully realised by the late 19th Century reforms. Various social barriers 
remained which, in practice, continued to protect the upper-class character of the officer 
corps and the system of purchase was not replaced by the system of promotion by merit, but 
instead by the principle of seniority. The system of promotion is particularly significant for 
the early development of the British regimental culture. Whereas in the former system an 
ambitious and rich officer could quickly buy his way up to a lieutenant colonelcy through 
several regiments, simply purchasing a vacated post wherever it had occurred, the seniority 
principle confined the officer’s career path to one regiment. John Keegan thus tellingly 
commented that the Cardwell system ‘had, quite accidentally, made loyalty to the regiment 




The Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny also manifested the urgent need for 
substantial reserve forces. These, however, could not be produced by the existing army of 
life-long servicemen. The system of short-term service in which soldiers would spend only 6 
years in the regulars and other 6 years in the reserves was an obvious and functional solution. 
This new system, however, could no longer rely on the recruitment from the lowest social 
strata – Wellington’s ‘scum of the earth’. A dramatic liberalisation of the conditions of 
service and convergence between the Army and society was hence considered necessary. 
The short-term service itself was believed to attract recruits from a wider cross-
section of the population, since return to civilian society would become relatively easy. 
Moreover, the restrictions on flogging and the prohibition on branding deserters were 
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supposed to improve further the image of soldiering.
116
 The localisation scheme, in which 
each regiment/brigade was given a territorial base for recruitment, was intended to have at 
least two crucial functions. As the regiment would become rooted in the social structure of 
the local community, joining up into the regiment would become a relevant and respectable 
option for significantly more young men. In addition to that advantage, Cardwell assumed 
that the close relationship between the regiment and the local community would facilitate the 
maintenance of morale and discipline in the ranks. Instead of the previous system of 
discipline, in which an instinctive obedience was being built throughout the long process of 
socialisation of the soldier in the military hierarchy – a process which was, moreover, 
facilitated by the use of corporal punishment – localisation, as David French explains, was to 
‘transplant into the army the communal roots that bound soldiers to the civilian society from 
which they sprang, and to which they would return at the end of their colour service. 
Regiments would become reflections of their parent communities.’
117
 
In reality, however, only a few regiments managed to recruit the majority of their men 
from their own neighbouring recruitment area. In practice, regiments took their recruits 
everywhere they could find them. French proposes that it was this incomplete success of 
localisation which bore the regimental esprit de corps as it is known today. The regimental 
authorities, having been deprived of their traditional instruments of discipline, had to rely 
upon communal ties to maintain discipline and morale. Yet, since in most cases no primordial 




The Cardwell system was primarily designed for imperial service and, expectedly, it 
was the deployment in the colonies which was best suited to the regimental identity. As 
Strachan points out, during its overseas service the regiment, quite naturally, became ‘a sort 
of extended family’. ‘Residence in alien lands only intensified the sense that the regiment 
was the embodiment of home.’
119
 Yet, since the system rests on distinct and exclusive 
identities, the question arises to what extent the regimental system worked during the world 
wars when the situation brought about the need for a nation-in-arms. 
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Surprisingly enough, the experience from the two world wars could not be more 
different. Arguably, the First World War completed the Cardwell reforms at least partly in the 
spirit that was intended by the reformer. The localised regimental bases provided a means of 
wartime expansion of the British Army. Each new battalion was embedded into an existing 
regiment. In this way, the 1914-1918 volunteers and conscripts, as Keegan puts it, ‘went off 
not to disappear inside a faceless juggernaut, but to join an identifiable unit whose reputation 
was part of local folklore, whose Territorials were a familiar and slightly comic part of the 
local scene and whose infinitely expandable structure offered accommodation to as many 
battalions as the resident population could raise’.
120
 Despite the fact that the war experience 
of battalions of one regiment often dramatically differed and, as Strachan notes, ‘had little 
more in common than their titles and their cap badges’, the regimental title and cap badge 




In contrast, recruitment and management of manpower in the Army during the Second 
World War was being progressively removed from the power of regiments in favour of larger 
formations – divisions and indeed the Army as a whole. Although the attempt of Adjutant-
General Sir Ronald Adam to create the homogenous Corps of Infantry was defeated by the 
opposition of regimental commanding officers, the General Service Corps was at long last 
established in July 1942. Every recruit would thus join the corps for the first six weeks of 
basic training and subsequent allocation of soldiers into arms, corps and regiments became 
subject to psychological and aptitude testing.
122
 To calm the traditionalist opposition, Adam 
advised the regimental commanding officers that the ‘regimental system is not to be 
abolished, and the fact that men will go early in their service into their correct Corps should 
help to foster the Regimental spirit and tradition’.
123
 Yet, rather than adopting regimental 
esprit de corps to the same extent as the pre-war volunteers, the war recruits tended to 
develop closer ties to their division. Some authors therefore maintain that the continuation of 
the regimental system after the war was far from certain. The system was ‘resuscitated after 
the war by officers who wished to get back to pre-war conditions; had it been changed 
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completely in 1945 there would have been little outcry, as at that moment most people were 
interested in divisional rather than in regimental identities’.
124
 
There were several dramatic changes of the regimental system after the war. In 1948, 
regiments became organised into fifteen brigades. Each brigade ran a common training centre 
and all fresh recruits in the brigade were initially trained in one of its battalions. Moreover, 
officers and men could be freely transferred between the regiments of the same brigade. After 
the Sandys reform of British defence policy in the late 1950s, General Sir Gerald Templer, 
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, started a process of deeper integration of single-
battalion regiments into brigades, which would subsequently evolve into ‘large regiments’. 
Templer’s goal, however, was not achieved, as by 1966 only three large regiments had been 
formed; the rest of the infantry remained organised in the brigade structure. At this time a 
new structure was proposed. Since even the large regiments were still too small to deal with 
uneven recruitment, the regiments and brigades were to be organised into six divisions. It was 
supposed to become commonplace that officers, NCOs and other ranks would move between 
regiments of one division.
125
 
Yet, although all these changes affected the strength of regimental identity, 
particularly due to the fact that officers and soldiers could be freely cross-posted between 
regiments of the same brigade or division, the regiment and the regimental esprit de corps 
remains even now the cornerstone of the army’s institutional culture. The soldiers and 
officers continue to attach themselves primarily to their regiments or a specialist corps, rather 
than to the Army as a whole. ‘The spirit of affiliation still largely remains among Army 
officers to the end of their service and beyond.’
126
 
The Second World War and citizenship education 
The regimental system provides the Army with a specific way of upholding morale 
and combat motivation. It is the regimental esprit de corps and the close affiliation of every 
corps and regiment to the sovereign herself which are believed to equip the soldiers with a 
powerful spiritual armament. While such a system may suit an all-volunteer regular army 
quite well, the citizen army’s needs to create and keep morale differ considerably. The 
experience of the British army during the Second World War, in particular, demonstrates that 
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in liberal society loyalty to a military institution, such as the regiment or the Army, and 
appeals to formal patriotism and civic obligations have to be supplanted by motivation based 
on the objectives of a war. The citizen-soldier has to be persuaded that the aims for which he 
is fighting are worth his sacrifice. To the front thus comes the need for citizenship education 
of soldiers. 
The British Army already gained its first experience with citizenship education at the 
end of the First World War. Early attempts to advance the general education of young 
soldiers were devised and carried out by the YMCA (Young Men’s Christian Association) 
and one of the first proposals for social and political discussion groups was presented by the 
Deputy Chaplain-General, Bishop H.L. Gwynne. However, it had not been until 1918 that the 
War Office created the Army Education Corps.
127
 Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, inspired 
by the educational work being carried out by the Canadian forces, authorised the setting up of 
an education scheme the aims of which should be: 
To give men a wider view of their duties as citizens of the British Empire. 




The founder of the Army Education Corps (AEC), Colonel Lord Gorell, explained that one of 
the most important purposes of the new educational schemes was to provide the soldiers with 
insight into the causes of the war. Such men would ‘face the discomforts, privations, and 
dangers of military life with better heart and firmer determination’.
129
 
With the demobilisation of 1919 and the return to an all-volunteer army the question 
arose as to whether the educational scheme should continue. The objections of some 
traditionalist officers against the scheme were conveyed by Major-General Childs when 
stating that, while before the war ‘we had a well-disciplined and ignorant army,’ the country 
was now burdened with ‘an army educated and ill-disciplined’.
130
 However, the military 
opposition was not overwhelming and, thanks to Lord Gorell’s political influence, the Army 
education received support among the members of parliament and in the press. The 
continuation of the education scheme in the peacetime army was approved. After all, as 
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Churchill commented, the Army education was practically ‘the only thing we’ve been praised 
for’.
131 
Yet the economic decline of 1920-21 necessitated cuts in public expenditures and the 
military budget was among the most severely affected. Education in non-military subjects 
hence came to be viewed as a luxury the Army could no longer afford. By 1923 the AEC was 
reduced from 450 to 200 officers. By 1938 only 120 officers remained in the corps and 
citizenship education had almost completely vanished.
132
 
At the beginning of the Second World War the British Army had no means of its own 
to provide the new conscripts with citizenship education and few in the War Office thought it 
necessary anyway. The expansion of a citizen army was confronted with the widespread 
belief of professional officers ‘that if the rank and file were taught to exercise their 
intelligence and initiative they would question orders and break down under the stress of 
battle’.
133
 Any educational work was left to the voluntary initiative of Regional Committees 
consisting of civilian educational organisations, such as the Worker’s Educational 
Association, YMCA and the universities. In May 1940, a closer cooperation between the 
Regional Committees and the War Office was recommended by a committee chaired by 
Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Haining, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff. According 
to the Haining Committee, it was of utmost importance, in terms of both morale and military 




The series of defeats in the spring and summer of 1940 and the lack of any activity in 
the aftermath severely affected the morale of soldiers. One of those who fully realised that 
different approaches were needed in order to maintain the morale of wartime conscripts was 
Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Adam. Immediately after Adam had taken over the office of 
adjutant general in May 1941, work began on a range of initiatives to improve the morale and 
efficiency of the citizen army. Among those initiatives there was also education in current 
affairs and citizenship. Officers were supposed to conduct compulsory weekly discussions 
with their men on current issues and thus raise their awareness of the war objectives. To 
provide officers with educational aids and pamphlets on which discussions could be based the 
Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA) was created in July 1941 and a civilian expert, 
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‘The aim of A.B.C.A.’, Williams explained in a newspaper article, ‘is to make the 
average private understand the world he is living in, the cause he is fighting for and the 
nations he is fighting side by side with’.
136
 In the pamphlet by the ABCA which announced 
the new scheme of current-affairs education the officers who were expected to carry out the 
talks were advised that the man ‘who understands the cause for which he fights is likely to be 
a more reliable soldier than the man who doesn’t.’ In contrast, those who possessed no such 
understanding were the type of men ‘liable in times of pressure to transform a retreat into a 
rout or a setback into a disaster’.
137
 In a similar vein Adam explained the significance of 
Army education:  
... the aims [of Army education] are to make the man a more enlightened individual, a more 
intelligent citizen and, therefore, a better soldier. Those three aims are inextricably 
interwoven. Good morale is a resultant not of one only, but of all three. On all three aspects 
depends the production of a man who is alert, receptive, and fortified by a knowledge of the 




Naturally, not all commanding officers came to embrace the idea of open and free 
discussions in the ranks. According to the ABCA director, W.E. Williams, there still existed 
battalion commanders who were ‘convinced that the soldier is a good-natured clod who is 
best left in his ignorance’. The idea of democratic discussion allegedly infuriated a general 
who then ordered 10,000 ABCA pamphlets to be burned and told his men that ABCA was 
‘rank treason’.
139
 On the whole, though, the commanding officers and military authorities 
came to appreciate the regular lectures and discussions. In the experience of a sergeant, only 
the ‘middle range in the hierarchy, majors and colonels who were often Regular Army, were 
mostly against education, news-sheets etc. They were opposed to free thinking, let alone 
radical thinking. At the top, and below, the lieutenants (mostly recruited from civvy street) 
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were often for it.’
140 
Reporting about the Winter Education Scheme of 1942/43, one senior 
commander acknowledged that the scheme ‘has assisted very materially in raising morale and 
quickening the men’s interest and alertness. Even [the commanding officers] who at the 
beginning of the period had grave doubts and little enthusiasm, admit that the results have far 
exceeded their expectations.’
141
 Moreover, according to a survey conducted among 5,000 
soldiers in transit camps and convalescent depots in late 1943, ABCA was carried out with 
complete success in 60% of all home units and adequately in another 10%, while 83% 




Rather than within the military, the most severe conflict about citizenship education 
had to be fought on the political level. Alerted by Conservative MPs complaining that ABCA 
had engaged in radical left-wing propaganda,
143
 Churchill ordered an enquiry, conducted by 
Sir John Anderson, Lord President of the Council, to investigate the ABCA for political bias. 
However, Anderson found no faults: 
My general impression of A.B.C.A is that it has proved a most successful experiment, that 
the Army Council is to be congratulated on having decided to launch it in spite of the 





However, political pressure continued to be put on the Executive Committee of the Army 
Council to limit the current-affairs discussions. The Executive Committee was told that it ‘is 
not a proper charge upon Army votes to educate the Army beyond the standard requisite for 
its success as a military machine’.
145
 Yet, Adam, armed with positive reports of army 
commanders and supported by the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1941-46, 
Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Nye, was able to prevent any reduction of the ABCA’s 
activities, or any attempt to narrow its scope. ‘Thus was Army Education the arena for a 
curious reversal’, comments Penelope Summerfield. ‘The military leaders in the WO [War 
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Office] protected an essentially political form of education, while the political leaders 
attacked it for its irrelevance to military efficiency.’
146
 
The Army programme of current affairs and citizenship education was only one of 
various innovations necessitated by the transformation from an all-volunteer regular army to 
a citizen army. Whereas the regular army could and did rely on an almost instinctive loyalty 
of the soldier to his regiment or corps, the conscripted citizen-soldier required a different 
style of leadership. Officers, in order to maintain the full cooperation of their men, had to 
explain the reasons for orders and were encouraged to seek out the views of their subordinate 
soldiers on matters affecting their welfare.
147
 Current-affairs and citizenship education was a 
natural part of this leadership style. Not only did free discussions on topical issues provide 
soldiers with a welcome entertainment, but also the soldier’s awareness of the war objectives 
proved to be an imperative for maintaining morale. 
After the war’s conclusion, the Army exercised a visible tendency to revert to the pre-
war system of the regular army. Despite the fact that conscripts continued to be called up, this 
was regarded as merely a temporal expediency and certainly not a reason for the Army to 
settle into the citizen-army mode. Therefore, like many other wartime innovations, the army 
education did not survive the end of the war unscathed. The education syllabus was thus 
newly designed to teach subjects directly useful for soldiering and provide information 
relevant to the Army, such as the structure and purpose of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty 




Individual thinking and freedom of conscience in the regula army 
Discipline and morale in the wartime citizen army, as illustrated above, differed 
considerably from the standards of the all-volunteer regular forces. The wartime officers were 
told to encourage men to discuss and think, to keep elaborate inspections of troops by senior 
officers to a minimum, and that standards of turnout should be observed in such a way which 
soldiers could understand and respect.
149
 The conscripted citizen-soldier was viewed by the 
military authorities as an individually thinking person resentful of authority and 
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regimentation. Since blind obedience to the word of command could no longer be 
automatically expected, officers were hence advised to persuade soldiers into cooperation.
150
 
In contrast, the interwar Regular Army had devoted great energy to suppressing the 
individuality of soldiers. Throughout the entire course of their service all soldiers were, in the 
first place, men under discipline, whose whole being was controlled by their superiors. It was 
the purpose of the endless hours devoted to parade-ground drill to ensure that both soldiers 
and officers inculcated collective spirit and subordinated their individual will to the authority 
of their superiors. On the parade ground soldiers learned to be part of a hierarchical 
community stretching from the sovereign at the top to the last private at the bottom.
151
 ‘Bull’ 
and ‘spit and polish’ – the regular and repetitive cleaning of equipment and uniforms – were 
other means to the very same end. As one guard recruit observed: ‘This “small-circling” [i.e. 
polishing boots] must have been devised as part of the grand strategy for reducing thinking 
persons to the level of mindless morons.’
152
  
The use of intelligence and initiative among the rank and file soldiers was believed to 
seriously undermine discipline. Indeed, the army appeared to work ‘hard to squeeze the 
initiative out of those men who were intelligent’.
153
 Furthermore, under the authoritarian 
command structure of the Army, officers were discouraged from showing initiative either. An 
officer described the interwar Army culture in this respect as follows: ‘As for expressing an 
opinion which differed from the general point of view, that was almost unheard of... It would 
have been considered very bad manners not to agree with the senior officer.’
154
 
After 1945, despite all the wartime innovation related to the citizen army, the 
accepted standard of instinctive obedience among soldiers and the rather anti-intellectual 
character of the British officer corps seemed to signify continuity with the pre-war regular 
army. The Grigg Report, commissioned in 1957 under Sir P. J. Grigg, a former senior civil 
servant and secretary of state for war, to ‘examine the factors bearing on the willingness of 
men and women to serve in the Armed Forces’, criticised the persistence of traditional 
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disciplinary measures of ‘bull’. The report pointed out the failure of the armed services to 
deal with things like ‘unnecessary, elaborate pay parades, kit inspections, formalistic 
mounting of guards over one gate when no guard at all is mounted on the other gates’. In a 
similar vein, ‘The military policemen patrolling the London railway stations’ were said to 
symbolise ‘everything the Service man dislikes on this score; he feels that, unlike men in 
other walks of life, he is not treated as a responsible adult.’
155
 With regard to the intellectual 
qualities of officers, the Grigg Report observed that ‘the services are a career for the “duller” 
boy’ and that intellect was considered of little use among junior officers, since they were 
supposed to obey their superiors as a duty. Junior officers, it was reported, were not expected 
to doubt or hesitate, as that would raise questions of insubordination.
156
 A report of Army 
Board examination of basic training criticised as late as 1966 that, in the recruit syllabus, drill 
and physical training still took priority over training in technical military skills.
157 
However, the basis of authority and discipline in the Army came to be fundamentally 
transformed in the 1970s and 1980s. The transformation came, on the one hand, from the 
bottom up as a consequence of the Northern Ireland experience; on the other hand, from the 
top down by adopting the manoeuvrist operational doctrine. The deployment in Northern 
Ireland, also called a ‘platoon commanders’ war’ or a ‘corporals’ war’,
158
 modified the 
relationship between officers and NCOs. The situation compelled the officers to adopt a more 
persuasive method of command so that in practice orders were ‘routinely “negotiated” 
between officers, NCOs and private soldiers. Only sensible orders could be obeyed in spirit, 
as in the letter.’
159
 Moreover, due to a lack of an operational strategy, junior officers found it 
often necessary to act on their own initiative. ‘There is plenty of evidence that Commanders 
of all ranks try out new tactics and methods’, commented a senior commander in Northern 
Ireland. ‘This is entirely right and to be encouraged.’
160
 Since then, devolution of 
responsibility to junior officers and low-rank soldiers – the concept of the ‘strategic corporal’ 
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In the mid-1980s the British Army began to adopt a doctrine of manoeuvre operations 
which ‘demands a philosophy of command that promotes freedom of action and initiative’.
162
 
The concept of ‘mission command’ was hence introduced as a new ‘Army’s philosophy of 
command’.
163
 The principle of mission command was described by Brigadier Richard 
Simpkin in 1984 as follows:  
The right of the Commander on the spot, at whatever level, to modify the plan, and even his 
own mission in the light of his superior’s mission and the situation without going back for 
new orders. As long as his decisions are militarily reasonable, they will be backed... and he 




The Army Doctrine Publications 2: Command of 1995 stipulated that the underlying 
requirement of mission command ‘is the fundamental responsibility to act (or, in certain 
circumstances, to decide not to act) within the framework of the commander's intentions’. 
Subordinates were supposed to be told only what effect they are to achieve and the reason 
why it needs to be achieved’; it remained upon them to ‘decide within their delegated 
freedom of action how best to achieve their missions’.
165
 Theo Farrell points out that the 
philosophy of mission command ‘explicitly recognizes the essential human-centric nature of 
warfare and values the human ability to respond in flexible and even innovative ways to 
complex and unexpected situations’.
166
 Thus, in contrast with the traditional British culture of 
military leadership, the principle of mission command requires that there will at all levels of a 
military hierarchy be people with sufficient intelligence, ability and (self)confidence to 
exercise their own initiative.
167
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Operational and tactical dictates have compelled the Army during the last three 
decades to promote individual initiative and freedom of action within the limits of the 
military operations at hand. However, liberal ethics is more concerned with the question as to 
whether this individual autonomy was extended also to the area of conscience. To what 
extent is the British soldier expected to fight and risk his or her life out of conviction? And 
does the Army offer a realistic option to refuse to obey orders because of his or her 
conscientious objection or in the face of instructions or missions that appear to a soldier to be 
questionably or certainly illegal? 
The text of the latest army doctrine and the Army’s code of values and standards 
suggest that the recent operational and tactical development requires certain individual 
responsibility also in the sphere of morality and ethics. On equal footing with physical 
courage is thus put ‘moral courage’. That is defined as ‘the courage to do what is right even 
when it may be unpopular, or risk ridicule or danger, and to insist on maintaining the highest 
standards of decency and behaviour at all times’.
168
 Moreover, the manoeuvre approach 
proscribes blind obedience. The kind of discipline which may work under this operational 




However, the doctrinal writings appear to view morality and ethics as ‘a shared view 
of what is right’. Owing to the fact that the British armed forces are ‘rooted in the spirit of 
democracy’, it has been rendered necessary that they ‘act within the bounds of popular 
understanding of what is thought to be right’.
170
 While this way of thinking apparently 
attempts to move the armed forces closer to the mainstream of British society, it avoids the 
issue of freedom of conscience and the right to individual dissent.  
Interestingly enough, a procedure for professional soldiers who wish to be discharged 
from the armed forces for reasons of conscientious objection was institutionalised as long ago 
as 1939. In its present form, objection to military service in general or a specific war or 
mission in particular, based on religious, moral or political grounds, may qualify for 
honourable discharge from the armed forces. However, this right is not set out in legislation, 
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or mentioned in the terms of service.
171
 Many, perhaps most, members of the armed forces 
are hence unaware of their rights.
172
 
In 1939, when National Service was re-introduced, the rules for conscientious 
objection were designed so that conscientious objectors could not be trapped in the ‘cat and 
mouse’ system, as in the First World War.
173
 Under the new procedure, the serviceman who 
refused to obey orders because of conscientious scruples and was consequently court-
martialled was allowed to submit an application to be discharged as a conscientious objector. 
This mechanism, designed to recognise conscientious objectors to national service, survived 
the end of conscription and became applicable also to career soldiers.
174
 However, in the late 
1960s, the issue of boy soldiers who wanted to break up their immature commitment to a 




The current system is based on the reform of the late 1960s. Under this, the members 
of the armed forces who develop a conscientious objection to their service are expected to 
raise the issue with their commanding officer who would then submit the application to the 
divisional commander. If the application is turned down at the divisional level, the objector 
can appeal to the Advisory Committee on Conscientious Objectors (ACCO), an independent 
committee of civilians appointed by the Lord Chancellor and chaired by a lawyer, which 
holds a public hearing and then makes a recommendation to the Defence Secretary.
176
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Despite the deep historical roots of the right to conscientious objection, observers 
have noticed serious deficiencies of the military authorities’ approach to this right. Between 
1970 and 2010, the Ministry of Defence reported 60 applications for recognition of 
conscientious objection, but only one of them was submitted in the Army.
177
 The 
disproportionally small number of army applicants may be explained by a combination of 
two factors: first, the reluctance of the military authorities to inform the personnel in the 
armed forces about the right to conscientious objection and second, the very low average 
literacy level of the British Army’s other ranks.
178
 Allegedly, a dramatically greater number 
of forces personnel have tried to solve their ethical scruples with desertion or absence without 
official leave (AWOL). Publically known became the case of Mohisin Khan, a Muslim 
reservist who refused to answer his call-up for the deployment in Iraq. His absence resulted in 
his arrest and subsequent sentencing to seven days loss of privileges. Mohisin Khan appealed 
to the High Court, where he explained that he had been unaware of the right to apply for 
discharge due to conscientious objection. The High Court upheld the conviction, but stated 
that it ‘is, however, true that the call-out materials in this case, like the 1997 regulations, do 
not mention conscientious objection expressly. In that respect, it would seem that the 
information provided to the recalled reservist could be improved’.
179
 The Iraq War is 
particularly suspected to have compelled some soldiers to go AWOL, yet the numbers of 
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Another shortcoming of the armed forces’ approach to conscientious objection lies in 
the actual process of application. According to the server At Ease, it used to be a 
commonplace practice that, while the application was under consideration, the commanding 
officers assigned non-combatant or otherwise suitable duties to the objectors. Nowadays, in 
contrast, conscientious objectors are liable to receive orders to which it is known they must 
object.
182
 Such was, for instance, the case of Michael Lyons, a medic in the Royal Navy who 
objected in 2010 to his deployment in Afghanistan. Lyons was convicted of ‘wilful 
disobedience’ and sentenced to seven months of detention, stripped of his rank and dismissed 
the service. The conviction was a result of his refusal to participate in pre-deployment rifle 
training at the time his application for discharge on conscientious grounds had been 
submitted and was pending a decision. The appeal court then only confirmed that a lawful 
command cannot be disobeyed on the ground of conscientious objection.
183
 
Lyons’ case is significant also for another reason. Lyons’ refusal to serve in 
Afghanistan was based on political objections to this particular conflict. This appears to be 
the reason why the application was turned down. The military authorities and the Advisory 
Committee on Conscientious Objection (ACCO) in December 2010 described Lyons’ 
objection as ‘political’ rather than ‘moral’ and for that reason remained unconvinced of his 
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 Despite the fact that the right to conscientious objection is solidly 
institutionalised in the military system and quite a large proportion (72%) of submitted 
applications has been accepted,
185
 the case of Michael Lyons suggests that professional 
soldiers are not expected to be convinced about the rightness of their mission. Tennyson’s 
‘Theirs not to reason why’ seems, in a sense, to be applicable also in the contemporary 
British armed forces. The motivation of professional soldiers is still supposed to be based 
solely on obedience to their political masters. 
 
*** 
The British armed forces in general, and the British Army in particular, profess the 
need to be different from the rest of society. Specifically it is insisted that they need a value 
system which sets them apart from civilians. Divergence between the liberal ethics and the 
ethics of the British regular armed forces, as demonstrated above, exists in the question of 
individual motivation and legitimisation to carry out given orders. Despite the existence of 
the right to conscientious objection, the armed forces promote apolitical or ‘politically 
formal’ legitimisation of soldiers’ participation in a military mission. Under this form of 
legitimisation, the soldier is not supposed to carry out orders and participate in missions out 
of personal conviction about the causes and utility of the particular mission. She or he is, 
rather, expected simply to abide by the authority of his or her political masters. This culture 
of professional obedience contrasts with the effort to motivate citizen-soldiers during the 
Second World War. The citizen-soldier was not deemed to fight only for King and Country, 
or out of loyalty to their regiment; understanding and acceptance of the objectives of the war 
were regarded as also being of great importance. 
Unlike the citizen army, the morale and motivation of regular soldiers rest on their 
identification with their regiment or corps. To facilitate this identification of the individual 
with the collective body, the regimental system maintains specific regimental traditions, 
which set apart one regiment from another. Consequently, this spirit of regimental tribalism 
naturally leads to the British Army’s insistence on the need for a distinct and exclusive value 
                                                 
184
 "Court Martial for Navy Medic Conscientious Objector ", ForcesWatch, 2 July 2011. 
185
 Response to FOI 21-03-2011-114944-007 Enquiry Regarding Conscientious Objectors 1970 to 2011. 
263 
 
system. It does not mean, however, that the British Army would avoid the civilianising 
processes which affected probably all Western armed forces in the last couple of decades.
186
 
The need to attract young people into service led to easing up the ubiquitous control 
that the regiment had previously exercised over the life of the individual soldier and officer. 
As early as the 1930s, a rather slow rate of recruitment necessitated the first significant steps 
away from the notion that regiments ‘were closed communities that had the right to regulate 
every aspect of [soldiers’] daily life’.
187
 Further pressure on narrowing the gap between the 
military and society was brought about by the incorporation of the European Human Rights 
legislation into British law and the provisions and rulings of the European Court of Human 
Rights and European Court of Justice. Specifically, the armed forces were compelled to 
comply with European governance regimes on equality and diversity, the end of the official 
discrimination of homosexuals in 2000 being one of the results.
188
 The Human Rights 
legislation also circumscribed the military’s disciplinary power. The 2000 Armed Forces 
Discipline Act and Armed Forces Act have reduced the powers of courts martial in order to 
make the judicial process more independent of the chain of command.
189
 Last but not least, in 
recent years the British courts ruled that British soldiers, even when deployed in a war zone, 
are protected by the Human Rights Act, and the Army is therefore obligated to protect 
soldiers’ ‘right to life’.
190
 
If compared with other West-European armed forces, what distinguishes the British 
armed forces, the Army in particular, is not so much their actual divergence from society, but 
rather their insistence on the need to be different. While the German Bundeswehr, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapters, consciously attempts to civilianise the military 
professional ethos, the British military is convinced that the distinctness of the military ethos 
constitutes one of the main sources of their military efficiency. It should not surprise, then, 
that almost all members (97%) of the British armed forces, according to a survey conducted 
by the Ministry of Defence, understand the values and standards of their service. Moreover, 
                                                 
186
 See e.g. Charles C. Moskos, "The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional, or Plural?," The Pacific Sociological 
Review, 16, no. 2 (1973); Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation."; Charles C. Moskos et al., eds., The 
Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2000). 
187
 French, Military Identities, 309. 
188
 Anthony Forster, "Breaking the Covenant: Governance of the British Army in the Twenty-First Century," 
International Affairs, 82, no. 6 (2006): 1048; Strachan, "The Civil-Military ‘Gap’ in Britain," 48. 
189
 Mileham, "Fifty Years of British Army Officership: Prospective," 190. 
190
 "Iraq Damages Cases: Supreme Court Rules Families Can Sue," BBC, 19 June 2013; Ross McGarry et al., 
"The Soldier, Human Rights and the Military Covenant: a Permissible State of Exception?," The 
International Journal of Human Rights, 16, no. 8 (2012): 1186; Helen McCartney, "The Military 
Covenant and the Civil–Military Contract in Britain," International Affairs, 86, no. 2 (2010): 419. 
264 
 
about 80% of all respondents – the percentage of soldiers and marines being even higher – 




The German Bundeswehr promotes the civilianised professional ethos because, 
among other reasons, it is believed that alienation from society would threaten the efficiency 
of the forces. The British armed forces, in contrast, want to believe that the ‘British expect 
their armed forces to be different to themselves’.
192
 Indeed, contrary to the tendencies to be 
expected of liberal society to integrate liberal ethical standards into the military, there has 
been little-to-no attempt since Cardwell’s time to change the fundamental character of 
Britain’s Regular Army. One reason was that in earlier times the system not only functionally 
fitted with the Army’s primary mission of imperial policing, but the imperial duties also 
conveniently kept most of Britain’s soldiers out of sight. ‘Distance had lent enchantment’, as 
Strachan puts it.
193
 Furthermore, the regimental system and service rivalry prevented the 
armed forces from becoming a powerful political player.
194
 ‘The army’s problem’, explicates 
Strachan, ‘is not that it cannot lobby, but that the regimental system has meant that it is 
lobbying against itself, and that that suits its political masters only too well.’
195
 
Yet, particularly owing to the active service of British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the times of keeping a low profile have definitely gone. In spite of their current visibility and, 
moreover, despite the controversiality of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the British public 
and its media have continued in the last few years to show great support for their soldiers. A 
convincing explanation of this phenomenon is offered by Helen McCartney’s analysis of the 
media discourse. Soldiers are often depicted as victims and in their image of victims, 
observes McCartney, they become ‘objects rather than subjects of their destiny’. Soldiers thus 
tend to be viewed as ‘passive victims rather than perpetrators of violence’. By adopting this 
perspective, it has become ‘easier for the British public and its media to show support for 
their soldiers while simultaneously condemning the job they are required to do’.
196
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Professional Identity: Imperial Policeman? 
Another factor that may be reconciling the Army and society is that the job which 
soldiers are required to do is not so contradictory to the liberal ideals of rule of law and order. 
Various authors propose that the British Army’s role as a police force of a sort throughout the 
20
th
 Century has been at least as important as the preparation for conventional warfighting. 
‘Indeed for much of the preceding hundred years’, maintain Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and 
Colin McInnes, ‘the British Army had been as much an imperial police force... as an army 
fighting general wars against modern, high technology armies.’
197
 Thomas Mockaitis places 
the counterinsurgency role even above the mission of conventional warfare. Imperial policing 
and counterinsurgency were, in his eyes, ‘the norm and conventional war the exception’.
198
 In 
a similar vein, Rod Thornton, a former Army officer turned academic, is adamant that the 
British Army is in the first place a counterinsurgency force: ‘Almost since its very formation 
and for the greater part of its history, this army’s principal mission was to acquire and then to 
police imperial possessions.’
199
 Even after the Empire had gone, the internal security 
operations in Northern Ireland 1969-2007, peacekeeping in the Balkans in the 1990s, 
intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are often viewed as a continuation of the Army’s traditional policing role.
200
 
Nonetheless, it is not the counterinsurgency mission itself that makes the British 
Army less at odds with liberal ethics. There is no reason to believe that a conflict with 
insurgents cannot be pursued in a thoroughly warfighting manner – with a maximum of 
destructive force and without being constrained by legal norms.
201
 Indeed, the soldier is 
usually assumed to view maximum force as the natural response not only in the case of 
conventional war, but also when dealing with insurrection and irregular warfare. The 
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rationale behind the use of maximum force in counterinsurgency is that ‘a show of strength 
implies resolution and thus constitutes its own deterrent’.
202
  
In fact, the concept of martial law stipulates that, in order to recover the rule of law, 
all standard legal norms and practices have to be temporarily replaced by force and military 
law. Yet, the post-1919 British civil authorities grew increasingly unwilling to declare martial 
law and thus to give free rein to the Army in dealing with insurgencies.
203
 The 
counterinsurgency mission hence compelled the British Army to adopt practices resembling a 
police or constabulary force rather than a military.
204
 One of the essential features 
characterising British soldiers conducting internal security and counterinsurgency operations 
thus was the use of minimum necessary force.  
Minimum use of force 
The concept of minimum force originated from the common law principle of 
minimum necessary force to maintain law and order. The common law entitles the armed 
forces ‘to use such force, and no more, as may be necessary to enable them to carry out the 
duties entrusted to them’. In such a situation the soldier is not different from the civilian, 
since both are supposed to be subjects of the same legal norms.
205
 However, it had not been 
until the Amritsar massacre in 1919 that the concept of minimum force turned to define the 
practices of imperial policing. On 13 April 1919 at Amritsar, Brigadier-General Reginald 
Dyer ordered his men to open fire on an unarmed crowd and let the firing continue even after 
the crowd tried to disperse. As a result, up to 379 people died and over a thousand were 
wounded. While Dyer’s action was viewed with approval among his fellow officers and 
superiors, news reports about the massacre provoked a public outcry. During an official 
investigation of the incident Dyer defended his decision to use maximum violence on the 
ground that his action had been aimed not merely against the crowd on the scene. Because, as 
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he believed, the entire Punjab was in an at least incipiant state of insurrection, his intention 
was to produce a moral effect throughout the region and thus to deter the insurgents.
 206
 
Dyer’s argument, however, was not accepted by the commission of enquiry, chaired by Lord 
Hunter. In fact, the Hunter commission stipulated the opposite, namely that ‘continued firing 
upon the crowd cannot be justified because of the effect such firing may have upon people in 
other places. The employment of excessive measures is as likely as not to produce the 
opposite result to that desired.’
207
 
Before the Amritsar massacre the law distinguished between riots and insurrection. 
While the principle of minimum force was applicable to the former, insurrection, which was 
regarded as a war of a kind, justified the use of any degree of force necessary to defeat the 
insurgents. After 1919, this distinction vanished and the principle of minimum force 
expanded to include all forms of internal conflict.
208
 So the Manual of Military Law of 1929 
unambiguously stated that ‘the types of disturbance in which troops may be called upon to 
intervene matter little and the principles... apply to each and every type.’ Moreover, the 
manual was explicit that the officer could use only such force ‘which is necessary to effect 
the immediate object before him and he must on no account use force with a view to its 
deterrent effects elsewhere or in the future’.
209
 
Srinath Raghaven argues that the concept of minimum force became embedded in the 
military practices due to the intrusive monitoring mechanisms established by civilian 
authorities in the wake of the Amritsar massacre. So the 1923 handbook Duties in Aid of the 
Civil Power stipulated that troops had to be accompanied by a civil magistrate and could take 
action to quell a civil unrest only at the explicit request of the magistrate. Moreover, enquiry 
commissions were used to investigate every incident in which soldiers fired their rifles during 
a civil unrest and Dyer’s case made officers aware of the possibility that an infringement of 
the minimum force principle would be punished.
210
 Yet, besides the effort by the civilian 
authorities to enforce the principle, the advent of air policing played an important role in the 
Army’s voluntary self-identification with minimum and discriminatory use of force. 
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The involvement of the RAF in the imperial policing during the 1920s undermined 
the Army’s position with respect to the effort of the Treasury to cut the budgets of the armed 
services. The RAF was able to police large territories for only a small fraction of the 
expenses required by the presence of soldiers.
211
 In 1929, the RAF proposed that if its Indian 
contingent was reinforced by six new squadrons, up to thirty infantry battalions and ten 
artillery batteries could be disbanded.
212
 The Army was thus compelled to counter the 
economic arguments on humanitarian ground. For instance, the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff from 1918-22, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, emphasised that aircraft pilots, unlike 
infantrymen, were not able to reconcile hostile tribes to civilised rule.
213
 Lieutenant-General 
Sir Cyril Deverell, the Chief of the Indian General Staff, came to argue that while the army 
had always sought to engage only the fighting men in battle, air policing was ‘aimed against 
the whole population, men, women, and children, with no distinction between combatants 
and noncombatants’.
214
 In a similar vein, Field Marshal Sir George Milne, Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff from 1926-33, felt that ‘To attempt to kill a party of natives, not all of 
whom can be singled out as rebels, seems hardly a way to administer a country with justice 
and on British lines.’
215
 The ability to differentiate between combatant and noncombatant and 
to effectively apply only minimum force became the only, yet crucial added value the Army 
could offer in the contest over missions, efficacy and resources with the RAF in the 1920s. 
So far we have seen that the principle of the minimum use of force was promoted in 
the Army by two external factors. First, in the aftermath of the Amritsar massacre the civilian 
authorities enforced the principle directly through a thorough control of military operations 
within the territory of the empire. Second, the Army came to identify itself with the concept 
of minimum discriminatory force in order to differentiate its practices from those of the 
RAF.
216
 Nonetheless, the principle of minimum force would not have become so deeply 
embedded in the Army’s doctrines and practices if it had contradicted the functional needs of 
effective counterinsurgency operation. 
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The Army itself realised that excessive force might be counterproductive from the 
perspective of a broader political effort to reconcile the local population.
217
 In the 1930s, 
Major-General Sir Charles W. Gwynn wrote in his influential book Imperial Policing (1934): 
‘Excessive severity may antagonize the neutral or loyal element, add to the number of rebels, 
and leave a lasting feeling of resentment and bitterness.’
218
 In a similar way, the Staff College 
syllabus of 1945 emphasised the importance of winning the respect of the local population. 
Respect, officers were told, ‘is achieved by law and order applied fairly and promptly’, and, 
as a result of it, the indigenous population would ‘gradually drift apart from guerrillas’.
219
 
Moreover, as Paul Dixon points out, the use of minimum force was dictated as much by 
necessity as tactics. The counterinsurgency operations of the British Army were more often 
than not constrained by the shortage of manpower and, therefore, it had to appease the local 




Admittedly, the record of the British imperial policing and colonial counterinsurgency 
operations is not free of such cases in which force was deliberately used in an excessive way. 
For example, Matthew Hughes documents brutal reprisals committed by British forces during 
the 1936-39 Arab Revolt in Palestine.
221
 Similarly, Huw Bennett’s examination of the Kenya 
Emergency, 1952-60, demonstrates that ‘intimidation of the population, summary executions, 
torture and unrestrained violence’ were commonplace at the beginning of the campaign. This 
leads him to the conclusion that it was in part due to violent coercion that the Kikuyu were 
persuaded to support the government.
222
 While the cases reported by Hughes and Bennett 
appear to be rather exceptional transgressions of the minimum force concept in the past-
Amritsar decades, the actual application of the principle did include quite a great deal of 
coercion and exemplary violence. Not unusual were collective punishments in the form of 
cordon and search operations, curfews and collective fines. Large numbers of people were 
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detained without trial – most extremely in Kenya, where over four percent of the ‘target’ 
population was being imprisoned at one time –
223
 and forced resettlement of entire ethnic 
groups was the key factor in defeating the Mau Mau in Kenya and the communist insurgents 
in Malaya. Nor did the application of minimum necessary force avoid a substantial amount of 
casualties among the insurgents and civilian population. As French puts it, in several cases, 
such as Malaya, Kenya and Oman, ‘the practical emphasis seems to have been placed on 




Nonetheless, from the 1970s until recently, British troops were being deployed to 
exercise minimum necessary force in internal security and stabilisation operations in 
Northern Ireland and in the Balkans, where exposure to continuous media coverage in 
combination with the complexity of the political situation supplied the concept of minimum 
force with new urgency. Upon this experience was based the minimum force approach 
applied during the early times of stabilisation operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
225
 
In fact, it was the Iraq deployment that produced the symbol of the contemporary 
minimum force approach – a foot patrol of British troops wearing berets, a picture that could 
be contrasted with heavily armed US soldiers in armoured vehicles. In 2003, shortly after the 
British forces defeated the regular enemy fighters in Basra and took over the city, the British 
soldiers adopted a soft and unobtrusive posture, an approach that had proved effective in the 
peacekeeping and internal security operations in the Balkans and Northern Ireland. The non-
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confrontational stance of British soldiers was intended to reassure rather than intimidate the 
civilian population and thus to avoid use of violence at all.
226
 
The troops who first dismounted their armoured vehicles and stepped forward to face 
a hostile crowd with their helmets off could do so out of personal experience gained in the 
Balkans and Northern Ireland, with the knowledge that ‘a smile’ is the best weapon in such 
situations.
227
 Nonetheless, at least as important for maintaining the minimum force approach 
were rules of engagement (ROE) that unambiguously prescribed the practice of minimum 
lethal force. The British ROE, for instance, forbade troops from firing on armed insurgents 
fleeing from a contact because they no longer posed an immediate threat.
 228
 
Moreover, owing to the hostile attitude of vocal sections of the British public and the 
media towards the Iraq War, the military authorities tried hard to prevent further criticisms by 
a very strict enforcement of the prescriptive ROE. The Royal Military Police hence exercised 
an over-zealous effort to investigate every incident involving the use of a weapon. As a 
consequence, soldiers grew reluctant to open fire, even when this might have been justified, 
for fear of a protracted investigation and that, if prosecuted, they would receive no support 
from their superiors.
229
 Indeed, illustrative is the case of Trooper Kevin Williams, who had 
shot dead an Iraqi civilian. In this case Lieutenant-General Sir Alastair Irwin, Head of Army 
Personnel, overturned a decision by Williams’s commanding officer not to prosecute the 
soldier. General Irwin explained the need for Williams’s prosecution on the ground that, 
With the current legal, political and ginger group interest in the deaths of Iraqi civilians 
during Op Telic, there is a significant possibility that this case, our investigation and 
subsequent failure to offer for prosecution, could become a cause célèbre for pressure groups 




In Iraq, as in many cases before, a combination of functional considerations and external 
pressure compelled the British Army to apply the concept of minimum force. Operation Telic 
was not exceptional, either, in the sense that the non-confrontational posture of British forces 
was necessitated by the lack of manpower and resources. 
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The UK conducted the invasion of Iraq with a force of 46,000 personnel, but numbers 
were reduced rapidly to 9,000 by July 2003. While the security establishment of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime kept the ratio of security personnel to inhabitants in Basra of 1:40 and the 
generally accepted rule of thumb for stabilisation operations is about 1:50, in July 2003 the 
British forces in Basra maintained a ratio of only one soldier to every 370 inhabitants.
231
 The 
British thus lacked sufficient strength on the ground and in the streets to provide basic 
security in the city. Although in comparison with Baghdad of 2003 the security situation in 
Basra was less serious, Basra was affected by mass looting and criminality too. The British 
occupational forces, unwilling to defy the population they had just liberated, made no serious 
attempt to restore order and some senior commanders even referred to the looting as an 
expression of liberty and a legitimate redistribution of wealth after decades of autocracy.
232
 
However, the incapability of the British forces to deal with the security situation created 
resentment and disillusionment among inhabitants of Basra and, furthermore, the security 
vacuum provided an opportunity for religious militias to become the primary providers of 
security in the localities under their control.
233
 If viewed from this perspective, the 
emblematic minimum force that British troops applied in Basra does not appear as a specific 
constabulary approach to providing security, but rather as a resignation or even abdication of 
effective control over the city. 
Warfighting, not constabulary force 
In his book Britain’s Civil  ars Charles Townshend argues that, since 
counterinsurgency represents a hybrid form between police law-enforcement and military 
operations, a hybrid or ‘third force’, which would be neither one nor the other, may be an 
effective answer. On the one hand, a police force, even if armed, could rarely be of adequate 
size and strength to deal with anything more serious than episodic violence. Insurrection can 
escalate into a kind of warfare, in which distinctly military techniques need to be applied. On 
the other hand, a simple military logic aims to maximise the application of force, yet this is 
negated by the guerrilla principle of avoiding battle. A synthesis of police and military skills 
is therefore needed to counter any insurrection effectively. Yet, to Townshend, such a 
combination of skills and capabilities was at the disposal of neither the British Army nor any 
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other British security force. At the beginning, and often throughout the course of each 
campaign he examined, what was apparent was ‘a direct clash between civil and military 
logic’.
234
 Townshend’s account of the British historical record in counterinsurgency thus begs 
the question to what extent the Army’s application of minimum force approximates a 
constabulary approach. In this section distinctly military characteristics of the British Army’s 
counterinsurgency doctrine and practices will be examined.  
During the years between the two world wars, at least half of the Regular Army at any 
one time was deployed in the colonies and, therefore, focused almost exclusively on activities 
connected with policing. In the opinion of later Field Marshal Sir Edmund Ironside, Chief of 
the mperial General Staff 1939-41, a battalion that had spent three or four years on internal 
security duties became ‘almost useless as a military force’.
235
 It, therefore, is not so self-
evident, as Townshend seems to argue, that soldiers must ‘have an intense dislike of internal 
security duties’.
236
 Imperial policing was de facto the primary mission of the interwar Regular 
Army. Yet, even in such employment the Army’s doctrines and practices did differ 
considerably from those of ordinary police and constabulary forces. 
Owing to the minimum force philosophy, the military authorities refused to employ 
machineguns and exercised a great restraint in using armoured cars in internal security 
operations between 1919 and 1939.
237
 Only infantrymen with rifles were viewed as the 
adequate instrument for quelling riots and insurrections. Yet, it was considered of utmost 
importance that the Army should not be confused with police. The Internal Security 
Instructions of 1937 explicitly stated that ‘troops will not use police methods or be armed 
with police weapons... they make use of the lethal weapons with which they are armed’.
238
 
The Army believed that its main utility was in deterring violence and, therefore, troops had to 
avoid the use of non-lethal techniques – such as physical contact, use of snatch-squads, firing 
blank cartridges or applying tear gas – in order not to lose respect of the population. As a 
general observed, ‘the populace should realise that action by troops is a serious business’.
239
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Also in accordance with military logic, the Army tried to avoid dispersion of soldiers 
into small patrols. Since the Army refused to adopt police methods of non-lethal violence, its 
power rested on the psychological effect of precisely drilled manoeuvres of a relatively large 
formation and, if need be, firing rifles ‘with effect’. Small groups of soldiers would not 
produce a sufficient deterrent effect and, consequently, would have to rely on lethal weapons. 
It was feared that the minimum force principle could not be observed if troops were not held 
under close control of their officers. A possible scenario in such a case was described by an 
internal security expert in 1935 as follows: ‘first time successful – then someone gets struck 
by a knife – men see red and confused firing starts.’
240
 
The interwar Regular Army accommodated the requirements of imperial policing into 
its doctrines and practices, yet it remained as a body distinct from other security forces. 
Moreover, from the perspective of an ordinary rank-and-file soldier, the nature of the military 
profession diverged little from the ideal type of soldiering. The soldier continued to be drilled 
to function as a part of a collective body under strict control of his superior officer and the 
execution of lethal violence, even if never practiced, remained the ultimate purpose of his 
service. 
The deployment of British troops in Northern Ireland or as a peacekeeping force in 
the Balkans had little in common with the deterrence philosophy of the interwar Army. The 
emphasis on the use of minimum force in Northern Ireland led the Army to develop various 
non-lethal techniques of crowd control and great restraint was exercised in the employment 
of lethal weapons. However, in terms of doctrines and training, the Army did not become 
willing to let the constabulary-style operations determine the professional identity of the 
British soldier. The nature of the peacekeeping and internal security operations, reads the 
British Defence Doctrine of 2001, ‘must not be allowed to divert the Armed Forces from the 
reality that their success in them has been based on their ability to escalate the level of force 
they deliver when the circumstances demand it.’
241
  
The British military doctrines accentuate warfighting and combat as the defining 
characteristics of the military profession. ‘The warfighting ethos’, states British Defence 
Doctrine, ‘signifies and embodies the ideals and duties of military service, and unifies those 
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who serve in the Armed Forces.’
 242
 Combat is then emphasised by the Army to be its 
‘primary purpose; its raison d’être’.
243
 According to the Army doctrine, most of the military 
activities, including peace support missions or military aid to the civil authorities, may 
involve combat, it is only ‘the intensity of the combat that varies’.
244
 Every soldier should 
therefore embody a ‘warrior spirit’. This means that the soldier is supposed to ‘have an 
offensive spirit and a desire to get to grips with adversaries and challenges’ and should never 
‘hesitate to engage in combat’ when necessary.
245
 
The doctrinal emphasis on warfighting and combat takes a material form in the 
structure of military training and education. The Army distinguishes two basic types of 
training: ‘force preparation’ and ‘force generation’.
246
 While the latter, force generation, 
focuses on a current operational contingency, in other words for ‘the war’, the concept of the 
military profession is inculcated into soldiers during the lengthy process of force preparation. 
This includes the overall development from turning an untrained civilian into a soldier up to 
training an all-arms grouping within a formation context. Importantly the training process 
under the framework of force preparation is predominantly concerned with ‘a war’, an idea of 




Although ‘a war’, or high-intensity conventional warfare, may be the least likely 
mission, the training process rests on the idea that it makes sense to train soldiers for, in 
military terms, the most demanding task and only afterwards to ‘train down’ for a coming –
probably less intensive – mission.
248
 However, the rather deficient British performance in 
Helmand between 2006 and 2009, as examined by Sergio Catignani and Anthony King, 
suggests that the practices related to high-intensity combat cannot be so easily ‘trained down’ 
to suit the needs of modern counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.
249
 The warfighting culture 
of the British military, King’s article points out, led the commanders of British contingents in 
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Helmand to produce tactical-level plans which were incompatible with the overall COIN 
strategy and Catignani’s analysis demonstrates that the training process was ineffective in 
providing soldiers with sufficient understanding of the counterinsurgency principles.
250
 
The warfighting ethos, King proposes, created a particular professional identity for 
the officer corps. The warfighting culture burdened commanders with the expectation that 
they always ought to strive to seize and maintain the initiative in any situation, while tactical 
inactivity was considered inappropriate. Commanders felt the need to do something 
appropriately military. Thus in 2006 British troops were dispersed into isolated ‘platoon 
houses’ within an area dominated by the Taliban and later mounted mobile patrols to actively 
search for the enemy. In both ways the British actions attracted large-scale engagements with 
the Taliban and thus satisfied the military’s warfighting ethos. However, neither approach 
allowed the British forces to hold and control ground; they therefore made little contribution 
to, or even jeopardized, the strategic objectives of the COIN campaign.
251
 
According to Catignani, the battlegroup commanders eventually came to embrace the 
tactical principles of a ‘population-centric’ COIN campaign and tried ‘to hammer into their 
subordinate commanders the need to focus on the local population rather than on the 
enemy’.
252
 In practical terms, troops in contact with the enemy were supposed to exercise 
‘courageous restraint’, or ‘tactical patience’, before resorting to heavy suppressive fire that 
might cause collateral damage and civilian casualties. However, Catignani finds that section 
commanders who had to deal with skirmishes often failed to take the COIN principles into 
account. The divergence between the official tactical directives and their implementation by 
troops on the ground is argued to have been the consequence of the training progression that 





To sum up, since the end of the First World War soldiers of the British Army have 
been deployed in military aid to the civil power, peacekeeping and counterinsurgency 
missions much more often than in wars with an external enemy. Consequently it is not such a 
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great exaggeration to say, with Thornton, that ‘The British Army is a counterinsurgency 
army’ whose officers considered the major conventional wars of the 20
th
 Century ‘to be 
“aberrations” that interfered with the normal activities’ of imperial policing.
254
 The frequent 
employment of the Army to quell civil unrests, disturbances and insurrections under the 
conditions of normal law forced the Army to adopt practices that resembled police or 
constabulary methods of law enforcement rather than warfighting.  
In a conventional war, which provides the military with its raison d’être, ‘the balance 
of physical force is the primary determinant of the outcome’, as Townshend puts it. ‘The 
form and sequence of military operations aim to maximize the application of force to 
overpower the enemy.’
255
 It is, therefore, remarkable that the British Army’s conduct in 
imperial policing and counterinsurgency operations has become characteristic for the use of 
minimum force. The Army had to import this concept, which is in complete opposition to the 
basic principle of conventional warfighting, from the common law principles of law-
enforcement. This aspect may be viewed as emblematic for the British Army’s convergence 
towards the image of a civilian constabulary force and therefore warranted the focus of this 
section. Yet, it does not mean that the use of minimum force is the only civilianising 
characteristic of the professional identity of British soldiers. 
‘Soldiers value martial law first and foremost because it resolves all uncertainties of 
command and responsibility’, states Townshend.
256
 Since 1919 the British Army was 
consistently denied martial law and, therefore, had to learn to cooperate with and even 
operate under direct control of civilian authorities, although in Malaya, 1948-60, arguably the 
most successful of all British COIN campaigns, Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, the 
General Officer Commanding was also appointed as High Commissioner.
257
 The 
counterinsurgency doctrine of 1970 insisted that it can only be a combination of political, 
social, psychological, economic and military programmes ‘together with a joint 
government/police/military approach to the problem, which will counter the efforts of the 
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insurgents, and restore lawful authority.’
258
 Cooperation with other actors hence became an 
essential professional skill of the British Army’s officers.
259
 
Moreover, the extensive experience with imperial policing and counterinsurgency 
endowed the British Army with the ability to deal not only with other state agencies, but also 
with indigenous actors, such as warlords and tribal leaders. The British Army came to 
recognise that, so as to restore order, the available options include not only killing and 
capturing the insurgents, but also reconciling them.
260
 Negotiation is thus considered on a par 
with the use of violence. Both Iraq and Afghanistan may demonstrate that negotiating with 
the adversary is no taboo for British officers. For example, in Helmand in October 2006, 
Brigadier Ed Butler concluded an agreement with local tribal leaders that British troops 
withdrew from the town of Musa Qaleh in exchange for guarantees that the Taliban, too, 
would stay away. The Taliban, however, retook the town in February 2007.
261
 On the other 
hand, more successful was the case of Lieutenant-General Graeme Lamb, who reputedly 
made the first negotiations with Sunni tribes in western Iraq. The ‘Anbar Awakening’, which 




However, despite the civilianising characteristics of the British Army’s conduct in 
imperial policing and counterinsurgency, the Army has always attempted to maintain 
distinctly military attributes for their soldiers’ professional identity. Thus, despite the 
minimum force principle, the interwar Army was persistently refusing to adopt non-lethal 
methods of law-enforcement. Unlike the police, a soldier’s duty remained to exercise lethal 
violence if being told to do so. The present-day Army seems similarly adamant that its focus 
on combat is as relevant in low-intensity operations as in major conventional wars. The 
‘warfighting ethos’ and the ‘warrior spirit’ are therefore promoted to constitute the core of the 
professional identity of British soldiers and officers. 
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 Century, the UK was a global great power with an ‘empire on 
which the sun never sets’, and although the aftermath of the Second World War brought a 
dramatic decline of her relative power and consequently the withdrawal from empire, the UK 
continued to play the role of a great power. To sustain her worldwide interests and to fulfil 
her global responsibility, military power has always been of utmost importance for the UK. 
After all, the armed forces played an instrumental role that allowed Britain to ‘punch above 
her own weight’ in global politics throughout the second half of the 20
th
 Century. Thus, as a 
tool in great-power politics the British military corresponds with Huntington’s assumptions 
about the role of armed forces and hence the professional military ethos and objective civilian 








Indeed, our examination of the British military capacities demonstrates that under 
normal conditions, i.e. during peacetime or only limited armed engagements, the UK armed 
forces, the British Army in particular, managed to avoid any significant penetration of their 
internal culture by the norms and principles of their parent society. The availability of the 
armed forces as an ultimate tool of the government for whatever aim the government decides 
effectively prevents the development of individualised legitimisation of and motivation for a 
particular mission. This means that soldiers do not tend – nor do they need – to become 
personally convinced that the mission they are carrying out is legitimate and necessary or 
desirable in itself; rather, the legitimacy of each mission rests on the constitutionality of the 
government’s decision to deploy the troops. Consequently, the soldiers’ motivation is not 
based on the objectives of the particular mission, but on their unquestioning loyalty towards 
the Army and, more significantly, their corps or regiment. The regimental system with 
distinct regimental identities and regimental esprit de corps is hence regarded as one of the 
most precious features of the British Army. 
This is not to say, however, that liberal principles would have absolutely no effect on 
the internal life of the British Army. Thus the politically formal legitimisation of and 
institutional motivation for a mission – which put soldiers in the position of objects in the 
hands of the government, rather than morally autonomous subjects – is, at least formally, 
counterbalanced by the possibility of an honourable discharge on the grounds of 
conscientious objection. A soldier who would develop a sincere objection to participation in a 
particular mission thus has a chance to avoid it. However, in theoretical terms, the right for 
conscientious objection does not change the fact that being a soldier means rejection of one’s 
moral subjectivity. Conscientious objection only provides a way to resume one’s subjectivity 
by leaving the military. Moreover, in practical terms, a rather low awareness among serving 
soldiers of the right’s existence renders the liberalising effect of conscientious objection even 
less significant. 
Another aspect of British military culture that narrows the gap between the military 
and liberal society is presented in the constabulary character of the professional identity of 
British soldiers. The philosophy of minimum use of force in low-intensity operations reflects 
the fact that the military does not operate in a normative vacuum. As the aim of such 
operations is to attain the rule of law, the military is supposed to act as an instrument of 
justice. Soldiers are hence required to respect the basic rights of the population in the area of 
operations and, moreover, they are themselves subjected to the law as well. The constabulary 
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approach to low-intensity operations thus contradicts the Clausewitzian assumption about the 
dual nature of war that underpins Huntington’s argument for military professionalism that 




Yet, although the minimum use of force is a respected military practice, the military 
authorities are trying hard to prevent soldiers from embracing – or even accommodating to – 
a constabulary professional identity. The soldiers engaged in the interwar imperial policing 
were drilled to function as parts of a collective body under strict control of their superior 
officer, whose order to exercise lethal violence had to be obeyed without hesitation. The 
current British military is explicit that it is the ‘warfighting ethos’ that ‘signifies and 
embodies the ideals and duties of military service’.
264
 In the same vein, combat is regarded as 
being the Army’s ‘primary purpose; its raison d’être’,
265
 and ‘warrior spirit’ is supposed to be 
a basic spiritual equipment of each soldier.
266
 In this way the military defends its internal 
culture from civilianising factors in spite of the fact that adoption of constabulary features 
into the professional identity of soldiers might have a positive functional effect, as the 
performance of the British contingent in Helmand seems to suggest. 
The British military culture appears to be capable of preserving, to a significant 
extent, its autonomous military ethos and professionalism. Meanwhile,  and simultaneously, 
its authority in security and defence policy is not marginalised either. According to 
Huntington, such policy of ‘toleration’ requires a society with a pro-militarist, such as a 
conservative, ideology.
267
 In the case of British society, however, it may be plausible to speak 
about a formally conservative society, which means that well-established institutions are 
respected, but it is less convincing to consider it pro-militarist. For most of the 20
th
 Century, 
the armed forces were deployed in far-away colonies and thus British society could be kept 
ignorant of military affairs. Being out of sight and out of mind hence facilitated the policy of 
toleration.  
However, the societal toleration of the military professionalism came into question 
with the growing ubiquity and intrusiveness of the media in the late 20
th
 Century. The armed 
forces came under an unprecedented and unforeseen invasiveness and political pressure from 
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human rights groups and purely military decisions began to be scrutinised by civilian courts 
of law. A report published by a conservative think tank hence warns that recent ‘legal 
developments have undermined the armed forces’ ability to operate effectively on the 
battlefield. The application of laws originally designed for domestic civilian cases to military 
operations overseas has changed the way the armed forces can act.’
268
 Moreover, telling is the 
effort of the armed forces to defend openly their ‘right to be different’. In response to 
attempts to subject the armed forces to human rights legislation, the military authorities chose 
to emphasise the divergence between armed forces and society. The fierce defence of the 
armed forces thus demonstrates that the traditional autonomy of the armed forces over their 
internal culture is viewed to be under siege. 
The fact that the UK armed forces were allowed to develop their military 
professionalism and autonomous military ethic does not mean that the British military 
capacities are nothing more than a rational response to functional imperatives. In fact, the 
relatively autonomous development of the military culture rests on the fact that every 
member of the armed forces is a volunteer. Individual free choice to become a soldier thus 
provides an ethical justification for using soldiers as mere instruments.  
The application of the voluntary principle in recruitment might be regarded as merely 
a functional choice in a situation when long-term service is required for building up essential 
professional skills and selective long-term compulsory service is incompatible with the 
standards of civilisation in the 20
th
 Century. However, the real strength of ideology in 
defence policy became obvious at the times when the advantages and disadvantages of 
compulsory service were publicly discussed. Voluntary recruitment was frequently argued to 
be the only compatible with free people whose interests were supposed to be defended and, in 
contrast with compulsory service, the voluntary principle was expected to bring into the 
military individual initiative and enthusiasm – virtues which would also improve the 
effectiveness of the armed forces. Yet, this is an obvious instance of ideological 
‘dissimulation’. Through dissimulation ideologies may justify situations by misidentifying 
them, often by equating particular conditions with an ideal.
269
 In this case the ideal of 
enthusiastic volunteers overshadowed the real picture of professional soldiers who were 
drilled to internalise instinctive and even automatic discipline and obedience and who lived in 
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a culture which actively discouraged individual thinking. That was the case of British Army 
at least until the 1980s. 
The two world wars, and that of 1939-45 in particular, necessitated a complete 
alteration of the military capacities (see Figure 25). Instead of a numerically small force for 
imperial duties, total warfare required a mass army. And as had been proved by early 1916, 
such a mass army could not be established and sustained by voluntarism. Strategic necessity 
thus permitted the wartime British Coalition government to override the peacetime principle 
of individual freedom and, instead, equality and individuals’ responsibility to society became 
the order of the day. Universal conscription was imposed to bring sufficient numbers not only 
to the armed forces, but also to public services and industry. However, even in such a 
situation the principle of individual freedom was not silenced. In fact, the possibility of 
exemption on grounds of conscientious objection was important for justifying the existence 
of conscription.  
Yet the conscripted mass army could no longer preserve the insularity and autonomy 
of its military culture. Whereas the morale and motivation of regular professional soldiers 
rested on their identification with their corps or regiment, it was not sufficient for the citizen-
soldier to fight only for ‘King and Country’, or out of loyalty to their cap badge. The 
objectives of the war must be able to justify the suspension of individual rights in favour of 
society and therefore understanding and acceptance of the war objectives rapidly grew in 
importance. The 1939-45 citizen army had to introduce a new leadership style of which 
fundamental parts were citizenship education and debates on current affairs. The compulsory 
but free-ranging debates on socially important issues increased soldiers’ awareness of the war 





Figure 25 Model of the British military capacities during the Second World War 
 
The British military capacities during the Second World War present a remarkable 
paradox. The severity of total warfare made necessary the overriding ‘for the duration’ of 
numerous peacetime rights and liberties. Yet, this was exactly the situation which led to the 
development of thoroughly liberal military capacities. In comparison with the armed forces 
for the purpose of great-power politics, the armed forces fighting in the Second World War 
were, through conscription and the ubiquity of the war effort, intimately connected to the rest 
of society. Similarly as in the case of German rearmament, the functional imperative of 
existential defence required the active engagement of society in its entirety. As a 
consequence, therefore, the transformation of the military according to liberal principles was 





The aim of this thesis has been to analyse in what ways liberalism – as a meta-
ideology or a guiding ethos – determine the military capacities of West European societies. 
The empirical analysis reveals that specific policies, institutions and practices are preferred 
because of their relation to liberal principles. Sometimes a reference to liberal norms was 
used to advocate an otherwise necessary policy or institutional design, universal conscription 
at the time of emergency being one of these cases. For certain policies and institutions, 
nonetheless, liberal principles can be identified as the most relevant causal factor. The 
existence of the right to conscientious objection, for example, resting almost exclusively on 
liberal ethics is a case in point. Although the latter example may reinforce the commonly held 
notion that societal imperatives are detrimental to military efficiency, this thesis demonstrate 
that more often than not a meaningful incorporation of societal imperatives into the military 
capacities of liberal states is functionally beneficial to their military security. 
The empirical analysis has been carried out on the cases of German Bundeswehr and 
the British armed forces. One could hardly find two more divergent militaries than those of 
Germany and the UK. Indeed, it is no surprise that the difference of their strategic cultures, 
traditions and historical experiences has led to a great variance between Germany and the UK 
in all the categories constituting their respective military capacities. Yet, despite this 
enormous divergence, a similar pattern of behaviour and a similar basic logic behind the 
decision-making is recognisable in the two cases. The chart below displays a simple 
synthesised model of liberal military capacities and the following parts of this conclusion are 
designed to highlight the common liberal underpinning, and thus also the essential similarity, 





Structural conditions → Existential threat No existential 
threats/international 
system dominated by 
liberal states 








Military ethos  Leadership by persuasion 
(citizen-soldier) 
Individual commitment to the 
mission (‘world-citizen in 
uniform’),  
conscientious refusal to obey 
orders 
Professional identity Combat-oriented (defender 




Figure 26 Liberal military capacities 
Mission 
The articulation of the functional purpose for which the military is maintained, in 
other words, the mission, should be related to the character of the international security 
structure and the position of the state vis-a-vis the structure, in order to be of any relevancy. 
Yet, it is essential to the constructivist theory of international relations that underpins this 
research that the relationship between the state and the international structure is constitutive. 
Therefore, the societal ideology of liberal states affects, to the extent of their significance on 
the international stage, the character of the international structure. Moreover and more 
important to this research, even if liberal states have to respond to challenges from a non-
liberal security environment, liberal ideology in general, and the assumptions about the 
universality of humanity and cosmopolitan justice in particular, do intervene into this 




Liberalism, as discussed in Chapter 2, views humanity as a united community with 
universal standards of fundamental rights and morality. Every single person is supposed to be 
a member of a universal community of humankind, regardless of one’s citizenship, and as 
such everyone enjoys some moral rights and is subject to certain duties. Existence of the 
universal community means, in the words of Immanuel Kant, that ‘violation of right at any 
one place on the earth is felt in all places.’
1
 It follows from this that raison d’état should 
never be the supreme law. The policies of the state, and its military strategy most of all, ought 
to abide by universal principles as stipulated by liberal international ethics. 
This does not mean, however, that the principles of peaceful coexistence would be 
applicable in relation to every actor on the international stage. Liberalism is by no means a 
pacifistic ideology. Instead, liberal thinking tends to distinguish between advanced – 
civilised, liberal and democratic – states, on the one hand, and backward – ‘barbaric’, illiberal 
and ‘outlawed’ – states, on the other hand. As the liberal peace theory postulates, it is only 
among the advanced liberal-democratic states that a fundamentally peaceful international 
system – ‘pacific union’ – is built. 
In contrast, a latent state of war, as some liberal peace theorists argue, exists between 
liberal and non-liberal states and, therefore, the rules of unscrupulous real-politics govern 
their relationships. Indeed, J. S. Mill insisted that it would be a ‘grave error’ to believe that 
‘the same international customs, and the same rules of international morality, can obtain 
between one civilized nation and another, and between civilized nations and barbarians’.
2
 
Yet, it would be wrong to assume that liberal principles become silent if a non-liberal state 
poses a security threat. 
The case of West Germany in the 1950s demonstrates that a use of force in an 
aggressive way or as a preventive action against the Soviet bloc was out of the question not 
only for practical reasons, but also normatively. A government memorandum of 1956 
explained that a force of 500,000 soldiers would perfectly suit the security situation since it 
‘enables an effective defence, but would be insufficient for an attack. The Soviet bloc, 
therefore, cannot regard it as a threat.’
3
 In normative terms, the constitution of West Germany 
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was explicit in that the sole purpose of establishing armed forces was defence and that to 
prepare for a war of aggression would be regarded as a crime.
4
 In addition, Graf von 
Baudissin imbued the emerging Bundeswehr with the view that war should be recognised 
only as the last defence of human-worthy existence. If a liberal state faces an existential 
threat from a non-liberal adversary, the only available option for liberal people is to wait in 
defence and attempt to deter and, if necessary, repel a possible aggression. Whereas liberal 
people consider preventive war illegitimate and have refrained from practicing it,
5
 deterrence, 
as both the German and British cases show, is a strategy that liberal states assume against a 
powerful non-liberal adversary and, consequently, also becomes the mission of the armed 
forces under such conditions. 
A dominance of liberal norms in the international structure is necessary but not 
sufficient to bring about a global ‘pacific union’, as the post-Cold War situation has proved; 
rather, it allows the liberal states to deal with security challenges in a liberal way. Harald 
Müller, for instance, points out that liberal states tend to fight wars that no one else would. It 
is unique to liberal societies, he maintains, that their wars are waged to preserve international 
law and to prevent human disasters and large-scale violations of human rights.
6
 In the eyes of 
liberal societies, the armed forces should be an instrument of international justice, rather than 
a tool of national interest. 
Moreover, it is the assumed inequality between advanced liberal and backward non-
liberal societies that imposes a duty on the former to help the latter in their improvement. Yet, 
it does not follow from this general principle whether such assistance should be strictly 
peaceful or whether a utilisation of military force may be required. Some authors stress that 
the liberal philosophical tradition allows for two competing modes of behaviour towards non-
liberal states. Depending on a historical experience with the use of force, but also which 
liberal values are more prominent in a particular society, whether peaceful tolerance or 
progress and civility, various liberal societies can take different attitudes to the utility of force 
on behalf of the liberal cause.
7
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The difference between Germany and the United Kingdom presents a striking 
example. The history of pacification and policing of the British Empire rendered the use of 
military force a relatively normal practice and, moreover, the imperial era taught British 
society to connect the use of force with Britain’s ‘civilising mission’. Consequently, in post-
colonial and post-Cold War times it was not difficult to justify the active engagement of 
British troops in the world under explicitly ethical terms, as a ‘force for good’. 
The German path towards global military engagement was much more tortuous. In the 
early 1990s, the Bundeswehr had no expeditionary capabilities and, more importantly, 
German society was not prepared to see its soldiers in military missions abroad. There were 
no doubts in Germany about their responsibility to help other people in need; however, it 
was, and to a certain extent remains, a controversial issue that such a moral obligation should 
be pursued with armed troops. It was only the experience of the international community with 
crisis management and conflict resolution in the early 1990s that brought home the lesson 
that military force may in some cases present an effective instrument to cope with critical 
situations. 
Yet, it is common to both cases that the use of force is never regarded as a panacea. 
Liberalism is generally hostile to the idea of using violence in order to achieve positive 
goods. Military force may enable other ways of help to deliver; yet, it is not considered, in 
itself, an appropriate and sufficient means to help other people out of misery. Therefore, if 
military force is deployed, it should always be followed by instruments that are more capable 
than the use of violence to bring social improvement. The British Army learned during its 
withdrawal from empire that programmes of social, political and economic development must 
accompany any attempts to deal with the problem of insurgency. As for the Bundeswehr, 
humanitarian assistance and development have always been the primary roles of German 
troops in a foreign deployment; in contrast, the use of violence has merely been subordinated 
to the execution of the humanitarian roles. 
To conclude, despite the great divergence between the missions of Germany and the 
United Kingdom, liberal principles did affect the articulation of the missions in both cases. It 
was assumed at the beginning of the thesis that the international structure dominated by 
liberal states would provide more favourable conditions for application of liberal principles 
on the military mission than would prevail under a more heterogeneous international 
structure. Yet, the empirical cases show that the difference is qualitative rather than 
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quantitative. The international structure of the 1990s and 2000s, arguably dominated by 
liberal actors, did permit states to engage armed forces in a whole range of expeditionary 
missions which were motivated, or at least justified, by cosmopolitan responsibility. In 
comparison, a threat to the national existence by a non-liberal adversary, as was the case 
during the Cold War, rendered unrealistic any desires to pursue cosmopolitan justice by 
force. Nonetheless, the liberal principle of universal humanity, and specifically the norms of 
just war, continued to inform British and German military strategy. Furthermore, under such 
conditions of national emergency the liberal principles also played a particularly important 
role in the other elements of the military capacities: the make-up of the armed forces and 
institutional culture. 
Make-up of the Armed Forces 
The attitude of liberalism towards the issue of conscription and compulsory military 
training and service on the one hand, and all-volunteer forces on the other, is not without a 
normative tension either. Two contrary liberal principles tend to influence the decision about 
the mode of recruitment and the personnel composition of armed forces. Certainly the most 
fundamental liberal principles emphasise the importance of individual freedom and oppose 
unnecessary intrusion by the state and society into the private life of the individual. 
Moreover, the division of labour and free market are the bedrocks of the liberal socio-
economic system. These principles, therefore, steer the decision-making towards the view 
that the soldierly profession, as Adam Smith proposed, ‘should become the sole or principal 
occupation of a particular class of citizens’.
8
 The all-volunteer forces and military 
professionalisation would, therefore, be the preferred liberal option if the principles of 
individual freedom and division of labour prevailed in the decision-making. 
In opposition to this professionalising tendency, however, lies the Kantian principle 
condemning the use of human beings as mere instruments. ‘Being hired out to kill or be 
killed’, Kant maintained, ‘seems to constitute a use of human beings incompatible with the 
rights of humanity in our own person.’
9
 It ought to be the responsibility of every individual 
citizen to bear his or her fair share in defence of society and the state. From this perspective, 
universal conscription may be a legitimate, even preferable, instrument of national defence.  
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 Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 930. 
9
 Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 69. 
291 
 
Historical experience, traditions and culture may favour one principle over the other. 
European continental countries preferred compulsory military service throughout most of the 
20
th
 Century. For example, France’s long policy of universal conscription (phased out 
between 1996 and 2001) was legitimised, to a certain extent, by her civic-republican 
tradition.
10
 To Germany, the negative experience with all-volunteer Reichswehr, some of 
whose senior officers played key parts in enabling the rise of Nazism in the early 1930s, 
demonstrated the advantages of an active participation of citizens in the armed forces. In 
contrast, the imperial past and naval tradition of Great Britain rooted in her strategic culture a 
strong preference for small professional land forces. 
Despite such cultural differences between the UK and Germany with regard to 
conscription, thinking about the personnel make-up of the armed forces was in both cases 
underlined by the same basic liberal principles. The principles of individual freedom and the 
equal responsibility of citizens for the security of society were always weighed against each 
other in considering reforms of the personnel structure. Moreover, in those cases in which 
conscription was found necessary, individual freedom, at least in its most elementary form, 
continued to be protected through the institute of conscientious objection. The right to object 
to military service on grounds of conscience accompanied national service in the UK since its 
first enactment in January 1916. In a similar vein, institutionalisation of this allowance was 
an important condition for the introduction of compulsory military service in West Germany 
in 1956. 
It seems plausible to say that the functional strategic requirements and the mission of 
the armed forces should determine the military’s make-up. Yet, liberal principles, in the same 
way as in the process of articulation of the mission, intervene in this relationship. They 
specify which institutional options are available as a response to the functional requirements. 
In this sense, Germany and the UK followed the same pattern in which only the perception of 
strategic necessity to provide for defence against an existential threat could and did override 
the principle of individual freedom and invoked the imperative of equal responsibility for the 
security of the state and society. So it was as late as January 1916, almost 18 months after the 
outbreak of the First World War, that the UK Parliament passed the first Military Service Act 
                                                 
10
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establishing compulsory military service. At this time some Liberal politicians who 
previously opposed the idea of national service came to recognise the unfairness of the 
voluntary system, which primarily relied on men for whom military enlistment was the only 
alternative to poverty. In the FRG the strategic need for compulsory military service was in 
the 1950s normatively justified by the tenet that universal conscription is a ‘legitimate child 
of democracy’. 
However, it is important to reiterate that liberal society may permit such a significant 
limitation of individual freedom, as compulsory military service, only if a strategic necessity 
of defence against existential threat is perceived. Moreover, the British case showed that 
universal conscription tends to be the last resort to deal with such an emergency. The more 
desirable alternative, in the eyes of liberal society, was to utilise the deterrence potential of 
cutting-edge technology. In the interwar period, it was the aeroplane and strategic bombing 
that were considered most likely to prevent any possible aggression. In a similar vein, nuclear 
weapons and V-bombers were put forward by Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government 
as an argument for abolishing national service in the late 1950s. 
Furthermore, the principle of equal responsibility is by no means applicable to justify 
conscription in situations when an existential threat disappeared and the military mission 
became defined through expeditionary deployments and crisis management. Most of the 
continental countries that drafted young men during the Cold War hence came to see 
inevitability to the professionalisation of their armed forces in the 1990s. Although the 
German Bundeswehr was finally transformed into all-volunteer forces as late as 2011, with 
respect to the out-of-area operations it has been effectively acting as a professional force 
since the early 1990s. However, not till 2010/11 was it broadly accepted that compulsory 
military service had been rendered unnecessary by the altered security situation and hence 
had lost its justification. 
To conclude, liberal principles unquestionably determine the composition of the 
armed forces. It is the mode of recruitment and personnel structure, in particular, that lie 
within the power of political representatives and are open to public discussion. In terms of 
specific policies and institutions, voluntary recruitment reflects the freedom and autonomy of 
the individual and is, therefore, a preferable liberal option and a necessary policy if the 
mission of the military is dominated by expeditionary deployments. Provided that the security 
situation requires a strong provision for national defence, universal conscription together with 
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adequate allowance for conscientious objection may be an option justifiable on liberal 
grounds too.  
Yet, it would be a bit of a trivial conclusion if it ended with this observation. One of 
the bedrock liberal imperatives proscribes militarisation of society, in other words, society 
being permeated with military values. And the military’s composition plays a particularly 
important role in preventing militarism. Universal conscription, for example, narrows the 
societal and cultural gap between the military and society. Yet, it depends on the institutional 
culture of the armed forces whether this integration of the military and society may prevent a 
militarisation of society or would affect society contrariwise. It is not uncommon that 
compulsory military service is regarded by authoritarian leaders or military authorities as a 
tool for indoctrination of young recruits with the military norms of patriotism (even 
chauvinistic nationalism in some cases), discipline and obedience, and through the young 
recruits also as an instrument for the militarisation of society as a whole. In this way, Field-
Marshal Helmut von Moltke the Elder, the chief of the Prusso-German Great General Staff 
(1857-1888), insisted that compulsory military service should function as a ‘school which 
trains the people to order and exactness, to loyalty and obedience’.
11
 Yet, the case of the 
Bundeswehr demonstrates that if the institutional culture is set up to respect the individuality 
of recruits and societal values, compulsory military service can be instrumental in 
civilianising and liberalising the military organisation. It is, hence, the combination of the 
make-up and institutional culture that may reveal the extent to which liberalism determines 
the military organisation. 
Institutional Culture 
Military ethos 
According to Huntington’s observation, liberalism, if no external threat exists, 
supports the virtual elimination of all institutions of violence (his policy of so-called 
‘extirpation’). Provided, however, large armed forces are deemed necessary, liberalism is said 
to insist upon ‘the refashioning of the military institutions along liberal lines so that they lose 
their peculiarly military characteristics’ (the policy of ‘transmutation’).
12
 In such a case, since 
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military defence becomes the responsibility of every citizen, rather than of a small exclusive 
group, conscription is rendered legitimate. Simultaneously and importantly for this section, 
such force is supposed to be of democratic character; this means, for example, that 
distinctions between officers and other ranks tend to be reduced and individual initiative is 
regarded as more important than discipline. Huntington argues that both the policy of 
extirpation and the policy of transmutation, while different in means, have the same goal of 
the subordination of the professional military viewpoint and marginalisation of the 
autonomous professional military ethic.
13
 
Indeed, liberalism is rather hostile to the ‘professional military spirit’, which 
inculcates into soldiers ‘habits of passive and active obedience’.
14
 A distinct and separate 
military class is regarded as not only incompatible with a liberal social order, but liberal 
thinkers also viewed such a military institution as an inefficient instrument to guarantee 
national security. Huntington is right that it is, in particular, the need for large armed forces 
that leads towards the refashioning of the internal institutional culture of the armed forces 
along liberal lines. The need to legitimise conscription and to retain the morale of a citizen-
army requires that citizen-soldiers identify themselves with the cause of their service. 
Therefore, it is not the loyalty and obedience but the understanding and acceptance of the 
necessity of their service that constituted the ethos of the citizen-army. 
Both the German Bundeswehr during the Cold War and the British Army in the 
Second World War adopted such a liberalised ethos. The concept of the citizen in uniform, as 
designed by Wolf von Baudissin in the 1950s, postulated that the soldier identify himself 
with the values of peace and freedom. The citizen-soldier was thus supposed to understand 
that through his readiness to fight he contributed to the credibility of deterrence – ‘be ready to 
fight in order not to have to fight’ being a tenet of the Cold War Bundeswehr. The capability 
to fight a war hence had to be in accord with the commitment of every soldier to peace. 
Moreover, the reason for the military service was to preserve the freedom of German society. 
Therefore, the citizen-soldier’s personal freedom and individual rights had to be upheld 
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during his service too. According to Baudissin, only if the soldier knows what a life in free 
society means, he ‘will then be ready to risk his life for it’.
15
 
In a similar vein, it could not be expected from the British citizen-soldier during the 
1939-45 conflict to fight only for ‘King and Country’, or out of loyalty to his regiment. The 
citizen army of the Second World War thus introduced a new leadership style of which 
fundamental parts were citizenship education and debates on current affairs. Officers were 
supposed to conduct compulsory weekly discussions with their men on current issues. The 
aims of these debates were ‘to make the man a more enlightened individual, a more 
intelligent citizen and, therefore, a better soldier’, as Adjutant-General Sir Ronald Adam put 
it. ‘On all three aspects depends the production of a man who is alert, receptive, and fortified 
by a knowledge of the great issues for which he is fighting.’
16
 The compulsory but free 
debates on socially and politically important issues was supposed to increase soldiers’ 
awareness of the war objectives and thus to contribute to upholding the morale of the wartime 
army. 
As was only to be expected, traditional concepts and practices of military leadership 
did not disappear entirely in either case. Regular professional officers and NCOs with 
ingrained ideas about discipline were not always able and willing to learn and practice the 
more civil methods of military leadership. Yet these methods eventually asserted themselves. 
In wartime Britain it was facilitated by the huge influx of civilian experts who joined the 
armed forces and the War Office. In the German Bundeswehr it was the institutional setting 
provided by German politicians in the mid-1950s and early 1970s that played the decisive 
role. 
In contrast, the all-volunteer force is rather susceptible to developing a traditional 
military culture, which is distinctly at odds with the liberal principles. According to 
Huntington, if liberal society does not need large armed forces, the military is allowed to 
develop the autonomous professional ethic but at the expense of its marginalisation in 
security policy (i.e. the policy of extirpation).
17
 This may be a valid empirical observation of 
Huntington; however, the tendency of liberalism is also to transform the institutional culture 
of professional forces along liberal lines. 
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The liberal principles that prescribe that soldiers ought to understand and accept the 
cause of their deployment should apply to the professional soldier in the same way as to the 
citizen-soldier. Of course, between the professional soldier and a conscript is the important 
difference that the former joins the forces out of his or her own volition. Yet, the decision to 
join the military should not strip the individuals of their moral autonomy. Whereas the 
professional military may be used as an instrument in the hands of the government and the 
state, provided it is used in accordance with international legal and ethical norms, no one, and 
that includes the professional soldier, should be treated by the state as a means with no regard 
to his or her subjectivity. Even if the deployment is in ethical terms beyond objection, 
without the soldier’s agreement to the aim of the deployment he or she cannot be asked to 
risk his or her life in the operation.
18
 Owing to the possible plurality of missions of a 
professional force, liberal ethics expects that the institutional culture permits the individual 
soldier’s responsibility for the cause of the deployment to manifest itself. 
However, the two cases examined here reveal that the adjustment of the military ethos 
to this ethical principle cannot be taken for granted in liberal society. In fact, the Bundeswehr 
and the British Army present two vastly different approaches to the motivation and morale of 
soldiers. German doctrinal writing stresses the importance of the individual conscience of 
soldiers and their responsibility for the wellbeing of the people to whose benefit they are 
deployed. The Bundeswehr soldiers are supposed, ‘out of personal conviction’, to ‘actively 
defend human dignity, freedom, peace, justice, equality, solidarity and democracy’.
19
 The 
value system of military professionals in Germany thus should not significantly differ from 
the ethics of liberal society. 
The British Army, in contrast, professes the need for a value system that sets soldiers 
apart from the civilians. It is, in particular, the question of individual motivation and 
legitimisation to carry out given orders in which the liberal ethics and the ethics of the British 
Army diverge. The morale and motivation of regular soldiers rest on their identification with 
their regiment or corps. To facilitate this identification, the regimental system maintains 
specific regimental traditions which distinguish one regiment from another. In this system, 
soldiers are not supposed to become personally convinced that the mission they are carrying 
out is legitimate and necessary or desirable in itself. The soldiers’ motivation hence is not 
based on the objectives of the particular mission, but on the soldiers’ loyalty towards the 
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Army and, more significantly, to their corps or regiment. The regimental system with distinct 
regimental identities and regimental esprit de corps is hence regarded as one of the most 
precious features of the British Army. 
Despite the difference between the promotion of the liberal ethics in the German 
Bundeswehr, on the one hand, and the regimental system of the British Army, on the other, 
the impact of these value systems on the behaviour and attitudes of the majority of soldiers 
may be not as dissimilar as one would expect. The case of the Bundeswehr reveals that 
deployments in out-of-area operations tend to create an informal corporate culture that 
promotes formal obedience and suppresses individual conscience. Yet, however (in)effective 
the impact of the rhetorically promoted values is, the difference between the respect for the 
moral autonomy of individual soldiers in the Bundeswehr and the British Army does exist. It 
is the right to refuse an order on the ground of conscience that makes a huge difference. 
The British armed forces allow their personnel to appeal to the right to conscientious 
refusal to obey orders. However, this right is available only in the form of an honourable 
discharge on the grounds of conscience. This right guarantees that a soldier who would 
develop a sincere objection to participation in a particular mission has a chance to avoid it by 
leaving the forces. This means, however, that the moral subjectivity and individual autonomy 
is regarded as incompatible with the terms of service. The right of conscientious objection 
thus only protect the soldier from a court martial. 
The Bundeswehr soldiers, in contrast, are granted the right to refuse orders on the 
ground of conscience without any adverse consequences for their career. The German 
constitution stipulates that freedom of conscience is inviolable and application of this 
constitutional right onto the service in the Bundeswehr was vindicated by the Federal Court 
of Administration in the case of Major Pfaff of 2003/5. As a consequence of this judicial 
case, freedom of conscience was affirmed also in the ‘Rights and Duties of Soldiers’ as 
another officially recognised limitation to obedience. The Bundeswehr thus explicitly 
recognises that it has no right ‘to force an individual to commit acts that violate ethical 
standards of good and evil’.
20
 
Why do the liberal principles so significantly determine the ethos of the Bundeswehr, 
whereas their effect on the British Army remains relatively marginal? As Huntington 
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observed, the armed forces in liberal society may develop a professional military ethic which 
sets them apart from the rest of society, but on the expense of their political and societal 
authority.
21
 The focus of the British Army on colonial service during imperial times created a 
norm of a socially insulated and geographically distanced military so deeply ingrained in 
British society that the insistence of the British military authorities on the right/need to be 
different causes little controversy. The situation of the German Bundeswehr is vastly 
different. German society came to tolerate the rearmament after the Second World War only 
under the condition of close integration of the Bundeswehr into civilian society. The legacy 
of German rearmament continues also to determine the current transformation of the German 
military towards an expeditionary all-volunteer force. Therefore, not only is it the case that 
the German military authorities, socialised into the culture of close integration, are quite 
perceptive to societal imperatives, but also German society is extremely sensitive to and 
touchy about any display of militarism or martial culture. In contrast with the UK the policy 
of extirpation, as Huntington calls it, would render the societal and political position of the 
Bundeswehr unviable. 
Professional identity 
Although, as the British case demonstrates, the military may preserve the autonomy of 
its ethos in liberal society, it is imperative for the institutional culture to adapt to the mission 
of the armed forces through the professional identity of soldiers. The mission of national 
defence may sufficiently justify the narrow focus of soldiers’ preparation on combat and 
warfighting. The same, however, does not apply to the situation of the professional all-
volunteer force. In his critique of the Oscar-winning film The Hurt Locker Slavoj Žižek 
depicted the liberal claims on the job of professional soldiers as follows: 
The film… tells the story… of an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) squad. This choice is 
deeply symptomatic: although soldiers, they do not kill, but risk their lives dismantling 
terrorist bombs destined to kill civilians – can there be anything more sympathetic to our 
liberal eyes? Are our armies in the ongoing War on Terror, even when they bomb and 
destroy, ultimately not just such EOD squads, patiently dismantling terrorist networks in 




Indeed, the professional military in liberal society can uphold the legitimacy of its existence 
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only as an instrument of cosmopolitan justice. Since the effort to improve the situation of the 
people in need is an essential part of the latter mission, a job description solely based on 
martial skills would, therefore, disqualify professional soldiers as an instrument for such 
humanitarian operations. 
The transformation of the Bundeswehr in the 1990s and 2000s from an organisation 
for national defence towards an expeditionary force required a broadening of the professional 
identity of German soldiers by incorporating some civilian or police-like capabilities. The 
mission of territorial defence had to be supplemented, and later supplanted, by the task of 
providing protection, furnishing aid and helping to build a base for humanitarian operations 
and peace missions’
23
. Correspondingly, the motto ‘to protect, help and mediate’ was used to 
represent publicly the humanitarian professional identity of German soldiers. 
As for the British soldiers, the military aid to the civil power, peacekeeping and 
counterinsurgency operations were the most frequent deployments of the British Army 
throughout most of the 20
th
 Century. In such deployments troops were used to quell civil 
unrests, disturbances and insurrections under the conditions of normal law. This compelled 
the Army to import from common law the practice of the minimum use of force, which is in 
complete opposition to the basic principle of conventional warfighting. This aspect together 
with the recognised importance of cooperating with civilian partners and to look for a 
political solution may characterise the British Army’s approach to counterinsurgency and 
MOOTW, and also demonstrate the convergence of the professional identity of the British 
soldier towards the more civilianised image of the police (or at any rate ‘armed 
constabulary’). 
This tendency to civilianise the military profession, though different in intensity, is a 
common experience of soldiers in both Germany and the UK. In a similar vein, a resistance 
or opposition to this civilianising tendency has developed in both the British Army and the 
Bundeswehr. The British Army, despite its frequent engagement in counter-insurgency and 
MOOTW, has always attempted to prevent soldiers from embracing a constabulary 
professional identity. So for the current British Army it is combat that is emphasised as being 
the Army’s ‘primary purpose; its raison d’être’.
24
 As for the Bundeswehr, the combat oriented 
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professional identity has grown in importance simultaneously with the mission creep from 
post-conflict reconstruction towards a war against insurgents in Afghanistan. 
It is conceivable to interpret the conflict between the humanitarian/constabulary and 
the martial professional identity of soldiers in Huntingtonian terms, as a clash between the 
societal and the functional imperative respectively. However, this thesis has argued that the 
bipolar, even Manichean, classification of societal and functional does not adequately reflect 
the reality of defence policy. With regard to professional identity, the martial/combat-
oriented identity, besides being preserved and cultivated by the conservative elements among 
the officer corps and in the ranks, is a functional consequence of the exposure of soldiers to 
intensive combat situations. As a case in point, it was the deterioration of the security 
environment in Northern Afghanistan in the late 2000s which led to the official 
acknowledgement of the combat-oriented identity of German soldiers.  
Yet, it is important that this martial identity may be functional only if the tactical-
level combat is considered in isolation. Since the mission tends to be determined by the 
liberal cosmopolitan ethics, it is the humanitarian/constabulary approach which may better 
suit the strategic requirements. The adverse effect of warfighting identity was, for example, 
revealed in Helmand in 2006. The British contingents in Helmand carried out operational and 
tactical plans which followed the principles of manoeuvrist operational doctrine and did 
succeed in engaging the Taliban in numerous set piece battles. However, these actions were 
incompatible with the overall ISAF strategy and inconsequential with regard to the objectives 




In a similar way as in this last point about the professional identity, the issue of the 
functional effectiveness of a military organisation established on societal imperatives 
permeates the entire thesis. Huntington’s theory postulates an antagonistic relationship 
between the requirements of military security (the functional imperative), and the desires of 
liberal society (the societal imperative). A similar perspective was expressed, for example, by 
General Edward Cummings, a fictional character from Norman Mailer’s novel The Naked 
and the Death. According to General Cummings, the liberal-minded American citizen-
soldiers were ‘the worst individual fighting soldiers of any big power’: 
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They’re comparatively wealthy, they’re spoiled, and as Americans they share most of them 
the peculiar manifestation of our democracy. They have an exaggerated idea of the rights due 
themselves as individuals and no idea at all of the rights due others. It’s the reverse of the 




To the fascist-minded general, the only way to increase the combat efficiency of American 
soldiers was to ‘break them down’: 
Break them down. Every time an enlisted man sees an officer get an extra privilege, it breaks 
him down a little more...  





Robert Graves – English poet and novelist, who fought in the trenches of the First World War 
– reported in his memoirs the following view on ideological motivation: 
Patriotism, in the trenches, was too remote a sentiment, and at once rejected as fit only for 
civilians, or prisoners. A new arrival who talked patriotism would soon be told to cut it out. 
As ‘Blighty’, a geographical concept, Great Britain was a quiet, easy place for getting back 
to out of the present foreign misery; but as a nation it included not only trench-soldiers 
themselves and those who had gone home wounded, but the staff… base units, home service 
units and all civilians down to the detested grades of journalists, profiteers, ‘starred’ men 
exempted from enlistment, conscientious objectors, and members of the Government. The 
trench-soldier, with this carefully graded caste-system of honour, never considered that the 
Germans opposite might have built up exactly the same system themselves. He thought of 





However persuasive these illustrations may be, it has been asserted in the sociological 
literature that the promotion of ideological values into the military is rather inconsequential 
for combat efficiency.
29
 In any case, the issue of combat efficiency is beyond the remit of this 
thesis. This research comes to a conclusion which General Cummings would label as ‘a 
liberal historian’s attitude’. The case studies examined in this thesis demonstrate that a 
meaningful adaptation of the military capacities to the principles possessed and held dear by 
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the domestic society that spawns the military can be, more often than not, desirable also from 
the perspective of security strategy. As Lawrence Freedman and B. K. Greener-Barcham 
recently suggested and this research has confirmed, the liberal justification of the Western 
contemporary interventions requires liberal values also to be adopted into the practices of 
Western militaries.
30
 The individual ethical commitment and the capability to act less as a 
warrior and more like a humanitarian worker might be a significant advantage in these 
operations. In addition, close normative identification of the armed forces with society (the 
concepts of nation in arms and citizen-soldier) had a positive effect on the overall war effort 
of the UK in the Second World War and on the credibility of the West German strategy of 
deterrence during the Cold War. 
In this sense, the field of strategic studies may benefit from far more centrally 
including societal-military relations in its considerations, alongside or even partly in place of 
more ‘traditional’ issues, concerns and focus. After all, to contemplate military strategy with 
no regard to domestic societal preferences makes such thinking an irrelevant pursuit. Since 
the foreign and security policy directions are formulated in democratic political processes, 
domestic societal imperatives which specify what institutions and practices are legitimate, 
and hence appropriate to use, should and indeed must be included into the strategic equation. 
This is not to say that societal preferences would never get into conflict with genuine 
strategic necessities. Yet the overriding of societal imperatives should never be something 
done lightly; and in liberal societies as they now progress deep into the 21
st
 Century, 
overriding societal imperatives should perhaps never be done at all. 
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